

الْقُرْآنُ الْكَرِيمُ
وَكَلَّمَ اللَّهُ هِيَ الْعَالَمِينَ

THE
ASCENDANT QUR'AN
Realigning Man to the Divine Power Culture

VOLUME 10
Al-Mā'idah:41-81



Muḥammad Ḥ. al-Āṣī



In the Name of Allah,
the Mercy-Giving, the Merciful

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ASCENDANT QUR'AN

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Muḥammad H. al-Āṣī

THE INSTITUTE OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC THOUGHT
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Allah (ﷻ) says in His noble Book,

إِنَّ اللَّهَ وَمَلَائِكَتَهُ يُصَلُّونَ عَلَى النَّبِيِّ
يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا صَلُّوا عَلَيْهِ وَسَلِّمُوا تَسْلِيمًا ﴿٥٦﴾

“Verily, Allah and His Angels send salutations on the Apostle.
O You who are firmly committed [to Allah], you too [must]
send the most worthy salutations and blessings upon him.”
(Sūrah al-Aḥzāb:56)

In launching this *tafsīr*, we beseech Allah (ﷻ) to bless His final Messenger, Muhammad (ﷺ), all the Prophets (ﷺ) who preceded him, and all those who, despite great difficulty and sacrifice, sincerely follow in their footsteps from the *ṣāliḥīn*, the *ṣiddīqīn*, the *shuhadā'*, and the *marḥūmūn*. We also beseech Allah (ﷻ) to bless and amply reward those who have helped in the publication of this *tafsīr* in whatever capacity.

— The Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought

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Publisher's Foreword

The contemporary world has banished God from its affairs. The endless wars with their attendant suffering inflicted on millions of innocent people, most of them Muslims, hardly registers on man's conscience, or at least on that of the decision-makers of this world. Like the tyrants of old — Nimrod and Pharaoh — whose stories are narrated in many *sūrah*s of the noble Qur'an so that we may derive lessons from them, the modern-day tyrants also decide who lives and dies based on their cost-benefit analyses. Human life has no value; it is a cheap commodity that can be dispensed with at the whim of the power-wielders.

This is true, unfortunately, even for many of those who call themselves Muslims. True, they do not explicitly deny the existence of Allah (ﷻ) but they have reduced His commands and injunctions to a few rituals that have little or no bearing on the larger aspects of life. At the personal level, critical decisions related to family matters, for instance, are not based on divine commands or the prophetic Sunnah. At the larger corporate or state level, the situation is even worse. God's commands are not allowed to intrude into decision-making in the boardrooms of major corporations or the

cabinet rooms of governments. Most of these decision-makers probably go to church, synagogue, or *masjid* but they have locked Allah (ﷻ) firmly out of their decision-making process (*nastaghfir-allāh*). They have tried to sequester Him to the rituals and polemics of church, synagogue, or *masjid* so as not to have Him “interfere” in the affairs of man that must be left in the hands of these “all-knowing” agents of consumerism, secularism, humanism, atheism, and political narcissism. They decide what policies are to be implemented and what options are to be avoided regardless of the suffering such decisions cause to the rest of humanity. Divine guidance has no role or input in such decision-making.

International institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, and now such concepts as the “international community” and the “right to protect” have all usurped the power and authority of Allah (ﷻ). While Allah (ﷻ) says He is “**the best of providers**” (62:11), these institutions, policies, and their chief executives insist they alone must decide who will be fed and who will go hungry or even starve to death. In the age of plenty where some die of obesity, hundreds of millions of others are on the verge of starvation, either due to wars of choice or preventable famines. No divine scripture, even those like the Torah and the Injil (Gospel), which have been corrupted by human accretions, supports such cruelty — yet it is widespread today and increasing.

What does the Qur’an say about this situation? The middle section of *Sūrah al-Mā'idah* (āyāt 41–81), which is the subject of this volume, narrates with stunning clarity the basic message reminding us who the ultimate authority is and who the lawgiver is. While the bulk of this *sūrah* was revealed between the Battle of al-Aḥzāb (Shawwāl 5AH) and the Treaty of Ḥudaybiyah (Dhū al-Ḥijjah 6AH), there are also āyāt that were revealed at the end of the Prophet’s (ﷺ) mission on earth. To the uninitiated, it may appear a little incongruous that these āyāt would be reminding us about Allah’s (ﷻ) authority in Madinah when such subject matter is often addressed in the Makkan *sūrahs* and seemed to have been settled as far as the situation in Madinah was concerned.

Not so. Given human nature and the tendency to become oblivious of the ultimate power and authority in our lives, Allah (ﷻ) reminds us once again in this section of the *sūrah*, as indeed in many others, that He, and He alone, is the Authority and Law-giver and those who get carried away by their self-importance will face the consequences of such behavior on the Day of Judgement, if not sooner while in this world. The noble Qur'an narrates the story of Iblīs (Lucifer) and how in his arrogance, he refused to obey Allah's (ﷻ) command to prostrate to Adam (ﷺ). The angels had immediately complied. Iblīs' refusal to obey Allah's (ﷻ) command turned him into a *kāfir* — denier of Allah's (ﷻ) power presence (2:32). We must bear in mind that Iblīs was not a *mushrik*; that is, he did not compromise Allah's (ﷻ) power and authority with rivals and competitors; however he regarded himself to be "superior" because Adam (ﷺ) was created of clay while he was made of fire (7:12, 38:76, and several other *āyāt*). His arrogance led him to reject Allah's (ﷻ) command. This Iblīsī (satanic) mindset is not only still present, but has increased alarmingly, putting the whole of humanity at great risk.

Thus, this set of *āyāt* provides, once again, an important lesson in the pairing of authority and divinity and the inseparability of "church and state." Societies that have abandoned God for false deities have already institutionalized the separation of church and state. God resides only in the church, if at all, while to Caesar belongs the rest. Almost all societies in the world today have adopted this creed. From the Islamic point of view, the relationship between man's commitment to God and the distinction of "God the authority" from any other false authorities or deities is inseparable. This point is repeatedly stressed in the noble Qur'an as it is here in this set of *āyāt*.

Even in Madinah while the Prophet (ﷺ) and his close companions were present and the Islamic State had come into existence, there were still people whose adherence to Allah's (ﷻ) commands was at best lukewarm and at worst opportunistic. This included both the *munāfiqs* — fifth columnists in the ranks of Muslims — and the Yahūd. The *munāfiqs* have no commitment to any

ideology; their overriding concern is their own perceived interest in the camp of those who wield temporal power but not necessarily principle. The *munāfiqs* emerged in Madinah and not in Makkah because it was in the former that the Islamic State with an established authority and a functioning system came into existence. It was a reality the *munāfiqs* could not deny so they pretended to be Muslims all the while doing everything to undermine the Islamic State and the Prophet's (ﷺ) authority. In fact, they found common cause with the troublesome Yahūd whose tribalism, and the racist culture of entitlement that attends the “chosen people” label, made them into staunch enemies of Islam. The Prophet (ﷺ) had hoped that of all the people, the Jews would recognize the divine source of his message and would, therefore, accept it readily. Their rabbis recognized that the message was divine; Muhammad's (ﷺ) advent had been foretold in their books but their exclusivist, racist nature got the better of them. Far from accepting the message of Islam, they became the most implacable enemies of Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ). They not only feared losing their self-awarded privileged position in the divine schema but also their worldly possessions. Not prepared to forego their “national” self-interest, they chose to abandon Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ).

That is why Allah (ﷻ) has repeatedly stressed in these and many other *āyāt* that only He is the Deity and Divinity; there is no other deity or divinity beside or alongside Him. He sent a chain of Prophets (ﷺ) — according to one prophetic hadith nearly 124,000 of them — either with or without a written scripture to teach man the proper relationship with Allah (ﷻ). He did not leave man to his own devices but taught him how to honor Allah (ﷻ) as man's only reference, man's sole sustainer, and man's one and only authority.

Left to his own devices, man has produced such demonic ideologies as Nazism, Zionism, capitalism, and communism along with reductionist theologies like Evangelicalism and Wahhābism, all with their concomitant horrors inflicted on mankind. If 10 million people were killed in the First World War (WWI), the Second World War (WWII) witnessed the slaughter of 60 million in a period of less than six years. And this was capped by unnecessarily

dropping not one, but two atomic bombs on Japan whose horrific consequences stunned even a world made largely insensitive to human suffering. No “religious” wars, often escorted by inquisitions — not even the Crusades with their macabre details — come close in the scale of horror perpetrated by secular and faux-religious ideologies. This is the direct result of abandoning God and His guidance. Only Allah (ﷻ) knows what is best for His creation. Through the limited capacity of his own faculties without the benefit of divine guidance, man can only wreak havoc on what are his own brethren.

In *āyāt* 51–66, Allah (ﷻ) draws our attention to a related aspect: not to take imperialists and Zionists as the guarantors and allies of the committed Muslims,

**O you who are securely committed [to Allah’s power]!
Do not take the [political] Jews and the [political]
Christians for your allies: they are but allies of one another — and whoever of you allies himself with them becomes, verily, one of them; behold, Allah does not guide an unfair multitude of people (5:51).**

This *āyah* is generally not translated accurately — leading to much confusion. The translation above is from Imam Muḥammad al-‘Āṣī’s multi-volume *tafsīr*, *The Ascendant Qur’an: Realigning Man to the Divine Power Culture, Volume 10*, for which this foreword is being written. Unfortunately, some Muslim translators have contributed to this confusion by misinterpreting this *āyah*. Since the words in the Arabic text refer to the “Yahūd” and “Naṣārā,” a sloppy translation can easily misinterpret the words to uncritically refer to all Jews and Christians, even those who are sincerely committed to whatever they have left of their scriptures. This has provided much ammunition to the enemies of Islam who waste little time in projecting it as a violent religion as they use the erroneous translation of this *āyah* to argue that Muslims are hostile to all Jews and Christians.

This misunderstanding has been reinforced by Banū Sa‘ūd, the illegitimate occupiers of the Arabian Peninsula, who prohibit non-

Muslims from entering the environs of Makkah and Madinah, referred to collectively as the Ḥaramayn (the Two Inviolable Places). Is this the correct interpretation of the prophetic hadith in which the noble Messenger (ﷺ) is reported to have said that there cannot be two *dīns* in the Arabian Peninsula?¹

The word *dīn* itself is mistranslated as *religion* when in fact that is not what it stands for. *Dīn* means a *complete social system, way of life, or a social convention whose objectives are framed by a particular legality*. The Islamic *dīn* refers to a system based on conformity to Allah (ﷻ) and in affirmation of Him, where the laws that society adheres to protect the morality that individual citizens commit to. Conversely, a *dīn* can also refer to a man-made social system in denial of Allah (ﷻ), where morality and legality are at odds with one another, such as in capitalism, imperialism, Zionism, and Wahhābism. As far as Banū Sa‘ūd are concerned, they have no problem with proponents of man-made systems (*dīns*) trespassing the holy land of Arabia, as they themselves have created a new religion out of erroneous hadiths. In fact Banū Sa‘ūd eagerly venerate the presidents and prime ministers of man-made systems, handing over the security of the Arabian Peninsula in general and of Makkah and Madinah in particular, to their generals, intelligence operatives, and drone technicians. Chaperoned in the retinue of British colonialism, Banū Sa‘ūd now leases out the Islamic holy endowment to humanity to the imperialist and Zionist heirs of colonialism, who desecrate holy land with military bases, fighter bombers, laser-guided missiles, and weapons of mass destruction. This does not bother them or their court clergy, the latter of whom are quicker to denounce any Muslim who challenges their Wahhābī adulteration of Islam than to do the same with the executors of those military bases who have, in the last decade, laid at least seven Muslim-majority countries to waste, slaughtering over two million Muslims in the process.

Due to the relative ignorance of the majority of Muslims, they can deliberately misrepresent Islamic terminology to serve their own narrow interests while projecting themselves as champions of Islam and adhering to its principles. If their definition were accepted, a permanent resident of Makkah or Madinah married to

a morally upright Jewish or Christian lady would not be allowed to settle her in these two holy cities. Further, while he may be able to marry such a woman, he cannot be “friends” with her. Can anything be more absurd than that?

In the ninth year of the Hijrah, a Christian delegation from Najrān (in southern Arabia near present-day Yemen) came to Madinah for discussions about Islam. The noble Messenger (ﷺ) not only received them with great kindness in al-Masjid al-Nabawī but, as a measure of the esteem he accorded them, he laid out his own gown on the floor for them to sit on. The Christians were welcomed and even allowed to offer their prayers in the Prophet's (ﷺ) *masjid*, the second-most sacred *masjid* in Islam in the second-most sacred city of the Muslims! This is the example of the noble Messenger but Banū Sa'ūd think they know Islam better than Allah's Prophet (ﷺ), *nastaghfir-allāh!*

So how should we understand *āyah* 5:51? As with all other *āyāt* of the noble Qur'an, it must be translated and understood in its proper context. The sequence of *āyāt* preceding this *āyah* refers to Allah's (ﷻ) power and authority. There is convincing condemnation of those who try to usurp Allah's (ﷻ) power and authority or place equals with Him. The political Jews (contemporary Zionists) and political Christians (today's imperialists) have replaced Allah's (ﷻ) laws with man-made laws. It is in this context that the *āyah* must be understood. Allah is reminding the committed Muslims that if these people are not patrons of Allah (ﷻ) because they have rejected His commands, then how can they be the sponsors and allies of His striving subjects, the committed Muslims?

The inescapable point here is that any Muslim — in a position to do so — who enters into an ideological arrangement and a political or military alliance with political Jews (Zionists) and/or political Christians (imperialists) becomes one of them and is no longer the independent, self-governing, and sovereign Muslim he was meant to be by virtue of his relationship with Allah (ﷻ). Once Muslims join a “Christian” imperialist or a “Jewish” Zionist power structure they lose their “Islamic” feature and assume their enemies' disposition.

These hard-hitting lessons are meant to shake the complacent Muslims out of their stupor and make them realize that if they forsake their Islamic power structure to join the Zionists and imperialists, then they will become one of them. They can no longer be the standard-bearers of Islam even if they have Muslim names, wear Muslim dress, have a foot-long beard, and twirl beads in their fingers to put on an air of piety. Islam is not about rituals; it never was. The noble Messenger (ﷺ) had to struggle for 23 long years to establish the Islamic State in the Arabian Peninsula and defend it with life and blood. He and the committed Muslims he nurtured did not achieve this by entering into alliances with political Jews or political Christians, who held the reins of temporal power at the time. The Prophet (ﷺ) never accorded any legitimacy to the political expression of Christianity (exceptionalism) and Judaism (racism), by giving their corrupt and self-important political leaders an audience; however, he showed their religious leaders and sincere theologians every courtesy and respect. The noble Messenger (ﷺ) was fully aware of how the Jews and Christians had distorted their divinely revealed books — the Torah and the Gospel. The Qur’anic revelation was meant to bring them back to the way of Allah (ﷻ), but to do so they would have to come to terms with their historically errant ways.

Since the Qur’an is the last and final revelation for all mankind, its message is relevant for all times. Also, Allah (ﷻ) Himself has vouchsafed its integrity by protecting it from human accretions or deletions (15:09). This is one of the miracles of the noble Qur’an. Given the Muslims’ sad plight today — a direct result of their abandonment of Allah’s (ﷻ) commands — the *āyāt* in this *sūrah* provide exacting guidance for Muslims to pull themselves out of the depth of darkness and into light.

Imam al-Āṣī has rendered and continues to render a great service to the Ummah by explaining the Qur’anic *āyāt* in such a way as to have them explain today’s situation. While the Qur’an provides narratives of earlier people, these are not meant as mere stories from history but as timeless lessons so that we may avoid the fate of our predecessors by ordering our lives in conformity with Allah’s (ﷻ)

commands. The lessons in this sequence of *āyāt* from *Sūrah al-Mā'idah* are especially applicable today as they talk about authority and divinity. At a time when man-made laws have run amok causing havoc with the lives of the vast majority of humanity, the Qur'anic guidance comes to the rescue of committed Muslims, and by extension, a wayward humanity. It is for us to internalize these lessons by renewing our covenant with Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ).

As with earlier volumes, this volume too is edited by Br. Afeef Khan. Copious endnotes and references have also been provided to assist those that want to delve deeper into the subject matter to pursue their research activities. Thanks are also due to Br. Imran Khan and Sr. Marjan Asi in providing timely and expeditious proofreading of the many pages in this volume. Thanks and gratitude are also due to all those who have helped in whatever way to bring this volume — and the earlier volumes — to fruition. Without their help, support and encouragement, it would have been extremely difficult if not well nigh impossible to reach this far. As with the other volumes, an electronic version of this tenth volume is available for reading or download on the ICIT digital library (www.icit-digital.org); and a hard copy is available through ICIT directly or through various online book retailers.

We cannot thank Allah (ﷻ) enough for providing us this opportunity to work on His Book to help clarify its multilayered meanings for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. We pray to the Lord and Sustainer of all the worlds to accept this humble effort from us and to make it a source of guidance and understanding so that Muslims can appreciate the noble Book of Allah (ﷻ) in the way it was intended, and then apprehend their dark situation into new vistas of freedom, independence, and self-determination.

We recognize that the task we have embarked on is difficult, indeed monumental. The road ahead is full of hazards but we have set out with sincere intentions and a firm conviction, and are thereby confident and secure in the knowledge that Allah (ﷻ) in His infinite mercy will provide the means to enable us to take it to fruition. We thank the many readers who have given and continue to provide input and support for this *tafsīr*. We continue to rely on

their support, which is a source of encouragement and solace for us. For all those who have selflessly and generously sustained our activities, your reward is with Allah (ﷻ). May He, the Most Merciful Lord and Sustainer, multiply your contributions many times over. *Āmīn*.

Zafar Bangash

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Jumadā al-Ākhiraḥ 9, 1437AH (3-18-2016CE)

Endnotes

- 1 “*Two dīns shall not coexist in the Arab[ian] Peninsula.*” Narrated by Abū Hurayrah and Muḥammad ibn Muslim ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī, and recorded by Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, Ibn al-Mulqin, and al-Haythamī.

لا يجتمع في جزيرة العرب دينان.

List of Honorifics

Honorifics are the words expressed by every Muslim when the name of Allah (ﷻ), the name of the Prophet (ﷺ), and the names of Allah's previous Prophets (ﷺ) are mentioned, spoken, or written. These are placed in parentheses after the name of each of the above is expressed. They are known to nearly every Muslim; however as this is an English-language *tafsīr* meant for a largely English-speaking audience that may have little experience with this kind of Islamic etiquette, the list below identifies the ones used throughout this volume, along with their meanings and specific usages.



subhānahu wa-ta'ālā (Exalted and August is He): used for Allah alone.



ṣallā allāhu 'alayhi wa-ālihi wa-sallam (may Allah's peace and blessings be upon him and his family): used for Muhammad in any and all of his designations, such as *Messenger of Allah*, *the Prophet*, *the Messenger*, *Rasūl-Allah*, etc.



'*alayhi al-salām* (peace be upon him): used for every other prophet; masculine singular.



'*alayhim al-salām* (peace be upon them): used for all other prophets; inclusive plural, masculine and feminine.



'*alayhā al-salām* (peace be upon her): used for Eve, the wife of Adam, and for Mary, the mother of Jesus, among others; feminine singular.



'*alayhimā al-salām* (peace be upon them both): used for any combination of two prophets, for Adam and Eve, or for Mary and Jesus together; inclusive dual, masculine and feminine.

Transliteration Chart

Consonants

أ	none (initial)	ض	ḍ
ؤ	' (medial or final)	ط	ṭ
ب	b	ظ	ẓ
ت	t	ع	‘
ث	th	غ	gh
ج	j	ف	f
ح	ḥ	ق	q
خ	kh	ك	k
د	d	ل	l
ذ	dh	م	m
ر	r	ن	n
ز	z	ه	h
س	s	ة	ḥ
ش	sh	و	w
ص	ṣ	ي	y

Vowels and Diphthongs

□	a	ا□	ā	□ى	á
□ُ	u	آ□	ā	□ئى	ay
□ِ	i	□و	ū	□ؤ	aw
		□ى	ī		

The small box in the table above represents an Arabic consonant; for instance, if the box were replaced with the letter *f* (ف), then the table would assume the following configuration,

ف□	fa	فَآ	fā	فَئى	fá
ف□ُ	fu	فَآ	fā	فَئى	fay
ف□ِ	fi	فُؤ	fū	فُؤ	faw
		فِئى	fī		

Tanwīn and Tashdīd

□َّ	an	□َّئى	ayy	□َّو	aww
□َّئى	an	□َّو	ūw	فَّ	ff
□̣	un	□̣ئى	īy (medial)	شَّ	shsh
□̣	in	□̣ئى	ī (final)	رَّ	rr

Similarly, if the box were replaced with the letter *f* (ف), then the table above would look like the following,

فَآ	fan	فَئى	fayy	فَؤ	faww
فَئى	fan	فَؤ	fūw	فَّ	ff
فُؤ	fun	فِئى	fīy (medial)	شَّ	shsh
فِئى	fin	فِئى	fī (final)	رَّ	rr

5

Sūrah al-Mā'idah, Part 2

The Tablespread

This lesson sheds light on one of the most sensitive issues in history, theology, religion, politics, philosophy, ideology, and contemporary affairs. The gist of it concentrates on authority, governance, laws, legislation, and jurisprudence. And this is something that has long been omitted from ritualistic religion and traditional theology. What is refreshing in this lesson is the pairing of authority and divinity, the inseparability of “church and state,” and the relationship between the commitment of man to God and the distinction of “God the authority” from any other false and fraudulent authorities around.

The question of whether man is capable of honoring God, the only authority on man’s and nature’s affairs; of whether man will look for other deities and lords, and abide by false laws and undependable legal structures, will be analyzed and dissected here. With numerous Prophets and Apostles (ﷺ) dispatched to deliver the

unitary message of God's authority in human society, this has simultaneously been the fundamental responsibility as well as the primary aspiration throughout the ages. Man does not have the freedom to become the slave of his lusts and greed. Market forces should not be in control of mankind's progress. Traditions cannot deliver humanity into a better tomorrow, especially when most of them have been elevated to the position of religion. The final determinant is whether God is man's Superior, his Sustainer, and his supreme Authority, or whether this role will be allocated by man to man or by man to governments and heads of state who do whatever they like, whatever the national interest dictates, or whatever disagrees with Allah's (ﷻ) word and writ.

Over and over, Allah (ﷻ) says He is the Deity and Divinity having no other deity or divinity alongside Him. He dedicated His Prophets (ﷺ) and scriptures to teach man the proper relationship with Him, to honor Him as man's only Reference, man's sole Sustainer, and man's one and only Authority. This has been the theme around which history has unfolded, it is the backbone of human struggle, and the test of our lifetime. This is the most consequential lesson of history, if only that history was written from scripture and by students and scholars of scripture. Nothing else compares with this most central of all issues.

Authority Is the Central Feature of Divinity

- (5:41) O Apostle! Be not grieved by those who vie with one another in denying the truth: such as those who say with their mouths, “We commit ourselves [to Allah],” the while their hearts are not committed; and such of the Jewish faith as eagerly listen to any falsehood, eagerly listen to other people without having come to you [for enlightenment]. They distort the meaning of the [revealed] words, taking them out of their context, saying [to themselves], “If such and such [teaching] is vouchsafed unto you, accept it; but if it is not vouchsafed unto you, be on your guard!” [Be not grieved by them] for, if Allah wills anyone to be tempted to evil, you can in no wise prevail with Allah on his behalf. It is they whose hearts Allah is not willing to cleanse. Theirs shall be ignominy in this world, and theirs shall be awesome suffering in the life to come —
- (5:42) Those who eagerly listen to any falsehood, greedily swallowing all that is evil! Hence, if they come to you [for judgement], you may either judge between them or leave them alone: for, if you leave them alone, they cannot harm you in any way. But if you do judge, judge between them with equity: verily, Allah knows those who act equitably.
- (5:43) But how is it that they ask you for judgement — seeing that they have the Torah, containing Allah’s injunctions — and thereafter turn away [from your judgement]? Such as these, then, are not [truly] committed [to Allah].
- (5:44) Verily, it is We who bestowed from on high the Torah, wherein there was guidance and light. On its strength did the prophets, who had surrendered themselves [unto Allah], deliver judgement unto those who followed the Jewish faith; and so did the [early] men of God and the rabbis, inasmuch as some of Allah’s writ had been entrusted to their care; and they [all] bore witness to its truth. Therefore, [O Children of Israel], hold not men in awe, but stand in awe of Me; and do not barter away My messages for a trifling gain: for

يَأْتِيهَا الرَّسُولُ لَا يَحْزُنكَ الَّذِينَ يُسْكِرُونَ فِي الْكُفْرِ مِنَ
الَّذِينَ قَالُوا ءَامَنَّا بِأَفْوَاهِهِمْ وَلَمْ تُؤْمِن قُلُوبُهُمْ وَمِنَ الَّذِينَ
هَادُوا سَمَّعُونَ لِلْكَذِبِ سَمَّعُونَ لِقَوْمٍ ءَاخِرِينَ لَمْ
يَأْتُوكَ يُحَرِّفُونَ الْكَلِمَ مِنْ بَعْدِ مَوَاضِعِهِ يَقُولُونَ إِنْ أُوتِيتُمْ
هَذَا فَخُذُوهُ وَإِنْ لَمْ تُؤْتَوْهُ فَاحْذَرُوا وَمَنْ يُرِدِ اللَّهُ فِتْنَتَهُ فَلَنْ
تَمْلِكَ لَهُ مِنْ اللَّهِ شَيْئًا أُولَئِكَ الَّذِينَ لَمْ يُرِدِ اللَّهُ أَنْ
يُطَهِّرَ قُلُوبَهُمْ لَهُمْ فِي الدُّنْيَا خِزْيٌ وَلَهُمْ فِي الْآخِرَةِ عَذَابٌ
عَظِيمٌ ﴿٤١﴾ سَمَّعُونَ لِلْكَذِبِ أَكَلُونَ لِلسُّحْتِ فَإِنْ جَاءُوكَ
فَأَحْكُم بَيْنَهُمْ أَوْ أَعْرَضْ عَنْهُمْ وَإِنْ تُعْرِضْ عَنْهُمْ فَلَنْ يَضُرُّوكَ
شَيْئًا وَإِنْ حَكَمْتَ فَأَحْكُم بَيْنَهُمْ بِالْقِسْطِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ
الْمُقْسِطِينَ ﴿٤٢﴾ وَكَيْفَ يُحْكِمُونَكَ وَعِنْدَهُمُ التَّورَةُ فِيهَا حُكْمُ اللَّهِ
ثُمَّ يَتَوَلَّوْنَ مِنْ بَعْدِ ذَلِكَ وَمَا أُولَئِكَ بِالْمُؤْمِنِينَ ﴿٤٣﴾
إِنَّا أَنْزَلْنَا التَّورَةَ فِيهَا هُدًى وَنُورٌ يُحْكَمُ بِهَا النَّبِيُّونَ الَّذِينَ
أَسْلَمُوا لِلَّذِينَ هَادُوا وَالرَّبَّانِيُّونَ وَالْأَحْبَارُ بِمَا اسْتُحْفِظُوا مِنْ
كِتَابِ اللَّهِ وَكَانُوا عَلَيْهِ شُهَدَاءَ فَلَا تَخْشَوُا النَّكَاسَ

وَأَخْشَوْنَ وَلَا تَشْتَرُوا بِآيَاتِي ثَمَنًا قَلِيلًا وَمَنْ لَمْ يَحْكَمْ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ
 اللَّهُ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْكَافِرُونَ ﴿٤٤﴾ وَكُنْنَا عَلَيْهِمْ فِيهَا أَنْ النَّفْسَ
 بِالنَّفْسِ وَالْعَيْنَ بِالْعَيْنِ وَالْأَنْفَ بِالْأَنْفِ وَالْأُذُنَ بِالْأُذُنِ
 وَالسِّنَّ بِالسِّنِّ وَالْجُرُوحَ قِصَاصٌ فَمَنْ تَصَدَّقَ بِهِ فَهُوَ
 كَفَّارَةٌ لَهُ وَمَنْ لَمْ يَحْكَمْ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ
 الظَّالِمُونَ ﴿٤٥﴾ وَقَفِينَا عَلَىٰ آثَرِهِمْ بِعِيسَى ابْنِ مَرْيَمَ مُصَدِّقًا لِمَا بَيْنَ
 يَدَيْهِ مِنَ التَّورَةِ ۗ وَعَاتَيْنَاهُ الْإِنجِيلَ فِيهِ هُدًى وَنُورٌ وَمُصَدِّقًا لِمَا بَيْنَ
 يَدَيْهِ مِنَ التَّورَةِ وَهُدًى وَمَوْعِظَةً لِّلْمُتَّقِينَ ﴿٤٦﴾ وَلِيَحْكُمَ أَهْلَ الْإِنجِيلِ
 بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ فِيهِ وَمَنْ لَمْ يَحْكَمْ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ
 الْفَاسِقُونَ ﴿٤٧﴾ وَأَنْزَلْنَا إِلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ بِالْحَقِّ مُصَدِّقًا لِمَا بَيْنَ
 يَدَيْهِ مِنَ الْكِتَابِ وَمُهَيِّمًا عَلَيْهِ فَاحْكُم بَيْنَهُمْ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ
 وَلَا تَتَّبِعْ أَهْوَاءَهُمْ عَمَّا جَاءَكَ مِنَ الْحَقِّ لِكُلِّ جَعَلْنَا مِنْكُمْ شِرْعَةً
 وَمِنْهَا جَاءَ وَلَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ لَجَعَلَكُمْ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً وَلَٰكِن لِّيَبْلُوَكُمْ فِي مَا
 ءَاتَاكُمْ فَاسْتَبِقُوا الْخَيْرَاتِ ۗ إِلَى اللَّهِ مَرْجِعُكُمْ جَمِيعًا فَيُنَبِّئُكُمْ بِمَا
 كُنْتُمْ فِيهِ تَخْلَفُونَ ﴿٤٨﴾ وَإِنْ أَحْكَمْتُمْ بَيْنَهُمْ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ وَلَا تَتَّبِعْ

أَهْوَاءَهُمْ وَأَحْذَرَهُمْ أَنْ يَفْتِنُوكَ عَنْ بَعْضِ مَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ إِلَيْكَ فَإِنْ
 تَوَلَّوْا فَاعْلَمُوا أَنَّمَا يُرِيدُ اللَّهُ أَنْ يُصِيبَهُمْ بِبَعْضِ ذُنُوبِهِمْ وَإِنَّ كَثِيرًا مِّنَ
 النَّاسِ لَفَاسِقُونَ ﴿٤٩﴾ أَفَحُكْمَ الْجَاهِلِيَّةِ يَبْغُونَ وَمَنْ أَحْسَنُ مِنَ اللَّهِ
 حُكْمًا لِّقَوْمٍ يُوقِنُونَ ﴿٥٠﴾

they who do not judge in accordance with what Allah has bestowed from on high are, indeed, deniers of the truth!

- (5:45) And We ordained for them in that [Torah]: a life for a life, and an eye for an eye, and a nose for a nose, and an ear for an ear, and a tooth for a tooth, and a [similar] retribution for wounds; but he who shall forgo it out of charity will atone thereby for some of his past sins. And they who do not judge in accordance with what Allah has revealed are, indeed, the evildoers!
- (5:46) And We caused Jesus, the son of Mary, to follow in the footsteps of those [earlier prophets], confirming the truth of whatever there still remained of the Torah; and We vouchsafed unto him the Gospel, wherein there was guidance and light, confirming the truth of whatever there still remained of the Torah, and as a guidance and admonition unto those conscious of Allah's power and authority.
- (5:47) Let, then, the followers of the Gospel judge in accordance with what Allah has revealed therein: for they who do not judge in the light of what Allah has bestowed from on high, it is they, they who are truly iniquitous!
- (5:48) And unto you [O Prophet] have We vouchsafed this divine Writ, setting forth the truth, confirming the truth of whatever there still remains of earlier revelations and determining what is true therein. Judge, then, between the fol-

lowers of earlier revelation in accordance with what Allah has bestowed from on high, and do not follow their errant views, forsaking the truth that has come to you. Unto every one of you have We appointed a [different] law and way of life. And if Allah had so willed, He could surely have made you all one single community, but [He willed it otherwise] in order to test you by means of what He has vouchsafed unto you. Vie, then, with one another in doing good works! Unto Allah you all must return; and then He will make you truly understand all that on which you were wont to differ.

- (5:49) Hence, judge between the followers of earlier revelation in accordance with what Allah has bestowed from on high, and do not follow their errant views; and beware of them, lest they tempt you away from any of what Allah has bestowed from on high upon you. And if they turn away [from His commandments], then know that it is but Allah's will [thus] to afflict them for some of their sins: for, behold, a great many people are iniquitous indeed.
- (5:50) Do they, perchance, desire [to be ruled by] the law of an ignocracy? But for people suffused with inner certainty, who could be a better lawgiver than Allah? (al-Mā'idah: 41–50).

Authority is the power or right to issue commands, make decisions, and enforce obedience without that right being disputed. In a related nuance, authority is the power to influence, especially because of one's commanding manner or recognized knowledge and wisdom. Authority as a form of legitimate power shapes the attitudes, behaviors, and outlook of those who voluntarily consent to its exercise. Sources of authority in secular societies are rational-legal (for example, via elections and/or qualifications), traditional (for example, monarchy), and charismatic (for example, Atatürk).²⁴⁸ Implicit in most temporal models of authority is the license to use coercion against those who do not consent.

A break with Allah's (ﷻ) authority gives way to human authoritarianism. In an authoritarian form of government, or a theory

advocating such government — which is antithetical to people’s participatory politics in a system that emphasizes justice and equality — the consent of society to the rulers and their decisions is not necessary. Voting and discussion are not usually employed, except to give the appearance of popular legitimacy to the government, and such arrangements remain firmly under the control of the rulers who rule outside the parameters of scripture. Authoritarian rulers draw their authority from what are claimed to be special qualities of a religious, nationalistic, ideological, or philosophical nature, which are used to justify their dispensing with principles of justice and the demands of equality. This type of rule relies heavily upon coercion, threats, and intimidation.

Any human experience attempting to rule without guidance from Allah (ﷻ) or adherence to revelation has always presented humanity with assorted flavors of totalitarianism. In its modern form, this human experience with atheistic totalitarian rule centered around the political construct first used to describe the now defunct USSR’s communist regime as well as the Italian and German fascist regimes during the intervening period between the two world wars of the 20th century. It is difficult to distinguish empirically from related concepts such as authoritarianism and dictatorship, but certain common features can be identified. These focus on the use of power and the means of government employed by the leadership, which claims the right to govern, usually on behalf of the party and its generally secular ideology. Furthermore, all aspects of social, political, industrial, military, and economic life are controlled or permeated by the state apparatus. Political opposition is suppressed, and decision-making is highly centralized.

The long journey away from Allah (ﷻ), the Qur’an, and the Prophet (ﷺ) gave humanity a barren century of the communist experiment. As a combined political and economic ideology, communism’s central tenet is the communal ownership of property used in productive processes, and thereby the abolition of private property rights. While many social and religious communities based on communally shared property have existed throughout history, contemporary communism, associated with the theoretical writings of Karl

Marx, was distinctive due to its overt rejection of God and its rationalization of that notion as something the capitalist overlords needed to deceive the masses.²⁴⁹ In these writings, communism is seen as the final stage in human historical and political development, a process that sees societies advance through feudalism, capitalism, and socialism (a transitional stage involving the dictatorship of the proletariat) before reaching this highest stage.

According to Marx, social class, the fundamental social division, is determined by an individual's economic relationship to the means of production. In a society in which productive property is communally owned, every person has the same relationship to the means of production, and is thus of the same social class. Communal ownership therefore logically entails the abolition of traditional social classes. Similarly, because the state is seen by Marx as an instrument of class oppression, with the abolition of classes the function performed by the state is no longer necessary and, as a result, Marx predicted that it would "wither away." The transition to socialism and then communism was to be brought about by the overthrow of the capitalist system and the seizing of the means of production by the proletariat, or working class. This new socio-economic system would allow for the liberation of human potential and for the development of a new social ethic of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need."

Marx's theories have been developed and adopted by many communist and socialist parties, and these developments have been used to legitimize both the policies and internal organization of these parties. Thus, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), initially under the leadership of Lenin and later of Stalin, reinterpreted Marxism as, first, Marxism-Leninism and then Stalinism. The major features of this reinterpretation were the communalization of property through the agency of the state, and the development of the doctrine of democratic centralism. This doctrine meant that the CPSU became a highly centralized, monolithic, and secretive organization bearing little resemblance to the spontaneous, decentralized forms of organization envisaged under communism by Marx.²⁵⁰

Under Stalin, the party became an instrument in the development of a brutal, totalitarian dictatorship. During the first half of the 20th century, the CPSU was the ideological forerunner of other European communist parties, and those that accepted the leading position of the CPSU were allowed to join the Third International (established in 1919).²⁵¹ Subsequently, however, the CPSU's leadership was both questioned and challenged for a variety of reasons. These included the economic inefficiencies associated with rigid central planning, and the neo-imperialist military crushing of attempts to liberalize communist regimes in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). The emergence of a challenge to Soviet-style communist rule in Poland (1980–1989), which consisted of demands for political reforms coupled with the lack of any military response by the USSR, further diminished the leading role of the CPSU.²⁵²

Outside the communist world (that is Eastern Europe, Russia, China, and some other countries), parties such as the Italian Communist Party, had developed a new variant, Euro-communism, which contained more elements drawn from social democracy than from Marxism-Leninism, as a response to the changing nature and aspirations of the working class in advanced industrial societies. The fall from a position of dominance of the Communist Party in Poland and the holding of multiparty elections (1989) was the first of a series of events that led to the institution of political reform and free elections throughout Eastern Europe, and also in the USSR under the leadership of Secretary-General Gorbachev. This change was symbolized best by the breaching and demolition of the Berlin Wall, a structure that had stood for the division of Europe into two ideologically opposed, armed camps. Following the failure of a military coup against Gorbachev in 1991, in which the CPSU was implicated, the Party was banned. Although the ban was later declared unconstitutional by the Russian Supreme Court, following the breakup of the former USSR, it lost all hold on power in the country that it had ruled absolutely for 70 years. There remain a number of countries in which communist parties continue to rule, most notably the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and

Cuba. However, even in these, the system is showing signs of strain, and in China the aging rulers — adherents to the variant of communism known as Maoism — had to resort to force to crush demands for reform in the Tiananmen Square Massacre (1989).²⁵³ Only in North Korea does a full-blown totalitarian democratic-centralist regime continue in power.²⁵⁴

The experience of communist regimes over the seven-and-a-half decades following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 has given rise to two types of assessment of applied Marxism. On the one hand there are those who say Marxism has failed because of its economic inefficiencies and because, contrary to theory, communist states have seen an inexorable growth in the power of the state rather than the withering away predicted by Marx. On the other hand there are those who say the regimes that call themselves communist are not really Marxist, but rather some dictatorial misinterpretation of Marxism and that, therefore, Marxism has not yet been tested in practice.²⁵⁵

This is the issue of our times; it is the issue of the hour. Whither mankind? It has stumbled from this man-made ideology to that secular government and then to the latest political fad. People who are not Muslims, who have no knowledge of this Qur'an and *āyāt* like these, may go on meandering for a long time, butting heads in regional and global wars, encroaching upon each other's political turf, and consuming generations and centuries in polarized hot wars and cold wars. But the Muslims of the Qur'an know that the central purpose of the historical continuum of prophets and the enduring feature of scripture is to communicate and socialize the one overriding, decisive, and paramount certainty: authority itself belongs to Allah (ﷻ). This is a clear-cut issue; it tolerates no gray area.

The long line of committed Muslims commencing from the earliest generations of mankind all the way until the end of time, ourselves included, wherever we may be in this extended entourage, are committed to Allah (ﷻ) and uphold His trust on this particular and sensitive issue; that is, He is the only Authority and the committed Muslims will govern, rule, and judge according to

the information, instructions, and ideology He imparted to them in scripture and through the Prophets (ﷺ). The committed Muslims have taken it upon themselves as His subjects to cling to the letter of His Script and to work their minds on understanding His will.

All other philosophers, ideologues, thinkers, statesmen, and politicians who argue for, try to outline and explain, and then rule, govern, and judge according to a doctrine, an ideology or a political orientation not based upon scripture and the models of Apostles of Allah (ﷺ) are either *kāfirs*, tyrants, or degenerates — because they chose God as a non-authority in the social justice affairs of man. Rulers and heads of state governments who accept the program for justice that is included in scripture and follow through on it to its last detail are thus committed to Allah (ﷻ); conversely, those rulers and heads of state who adopt and devote themselves to any other secular and laic social justice program such as free-market theories, controlled-market theories, monarchies and republics, etc., are thus in denial of God's authority in the area where it matters most.

Everyone has to be clear on this issue. The issue of authority is central to the issue of divinity. If the divine has no authority in man's life pertaining to social justice issues and all the other issues of life, then His divinity does not have the human recognition that it deserves. And such individuals or institutions that work on trying to reposition God's authority in the hands of man are in reality delegitimizing Him where it counts the most.

People who call themselves Muslims and people who do not are going to have to come to grips with the fact that it is Allah (ﷻ) who has given mankind a social justice program. After that they will have to delve deeply into this program, which is preserved in the eternal words of this Qur'anic script, and study it with the same passion and discipline they dedicate toward proficiency in their careers. Upon reaching that point, they will have to decide whether to accept it or reject it. This choice is for all human beings to make. As committed Muslims, we are already convinced that Allah (ﷻ) is the Sustainer of life, existence, and the universe. He, better than all political philosophers and ideological intellectuals, knows what is

good for man all the way from defining moral values to making military decisions. The *shari'ah* that springs from the Muslims' *ḥaqīqah* (factuality) and *'aqīdah* (conviction) is in the best interest of everyone and everything. There is no political doctrine, ancient or modern, that supersedes or bests His. Either a person has to be thoroughly ignorant of Allah (ﷻ) to proclaim that he refuses God's laws (His *shari'ah*), or he has to be a hard-core denier to spin a web of ideas that suggests he knows more about the well-being and the advancement of mankind than Allah (ﷻ). Whoever, though, does such a thing has parted with Allah (ﷻ) and ventured into *kufr*.

His indivisible authority is the theme of this lesson, presented in clear and vivid language. Along with this beautiful outline on the subject at hand comes yet another admonition to those generational agents of the counter-program of institutionalizing the rejection of God in human affairs: the obstreperous bloc of Yahūd in Madinah. Their shenanigans, chicanery, and how they dovetailed with the *munāfiqs* are once again on display, **“Of those who say, ‘But we are committed [to God]’ with their mouths but their hearts have not committed [to God]...”** The Prophet (ﷺ) and the rest of his followers (ourselves included) will need direction on this Yahūdī-Israeli stance, for these Yahūd have never softened their approach to Muslims who are keen on Allah's (ﷻ) authority, ever since its first manifestation in Madinah.

In the History of Scripture, God's Authority Is Indisputable

The incontrovertible *āyāt* here are conclusive in stating that Allah's (ﷻ) authority is indisputable in the history of scripture. All prophets worked on raising His authority and expunging the pseudo-authority of pharaohs and kings. Life itself has to fit within the legal system that is founded upon scripture. This is the litmus test of *īmān* and *kufr*. The Islamic morality that blossoms into an Islamic legality is at odds with political systems that are not grounded in scripture and that once applied, even for the stated purpose of achieving social justice, end up inflicting their citizens with all types of social ills and injustices. The followers of the Jewish faith

are reminded of the Torah, which was revealed by Allah (ﷻ) as a source of guidance and light,

And they [the Jews] have the Torah within which is Allah’s dominance [through legal authority]... (5:43);

Prophets who were subjects of Allah ruled by it [the Torah] for the sake of those who confessed their home-coming [to Him], as did the rabbis and the sages in accordance with their upkeep of Allah’s Book and their testimony to its [legitimacy]... (5:44);

And We decreed upon them [the Jews] in it [the Torah]: a life for a life... (5:45).

Similarly, the Injil (the Gospel) was disclosed by Allah (ﷻ) to ‘Īsá (Jesus), the son of Maryam (ﷺ),

...as an affirmation of the existing Torah and We vouchsafed unto him the Gospel, wherein there was guidance and light, confirming the truth of whatever there still remained of the Torah, and as a guidance and an admonition for those who are on their guard [concerning Allah]. Let the people of the Gospel govern in accordance with that which Allah has revealed in it [the Gospel]... (5:46–47).

Likewise, this Qur’an was imparted by Allah (ﷻ) to His Prophet (ﷺ), “**...in truth confirming whatever still remains of earlier scripture and to inundate scripture.**” Allah (ﷻ) also says to Muhammad (ﷺ),

Exercise authority over them in accordance with what Allah has imparted [to you via the Qur’an] and do not follow their desires lest that sway you away from the truth... (5:48);

And all those who do not exercise authority in accordance with what Allah has revealed are *kāfirs*... (5:44);

And all those who do not exercise authority in accordance with what Allah has revealed are guilty of injustice... (5:45);

And all those who do not exercise authority in accordance with what Allah has revealed are degenerates... (5:47);

Do they seek the rule of ignocracy (*jāhiliyyah*)? And who could be better in governance than Allah for people of certitude? (5:50).

All religious doctrines, all scriptural programs, and all prophetic struggles converge on the fact that Allah's (ﷻ) authority rules over man's will and social well-being. People's representatives in government are duty-bound to carry this responsibility of God's authority into their decision-making and their electors are duty-bound to ensure that these representatives live up to this historic obligation. No other political system is acceptable.

The fact that Allah (ﷻ) is the source of authority and dominance is the "make or break issue" because it is this specific issue that has been carefully and selectively deleted from "religion." God is not a divinity or a deity if His authority is not recognized, honored, and integrated into human life and social programs insofar as man is concerned.

If we human beings attest that Allah (ﷻ) is the Creator who created the universe and man, and then made the whole physical surroundings of man accessible and usable by this man, then we must affirm that it is only He who qualifies to enlighten us on how to manage our surroundings when we look for solutions to our human and social problems. If we submit that Allah (ﷻ) is the Owner of all — and thus on par with His creativity, He owns the heavens and the earth, the skies and the lands, the solar, the galactic, and the cosmic, and everything beyond, having no equal

or match — then He, and only He, qualifies to express His love for us by giving us the information that will minimize the evil tendencies in our clash over property and resources. If we comply with the fact that Allah (ﷻ) is the Provider, and that no one else has the means to give and deny, then we should acknowledge Him being the provider of our mental wants as much as Him being the provider of our physical needs.

This makes Allah (ﷻ) in our minds and hearts the authority in our lives. He is in control of the physical universe as much as He is in control of the human introversive. Is He not the Creator, the Owner, and the Provider? And if He is, then He has the power to create, the power to claim, the power to supply and provide, and the power to care and scare. Thus, His authority should be absolutely indisputable.

Without much ado, a human commitment to Allah (ﷻ) — or *īmān* — is an affirmation in human life of these divine attributes: divinity, authority, and propriety. Islam becomes the compliance to this fact as it struggles to become a consolidated social norm and after it becomes the “order of the day.” Man’s recognition of a valid, current, and applicable *shari‘ah* corresponds with man’s recognition of Allah (ﷻ) as a superior deity, a supreme authority, a superordinate legality, and a sovereign power — without a challenger or a competitor. Correspondingly, man’s rejection of Allah’s (ﷻ) “program for social justice” as expressed in His scriptures and as explained by His Prophets (ﷺ) is a rejection of His authority and power. The institutionalized substitution of His *shari‘ah* with any number of “-isms” becomes a practical affront to the dominance and dominion of Allah (ﷻ). Therefore, every political program that is not extracted, rooted, and constructed upon scripture is a repudiation of God, His scriptures, and His Prophets (ﷺ). This can have its active and passive components and agents. If history would have been written in the spirit of scripture everything would have rotated around this fundamental fact. It is so relevant and decisive that the Qur’an here in this lesson says so unequivocally, “**And whoever does not rule in conformity with what Allah has revealed is a *kāfir*... is an oppressor... is a decadent...**”

There is a deluge of theories in the secular world that makes a person wonder and drift into the world of relativism. These types puzzle over what all the big fuss is about as there is one set of laws belonging to the Muslims and another set belonging to a variety of non-Muslims, and at the end of the day, there does not appear to be a big difference between societies in Muslim areas of the world and societies in non-Muslim areas. In fact, they say evidence demonstrates that the Muslim world is much behind the rest of the world according to almost any standard of measurement. This argument is off base. Significantly, Muslims who “breathe the Qur’an” know there is no significant consolidation of an Islamic “ethos” that extends the moral quality of the human condition into a working program of laws and regulations. There are serious attempts to do so; and hope abounds that in the near future these words here will become part of the past and the Muslims will have established their own realm as a matter of self-determination.

But the most important conviction toward that end is for the committed Muslims to entertain no doubt about the quality and superiority of Allah’s (ﷻ) scripture compared to the sub-quality and inferiority of man’s secular and sometimes sacrilegious programs. This superiority of God over man is emphasized in the *āyah*, “**And who could be better in governance than Allah for people who are sure?**” It makes no sense for anyone to say he is committed to Allah (ﷻ), and then for him to think that fascism is better than Islam, or capitalism is better than Islam, or Zionism is better than Islam, or communism is better than Islam, etc. Anyone who utters or believes in such a statement is knowingly or unknowingly saying that he knows how to run a society better than God, and that he and his political preference suit the human condition better than God’s organization of society and upliftment of the human condition. Some would argue that compared to contemporary times — which are more complex and in which change is occurring at breakneck speed — when God revealed His scripture, things were more primitive and simple; therefore, now that we have all this knowledge and are better able to take care of ourselves because of it, we no longer are in need of God’s archaic laws and antiquated

ways. This type of person cannot be committed to Allah (ﷻ) on the one hand, and committed to kings and tyrants on the other.

What distinguishes Allah's (ﷻ) Scripture and Prophet (ﷺ) from secular and irreligious dogmas is that there is a consistency and a congruence between the moral roots of the Qur'an and its legal branches. In non-Islamic political arrangements there is a serious disconnect between values on one side and laws on the other. If there are morals within a particular non-Qur'anic political system, these morals will often conflict with the outlook and behavior of those who sit at the top of the secular order and run the show. Another distinction that sets Islam apart from the rest of man-made systems is that Islam concords with the physical and natural laws that are at work around us; there is no clash between a social law and a physical law because both of them issue from Allah (ﷻ). Meanwhile, the worldly systems erected by man, because they are devised by him, have within them a tendency to clash with each other because there is a human inability to synchronize the social with the material. Humans are not all-knowing, while Allah (ﷻ) is. Finally, what also singles out an Islamic working order is its elevation and adulation of justice. Justice can only be experienced by human societies when they accept and apply Allah's (ﷻ) principle and pattern. And because Allah (ﷻ) is the source, and as He does not belong to or is not a monopoly of a race or a nationality, His system is guaranteed to be fair to all races, ethnic groups, and peoples.

How Banū Isrā'īl Corrupted the Divine Law They Were Given

O Apostle! Be not grieved by those who vie with one another in denying the truth [of Allah's power]: such as those who say with their mouths, "We commit ourselves [to Allah]," the while their hearts are not committed; and such of the Jewish faith as eagerly listen to any falsehood, eagerly listen to other people without having come to you [for enlightenment]. They distort

the meaning of the [revealed] words, taking them out of their context, saying [to themselves], “If such-and-such [teaching] is vouchsafed unto you, accept it; but if it is not vouchsafed unto you, be cautious!”

[Be not grieved by them] for, if Allah wills anyone to be tempted to evil, you can in no wise prevail with Allah on his behalf. It is they whose hearts Allah is not willing to cleanse. Theirs shall be ignominy in this world, and awesome suffering in the life to come — those who eagerly listen to any false statement, greedily swallowing all that is evil!

Hence, if they come to you [for a ruling], you may either judge between them or leave them alone: for, if you leave them alone, they cannot harm you in any way. But if you do rule, [then] rule between them with equity: verily, Allah knows those who act equitably. But how is it that they ask you for a ruling — seeing that they have the Torah, containing Allah’s injunctions — and thereafter turn away [from your verdict]? Such as these, then, are not from among the [truly] committed (5:41–43).

It appears that these *āyāt* were revealed during the initial years in Madinah when the Yahūd were still a persuasive contingent in the city. This would have been before the military campaign of al-Aḥzāb, at the conclusion of which justice caught up with Banū Qurayzah, and perhaps even before the Battle of Uḥud, when Banū al-Naḍīr and Banū Qaynuqā’ were still present in Madinah. Recall that Banū al-Naḍīr was deported from Madinah after the Battle of Uḥud, whereas Banū Qaynuqā’ had been expelled beforehand. During this time period, the Yahūd were in their full swing trying to abort and sabotage the authoritative expression of Islam. Concurrently, the *munāfiqs* of Madinah — verbal Muslims whose proclaimed *īmān* was not substantiated by their efforts against injustice — were beating a path into and out of the Yahūdī quarters there. Both of these exclusivist circles of people with a common purpose

were trying to expedite *kufr*. The social dissembling of these *munāfiqs* was weighing heavily on Allah's Apostle (ﷺ), and since a two-faced cabal did not exist in Makkah, this new development was straining him emotionally.

So as to help him better deal with these circumstances, Allah (ﷻ) was soothing His Prophet (ﷺ) by giving him moral and emotional strength, saying to him and the rest of the Muslims for the rest of time, in effect, that they need not worry about the activities of the *munāfiqs* and their enablers; for such as they are but rushing into *kufr* and its consequences. Through these *āyāt*, Allah (ﷻ) was demonstrating to His Prophet (ﷺ) how he should behave with them when they come soliciting his judgement and decision. Moreover, Allah (ﷻ) was also giving him a lay of the land so to speak by providing insight into their attitude and behavior before they (the Yahūd) actually came to Muhammad (ﷺ) for a "legal opinion,"

O Apostle! Be not grieved by those who vie with one another in denying the truth [the Yahūd and the *munāfiqs*]: such as those who say with their mouths, "We commit ourselves [to Allah]," the while their hearts are not committed; and such of the Jewish faith as eagerly listen to any falsity, eagerly listen to other people without having come to you [for enlightenment]. They distort the meaning of the [revealed] words, taking them out of their context, saying [to themselves], "If such-and-such [teaching] is accorded to you, accept it; but if it is not accorded to you, be cautious!" (5:41).

Historical narratives indicate that this *āyah* was revealed to explain the behavior of some Yahūdīs who had committed crimes and misdemeanors. Their exact lawbreaking cannot be pinpointed with certainty; however, it is known that their transgressions were inclusive of adultery and theft. Also well known is the fact that such misconduct was punishable by the divine law of the Torah. But what distinguished these Yahūdīs from their coreligionists is that they had blunted the original punishment and settled on sub-

stitute penalties in place of the harsh Torahic ones. This was all ostensibly done to accommodate the elites among them, who, when they were guilty of such offenses, could rely on a corrupt legal class to buffer the penalty by giving them lesser sentences (judgement of conviction). But in a manner of speaking, special dispensations for the people in power are the force that breaks open the flood gates, and so as things typically go, the “watered-down” punishments were then generalized and applied to the common Jews as well as the upper-class Yahūdīs. This may have been a primitive example of people substituting God’s laws with man’s laws, but once the process began, it quickly went down hill from there: left to their own secular “better” judgement, they could pick and choose, add and subtract, impose and omit whatever they wanted, ultimately winding up with no divine law altogether. Incidentally, Muslims nowadays are behaving in a manner reminiscent of this Yahūdī trait. And no amount of rinsing the Ka’bah and offering free airfares to the Hajj is going to detract from this fact.

So when these types of crimes and felonies were committed in the Jewish quarters of Madinah during the reign of the Prophet (ﷺ), some of them colluded to solicit his verdict. They thought that if Muhammad (ﷺ) was to pronounce a light penalty such as was their custom they would agree to it; in their minds, this would amount to an exoneration of their position because now a “prophet” was dispensing a corroborating ruling. On the other hand, were he to pronounce a verdict coinciding with the law in the Torah, then they would refrain from accepting it. This attitude of theirs explains the words of the *āyah*, **“If such-and-such [finding of fact] is accorded you, accept it; but if it is not accorded you, be cautious!”**

To their own detriment, they were only displaying how arrogantly smug and irritatingly egotistical they could be. They actually thought they could get away with trying to trick Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ). This is the mental attitude that overtakes people who have long parted company with Allah (ﷻ). Their hearts turn into impenetrable masses void of sensitivity and receptivity. Their relationship with God no longer resonates. Using God’s guidance to manage their lives becomes too much for them, and so they

begin to parse through scripture, searching out loopholes and excuses for abandoning His commands and orders. They look around for edicts and legal opinions as a way out of the predicament they put themselves in.

The hard fact today is that there are “Muslims” who fit this description of **“...those who say they are committed [to Allah] verbally while their hearts are not committed.”** Let us be honest with ourselves; are there not among the “Muslim” crowd those who go fishing for fatwas to cover up or to find a way out of their misdemeanors and felonies? Do they not “use” religion as a legitimizing instrument for their whims and interests? Do they not go to some “Islamic” scholars from this or that famous Islamic university and tell them to issue grand fatwas that peddle the official policies of secular states and statesmen? If any principled ‘alims have the courage to speak the truth and represent the Qur’anic fact of the matter, at that time the government and its high-ranking official will disregard or even attack such an unblemished representation of Islam, saying to themselves, **“If such-and-such [fatwa] is accorded to you, accept it; but if it is not accorded to you, be cautious!”** The Yahūd of Madinah were centuries ahead of the Muslims in Makkah, Cairo, and Istanbul today. Hence it should come as no surprise that the Qur’an concentrates on the Children of Israel and the details of their commandment-dodging nature, lest the Muslims of sincerity and integrity become a carbon copy of these slick Israeli God-deniers.

Allah (ﷻ) tells His Prophet (ﷺ) not to be dispirited or demoralized by these people who are rushing into *kufr* along with their *munāfiq* co-conspirators, **“Be not anguished by those who compete with one another in denying the *ḥaqq*...”** They are on their way to criminal action that will incite resistance; they will definitely fall into their own sedition. Allah (ﷻ) apprises the Prophet (ﷺ) that he cannot interfere with the destructive course these types of people have set themselves on. There is nothing he can do that will reverse their course of self-destruction, **“...if Allah wills anyone to be tempted to evil, you [O Muhammad] can in no wise prevail with Allah on his behalf.”** These self-delusionists will run into notorious

fame and reputation in this world and into a vast torment in the oncoming life, **“Theirs shall be abasement in this world, and grand suffering in the life to come.”** At this point no one should be concerned with their shenanigans; not even their *kufur* should be an irritant. Their whole affair shall be settled by the will of Allah (ﷻ) through the committed Muslims’ adherence to Him.

Such people disposed to *kufur* present nothing insofar as moral quality is concerned; or to give them the benefit of the doubt, they no longer have a morality that has any social value. Here is how Allah (ﷻ) describes them before they set out on their mission to solicit the Prophet’s (ﷺ) judgement concerning some of their own activities that transgressed moral and civil law,

Those who eagerly listen to lies, greedily consuming spurious wealth! Hence, if they come to you [for an assessment], you may either judge between them or leave them alone: for, if you leave them alone, they cannot harm you in any way. But if you judge, [then] judge between them with equity: verily, Allah knows those who act equitably (5:42).

This is the second time Allah (ﷻ) says about the Yahūd that they are apt to listen to lies, pertinently suggesting that they are prone to keep company with liars and libelers. They have an ear for statements that deviate from or pervert the truth. Correspondingly, they have no courage for the truth and no fortitude for its responsibilities. This mendacious disposition of theirs explains the moral erosion of their communities and the sidelining of their religious doctrine. Continuing to allude to their historical character may seem to be laced with a tinge of prejudice were it not for their contemporary demeanor in societies, which is a reflection of their scriptural description about how their peculiar influence makes lies, overstatements, mistruths, deception, and fiction in vogue. When it comes to truth and honest expressions, “no one wants to hear about it” — as if lies belong in the market and the truth belongs in the junkyard.

Allah's (ﷻ) words here are speaking about the Yahūd who are qualified by lies and who devour illegal wealth. This accumulation of unlawful wealth in the hands of crooked cliques feeds off usury, bribes, buying legal opinions, and trading away God's word for immediate luxuries and fleeting self-gratification. These are some of the salient features of societies that have gone off their scriptural course. Theirs is a financial culture of payments made in an illicit or underhanded way to secure a favor; it seems to be natural in this culture to bribe or threaten someone into committing a wrongful act, especially perjury. Hush money, a bribe paid to prevent someone from disclosing discreditable or embarrassing information, and slush funds, a reserve of money used for corrupt activities and political bribery, are other aspects of this pecuniary and corporate culture. Scripture in such a society loses its unique culture and the Yahūdī counter-culture takes over.

Despite all of this corruption, which they know they are managing and participating in, these Yahūdīs will still seek to approach a prophet (ﷺ) and request his judgement to see if he would validate and legitimize their corrupt practices. And the decision on whether or not to express his ruling was left up to Muhammad (ﷺ). Both ways, these Yahūdīs were unable to harm him. If he were to choose to rule, then he was counseled to rule with the standards of justice and in a manner of fairness. He should not be influenced or tempted by their preferences, wishes, or by their previous track record. Likewise, he should not be reactive to their general scheme of promoting *kufir* and their behind-the-scenes relations and cooperation with the *munāfiqs*, **“Indeed, Allah loves those who act equitably.”**

The Prophet of Allah (ﷺ), and by extension the Muslim ruler and the Muslim judge(s) at any time in history, are all interacting with Allah (ﷻ) on matters of justice. They are tasked with equity for the sake of Allah (ﷻ) — for they know that Allah (ﷻ) adores the administrators of justice. Regardless of any people's social character, be they deviants, traitors, or oppressors, the institution of justice is the priority. The fact is that justice is done for Allah (ﷻ) and not for human beings. This stands out in Islam if the Muslims could only read it right.

Giving the Prophet (ﷺ) the choice here indicates that this affair must have unraveled near the beginning of his time in Madinah. In later years, Islamic governance was binding on all. An Islamic state has only one set of laws — Allah's (ﷻ) laws. All citizens therein must live by this law, with the proviso that Ahl al-Kitāb is allowed to maintain a form of civil autonomy inasmuch as they themselves agree to abide by the legal proceedings in their holy books. Thus, whatever is lawful in their Torah or Injil passes as lawful in the overall Islamic civil context. A case in point is the raising of pigs for the purpose of human consumption in an Islamic state, which is unlawful to Muslims but lawful to Christians in an Islamic state. Similarly, possessing intoxicants is unlawful to Muslims but lawful to Judeo-Christians. Usury though is illegal to Muslims, Jews, and Christians alike because usury has never been sanctioned by scripture. The penalties for adultery and theft are referred to the particular scripture of the violator. If Jews or Christians rebel against an Islamic authority or are involved in subversive activities within an Islamic society and state, then they are subject to the same penalty and punishment that would apply to Muslims engaging in the same activities. Security is a common feature of an Islamic state and therefore it is the responsibility of all its citizens: Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

In this early stage of Islamic governance in Madinah, and having been given the choice to get involved in affairs peculiar to the Jewish community, the Prophet (ﷺ) offered those who sought advice from him an open door policy. In one of those instances when the Jews petitioned the Prophet's (ﷺ) ruling, the unfolding narrative divulges the following,

The Yahūd came to the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) and told him that a man and a woman belonging to them [the Yahūd] committed adultery. Then the Messenger (ﷺ) asked them, "*And what do you find in the Torah concerning the stoning [verdict]?*" They replied, "We damage their reputation [and] then we flog them." Then 'Abdullāh ibn Salām interjected, "But you lie. In the Torah there is an

injunction pertaining to the punishment of stoning.” Then these Yahūd brought the Torah scrolls and unfolded them. Thereupon one of them placed his hand on the verse pertaining to the stoning of the adulterer, and read what preceded and what followed that particular verse. However ‘Abdullāh ibn Salām told him to lift his hand, and there it was — the verse pertaining to the judgement and penalty of stoning an adulterer. Following this, they [the Yahūd] said, “He [‘Abdullāh ibn Salām] speaks the truth — there is a verse about stoning the adulterer.” At this point, the Messenger (ﷺ) advised that their law be applied, and the adulterers were stoned. In that incident the male adulterer covered over the female [with his body] in an attempt to shield her from the stones coming their way.²⁵⁶

Another hadith narrative relates the following,

The Prophet (ﷺ) passed by a Jew who had been flogged and had his face charred [smudged]. So the Prophet (ﷺ) summoned the Jews and asked, “*Is this the penalty for fornication in your [holy] book?*” They said, “Yes.” Then the Prophet (ﷺ) called for a particular Jewish sage and inquired of him, “*By He who revealed the Torah to Moses, is this the way you punish an adulterer according to your [holy] book?*” He replied, “O God! No. Had you not pressed me on this issue I would not have apprised you. In our [holy] book we find the penalty of an adulterer to be [killed by] stoning. But the cases of adultery had increased among our ‘upper class,’ so if we ever apprehended an upper-class person who committed adultery we would let him go; but if we apprehended a lower-class adulterer we would execute the stoning law. Then we reached the point where we said, ‘Let us agree on a common and across-the-board punishment for the upper- and lower-class adulterers.’ That was when we decided to stigmatize

and flog the adulterer instead of stoning him/her.” Then the Prophet (ﷺ) said, “O Allah! I will be the first to reinstate a verdict of Yours that they [the Yahūd] have abolished.” The [Jewish] adulterer was then subpoenaed, and then eventually stoned.²⁵⁷

It was in this context that Allah (ﷻ) revealed,

O Apostle [Muhammad]! Be not anguished by those who contend with one another in denying the truth: such as those who say with their mouths, “We commit ourselves [to Allah],” the while their hearts are not committed; and such of the Jewish faith as eagerly listen to any subterfuge, eagerly listen to other people without having come to you [for enlightenment]. They contort the meaning of the [revealed] words, taking them out of their context, saying [to themselves], “If such-and-such [determination] is [divinely] imparted to you, accept it; but if it is not imparted to you be cautious (5:41).

It should be pointed out that the expression, *yā ayyuhā al-rasūl* (O Messenger/Apostle), besides being mentioned in this *āyah*, has only been mentioned one other time in the Qur’an: in *āyah* 5:67 of this same *sūrah* when Allah (ﷻ) says to Muhammad (ﷺ), “**O Messenger! Communicate what has been revealed to you from your Sustainer.**” The other times Allah (ﷻ) calls upon him by saying *yā ayyuhā al-nabī* (O Prophet).

This Yahūdīs’ approach to the Prophet (ﷺ), asking him his opinion and judgement, can only be suspect as they neither recognized his prophethood nor accepted the Qur’an that was revealed to him. Hence, it could only be spurious motivations that led them to the Prophet (ﷺ). And so the words from heaven comment upon this Yahūdī charade, “**But how is it that they ask you for a ruling — seeing that they have the Torah, containing God’s laws — and thereafter they turn away [from your ruling]?**” In both instances these Yahūdīs cannot be satisfied; firstly, they want to skirt around

God's laws, which they have in front of them in the Torah, and secondly, they spurn Muhammad's (ﷺ) legal pronouncements, which coincide with the Torah and the Qur'an. They do not show any willingness to uphold God's laws in the Torah and similarly His laws in the Qur'an, therefore, **"...these, then, are not [truly] committed [to Allah]."**

No one can claim to be faithful to God and then say he refuses to honor His laws. Likewise, they cannot claim to be people of the covenant and then say they are dissatisfied with the legal system that has come to them from the Lawgiver. Nonetheless, there are those who publicly proclaim with deafening consistency their religiosity, faithfulness, and belief, yet with a congruent militant contentiousness, they object to God's laws and His authority. And at the end of the day they want everyone to believe they are "devout Jews" or "practicing Christians" or "true Muslims." All these pharisees, double-crossers, and hypocrites run into His eternal words, **"Such as these, then, are not [really] committed people of faith."** Not only are they opposed to committing to God's laws as the laws of their land, they are also upset, to the point of nervous frenzy, to see God's laws being applied in other people's lands. This lesson is a reflection of a lesson from *Sūrah al-Nisā'* where Allah (ﷻ) says,

But then, by your Sustainer, they will not commit themselves [to Allah] until they accept you [O Muhammad] as an arbiter and judge of their own differences and then [after the verdict from you] they will not have any reservations inside their own selves, and will accept your ruling with open hearts (4:65).

All of these enlightening *āyāt* speak to the citizens, the constituencies, and the populations of people. They do not speak to their rulers and governors. The point is well taken: if there is no mass psychology to displace Allah's (ﷻ) authority with the authority of men, then there would be no kings and presidents today who could get away with "filling in for God" as the highest authority in the land.

Before moving on to the next set of *āyāt*, let us wind up the lesson with some concluding afterthoughts. Firstly, there was no fanatical boycott by the Yahūd of the Prophet (ﷺ) nor was there a fanatical estrangement between the Prophet (ﷺ) and the Yahūd in Madinah, despite the fact that ongoing Yahūdī efforts to delegitimize the Prophet (ﷺ) and to incapacitate the emerging Islamic authority were well-known to the residents of Madinah. Secondly, the Islamic expression and institution of justice was offered to all who requested it. The Prophet (ﷺ), from his own experience with them and by virtue of the information he was getting from Allah (ﷻ), was aware of how frivolous these Yahūd were. Nonetheless he did not turn away from them, nor even imply that they were unworthy or too contemptible to accept his ruling. However, once they finally came forward to seek a legal judgement, and that legal judgement was pronounced, then it had to be honored, regardless of whether or not it was to their liking, because at that point it became an issue of justice and not an issue of appeasing or pleasing someone. Thirdly, the committed Muslims are apprised that the Yahūd are compulsive fabricators who have an ear for lies and innuendo; they are also hysterical and unscrupulous moneymakers. They will grab the *dīnār* or the dollar through legal and illegal means. Their fraudulent acts and business schemes are second nature. Money in their religion of materialism, commercialism, and consumerism buys and sells sex, it buys and sells justice, and it buys and sells “God.”

Some people at this juncture will want to say that there is a serious gap between the Qur’anic characterization of the Yahūd and the “humble” and “oppressed” image of Jews that people generally have. And, yes, there is a problem, but not because of prejudice, stereotyping, or the like; rather, because the Jews themselves, who despite their dominant position in media and education, have not come out and expressed themselves on these issues. One can dig and dig for years on end and not find any recorded information from Jewish sources on their social behavior toward the Prophet (ﷺ) in Arabia. Fortunately, the committed Muslims do not need Jewish “history” on this matter because all they require is right here

in this lively Qur'an, which relates exactly what happened. The Jews of this world, especially the powerbrokers amongst them, have a lot of explaining to do before this gargantuan problem can begin to be diminished.

What is yet another complicating factor is that there are many Jews who are unversed on these issues. They live in their own bubble and refuse to consider how other people think, what impact their own history and behavior has had on the way these people think, and therefore how the latter should behave toward and treat Jews. This is yet another nuance of the problem that has to be sorted out by the Jews themselves.

Finally another contributing factor is that the world's Muslims are incapable of expressing themselves because of the 60-odd nation-state stumbling blocks, each of which purports to represent the Muslims when, in fact, they represent anti-Islam. Why are the Muslims deliberately lumped with nation-states that have no validity in Allah's (ﷻ) Book and then purport to speak for Muslims, while the Jews cling to a Zionist Israel in a largely un-public way hoping that it can represent them but ambiguously oblivious of its destructive nature? Therein lies the inescapable clash between this whole history of misunderstandings, especially insofar as it is exploited by those who are in power on all sides — "Jews" and "Muslims" alike. And those who say they are "Christians" are just as guilty by taking the side of the power structures — illegal as they scripturally are — in the Holy Lands.

Kings and Presidents Are Not Exempt from Justice

As its subject is always current, this next lesson needs to be considered in detail and subjected to more input and analysis to discover its essential features and meaning. The Qur'an — Allah's (ﷻ) ever-truthful word — is not shy or elusive when it comes to the highest offices of the land. Kings, presidents, and other chief executives may hold sway over taxpayers and consumers, who are their subjects in many godless societies, and even in societies that embellish their outward appearances with religious traditions and spiritual

customs. But here in this forthright Qur'an, it is immediately clear that "big shots," VIPs, honchos, and party bosses are not excluded from Allah's (ﷻ) program of justice. The Qur'anic narrative here begins with what Allah (ﷻ) had revealed in the Torah,

Verily, it is We who bestowed from on high the Torah, wherein there was guidance and light. On its strength did the prophets, who had surrendered themselves to Allah, deliver judgement to those who followed the Jewish faith; and so did the [early] men of God and the rabbis, inasmuch as some of Allah's writ had been entrusted to their care; and they [all] bore witness to its validity. Therefore, [O Children of Israel] hold not men in awe, but stand in awe of Me; and do not barter away My *āyāt* [power presence in life] for a trifling gain: for they who do not judge/rule in accordance with what Allah has bestowed from on high are, indeed, deniers of the truth [about Allah!]

And We ordained for them in that [Torah]: a life for a life, and an eye for an eye, and a nose for a nose, and an ear for an ear, and a tooth for a tooth, and a [similar] retribution for wounds; but he who shall forgo it out of charity will atone thereby for some of his past sins. And they who do not rule/govern in accordance with what Allah has revealed — they, they are the terminators of justice (*ẓālims*) (5:44–45).

All scriptures and prophets were reflective of a divine will. As this divine will is inclusive of man's social arrangement on earth, it takes into consideration the frailty and the force of the human potential. The sequence of human history is inevitably attached to this divine will. The ups and downs, the affirmation and the denial of God, as well as man's obedience and disobedience of God are all intertwined into this historical construct. Never did Allah (ﷻ) intend for His Scripture and His Prophet (ﷺ) to become parts of a receding past, or some idealistic notions, or even some theoretical

propositions out of which man may develop his own secular values and laws. It was never intended for the oldest and newest “Testaments” to be psalms and hymns that are vocalized in temples and edifices for the worship of the deity. When a scripture and prophet are downgraded and constricted to “religious value orientations and moral preaching” they no longer serve the purpose for which they were commissioned.

There is no doubt that Allah’s (ﷻ) scriptures and prophets teach morality and good behavior; these are integral and essential parts of His overall will and purpose of life. But the insistence on values undergirded by morality should extend into the larger effort of remaking and remolding society in accordance with the will of the Creator. A moral impulse needs a legal complex of the same source and nature. Human existence and social life cannot progress in a significant and meaningful way without a symbiotic relationship and a complementary kinship between what is moral and what is legal. The conscience in man’s soul and the court in man’s society have to be of the same formative material. If they are made of separate and incompatible notions, ideas, and convictions, then life will become, in one way or another, miserable, objectionable, and harmful.

In our free-for-all world today there are many authorities ripping at man’s heart and humanity. In most contemporary societies, the internal convictions of man are said to belong to God while the external codes belong to Caesar. To heighten the schizophrenia, this world’s punishment is supposed to be man-made while the coming world’s punishment is supposed to be God-made. This world of run-amok multiple authorities is tearing humanity apart: religiosity is pulling it in one direction and civic formalism is pulling it in another. This type of worldwide social upheaval is pointed out in other sections of this resolute Qur’an, for example,

...had there been in both of them [heaven and earth] deities [with authority] other than Allah, both [those realms] would surely have fallen into ruin (21:22);

But if the truth [validity and legality] were in accord with their own [human] likes and dislikes, the heavens and the earth would surely have fallen into desolation, and all that lives in them [would long ago have perished]! (23:71);

And, finally, [O Muhammad], We have set you on a course by which the purpose [of faith] may be fulfilled: so follow you this [course], and follow not the likes and dislikes of those who do not know [the truth of this matter] (45:18).

Let it be known that every *dīn* is a series of steps to be followed and a host of goals to be accomplished. This is equally true of what are generally called “primitive” cultures or societies, such as the public recollections of ancient Egypt, Greece, and Persia, as well as more recent societies such as Arabia and America. The absent fact that is being “unearthed” here for all to see is that human life anywhere and everywhere, anytime and all the time, is being presented with a moral law and a lawful morality that go hand-in-hand and side-by-side. The thinking human being has to rediscover this scriptural and eternal fact: progress and advancement in the human condition occur through the integration of God’s values with the collection of rules imposed by His authority. This whole subject matter begins with reference to the Torah, **“Verily, it is We who bestowed from on high the Torah, wherein there was guidance and light...”**

The Torah in its original wording and meaning is Allah’s (ﷻ) scripture that was meant to steer and escort the Children of Israel in the right world-to-God direction. It was meant to show the Israelis their course of action unto God, the more so because of their peculiar history in Egypt, where they were forced to serve one master in everyday life, and another one in their religious life. Hence in order to liberate their hearts and minds to the service of the one and only Lord, in the Torah there was that intrinsic and necessary intermixing of what is moral and what is legal; that is, all

morals and laws issued from the same divine source. This is an expression of what the Qur'anic generations understand to be *tawhīd*. The Torah delivered to the descendants of Israel a *sharī'ah*,

On its strength did the prophets, who had surrendered themselves to Allah, deliver legislation to those who followed the Jewish faith; and so did the [early] men of God and the rabbis, inasmuch as some of Allah's writ had been entrusted to their care; and they [all] bore witness to its truth [and validity] (5:44).

In today's worn-out understanding of this Islamically preserved fact about the history of the Israelis, the legal side of Judaism is referred to as Halakhah. It embraces not only the practices and observances of the Jewish religion but personal, social, national, and international relationships as well. The word comes from the Hebrew word *halak* meaning *to go*. In the Bible the good life is frequently spoken of as a way in which persons are *to go* (author's emphasis in italics),

The Lord your God which goeth before you, he shall fight for you, according to all that he did for you in Egypt before your eyes; and in the wilderness, where thou hast seen how that the Lord thy God bare thee, as a man doth bear his son, in all the way that ye went, until ye came into this place. Yet in this thing ye did not believe *the Lord your God, who went in the way before you*, to search you out a place to pitch your tents in, in fire by night, *to shew you by what way ye should go*, and in a cloud by day (Deuteronomy, 1:30–33).²⁵⁸

Halakhah is the distinctive feature of Judaism as a religion of obedience to the word of God. It includes jurisprudence, worship, ethical injunctions, and ceremonial observances.

The chief difference between Orthodox and Reform Judaism depends on their different attitudes to the Halakhah. Orthodox Ju-

daism considers the Halakhah to be absolutely binding since it emanates from God. Reform Judaism, while guided by the legal decisions of the past in some areas, rejects the absolute binding force of the traditional Halakhah. Conservative Judaism has a midway position. It treats the traditional Halakhah as binding, but it feels somewhat free to interpret it. It attempts to preserve the dynamic principle of legal development which, it claims, is typical of the talmudic period.²⁵⁹

In the distorted and racist understanding of whatever remains of the Torah, a strong current of influential and wealthy “Jews” have conjugated (combined or joined reversibly) their “morality” and “legality” into today’s nation-state called Israel. The Jews and Muslims both seem to have a common agreement felt in the core of their beliefs that God’s moral and legal instructions are inseparable. The very tense and divisive issue is on locating and identifying what exactly is this conjugation. Is it what the Jews have today in the Torah? Or is it what the Muslims have today in the Qur’an? In one instance, this difference works itself out into a political nation-state called Israel that seems to be endorsed by the majority of those who call themselves Jews. Diametrically juxtaposed to that are the political nation-states in what used to be the unified Islamic Ummah that are not endorsed by the majority of people who say they are Muslims.

However, despite the contemporary differences between Muslims and Jews on the inseparability of morality from legality, in the immediate consequence of the Torah there were complying prophets who went by the legal standards of the Torah; the divine pronouncements as recorded therein were their reference in matters of law, jurisprudence, and governance. They were not ruling from a position of selfishness or self-centeredness. They were aware that authority belongs to God, and as His agents on earth, they were invested with the responsibility of institutionalizing this authority. Their jurisdiction at that time, however, did not or could not stretch beyond their own tribal or “national” frontiers. Entrusted with the same responsibility of conventionalizing God’s authority on earth were rabbis and sages, who were also the scholars and judges in those times. In

doing so they were witnesses to the fact that there can be people on earth administering the revealed directives of God, and there can also be a practical dimension to God's laws.

Whenever there appears to have been a successful application of God's integrated scripture, there also seems to have been an accompanying risk of losing that experience. This insecurity comes from an internal fear of other people, usually vested interests primed to maintain a status quo of class differentiation, who are against such understanding and such practical application of His revealed word to the human condition. It is here that Allah (ﷻ) wants the Muslims to learn from their predecessors, those who were assigned the Torah,

Therefore, [O Children of Israel] hold not men in awe, but stand in awe of Me; and do not swap my *āyāt* [power presence in human affairs] for a negligible gain: for they who do not adjudge/regulate in accordance with what Allah has bestowed from on high are, indeed, deniers of the truth [pertaining to Allah's authority] (5:44).

This *āyah* preempts all attempts, which will never cease to emerge in every generation, against designating God's authority as the source of man's laws on earth. Allah (ﷻ) knew there would be spontaneous adversaries to His authority when it is implemented in man's day-to-day life. Some people cannot tolerate having God's authority as their law of the land. These atheists, agnostics, secularists, and God-deniers have a common reflex reaction to any scripture-centered authority. Most of the time, they are buttressed by tyrannical *ṭāghūt*, corporate capitalists, and hereditary kings. These influential members of society who oppose the rule and authority of God do so because it takes away from their self-centered rules and personal authority. Whether they realize it or not, this nexus of moneyed, empowered, and birthright personalities do not want to step down from their thrones of influence and become equal human beings with the rest of the people who, if left to their

state of nature with God, would want His authority to be their laws and jurisdiction.

To put it simply, the ungodly laws governing our secular world today are meant to protect and diversify the interests and the status of the elites who run the world preponderantly in a manner to accumulate as much wealth as possible in as little a time as possible at the expense of the rest of humanity. These few individuals and their elitist camaraderie enact laws that provide shelter for their exploitation, that agitate for their injustices, and that exponentially inflate their net incomes and excessive revenues. This club of the rich and influential in the secular world instinctively knows that if God's words and orders were to be implemented, it will be a system of justice whose short list of immediate tasks will include depriving them of their quick gross income.

Society in this secular world also has a subculture of vice that thrives on an ambiance of greed and covetousness. There is a class of people that makes tons of money out of gambling, money laundering, pimping, prostitution, and drugs. And these purveyors of organized crime also know that a godly order of things on earth will strip them of their lucrative, licentious, and solicitous trades. They know all too well that God's laws will flush the social context of all its vices. Laws that come from God and scripture are the extension of the moral standard; therefore, any violation of that moral standard will have to be punished harshly. There may be other interest groups and classes of people who will object to a scriptural system based on fairness and equity because they do not want tangible justice and palpable fairness to be the glue that prevents complementary human relationships from fracturing.

What the future holds is not known; however, today the major challenge to a scriptural social order based on God's eternal word are the secular establishments in the world. A historical reading of the European Middle Ages suggests that secularization originated from that era. First used to indicate the process of alienation of Church property to the state, it soon came to be applied to the loss of temporal power by the Church. Later its meaning was extended to include the process by which priests abandoned or were

forced to leave their clerical role and become laymen. Overall, then, secularization involves a transition from the religious to the nonreligious world — that is, the secular world.

In order for such a transition to take place, it must be possible to differentiate clearly between the two spheres, to distinguish the lay and civil from the religious and sacred. Consequently and inevitably in Euro-centered history, secularization implied increasing reliance on worldly criteria in the process of decision-making, the jettisoning of religiously-based or -inspired doctrines, the rationalization of attitudes and behaviors, and the Weberian imperative to apply rationality to the goals selected and to the means utilized.²⁶⁰ Accordingly, rulers would no longer be expected to follow religious doctrines but would structure their decisions according to secular criteria. As a consequence, the population at large, in its social and political behavior, would no longer feel bound to the teachings of the Church and dependent on its representatives and their religious principles. Finally, all ideologies, and not just religious doctrines and beliefs, would be abandoned and replaced by secular, rational behavior. Because some political ideologies have a quasi-religious character, de-ideologization would therefore come to coincide with the process of secularization.²⁶¹

Taken for granted and considered irresistible and irreversible, the process of secularization has encountered serious obstacles. Religious principles and criteria continue to play a significant role in the life of many individuals who generally abide by them in their social and political behavior. They can still serve as justifying principles of more than passing significance. Political ideologies may have crumbled away, but they have not necessarily been replaced by rational criteria and rational processes of decision-making. More importantly, powerful religious beliefs are still used to shape and justify the behavior of rulers, both domestically and on the international scene.²⁶²

Twentieth-century fundamentalism has acted as a drag on secularizing tendencies. Fundamentalist thought aims directly at the reconstruction of temporal power for religious organizations and their leaders. It denies the separation of the religious sphere from

all other spheres and especially from the political, social, and cultural domains. Indeed, fundamentalism affirms the supremacy of the religious sphere over all others and the supremacy of its interpreters over all other socio-political actors. It claims that religious criteria must be not only the dominant criteria but the exclusive arbiter of behavior. Thus all major principles of thought and behavior must be sought, and can be found, in the books of the prophets. Any action whatsoever should be inspired by those principles and evaluated according to those criteria. Islamic self-determination worldwide and, to a lesser degree, Jewish and Christian fundamentalism are contemporary phenomena that underscore the fact that secularization has not been completed. The proliferation of religious sects all over the world testifies to the resurgence of fundamentalism and throws doubt on the prospect that complete secularization will ever be accomplished. Encircled and endangered minorities may always resort to some immutable, fundamental principles to have hope, to strengthen their faith, to survive in a hostile world, and to justify sacrifices for a holy cause.²⁶³

The fundamental contradictions of Western rationalism and the corresponding process of secularization are exposed by current challenges. The continued significance of fundamentalism calls into question a conventional modernist view of history as continuous progress, with secularization as an important constituent process. A different conception of history seems to be in order, one that makes room for the reversal of processes, the resurgence of ideas, and the basic spiritual needs of individuals. A more subtle understanding is required of different principles and criteria for different realms of individual life, thinking, and activities. An awareness is developing in the West that religious criteria are not the only, nor even the dominant, criteria to be used. At the same time, secular, rational criteria are not the only criteria people will apply in their behavior. Secularization, although a powerful and still-undefeated process, is not all-encompassing.²⁶⁴

Though this is an undocumented fact in the mainstream books of history, there has been a persistent tug of war between prophets and their followers who are ardent about God's laws be-

coming the law of the land on the one hand and the elites of vested interests who want “God out of the political and legal affairs of man” on the other hand. Even though these elites have paid big money to have their histories recorded for posterity — they call it “legacy” — the Qur’an dispels their historical omission by unequivocally stating that man is tasked by Allah (ﷻ) to arbitrate, administer, and regulate the social, economic, legal, and political affairs of man on the basis of His scriptures. But people are wary of this responsibility; they are afraid to assume it because they will run up against the established orders, the vested interests, and the dominant powers. And so, to give confidence to those who have committed themselves in His cause, Allah (ﷻ) immediately responds to their natural human trepidation, **“Therefore, [O Children of Israel and all followers of scripture], hold not men in awe, but stand in awe of Me...”**

Fear of persecution, torture, imprisonment, and the oppressive retribution of earthly powers should never detract from the task of pressing ahead and extending the moral values of God into their natural social and legal dimensions. Of course there were and there still are commanders in chief, fascists, and dictatorial rulers who will fight tooth and nail to oppose the “imposition of religion into politics.” They simply do not want to conform to a legal standard from God that will secure even a modicum of justice. They are the first to realize that a divine legal system will translate into the loss of their commandeering positions over the controlled masses as well as the wealth they had accumulated through the imposition of their own corrupt legal strictures. It is because Allah (ﷻ) is the only source of justice that they disagree with the notion of the One God. In their highly sensitive thoughts on the matter, this would mean that there can be only one form of justice because it comes from only One Source. So they instinctively take on this proposition and try to convince their citizens that there are many sources for justice, and by playing this up, they “market” the subconscious message that there are or could be many gods.

Most of the time, these types — who use their wherewithal to create a wealth-protection industry in the form of chairs (depart-

ments) at universities, grants for visiting “scholars” at think tanks, legal representation to look for loopholes and tax shelters, and creative accountants to “cook the books” so as to stay within the bounds of the law — are looking out for their selfish interests, their accretionary revenues, as well as their habitual plundering of the earth’s resources. There are also those leeches and bloodsuckers who hate even the word *morality* and hence have no ethical motivations. Individuals who are running the sex, drug, and gambling industries cannot tolerate any type of ethics as it would threaten their livelihood. All they have to show in a secular culture is that their “businesses” are about freedom of expression, or that they create employment, and thereby provide tax revenue for wholesome activities that societies depend upon such as public education, public health, accessible transportation, etc. Such a fraudulent acquisitive culture and all the substantiations that chaperone it should never deter committed Muslims from expanding their God-based moral convictions into society, with all of what that means legally and legislatively. If there is anyone here to be feared, it is Allah (ﷻ).

Allah (ﷻ) also knows there are some “insiders” — that is to say scholars and ‘alims — who may be tempted to look the other way on this matter, because their pusillanimous posture will bring them a hefty salary, a landed position in the aristocracy, or a share of the capitalistic enterprise. Some of them may experience routine contact with people of power, wealth, and lust. In this enticing atmosphere some of these clergymen may opt to join the “prosperous class” of people and play down the social justice aspect of God’s scripture. This phenomenon, which finds its expression today in “Muslim imams,” “Christian reverends,” and “Jewish rabbis,” goes all the way back to the generation of Israel (Banū Isrā’īl). And once again, Allah’s (ﷻ) words are well-timed, “...and do not sell out My *āyāt* for a paltry price.”

Some learned people who are “in the know” about this issue will want to switch sides. They will abandon their God-given responsibility of expanding the expression of justice from a spiritual notion to a social reality by joining the earthly powers and their nexus of interests. These “scholars” (muftis, *qādis*, *ḥujjah al-islāms*,

shaykhs, and “imams”) join the secular forces either by remaining silent about this central scriptural issue, or by placing God’s words in an improper context as these words pertain to this particular topic, or by prefabricating custom-made fatwas to fit the secular and sometimes sacrilegious policies of their paymaster superiors. Through whichever method they choose to “kill this issue,” they only gain a trifling and measly compensation. Even if these “slick” shaykhs were to be given the whole world it would still be a contemptibly small amount. Of course, what they received was never anything significant even by the standards of the materialists — petty positions, junk jobs, and small salaries. What a transaction! These court-clergymen sell God’s words in this world for an exchange of the fire in the world to come.

One of the worst behaviors in life is to encounter an individual who betrays his trust. This particular case cites “religious” individuals who betray God’s trust in them. A betrayal of trust may be predictable from a criminal or charlatan, but it would be unexpected for the most part from theologians or ‘alims to betray their scriptural trust. Unfortunately when that happens, and it occurs much too frequently today, one can only feel sad for the despicable and cowardly sycophants who engage in this failure of faith and proliferation of perfidy. The historical mission of prophethood has always been centered around this theme: the actualization of Allah’s (ﷻ) scriptures into their social justice breadth and magnitude. Look around in today’s “religious” spheres — how many spiritual leaders are publicly working along this line? Not many. But how many of them have dismissed this topic from their public and private discourses? Most of them. And when the footsteps of these glaring derelictions are traced, they lead to the theologians’ silence or approval of the secular world as it goes all the way to the empowered and moneyed elites.

“For they, who do not govern/exercise judgement in conformity with what Allah has bestowed from on high, are, in fact, deniers of the truth [of Allah’s power in society].” This *āyah* candidly and evenhandedly says that anyone who does not administer his social decisions and judicial findings in fulfillment of Allah’s

(ﷻ) scripture is denying Him His attributes as the Almighty, the Sovereign, the Divine, and the Authority over man the individual, and man the society. And the word *anyone* is inclusive of canonical “Jews,” conservative “Christians,” and conventional “Muslims.” This *āyah* can also be rendered into English as, **“And all who do not rule according to what Allah has sent down [in the form of scripture], they are [for practical purposes] deniers [of His powerful authority].”**

The undeniable and emphatic content of this *āyah* has to be underscored and highlighted — because it has been buried throughout the lapse of recorded history. The crux of the matter is that individuals and societies who deny the “authoritative” disposition of Allah (ﷻ) are denying Him a central attribute of His. God’s divinity, in a sense, is centered around His authority. A god without authority amounts to a god without divinity. In other words, those who allocate authority to humans are, in a sense, deifying them. They are not deifying them in a temple of religion, rather, they are deifying them in a court of law. When someone denies the core of divinity, which is His authority, he becomes a core *kāfir*. What scriptural value is there in today’s world when people of all religious convictions pay lip service to God in their ceremonial places of religious fervency, while at the same time their “legwork” is in the service of secular governments, irreligious regimes, or laic establishments? What they say is nugatory; what they do, though, is suggestive and indicative of their fundamental convictions.

All the arguments for secularization are meant to smother this historical relationship and this immutable fact. In particular, those so-called Muslims who craft such arguments for a secular government are to be declared unfit and dishonorable. Probably the first to do so with a “scholarly” facade was ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Rāziq, and from there on, a plethora of them continued to try to convince the public that there is no such thing as Islamic governance.²⁶⁵

The Qur'an Confirms the Judicial Thesis of the Torah and Injil

In this context the Qur'an reaches deep into the history of the established "legal" aspects of the Torah. This would be in reference to some of the *shari'ah* or *halakhah* content of the Torah that was sent to the prophets, to the leaders of the Jewish congregations, and to the mentors who were steeped in scripture and scroll, reminding them of their cumulative, primary social responsibility,

And We ordained for them in that [Torah]: a life for a life, and an eye for an eye, and a nose for a nose, and an ear for an ear, and a tooth for a tooth, and a [similar] retribution for wounds... (5:45).

The general philosophy or the gist of this penal code that was revealed in the Torah is found in the Qur'an. The formal and logical underpinnings that are found in the legal format of the Torah are also found in the legal format of the Qur'an. In other words, the Qur'an has reinstated and reinforced the judicial content of the Torah and carries it as the final arrangement of justice until the world comes to its end. But in our time, the legal component of the Qur'an has been suspended due to the imposed secular governments that inundate the majority Muslim world. Some of them govern with a religious gloss and some of them govern without it. Saudi Arabia is an example of the former and Tunisia is an example of the latter, and in between there are varying shades of gray. An appreciable difference between the legal application of the penal laws in the Torah and those in the Qur'an is that the Qur'an has abated the sting or the mental pain and distress that were imposed on the particular character of the Israelis due to their obfuscatory interaction with prophets and their shifty relationship with God. This exemption found here in the Qur'an and not found in the Torah is expressed in the *ayah*, "...but he who shall forgo it [the penalty] out of charity will atone thereby for some of his past sins." The torahic penalty was strict, without a concession, without an atonement feature, and therefore without penance or expiation.

Considering legal penalties further, in the non-scriptural legal world of today, penal action, in practice, is an action taken upon a penal statute — an action for the recovery of a penalty given by statute. It is an action that enforces a forfeiture or penalty for transgressing the law. The term *penal* is broader than *criminal*, and relates as well to unlawful actions that are not necessarily criminal. The term *penalty* in its broad sense is a generic term that includes fines as well as other kinds of punishment, but in its narrowest sense is the amount recovered for violation of a statute law of the state or a municipal ordinance; the violation itself may or may not be a crime, and so the term applies mostly to a pecuniary (financial) punishment. The word *forfeiture* is frequently used in civil as well as criminal law; it is also used in actions for a penalty, though the action is a civil one.²⁶⁶

By and large, the secular mind on penal code seems to be void of the concept of equality that is enshrined in scripture. There should be an underlying and overarching architecture of equality in matters of legal justice. One life is equal to another life; therefore, equality of punishment is required. No non-scriptural penal system has taken an uncompromising approach to the equality of human life. This basis of equality dictates in matters of legal justice that a life be taken for a life, and that other parts of the human body correspond to both victim and violator in a penally equivalent way, regardless of either one's status, social class, hereditary line, ethnic origin, or racial feature.

Thus, the equality of human life necessitates an equality of justice, which means an equality of punishment; therefore, **"...a life for a life, and an eye for an eye, and a nose for a nose, and an ear for an ear, and a tooth for a tooth, and a [similar] retribution for wounds."** There is no judicial discrimination, no racism or classism, and no consideration given for power status. There may be a "master" and a "slave" mentality here and there, but when such persons enter a court of Islamic law, all are equal, because they are all from the same *nafs* (Adam – ﷻ) that was created by the same God.

This is true equality. This is when man feels that he is in a court of justice before it is a court of law, and a court of equality be-

fore it is a court of justice, and a court of morality before it is a court of equality. Adjudication and jurisdiction here belong to one set of heavenly inspired laws administered by an integrated judiciary. The moral weight of society is translated into the legal procedures of that society. Man-made laws — past and present — have never come close to this honorable and high-principled court of justice.

The Jews have deviated away from this standard of justice, which is inherent in the Torah. In their exclusivist way of looking at things, not only is there a built-in discrimination between Jews and Gentiles, there is also a class structure within the Jewish community itself. On the first level of discrimination (Jews versus Gentiles) they would say, **“We are not to be held [legally] responsible toward the Gentiles...” (3:75)**. Discrimination was also rampant among the Jewish communities in Madinah as Banū Qurayẓah was considered an inferior clan, while Banū al-Naḍīr was considered superior. The advent of Muhammad (ﷺ) brought back a sense of social justice that had its impact even on these Jewish clans in Madinah, and so the “inferior” Jew felt equal to the “superior” Jew due to the social climate of an Islamic “legal” standard.

The basis of this legal system forces a criminal to think very seriously about the crime he is about to embark upon. Anyone who may be contemplating “murder” or “homicide” will want to reconsider because the punishment is death. Injuring another person means that the same injury will be legally inflicted on the villain. No social status, community connections, or racial features can be leveraged to ameliorate, modify, or curtail the penalty and punishment. If a criminal inflicts bodily damage on an innocent victim, then that same bodily damage will be inflicted upon the violator. The head, the limbs, and the trunk of the human body are sacrosanct; therefore, any harm or injury inflicted without justification upon an unfortunate person who suffers from another’s infliction of bodily harm and injury will be requited in kind as a sentence from a court of justice and law.

This goes a long way toward satisfying the urge and need for justice in human nature. The aggrieved side, after such punishment is carried out, does not feel an impulse for revenge or that justice

was not done. This puts an end to what happens with some people who want to “take the law into their own hands” as they may feel the court was lenient in its judgement. Some people are prone to behave that way; however Allah’s (ﷻ) laws were not meant to satisfy these people. Rather, they are there to do justice, and doing justice allays the psychological feelings for retaliation. With that being said about reciprocal punishment, there is nonetheless an alternative: the aggrieved or victimized side in a court of justice is given the option of accepting financial compensation, which is a monetary equivalent for the harm and injury inflicted on a victim. Some people are calm and understanding enough to accept such compensation and they have the right to do so; but others are not, and in such a case the scriptural punishment is due.

The legal spirit found in the Torah and the Qur’an underscores justice; and when people know that justice is the main concern it assuages their feelings of rage and sometimes uncontrollable passion in the aftermath of a serious crime. Human nature is ennobled by this approach.

In the case of a Qur’anic court of justice, the violated and abused party is given the option of sparing a human life by accepting financial compensation (*diyāh*); hence, **“...but he who shall waive it [the physical punishment] out of charity will atone thereby for some of his past sins.”** This can be done by accepting a monetary compensation in lieu of the physical punishment, or it can be by relinquishing both the physical punishment as well as the financial recompense. All this is, strictly speaking, the choice of the victim or his assignees (should he have been killed). In certain instances, the judge may also suggest a secondary form of punishment if his understanding of the case and his experience suggest it. This is an exemplary gesture by the victim’s party and in this regard Allah (ﷻ) Himself will be forgiving, generous, and exonerating toward those who take the high road and choose to forgive.

In their ongoing moral development, a few people reach a stage where they realize that they themselves, as victims of a crime, will have gained nothing substantial by permitting the court to severely punish the criminal(s). Money to them is not compensatory.

And taking away another person's life (in case of murder) is not going to bring back the deceased's life. So what is to be gained by killing a killer — especially when there is significant hope that the killer will — after atonement — become a better person? The only other thing left is to have hope in the mercy, blessings, and rewards of Allah (ﷻ). And this is certainly an option in a court of justice.

This is how clear the issue of law is in the Qur'an. The religious establishment of the Jews, though, has muddied up this whole institution. In their own literature, in a nutshell, they tell themselves that since the Gaonic Period, the Talmud has been accepted as the code book for the regulation of Jewish life.²⁶⁷ However, it does not have the outward form of a code since, besides lacking strict schematic arrangement, it contains long extraneous discussions and presents a variety of opinions among which the practical decision is not always readily apparent.

By contrast, logically ordered books of law codifying talmudic and later decisions were composed at different periods. The earliest such compilations are the agonic *Halakot Pesukot* and the *Halakot Gedolot*, in which the order of the laws is based on talmudic sequence. The important and still popular codification of Isaac Alfasi, also based on talmudic order, gives a synopsis of talmudic law in the original language, omitting the surrounding discussions.²⁶⁸ Where a difference of opinion is recorded in the Talmud, Alfasi mentions the one he accepts as Halakhah. He omits those aspects of legislation that are not applicable in post-Temple Diaspora life. The most comprehensive codification is the *Mishneh Torah* of Maimonides that includes all talmudic law, even that applicable solely during Temple times in Palestine. The material is rearranged according to subject-matter and the language is lucid, approximating mishnaic Hebrew.²⁶⁹

The abstract of halakhic material by Asher ben Jehiel is patterned after Alfasi's work, with the addition of the views of later authorities. His son, Jacob ben Asher, compiled the code *Arba'ah Turim* that arranged the laws logically, giving first the various opinions expressed in the Talmud and by codifiers (*posekim*), and then the author's own views, generally based on his father's decisions.²⁷⁰ This

formed the basis for the shorter and relatively summarized *Shulkhan Arukh* of Joseph Caro, who follows Alfasi, Maimonides, and Asher ben Jehiel, and in the event of a difference of opinion, sides with the two who agree.²⁷¹ Moses Isserles added to this work supplementary notes called *Mappah* giving the views of Ashkenazi scholars and incorporating their customs, which had been omitted by Caro.²⁷² On occasions when Isserles differs from Caro, Ashkenazi Jews follow the former and Sephardic Jews the latter. The combined codes of Caro and Isserles have been accepted as standard by all Orthodox Jews. Subsequent legal codifications have not found general acceptance.

This is how the Yahūd embed their own purposes, generally at variance with divine commandments, in words of their own utterance. Obfuscated in all this is the fact that God's laws have been put out of mind by their failure to simply live by them. These Yahūd have done a good job of burying God's laws into their mumbo-jumbo. Compare the above description of their own codification of laws that are supposed to be biblical with the direct, distinct, and comprehensible words of this refreshing Qur'an. What a difference!

Now the Qur'an moves on to the next generation of what were supposed to be responsible people of scripture,

And We caused Jesus, the son of Mary, to follow in the footsteps of those [earlier prophets], confirming the truth of whatever there still remained of the Torah; and We vouchsafed unto him the Gospel, wherein there was guidance and light, confirming the truth of whatever there still remained of the Torah, and as a guidance and admonition for those conscious of Allah [and His power]. Let, then, the followers of the Gospel judge [and rule] in agreement with what Allah has revealed therein: for they who do not judge [and rule] in the light of what Allah has bestowed from on high — it is they, they who are truly degraded (5:46–47).

It is a fact that Allah (ﷻ) gave Jesus (ﷺ) the Gospel. This new scripture, too, was meant to contain a program that reformulates

human life in all its activities; that is, it was inclusive of all the necessary moral and legal ingredients. The Gospel, though, placed little intrinsic emphasis on “laws” other than making a slight adjustment to some torahic laws. Be that as it may, the Gospel did confirm the legal contents of its sister-book, the Torah. That is why it espoused the Torah and did not conflict with it. The Injil (Gospel) was also a fountainhead of guidance and enlightenment — but for whom?

By now, it should be evident, due to the consistency of scripture from day one until the Final Testament, that the Gospel was meant for those who are deeply conscious and actively aware of Allah’s (ﷻ) power in man’s life and society. These are the *muttaqīs*. After the human psychology is formulated around a keen sense of Allah’s (ﷻ) power presence in society and self, it gains perceptiveness (cognition that results in understanding) and a particular predisposition toward the majesty of Allah (ﷻ) Himself. In this state of mind scripture takes on an otherwise unachievable quality. Conversely, hearts and minds that do not interact with God, His Prophets (ﷺ), and His scriptures in such a way remain cold, indifferent, and aloof of this valuable reference. His words do not move them. His books do not impress them. All the ingredients are there; what is absent is the catalyst. And it is absent in some people because they choose to ignore it, ridicule it, or reject it outright.

The Injil was meant to enliven the character and conscience of its adherents. The people of the Gospel were supposed to raise the quality of their personal and neighborly lives. As was the case with the Torah, the Injil was meant for a particular society at a particular time. Unlike the Qur’an, all scriptures before it were keyed to specific social orders, but the final revelation came to address the full spectrum of humanity on earth with all its societies, cultures, and nationalities. The Qur’an has brought out the “legal features” of its preceding scriptures and internationalized or globalized them to include all the peoples of the earth irrespective of who they may be. Hence, the people of the Injil were expected to uphold the legal standards of the Torah, after fulfilling and uplifting their moral character, **“Let, then, the followers of the Gospel judge in conformity with what Allah has revealed therein...”**

What comes to us very clearly in this extended lesson is that adherents of scripture are expected to bear in mind and to work toward the eventual augmentation of their moral selves with their social and legal selves. Thus, before the advent of Muhammadi Islam, the Jews and Christians would not have reached their scriptural summit until and unless they fulfilled the full character of the Torah and the Injil. With the revelation of the Qur'an and its prophetic implementation by Muhammad (ﷺ), they are required to stand up for the Qur'an itself as it is the embodiment of both the Torah and the Injil. It is this concluding Scripture, the Qur'an, which has not been altered in any way, shape, or form, that is binding on all people of scripture until the end of time, **"...for they who do not rule/govern in the light of what Allah has bestowed from on high — it is they, they who are truly decayed [and insecure]."**

The word *fāsiqūn* used in this *āyah* to define individuals and elites who are in violation of upholding Allah's (ﷻ) authority, which has been rendered into English here as *decayed*, denotes a generic sense of decomposition. The fact is that people in their covenant relationship with Allah (ﷻ) have a healthy bond with Him; they continue to have this vibrant bond and adherence until they begin to violate His authority by reducing Him in their minds to a distant deity who has no influence and impact on man's social structure or societal construct. This deliberate and thought-out distancing of man from Allah (ﷻ) begins to have its negative and destructive effects on human life, man himself, and his society such that they become spoiled, tainted, and insecure. Once this process takes hold with all of its ruinous consequences, the human beings who are responsible for these results are themselves called *fāsiqūn* because they have deteriorated and fallen apart from that relationship of faith, trust, and confidence in Allah's (ﷻ) power and authority. Falling short of this immutable responsibility — the legalization of morality — has already been described as God-denial and dissolution of justice; and now, degeneracy has been added to that list. All of these descriptions are final as Allah's (ﷻ) word on this subject is final.

There Is No *Dīn* without Its *Sharī'ah*

To cap off this historical continuum of scripture, the Qur'anic text now guides the reader to the climactic Scripture, to the all-encompassing *sharī'ah*, and to the consummate codification of heavenly laws to earthly humans. This is the Qur'anic Islam and the Islamic Qur'an, complemented by Allah's (ﷻ) enduring prophet, Muhammad (ﷺ). As this is the revelation to end all revelations, this Prophet (ﷺ) and this Scripture belong to all peoples of the world. The legal code and its moral underpinnings in this culminating Scripture are superior to all others and the only reference left for mankind. Henceforth, people will be held to the high standard and refined practice of justice as enshrined in the perfect Qur'an and authentic Sunnah.

The rightful, formal, and lawful content of the 23 years of Rasūl-Allah's (ﷺ) mission are part of the inclusive and extensive experience with scripture that humanity can draw on in any place at any time until the Final Day. Out of this large-scale and wide-ranging experience human beings have a workable concept to lead their lives that does not "break their backs" with its "impossible" demands. They have a social system that does not break up because of racial discrimination or class warfare, and they have rules and regulations that define an individual's behavior as well as a society's orientation. This ample richness of experience and information is indispensable for a "smooth running of society."

All of this was not meant to be an academic exercise, or a set of research topics for myriad PhD theses. The vibrancy of the Qur'an and the vigor of the Sunnah are not meant to fill the bookshelves of libraries and the hard drives of digital storage devices. Each word and meaning encountered herein within its context were meant to deliver human energy to the progressive social momentum of mankind. No human intelligence, either individual or collective, can stand in for the moral-to-legal breadth of this verbatim and undiminished Qur'an. Any substitution of man-made ideas and philosophies for this God-given gift for mind and heart is like exchanging light for gloom and iniquity. There can be no excuse for replacing the overall Qur'an and its *sharī'ah* for secular

steps in the dark. No one can entertain a pretext for trying to “unite a nation” by abandoning the Qur’an, by minimizing the Qur’an, or by “neutralizing” the Qur’an. Had Allah (ﷻ) willed, all of mankind would have been united; however, His will was that human society be what it is with all of its divisions, so that we may all find our way to Allah (ﷻ),

And unto you [O Prophet] have We vouchsafed this divine Writ, setting forth the truth, confirming the truth of whatever there still remains of earlier revelations and determining what is true therein. Exercise authority, then, among the followers of earlier revelation in conformity with what Allah has bestowed from on high, and do not follow their errant views, forsaking the truth that has come to you.

Unto every one of you [scriptural communities] We have appointed a [newfound] law and way of life. And if Allah had so willed, He could surely have made you all one single community, but [He willed it otherwise] in order to test you by means of what He has vouchsafed unto you. Compete, then, with one another in doing good works! Unto Allah you all must return; and then He will make you truly understand all that on which you were wont to differ.

Hence, exercise authority over the followers of earlier revelation in conformity with what Allah has bestowed from on high, and do not follow their error-prone views; and beware of them, lest they tempt you away from any of that which Allah has bestowed upon you from on high. And if they [the Jewish and Christian scriptural communities] turn away from [His commandments], then know that it is but Allah’s will [thus] to afflict them for some of their sins: for, behold, a great many people are iniquitous indeed. Do they, perchance, desire [to be ruled by] the law of [ungodly ideological] ignorance? But for people who have

inner certainty, who could be a better lawgiver than Allah? (5:48–50).

No one who understands the Arabic language can claim any ambiguity of expression here. There is a singular meaning delivered by this lesson. There is no room left for secularized elites who want to understate or denigrate the essential element of *shari'ah* in this *din*. After soaking up the meanings of this lesson, there can be no Muslim in his right mind who will advocate a *din* void of *shari'ah*. Even in the presence of threatening superpower nation-states with atomic bombs, nihilistic arsenals, and genocidal generals, no Muslim absorbing this lesson can cook up a circumstance or concoct a condition in which Islam is void of honoring Allah (ﷻ) as authority.

The concrete world out there, though, does have innumerable Muslims who really think they are “the true Muslims,” even as they vehemently advocate for a secular system content with relegating God to the distant heavens, having no authority over man’s life and no involvement in issues of justice. These secularists in practice and Muslims by name, who have no compunctions about evacuating their minds and societies of an authoritative God, will go to the end of the world to assert they are “pious Muslims.” Is it any wonder, then, that this dominant and ruling class of secular convictions avoids a public debate on this and similar passages in this potent and powerful Qur’an? When they deliberately fail to admire and appreciate Allah (ﷻ) as the only Authority man has, they wittingly or not, betray and blaspheme His godliness and sacredness. Allah’s (ﷻ) *shari'ah* is not ancient. Man’s modernity cannot antiquate scripture. Allah (ﷻ), His Prophets (ﷺ), and His scriptures are meant to give man guidance, direction, information, and light until there is no longer life and existence. If man accepts and affirms Allah (ﷻ), then he accepts and affirms Him regardless of culture, modernity, a specific spike in scientific or technological advancement, or whatever occurs in human history that makes man rationalize a “superiority” over the divine.

So as to be able to thoroughly delve into the social context in which these *āyāt* were disclosed, it would be instructive to present

some background information about the secular mind and how it views the relationship between religion and politics. The secular disintegration from scripture suggests that religion relates to politics in a number of ways, all of which of course are often intertwined,

1. there are nuances in its interaction with the nation-state, which is now the standard political arrangement throughout the global community;²⁷³
2. many religions are powerful worldwide forces and thus affect international arrangements;
3. religious conflicts can intensify divisions within and between nation-states;
4. religious values are often invoked to justify and legitimize political action and political arrangements, and this links with ways in which they affect voting behavior and other manifestations of political behavior or political struggle;
5. religious institutions themselves play a role within the inner workings of nations; and,
6. the behavior of political leaders often owes something to their religious beliefs.²⁷⁴

Whereas premodern arrangements varied widely between west and east, north and south, the nation-state as understood today is roughly homogenous, and by treating it in relation to religion, this might be a useful analytical tool in surveying the global scene and preparing the path for a more extensive historical analysis. In describing interactions the usual (secularist) approach is to adhere to a rather traditional definition of religion, which emphasizes belief in the transcendent or supernatural, to distinguish religion from secular ideologies such as Marxism, though in practice such ideologies may function like religions.

The classical modern nation-state, as developed in 19th-century Europe, was linguistically and culturally based. Regions such as Germany, Italy, Norway, and Poland acquired self-consciousness in part through the creation of modernized national languages and literatures. But religious affiliation could also stand as an additional marker of identity — for instance, Catholicism in Poland could

help to define Polish identity, although this immediately created problems for minority groups. There could also be conflict between religion and nationalism as with Italy, because Italian unification was bound to destroy the Papal States. Further, the ideology of much of 19th-century nationalism was liberalism, and the conservative traditionalism of the papacy resisted this. In Italy it was only after World War II (WWII), with the coming to power of the Christian Democrats (effectively a blend of Catholicism and liberal democratic ideology), that the Church was able or willing to play a fully effective role in Italian national politics.²⁷⁵

In some cases the marker of national identity is itself religious or ideological. For instance, despite Protestant leadership in the 19th century, Ireland's nationalism has been defined through Catholicism, and in contemporary Northern Ireland the split occurred along religious lines between the two main ethnic groups. Even before the breaching of the Berlin Wall, the German Democratic Republic's (East Germany) *raison d'être* disappeared with the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism as its official ideology, given too that the masses were disillusioned with it.²⁷⁶

Where religious divisions were significant, linguistic nationalism might serve to cement the nation, itself the focus of ultimate loyalty, as in 19th-century Germany. In the United States, things were different: there was a nation defined through a constitution, where the separation of church and state came to be thoroughly realized despite the religiously homogeneous, primarily Protestant, character of its history up to the 19th century (obviously such a reading of history marginalizes the Native American and African American narratives as a part of American history), when Catholic and Jewish migrants began to arrive in large numbers.²⁷⁷

Japan, though mainly a Buddhist country, reshaped itself in a different key through the Meiji Constitution of 1889, which defined the national ethos as racial and political analog of Shinto ritual. Even though the constitution declared Shinto not to be a religion, nonetheless, it endorsed freedom of religion; however, the doctrinal dimension of Shinto, never strong, was eliminated, in favor of aggrandizing the myth of the imperial family and its divine

descent. Shinto was seen as an integral part of the *kokutai*, or national essence.²⁷⁸

The breakup of the Ottoman and Habsburg political structures after World War I (WWI) led to further national development, giving rise in Europe to a number of new linguistically-shaped nations. The most significant long-term occurrence was the ideological inception and ultimate realization of the offensive Zionist state. Although the Zionist movement was secular and socialist in ethos, the definition of Jewishness could not escape the religious question: was it not because of the observance of Judaism that the Jews had come to be a separate people?²⁷⁹

The position of minorities throughout the new, nationally oriented Europe was untenable; in particular, hyper-nationalism was a main factor in the growth of what became known in the West as anti-Semitism. Pre-modern religious epistemology (the philosophical theory of knowledge) also played a part as Lutheran and Catholic anti-Jewish thinking was predicated on the assumption that revelation was plain and so the Jews, in neglecting the Christian interpretation of the Old Testament, were willfully rejecting the truth.²⁸⁰

The spread of colonialism contributed to the development of nationalist identity among subject peoples, taking various forms relative to religion. In India a modernized Hindu ideology of tolerance of different religions as so many paths to the one truth provided the content of a new sense of India as a single, however diverse, people. After independence, India's constitution was outwardly pluralist, though in acknowledging partial rights to the Muslims and other minorities it slowly began to provoke a backlash among Hindu nationalists. A large segment of India's Muslims, moreover, parted from the Republic of India, creating Pakistan. Like other predominantly Muslim countries Pakistan has experimented with a partial imposition of Islamic law, which consequently caused some problems for minority groups. But secularized religion was not strong enough to bind East and West Pakistan together: the Bengali-speaking eastern province became Bangladesh in 1971.²⁸¹

The colonialist-cum-nationalist impact in the Arab world gave birth to pan-Arabianism, which tended toward secularism. Subjecting Islam to secular nationalism proved a convenient tool for some heads of state, most notably in the case of Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāṣir. Secular pan-Arabianism peaked in the 1950s and early-1960s only to crash in the 1967 debacle with Zionist Israel. Attempts to unite countries on this basis have failed; whereas Islamic self-determination is a growing movement in various major Arab countries from the steppes of Asia to the bushlands of Africa. A soft hypothesis of religious unity has been a major instrument in governing predominantly Muslim Indonesia, which because of its geographical and cultural configuration is prone to autonomies.²⁸²

Many formerly Buddhist countries have come under Marxist rule. Because Marxist ideology is aggressively antireligious, traditional religions have suffered greatly in these circumstances, and especially when, as in the case of Tibet, national consciousness is vitally religious as well as linguistico-cultural in nature. But in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, China, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), traditional religious practice was mostly suppressed until the mid-1980s. On the other hand, a strong Sinhala Buddhist nationalism became evident not very long after the independence of Sri Lanka in 1948. In 1956, Solomon W.R.D. Bandaranaike campaigned under the slogan “Sinhala only.” This linguistic enthusiasm was the cover page of a manual (movement) to restore the glories of a medieval Buddhist state. It led to deteriorating relations with the Tamils, an uprising among young Sinhalese radicals (the People’s Liberation Front) in 1971, and eventually civil war in 1985. Sinhalese Buddhist ideology did not have a suitable theory for the place of Hinduism (practiced by Tamils) or other minority religions (Islam and Christianity) in a Buddhist Sri Lanka.²⁸³

In sub-Saharan Africa the relations of a religion to the nation are even more complex because of the ethnically irrational colonial boundaries. Since so many of the political elites were trained in missionary schools, there is a presumption of Christianity as the ruling ethos; but in some areas the new states must try to balance

Islamic, Christian, and indigenous African practices, as in Nigeria. An interesting evolution occurred in South Africa. After the Union of South Africa was founded in 1910, the humiliated Afrikaners systematically began to work for power, realized in 1948, and then for the imposition of apartheid. They had constructed a language and literature (Afrikaans), and used the ethos of the Dutch Reformed Church to underpin their conception of the political order.²⁸⁴

Some of the effects of religion on nationalism can be seen operating in the successor states of the Soviet Union since 1989. Christianity has helped to reinforce culture in the national struggles of Armenians and Georgians against contiguous Muslim populations. Revived (Eastern) Orthodoxy, after its taming during the Marxist period, has helped to intensify Russian identity, and so on.²⁸⁵

In addition to the religious factor in the composition of national identities, there is the increasingly transnational character of major and minor religious traditions and ethnic groups. This often has great political significance, because diaspora migrants can use their economic and political influence abroad to help movements at home. For instance, in the 1980s, Sikhs in Britain, Canada, and the United States strongly supported the movement for an independent Sikh state (Khalistan) in the Punjab. Tamils abroad have taken part in the struggle for autonomy in Sri Lanka. Diaspora communities may be doubly effective: firstly, they are likely to be more prosperous than their coreligionists at home; and secondly, because their identity is ambiguous, they are likely to contain people more fanatically motivated to tradition as a means of overcoming the ambiguity. This is one factor, for instance, in the migration of some Jews to occupied Palestine, out of a hyperactive sense of renewed commitment to the faith, and this reinforces some of the groups, such as Gush Emunim, which combine nationalism and religious fervor.²⁸⁶

In debating the concept of civil religion, some in the secular West draw attention to the way in which the nation itself functions as a focus and vehicle of pieties that are analogous to those of traditional religion. Patriotism has the dimensions of religion, having

for instance, a mythic or narrative, an ethical, an experiential, a ritual, an organizational, and material dimensions. History as taught in high school textbooks sums up much of the myth of the nation and refers to its heroes and saints, such as successful generals, presidents, poets, artists, and so on. The national ethos is presented through civics and in the inculcation of the values of the good citizen such as, for example, willingness to fight, ability to raise a family, honesty, etc. The experiential dimension is expressed through the feelings of glory and upliftment found in the celebration of the nation. The ritual dimension is expressed through the flag, the national anthem, state ceremonies, television presentations on solemn occasions, tours of national monuments, etc. The organizational dimension is woven into the development of ritual (the military, the president, the schoolteacher, and others are significant members of the social pattern of the nation). The material dimension is found in the monuments, the land itself, the artwork and architecture of the nation, and military hardware. What is lacking in terms of the comparison is a highly developed doctrinal dimension, and this is why the nation-state, to justify the great sacrifices it demands of individuals (and we may note how the language of sacrifice pervades war memorials and political rhetoric), tends to fall back on doctrines of "religion" or universal ideology (such as Marxism), and sometimes on both. Consequently Britain could see itself in WWII as fighting for Christian and democratic values against paganism and totalitarianism; the Soviet Union invoked its Marxist values, and in a more minor key the support of the Orthodox Church.²⁸⁷

The demand for religious or ideological justification for the nation-state arises simultaneously from the great sacrifices demanded and the weakness of mere nationalism as an ideology. But insofar as the doctrines designed to fill out the doctrinal dimension of nationalism tend to be universalistic, a contradiction can easily develop between them and patriotic values; hence Margaret Thatcher's anger at Saint Paul's Cathedral for including the Lord's Prayer in Spanish in the memorial service after the Malvinas/Falklands War.²⁸⁸ This was also true for the struggles of a minority of

Christians against the regime in Germany during WWII. Also, a ruling elite may try to impose an unpopular worldview at odds with the values of the majority of the population (for example, in Poland up to 1989; in the Shah's Iran, with its ideology of modernization and quasi-fascist celebration of ancient glory; and in the blend of Calvinism and racism in the apartheid ideology of South Africa).²⁸⁹

But the most vital strain is represented by the essential contradictions between universal worldviews and the particularities of nationalism. So, for instance, the professed democratic worldview built into the US Constitution and suffused palely with religious values comes into conflict with US foreign policy in supporting authoritarian regimes such as that of Chile under Pinochet (1973–1989) and Iraq under Ṣaddām Ḥusayn (Ṣaddām Hussein) during the war in the 1980s against Islamic Iran, both out of fear of the supposed alternative.²⁹⁰ Former US President Jimmy Carter tried to reconcile his own Christian and democratic values by using the bully pulpit as a platform to align US foreign policy with the protection of human rights.²⁹¹ The takeover of universalistic values by nation-states helps to explain the paradox of nations fighting each other under the flag of the same God (as with Germany and France in WWI). The Nazis overcame such contradiction by adopting a racially-based ideology that undergirded a kind of nationalism writ large, and so could mobilize support among suitable ethnic groups beyond the German nation. But its intellectual power was weak, although partly compensated for by the Nazi mastery of ritual.²⁹²

The secular influence upon religious universalism often makes religious values a rallying point in the critique of authoritarian regimes and in revolutionary movements. Thus Catholic liberation theology has had a revolutionary and reconstructive role in Latin America, reactionary *salafī* dogma has provided a platform for what is called al-Qā'idah (al-Qaeda) and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), and the Komeito has argued for the purification of Japanese politics. The prevalence of religious revitalization movements, ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and Egypt to new independent churches in sub-Saharan Africa, and from the new Christian conservatism in the United States to the neo-Hindu na-

tionalism of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, is politically significant, and itself follows behind secularization, at least up until now.²⁹³ Such movements are sometimes protests against religious changes consequent upon the adoption of liberal values (as in liberal Protestantism, post-Vatican II Catholicism, etc.); sometimes, as in the colonial world, revivalism represents a protest against the adventitious (additional, non-necessary) Western trappings of modern methods; sometimes (as in India) it is a backlash against a pluralism whereby minorities are seen as having privileges not accorded to the majority. Also, revival movements often aspire to reestablish traditional or ethnic glory perceived to have existed in the past as evidenced by some unrefined and shallow Islamic organizations influenced to a considerable degree by Saudi sponsorship.²⁹⁴ This yearning for an idealized past by impulsive, trial-and-error religious movements, a phenomenon that has endured the test of time until today, still calls for a thorough consideration of the details of this Qur'an

Traditional relationships between religion and the political order generally have not persisted into the contemporary era; some aspects of earlier arrangements, however, have survived, albeit in modernized form, as with the monarchy in England (where the queen is both constitutional monarch and head of the Anglican Church). In Thailand something akin to the old symbiosis between monarch and Buddhist *sangha* (order) persists. An aspect of older arrangements was evident in the role of the emperor in pre-WWII Japan. But by and large, previous modes of conceiving the relation of political and religious power have disappeared.²⁹⁵

In different ways, political power used to be religiously sanctified, though in general, religious institutions had some degree of autonomy. In Western Europe this independence was in part expressed through the papacy; by having a spiritual monarch the Catholic Church protected its transnational status. But the feudal system also allowed for Church functionaries, for instance the abbots of powerful monarchies, to adopt something of a baronial role. The traditional Buddhist schema involved a symbiosis between the *sangha* and the king. The latter was responsible for the

economic well-being of the order and the purification of the system through the periodic purging of monks and nuns who did not live according to the rules. On the other hand, the *sangha* guaranteed the legitimacy of the monarch. In modern times the disappearance of monarchs from many Buddhist countries means that the state functions to control the *sangha*, often ineptly because of the different basis of political power. Some would say that the Buddhist system was adapted in Hindu contexts, where the king was seen as a divine being mediating between heaven and earth: his symbolic role was managed by Brahmin priests, for example, through coronation rituals. The deep entrenchment of sacred legal values interpreted by a priestly class placed some restraints on the monarchy's absolute authority. Sometimes the political and spiritual systems were fused, as in the traditional role of the Dalai Lama in Tibet.²⁹⁶ The Chinese emperor's role was for the most part conceived within the framework of Confucian values, which also served as an ideology for the unified imperial civil service. The Confucian examination system based on classical literary and sacred texts lasted over two millennia, until its abolition in 1905.²⁹⁷

Monarchy in Muslim history was restrained by the Islamic civil society that would not tolerate the preponderance of injustice. Even this was to erode by the passing of centuries until governments in majority Muslim domains at length became secular. In the Ottoman Sultanate a partially pluralistic system called *millet* was developed, and it gave Christians, Jews, and other minorities control over their own sub-communities, which could adhere to their separate systems of custom and local law. By contrast, from the 17th century onward in Europe, the usual political system was one of *cuius regio eius religio* — that is, every principality or state had its official religion to which citizens were expected to adhere, although they were not prevented from migrating to another state to practice their own religion. While fragments of such prior systems have carried over, even these have undergone profound modification. Established religion associated with the monarchy continues, for instance, in England, but effectively the country is pluralistic; the role of the Dalai Lama has been greatly spiritualized

during his exile; the imperial functions of the Japanese emperor have been greatly diminished; and the Indian maharajas have in effect been privatized.²⁹⁸

In a secularly dominant world the influence of religious organizations on political life results in part from their weight within the interplay of institutional forces, from the ways religious values may influence voting, and from motivations and policies of individuals among the political leadership. Instances of the first kind can be found in the effects of church lobbies on issues such as abortion and divorce in the United States and Ireland respectively; the lobby in the United States on behalf of Israel (AIPAC); and the revivalist Hindu pressures on the state of India.²⁹⁹ In relation to the second, the historic non-conformist linkage with the emergence of the Labor Party in Britain, the tendency of pious Catholics in Italy to vote Christian Democrat, and Buddhist support for the Sri Lanka Freedom Party from 1956 onward deserve mention. Finally, among influential individuals whose politics were impassioned by religious belief include Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi in India; Martin Luther King Jr. in the US Civil Rights Movement; Alcide De Gasperi in the restoration of Italian democracy after WWII; Solomon W.R.D. Bandaranaike, a convert to Buddhism, in the revival of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism; Dag Hammarskjold, the mystic who was UN secretary-general; Desmond Tutu, Archbishop of Cape Town, prominent in the anti-apartheid movement; Jimmy Carter, 39th US president; Imran Khan, founder of the Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf Party; Recep Tayyip Erdogan, two-term prime minister of Turkey and head of the Justice and Development Party (AKP); and Lech Walesa, leader of the Polish Solidarity movement.³⁰⁰ Also important is the impact of anti-religious trends as seen in the lives of Mustafa Kemal, Mao Zedong, and Joseph Stalin.³⁰¹ Modern communications elevate leading religious figures to global status and give them political influence in a wider context than would have been true even 50 years earlier; for instance, the extensive travels of Pope John Paul II gave him a political role beyond that implied by the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church. The same holds true for the Dalai Lama and Archbishop Tutu.³⁰²

The globalization of institutions also affects traditional religions. The contemporary trend focuses on the formation of spiritual blocs through such organizations as the World Council of Churches, the World Fellowship of Buddhists, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.³⁰³ This accompanies a move toward a relative homogenization of faith and practice in the different religions. These moves, it is claimed, enhance the power of traditions to influence events. Such power may reflect demographic developments: for instance, the shift of Christianity southward and eastward, with its relative decay in the north and west, leading to its inception in Africa, India, South Korea, and Taiwan, and revival in Latin America. Such a shift is redolent not only of the encroachment of secularism into the European home of Christianity but also of its peculiar history with Islam, as the great concentration of non-Arabic speaking Muslim populations is in South and Southeast Asia, with Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India being by far the largest population blocs.³⁰⁴

Until the Islamic Revolution in Iran there was a tendency for political scientists to ignore or downplay the force of religion in politics. This was in part ideological — attributable to, for example, the influence of Marxist thought — and in part bias, due to an overweening secularism within the discipline as a whole. Conversely, some scholars of religion have tended, out of a sense of idealism, to neglect the political dimension of religions. Now, the range of patterns of interaction between these two critical aspects of human existence is becoming obvious, even to the novice.

With this brief sojourn into the secularist mindset and its view of the relationship between politics and religion, along with all the upheavels that have accompanied the tussle for dominance between the two, let us now consider the harmonization of man's political character with his moral character as is presented here in Allah's (ﷻ) faultless Book, or in other words the exercise of man's political will to socialize a legal morality into a moral legality, both of which issue from one — and only one — Source.

“And unto you [O Prophet] We have accorded this divine Writ, setting forth the truth...” The categorical truth of this

matter is that the Qur'anic writ comes from Allah (ﷻ). No other source can issue a scripture. No other source can be the provenance of law. And no other source can enforce its laws. All the contents of this Qur'anic judicial writ are original, valid, and current. This Qur'anic legal document tolerates no doubt or dubiousness. Everything therein, from cover to cover, is well-founded and authoritative.

“...Confirming the truth of whatever there still remains of earlier revelations and determining what is true therein.” This Qur'an is the “finished product” of scriptures. It is also the final reference on scriptural matters. If people are looking for answers to the ambiguities of life, they will find them here. If social scientists are looking for replies concerning the ebbs and flows of society, they will find them here. If jurists are looking for a legal structure to facilitate the administration of justice in society, they will find it here. The Qur'an is the master book on the “troubling issues” that have rocked human society ever since it parted company with its Maker. Let us be clear: human societies have been dreaming up and thinking up new ideologies and legal systems with good and bad intentions — and none of them has served the well-being of their respective societies. There have also been serious differences among the followers of scripture: Jews and Christians cannot agree on how to integrate the “moral” with the “legal.” And some “Muslims” are equally guilty of this awkward impairment.

Today's contracting world is beginning to live the acuteness of this lack of light and scarcity of scripture in its social organization, particularly where there is a need for a compatibility between a society's moral values and its legal principles. The fact that almost all power structures and entrenched orthodoxies have been able to deflect is that no one is going to find a satisfactory response and a fulfilling answer to these problems anywhere except in this divine Qur'an. Man may be able to put together a temporary solution to his social problems, but these problems after a short while will consume society itself if it does not find refuge and solace in Allah (ﷻ). The only valid opinions that may find resonance in society are the informed opinions of men who extract their ideas from this blessed Book. When enlightened Muslims of courage and conviction

realize this, they put themselves in a position to consider more pertinently their responsibilities,

Rule, then, between the followers of earlier scripture in accordance with what Allah has bestowed from on high, and do not follow their obsessions and partiality, forsaking the truth that has come to you (5:48).

This assignment first came to Allah's Prophet (ﷺ). He was instructed to rule among "Jews and Christians" on the standard of this sublime Scripture (the Qur'an). As mentioned earlier, there were instances in which some Jews came to Muhammad (ﷺ) asking for direction and a ruling on some of their matters. But this *āyah* is not meant to be understood as exclusively limited to that time period or to the Prophet (ﷺ) himself. This *āyah* speaks to all committed Muslims and is inclusive of all future generations. The established fact of the matter is that there will be no more prophets and no more scriptures, so all humanity has to rely on the Qur'an, Allah's (ﷻ) only unchanging and unaltered scripture.

Some people want to treat the Qur'an like they treat the Old and New Testaments; they feel confident that if they are able to tear down the Old and New Testaments, then by extension they can do the same thing to the Qur'an. This is how these Euro-American or "Judeo-Christian" ideologues cobbled together their secular substitutes for scripture, be they humanism, liberalism, capitalism, or communism. Not to be excluded, there are some "Muslims" whose minds are in sync with these masters. The only difference between these "Muslims" and their Euro-American masters is that the former worship God with a different set of rituals and have a hard time thinking for themselves. A ceremonial Muslim who has dislocated his ideological mind and his psychological confidence cannot "find" himself by a customary observance of formulaic motions.

Pluralism: Social Reaction to Nation-State Political Exclusivism

Allah (ﷻ) knew there will be times in which Muslims will think about replacing scripture with secular orientations. As a case in point, today's Muslims who are in government positions feel very much at home adopting laws and regulations that come from a mighty nation-state as opposed to those that come from the Almighty. In today's world one of the pitfalls that ensnares Muslims is called *pluralism*. This is a description of and prescription for circumstances where political power is widely dispersed, so that no one interest group or class predominates. The principal conditions for pluralism are free elections, many and overlapping interests, low barriers to ways of organizing pressure on government, and a state that is responsive to popular demands. The term is commonly applied to liberal democracies, where it is argued that a large number of pressure groups complement electoral politics in allowing citizens to get their preferences reflected in government decisions. However, the argument that pluralism is democratic has been criticized by some on the grounds that social and economic inequalities make political competition unequal. The Muslims of today do not have their facts straight: in Euro-American societies where there is only a veneer of pluralism, and that too at election time, the fact of the matter is that on the street it has been nothing more than a pipedream, an apparition that has to be constantly floated by the mainstream media so as to fool the people into thinking they actually have a voice in how their governments make decisions. If pluralism really did exist, then the Muslim citizens of these societies would not be the perennial targets of deep-seated discrimination and exclusion from civic responsibilities.

Muslims around the globe are routinely and unabatingly told that they are fanatics, and that their fanaticism does not tolerate the equality of the "other." The vast majority of Muslims are intentionally placed in this reactive mode by the powers that be so as to make them fall in line with the secularized established orders. All of this pressure to conform themselves to the diktat of the dominant power culture and to subsume themselves into its national interest has gestated into Muslims with a "pluralism" complex.

The word *pluralism* was created in the early-20th century within the legal and political science domains of a secular West to designate theories that strongly emphasized the importance of human associations other than the state. Previously, in its general, though rarely employed usage in English, the word simply meant, as the *Oxford English Dictionary* defined it, “the character of being plural.” It had been used more specifically in England since the 14th century to refer to ecclesiastical practice according to which one person held more than one benefice (an endowed church office giving income to its holder) at the same time. Especially after the work of US philosopher William James, it began to be applied to philosophical theories that recognized more than one ultimate principle, as in morals or ethics, for example. In the mid-20th century yet another meaning was attributed to the term by social scientists who employed it to refer to societies stratified along racial or ethnic lines.³⁰⁵

In political science and law, however, pluralism came to be attached to theoretical and empirical work that stressed the role played in political life by associations, organizations, and groups that were relatively independent of the state and one another. Typically, pluralist work in this sense was both descriptive and prescriptive, empirical and normative. From a pluralist perspective, a diversity of autonomous associations was not only a fact in democratic polities, but also desirable. However, neither pluralist writers nor their critics have always sharply distinguished empirical from evaluative judgements: it is not always clear whether their statements about pluralism are meant to be purely descriptive and explanatory, or judgements about the desirability of the state of affairs described, or both.³⁰⁶

Although efforts have been made to group different pluralist accounts into various categories, the variety of writings that might be called pluralist in orientation defies easy or simple classification. However, a historical perspective suggests three rough phases in the development of pluralism in legal and political thought, each of which can be better understood if it is seen in opposition to a contrary and more “monistic” point of view.³⁰⁷

The first, to which the term pluralism was initially and explicitly attached, arose during the first two decades of the 20th century in opposition to widely prevalent doctrines about the exclusive sovereignty of the state. For convenience, this form can be called *legal pluralism*. Among its best known advocates were Leon Duguit whose principle works appeared in France between 1911 and 1913, and Harold Laski in England, who shortly thereafter not only translated Duguit but also mounted his own attack on the idea of state sovereignty.³⁰⁸ Legal pluralists like Duguit and Laski insisted that the conception of the state as the single and wholly sovereign association was simply false as a matter of fact; moreover, no state that attempted to achieve absolute internal sovereignty would be morally justifiable.³⁰⁹

In their attack on state sovereignty, legal pluralists echoed earlier views — Greek, Roman, and medieval — that had also emphasized the actual and proper existence of associations within a political society. By contrast, later conceptions of state sovereignty advanced by Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, John Austin, and others stressed the overwhelming primacy of the state.³¹⁰ Even the French Revolution, Duguit argued, had merely substituted the sovereignty of the nation for that of the monarch, thereby creating a myth that thereafter gained hold widely throughout Europe. The myth, Duguit contended, implied not only an exact correspondence between state and nation but also the suppression in the national territory of all groups exercising independent control. Both implications, he pointed out, were denied by the facts of actual social and political life in many countries — not least in countries where decentralization or federalism maintained vigor. Some legal pluralists, including Duguit, not only insisted on the rightful independence of associations other than the state but went even further, contending that the state was simply one association among many, neither more important nor necessarily more powerful (in all circumstances) than others.³¹¹

In the 1920s, legal pluralism acquired a substantial body of intellectual supporters in the West, including, in addition to Laski, A.D. Lindsay, Dernest Barker, J.N. Figgis, and G.D.H. Cole in

Britain. During the next decade, however, interest in legal pluralism greatly declined, and thereafter it almost disappeared in Britain and the USA. Critics argued that the legal pluralists had overstated their case, misrepresenting the prevailing doctrines of sovereignty and exaggerating the relative strength and importance of associations in comparison with the state. Laski himself became a Marxist. The Great Depression of the 1930s and WWII lent greater credibility to the belief that strong central governments were necessary for general well-being, and even for the survival of democratic systems and national independence.³¹² However, the decisive blow to legal pluralism probably came from the rise of authoritarian and totalitarian ideas and systems in Italy, the Soviet Union, Germany, Austria, and Spain. These systems demonstrated beyond much doubt that a highly centralized authoritarian state could virtually eradicate autonomous associations, and certainly could deny them a significant place in social, economic, and political life. Thus, while pluralism in associational life might be desirable, and a basic characteristic of liberal and constitutional political systems, the authoritarian systems demonstrated that it was definitely not an inherent feature of all modern political systems.³¹³

From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, pluralism once again popularized the notion that the existence of associations, which are relatively independent of one another and of the state, is a fundamental constituent of modern democratic orders. This perspective, which might be called *democratic pluralism*, explicitly countered the older monistic argument, strongly endorsed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in *The Social Contract* (1762), that associations were undesirable because they expressed interests narrower than the general good. The seeds of democratic pluralism had been implicitly foreshadowed by, among many others, Alexis de Tocqueville, who in his famous *Democracy in America* (1835–1842) implicitly rejected Rousseau in contending that a rich associational life was essential to democracy.³¹⁴

With its federal system, separation of power, relatively decentralized political parties, and multiplicity of groups and associations, the United States furnished a setting that was unusually supportive

of pluralist interpretations. In 1908, A.F. Bentley set out a theory of politics that focused on the primacy of small groups; in 1929 E. Pendleton Herring described the role of group interests in the US Congress; the perspectives of Bentley and Herring on the importance of groups in US political life were adopted and systematically developed and documented by David Truman in a highly influential work in 1951. The general thrust of these approaches was opposition to the common belief, espoused not only by Rousseau but many others, that for groups to advance their own specific interests was necessarily inimical to the public interest.³¹⁵

In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the monistic alternative to pluralism likely contested by democratic pluralists was the view of a relatively unified ruling class or elite dominating political decision-making, even in ostensibly democratic systems. This monistic alternative was supported not only by writers such as Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, and Robert Michels, who held that a ruling class was an inherent condition of social life and organization, but also by Marxists and others, who contended that a ruling class was an inevitable consequence of capitalism. Democratic pluralists however contended that while serious inequalities in political resources prevented full political equality among citizens, careful empirical study of local or national governments in democratic countries failed to show that political life was dominated by an identifiable ruling class. On the contrary, empirical work demonstrated to some that public policies and decisions were often significantly influenced by different groups with different and even conflicting interests and objectives. A multiplicity of relatively autonomous associations, democratic pluralists contended, was inevitable in a democratic system because of the rights and opportunities guaranteed in democratic systems, and the advantages such associations provided their adherents. What is more, like Tocqueville, they argued that associations were a positive benefit to democracy: they served to educate citizens in political life, strengthened them in their relations with the state, helped to ensure that no single interest would regularly prevail on all important issues, and, by providing information, discussion, negotiation, and com-

promise, even helped to make public decisions more rational and more acceptable than they would otherwise be.³¹⁶

Anti-pluralist critics contended in turn that pluralist accounts neglected the defects of democratic pluralism in practice. Some critics insisted that pluralists described only the facade, behind which existed the reality of monistic rule by capitalists or business elites. Even if the ruling elite did not always control specific decisions, it indirectly maintained its domination by preventing matters adverse to its interests from being placed on the agenda of the official decision-makers. The elite, anti-pluralists argued, also manipulated public opinion creating a circularity in beliefs running from the elite to the public to elected officials.³¹⁷

While rejecting these claims, democratic pluralists agreed that social pluralism was not, by itself, a guarantee that democratic values were adequately achieved. Social pluralism, they said, was necessary to democracy; it was not sufficient. In some cases, associations might even tend to exacerbate inequalities, deform civic consciousness by exaggerating group interests, distort the public agenda, and alienate some control over decisions from the general public to the groups themselves. Yet because social pluralism is necessary, inevitable, and desirable in a democratic order, associations cannot be destroyed without destroying democracy itself. As with individuals, so with associations: independence or autonomy, though necessary to a good life, also creates an opportunity for individuals to do harm. Like individuals, associations ought to possess some autonomy, and at the same time ways should be found to eliminate or reduce the harm they might cause. How best to achieve a desirable balance between autonomy and control is, then, a fundamental problem of pluralist democracy.³¹⁸

When democratic pluralists looked beyond the USA, they observed that no single solution to this problem had been adopted among democratic countries. Democratic countries vary greatly in their patterns of cleavages and the relative strength of associations in different spheres. Judged comparatively, the USA is a deviant case. Many factors, including the relative absence of class-based organizations, the weakness of trade unions, and the persistence of

cross-cutting cleavages, make pluralism in the USA markedly different from that in many other countries. At the opposite extreme are countries where national bargaining between employers and unions that include most of the labor force leads to agreements supported by the government, and carried out by legislation if need be. This “corporatist” variant of democratic pluralism, so unlike the pluralist patterns in Britain and the USA, has existed not only in Sweden but in some form in the other Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Austria as well. Thus because of historical and societal factors, the shape of democratic pluralism comes in many varieties of which the USA provides only one, and probably an irregular example.³¹⁹

If pluralism is an inherent aspect of modern democracy, and at the same time the specific patterns of pluralism vary enormously among democratic countries, the critiques of democratic pluralists by anti-pluralists in the USA appear to have focused, more narrowly than they usually made clear, on the particular achievements and defects of democracy in the USA.³²⁰

In the 1980s, the desirability of pluralism became a rallying cry for opponents of the theory and practice of authoritarian rule in communist party states, particularly in Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union. Like legal and democratic pluralists earlier, anti-authoritarian advocates of pluralism insisted on the need for independent associations in political, social, and economic life. Although they developed no single or systematic doctrine, in contesting the monopoly of power of the state and insisting on pluralism as a necessary ingredient of the democracy they aspired to, these anti-authoritarian pluralists could be understood as an amalgam of both legal and democratic pluralism.³²¹

Liberalization and democratization in these countries soon revealed the fundamental problem of democratic pluralism mentioned above. Through their newly formed associations many people gained a voice, and influence, and a degree of freedom in political life they had hitherto been denied; at the same time, the interests and goals advanced by some groups were seen by others as clearly harmful. Thus the introduction of pluralism inevitably

brought with it the need to confront the inescapable dilemmas of pluralist democracy.³²²

The above constitutes a foray into the human intellect when it tries to deal with one social issue — that is, pluralism. However there are many other social issues that have constituted problems for society, past and present, and for which man has spent a great deal of effort trying to reconcile to his state of nature. Democracy is yet another one of these human attempts to find a pattern for governance in the absence of scripture. The same can be said about equality and inequality. Marxism, political parties and political competition, authoritarianism, corporatism, interest groups, and totalitarianism all constitute human efforts that do not bring society to its state of nature. Try as they may, all the political scientists, philosophers, and ideologues have failed miserably to place human society in its state of equilibrium in the absence of direction from Allah (ﷻ), His Prophet (ﷺ), and this letter-perfect and word-perfect Qur'an.

In our Islamic literature there are accounts of incidents and events in which the Yahūd suggested they would comply with the Prophet (ﷺ) if only he would agree to be lenient and easygoing on some scriptural penalties, especially the stoning of adulterers. This intra-scriptural difference between a committed prophet and community on one side and a derelict Yahūdī society on the other may have accounted for this divine response as stated in these heavenly *āyāt*. Be that as it may, the gist of this lesson is to concentrate on the general breakaway attitude that is exemplified by the Yahūd and their superficial and devil-may-care relationship with the word and meaning of God and scripture. This attempt at slipping away from the moral standards of scripture and the socializing thereof so that the result will become the law of the land is observable in many societies and circumstances; it is a part of human history. Allah (ﷻ) here is preempting this human tendency that wants to dilute the value of morality and the natural relationship between what is moral and becomes legal on the one hand and what is legal on the basis of a moral fervency on the other. There can be no condition or set of conditions that can rationalize a disregard for the or-

ganic relationship between a common morality and a social legality. And if there ever is a tendency to “water down” God’s laws, that tendency should be referred to this Book where the principle still stands and the criterion stays clear.

Then Allah (ﷻ) says to His messenger that if He so willed He could have made mankind into one specific kind of community — without differences and endemic disputations. But He willed this humanity to have subsets of discourses and disciplines. Allah (ﷻ) has caused these social trends in human nature and society to converge on or diverge from His *dīn* and *sharī‘ah*, from His inspired ideas of right and wrong. In this convergence or divergence lies the abiding human test of all generations. What is important to remember here is the oft-forgotten fact that Allah (ﷻ) has given human beings the freedom to choose between Him or anything less than Him. This God-given freedom distinguishes who is truly committed from who is truly in denial. The final recourse, though, is to Allah (ﷻ): no one can argue with the fact of death, from which point we will no longer have the freedom we had here in this world as we will be in His custody of justice and grace. Once there, we will know the truth about all the issues we were arguing about in this worldly life. No one can unite people running away from God with people running toward Him. And any attempt to do so by way of imposition and force is futile and possibly counterproductive. And so Allah (ﷻ) says,

And if Allah had so willed, He could surely have made you all one single community, but [He willed it otherwise] in order to test you by means of what He has vouchsafed unto you. Compete, then, with one another in doing good works! Unto Allah you all must return; and then He will make you truly understand all that on which you were wont to differ (5:48).

No amount of phony pluralism is going to unite mankind. Even if there was a militaristic government that could impose a “one-world order” there will remain a serious difference of orienta-

tion among people when they are not bound to their Creator and His word. Unity is a function of the heart. If hearts are not bonded together through a common understanding of God and scripture nothing else can bring them together. That being the case, there can be no justification for those types of “Muslims” who want to distance themselves from Allah (ﷻ) for the purpose of bringing human beings together. It does not work that way. We are all from Allah (ﷻ), we come from His will, and we will be able to find ourselves together again when we regroup around Him. Some “Muslims” are naive in the extreme when they claim they are bringing people together by separating from Him.

It is true that this Qur'an and the understanding of its counsel by Muslims has made it possible for Christians, Jews, and other “minorities” to live and dwell in a harmonious society. And this is due to the freedom that is granted to all under an Islamic umbrella of understanding, coexistence, and cooperation. But to turn tail and suggest that the only way committed Muslims can have a “closer relationship” with these non-Muslims is to dispense with this Qur'an and its ideal morality as well as with its harsh punishments, then this is a misunderstanding of Islamic history, a misinterpretation of Islamic freedoms, and a lack of confidence in what the Muslims are supposed to be.

This Qur'anic package of morality and legality is exactly that: a package, a fusion, a synthesis, and a combination of complex ideas into a homogenous whole. It is too precious to be discarded at the whims of the politically powerful and the financially filthy for the purpose of a “unity” that will remain illusory. We Qur'anically-molded Muslims should know that human beings grow into their choice of society. We should guarantee them the right to choose what society they want according to their better judgement and their benevolent will. In the process they will play with pluralism, they will experiment with egalitarianism, they will dally with democracy, and they will try totalitarianism. They will eventually fail. Our Islamic responsibility is to offer them the alternative to these self-destructive choices. And if they turn us down, we must be magnanimous enough to supervise their “wrong choice” from a po-

sition of strength that is combined with compassion and care. We should know that it is Allah’s (ﷻ) will to allow human societies to extend in different directions. We Muslims have to mature to a high level of responsibility that oversees the childish choices of people who should know better — in the same way that Allah (ﷻ) offers His guidelines and wisdom. This is the kind of attitude that captures the essence of human liberties, rights, and responsibilities.

Euro-Kufr from Church Christianity to State Secularism

What impinges on this thoroughgoing Qur’anic outline is the deliberate policies of governments and regimes that are meant to exclude human societies and communities from the opportunity of choosing between Allah’s (ﷻ) program and the programs of others. Therefore, it becomes the task of the solidified bloc of committed Muslims to rearrange the political furniture to make it possible for people to have a choice, to exercise their freedom in this important matter, and to bear the consequences. Muslims cannot be abandoning this historical and self-determining responsibility for the flimsy excuse of reconciling people together at the expense of expelling God from conscience and community. Impossible.

There have been many attempts by pseudo-Muslims to reconcile worldly “priorities” at the expense of divine priorities. Former president of Tunisia, Ḥabīb ibn ‘Alī Būrḡibaḥ (Bourguiba), who was thoroughly saturated with French ideas, became known for his westernizing reforms — some of the most far reaching in any Arab or Muslim country.³²³ He nationalized religious land holdings, dismantled religious schools and courts, and sought to abolish the Islamic fast of Ramaḍān. He also tried to Europeanize Tunisian women with legal and social disregard of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, including a campaign to end the concept and practice of *ḥijāb*.

This abandonment of the Qur’an as demonstrated by one Būrḡibaḥ is illustrative of the tier of rulers who are beholden to the secular West with all of its “fun” and fury against God. Such are the ignoramus “Muslims” who will go to their grave neither as committed Muslims nor as faithful Europeans. They have lost their earthly

world and their coming world. Neither will their memories remain among the Muslims of coming generations nor will they be acknowledged by their Western masters. Their fate is ignominy. How far afield these “Muslim” rulers are, who want to govern with the trappings of democracy to curry favor with their human masters in their European and American *qiblahs*, from Allah’s Prophet (ﷺ) who sought to rule in fulfillment of scripture and sound judgement,

Hence, rule between the followers of earlier revelation in fulfillment of what Allah has bestowed from on high, and do not follow their errant views and beware of them, lest they tempt you away from any of that which Allah has bestowed from on high upon you... (5:49).

Here Allah’s Prophet (ﷺ) is being given the authority to extend the Qur’anic scripture into the domain of the Yahūd and Nasārā. And to our great dismay today, there are “Muslim” rulers and leaders who are incapable of extending the Qur’anic authority among Muslims themselves, not to speak of the Jews and Christians. What a difference and what a distance between then and now: the high ground of Muhammad (ﷺ) and the abyss of today’s kings and presidents all around the Muslim world, or to be more precise, a world that at one time honored Islamic governance by practicing it.

The *āyah* has to be read over and over again until it becomes second nature, “**Hence, govern between the followers of earlier scripture in accordance with what Allah has bestowed from on high, and do not follow their error-prone views...**” In an Islamic social order, those who consider themselves followers of earlier scriptures, such as Jews and Christians, are expected to live according to their divine law. And Muslims are, by the understanding of this *āyah*, required to help them live by their divine law, the basis of which is confirmed in the Qur’an. But what if the widespread opinion of Jews and Christians outside Islamic jurisdiction decides not to live by scripture? What if there are “Jews” and “Christians” who prefer to live by Jewish morals and drop Jewish laws? What if there are Christians who decide to finalize the

“cleavage” between church and state by adopting a secular lifestyle, a secular standard, and a secular government? The answer is here in Allah’s (ﷻ) words,

And if they [Jews, Christians, and other scripturalists] turn away [from His commandments], then know that it is but Allah’s will [thus] to afflict them for some of their sins: for, behold, a great many people are iniquitous indeed (5:49).

In the name of modernity, governments began to turn people away from the direction of God. The word *modern* entered the center of West European intellectual debate in the 17th century, though it had been sporadically used as far back as the 5th century; ostensibly, it meant no more than *current* or *of recent origin*. And yet the context of its appearance and fast-growing popularity due to the peculiarities of the dichotomy between church and science, and then church and state, suggest a deeper meaning than merely the technical: the quality of “being of recent origin,” being newly created, had suddenly become a matter of acute interest, apparently acquiring a thoroughly novel significance. That significance derived from changing values, which now, unlike in previous centuries, favored the new over the old, denied authority to the past, and approved of irreverence to tradition and readiness to innovate, to “go where no man dared to go before.” From the moment of its sponsored entry into public discourse, the idea of the modern tended to recast the old as antiquated, obsolete, out of date, about to be (deservedly) sunk into oblivion and replaced.³²⁴

All of this is enough to have a person worry. And it does not stop here because there is a history to this cardinal deviation away from God and scripture. The idea of the modern reappeared in the 17th Judeo-Christian century as a militant concept, as the focus of contention in the so-called “Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns” that lasted in France and England for almost a century.³²⁵ Arts and literature served as the initial battleground; however, after the spectacular achievements of scientists like Newton and Descartes,

and with the Royal Society in England and more diffuse but no less influential *Les Sociétés de pensée* (the Societies of Thought) in France valiantly promoting the unprecedented excellence of new science and philosophy, the question had to be asked sooner or later whether this upward movement was the lot of science alone or of all human endeavors — particularly of creations like painting and poetry.³²⁶

The Ancients (like Nicolas Boileau and Jean de La Fontaine in France, William Temple and Jonathan Swift in Britain) defended the long-standing conviction that the peak of human achievement had been reached in Greek and Roman antiquity and that the inevitably inferior products of later generations could attempt no more than to struggle in vain to approximate its perfection.³²⁷ Earlier, such propositions were voiced routinely, seen as trivially true, and aroused no dissent. Now, however, inspired by the astonishing discoveries of the new science, this opposing view began to spread and gain in popularity. The holders of the traditional views were redubbed “Ancients” — a concept, for the “Moderns,” tinged with contempt and derision. Charles Perrault and Bernard de Fontenelle were among the most pugnacious and vociferous advocates of the modern, daring attitude, which would draw its confidence from the belief that, as in science, so in all other fields of spiritual creation, the new may be better — that is to say, truer, more useful, more right, more beautiful than the old.³²⁸ Furthermore, it followed that the potency of human reason and will was unlimited and that, therefore, human history would have been and will forever remain a relentless march upward and forward. This European experience with science and religion, finding its psychological path into Muslim minds and attitudes, would coalesce into governments throughout Muslim territories in the generations and centuries to come.³²⁹

This European or Judeo-Christian Quarrel was never conclusively resolved to everybody's satisfaction (a century later the Romantic movement resuscitated the ideas that the Moderns strove to put to rest once and for all); it just fizzled out, as the philosophical edge of the issue was blunted by the rapid pace of practical cultural change. In retrospect, however, the Quarrel may be better appreci-

ated as the condensed expression of an upheaval taking place in the Judeo-Christian European mentality: the new feeling of self-reliance and self-assurance, readiness to seek and try unorthodox solutions to any current trouble and worry, belief in the ascending tendency of human history, and growing trust in the capacity of human reason. In the 19th century, the emergent mentality itself came to be described as *modern*, and the dominance of such mentality came to be seen as one of the crucial attributes of the new age of modernity. While Euro-Christianity and its church-state dichotomy was pregnant with these modernistic arguments against scripture, or whatever was left of it, the Muslim world was absent-mindedly defending itself at the military front, not realizing that the European secular bug was already penetrating its frontiers.³³⁰

Modernity with its secular veneer may be best described as the age marked by constant change, but an age aware of being so marked — an age that views its own legal forms, its material and spiritual makings, its knowledge and convictions as temporary, to be held “until further notice” and eventually disqualified and replaced by new and better ones. In other words, modernity is an era conscious of its historicity. Human institutions are viewed as self-created and amenable to improvement; they can be retained only if they justify themselves in the face of the stringent demands of reason, and if they fail the test, they are bound to be scrapped. The substitution of new designs for old is to be a progressive adaptation, a new step up the ascending life of perceived human development.³³¹

The notion of “progress” became an idol of sorts — first to the Judeo-Christian peoples and then to the caricature Muslims. Progress is, essentially, a human trait. It consists in applying human reason to the task of making the world better accustomed to serve human needs. Whatever is seen as a human need, as a condition of agreeable life, is accorded unqualified priority over all other considerations: the non-human part of the world (nature) is in and of itself meaningless, and any meaning it may be given can derive only from the human use to which it is put. Designing an artificial, rational order of the human habitat is not an arbitrary choice; it is to some a necessity, an unavoidable human condition, for to be

habitable, the world must be made fit for the satisfaction of human needs through science-assisted technology. Science, and its technological applications, are therefore the principal sources and instruments of political, social, cultural, and ethical progress. They are both the expression and the vehicle of human material ascendancy over nature.³³²

The footsteps of European modernity would in due course inform the direction for “progressive Muslims.” To modern Europe, the consciousness of its own historicity, styles of life, and institutions that differed from those it currently approved were merely steps leading to its own “superior” condition — survivals of its own past. Other cultures, the Muslim ones included, were seen by these European modernizers as forms temporarily arrested in their development, and in this “frozen” state, retarded. This belief gave modern Europe its characteristic self-confidence as a carrier of historical destiny, a collective missionary resolve with the duty to spread the gospel of reason and to convert the rest of the world to its own faith and form of life. In case of resistance, the objects of prospective conversion could only be viewed as primitive, as victims of superstition and ignorance, whose authority (and particularly the ability to decide what was best for them) European reasoning denied in advance. The modern period in European history, and the history of countries that first underwent the process of Europeanization, was therefore an age of proselytism, one marked by colonization of the non-European world and by repeated cultural crusades aimed at the regional, ethnic, or class-bound traditions within European societies themselves.³³³

This ideological conversion from church Christianity to state secularism was invested with functions never contemplated by pre-modern rulers. It had to impose a unified order on vast territories heretofore regulated by a variety of local traditions; by the same token, it had to make the creation and maintenance of social order a matter of deliberation, conscious design, monitoring, and daily management, rather than limit itself to the observance of traditional customs and privileges. It had, one might say, to assume an overlordship position — as the concept of a deity was no longer a rele-

vant or functional one. The new tasks involved standardization of law and legal institutions across the state; unification, and often direct administration, of the process of popular education; and securing the priority of a unified secular and legal discipline over all other particularistic loyalties. It is for this reason that modern nations, in their campaign to proselytize others to their secular frame of reference, have engaged in the process of nation-building, as they themselves had assumed the form of nation-states rather than communities adopting to scriptural guidelines. Hence, they promoted national unity over ethnic differentiation, deployed nationalism in the service of state authority, and adopted the promotion of national interests as the criterion and purpose of state policies. It is for the same reason that the modern state rejects and devalues traditional entitlements to rule, such as the longevity of hereditary “rights”; and charismatic rule, which is grounded on peculiar — and superior — personal qualities of a given ruler. In so doing, it has focused on demanding discipline to its own commands solely on formal, legal grounds, that is, these commands have been issued by duly appointed incumbents of offices entitled to make rulings related to the given area.³³⁴

“And do not follow their erring views...” This temptation is almost instinctive because by all hyped-up governmental accounts, modernity (often referred to as “modern civilization,” to locate it as a distinct type of social organization and culture among other civilizations — ancient, medieval, or contemporary) has been a “remarkable success.” It has come closer than any other known civilization to the status of unfeigned universality. It seems to be on the way to becoming the first “global civilization” in history. The states of the modern world may be politically and ideologically divided and even locked in mutual conflict, but they all at the official level agree on the superiority of the secular and modern way of running human affairs and use “modern” methods and implements to assert themselves and pursue their ends. The modern form of life seems to have no serious competitors left among the forms it has displaced; it has succeeded, moreover, in confronting its own difficulties and “developmental problems” in a way that strengthens the

ascendancy of the worldview and pragmatic stance that are its most characteristic traits. Thus, this modernity is usually described as the ultimate form of historical development. Inherently dynamic, modern Western civilization yet retains its own identity. It is capable, apparently, of continuous “creativity” rather than, like other civilizations, ossifying and losing the capacity of creative adjustment to new challenges. With its arrival, the world has been split into a “modern” part and the rest, confronted with the challenge of modernization. This is the challenge today’s Muslims are resisting on the basis of the injustice that has been inflicted on the dispossessed world by the institutions and governments of Euro-modernity.³³⁵

The Muslim mind has still to absorb the social and ideological meanings cast in the *āyāt* of this Qur’an so as to respond in an intellectual and coherent way to the theoretical models of modernity. The advocates of materialistic modernity agree that dynamism is the most important task — and duty — of any theory of modernity. Beginning with the early-19th century, most analysts sought the secret of modern dynamism in emancipating human action from the shackles of custom, tradition, and communal obligations while simultaneously subjecting it solely to the criteria of efficient task performance. In line with Karl Marx’s picturesque expression, “everything solid melts into air, everything sacred is profaned,” once the authority of tradition had been sapped and denied, nothing could prevent human courage from setting ever more ambitious tasks and designing ever more effective ways of performing them. It is the match between means and ends that would now decide which course of action would be chosen.

Elaborating on the ideas of the 19th-century German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, US social theorist Talcott Parsons surmised that in modern times the traditional ways of assessing actors and their actions have been reversed.³³⁶ Accordingly, action is now judged “out of context,” independently of the socio-cultural setting in which it takes place and the social standing of its human objects — solely according to the universal rules of adequacy and efficiency. By contrast, actors are judged by their specific performances relevant to the task at hand, not by their general qualities. What

truly counts is what is being done and how, not by whom and why. Selection of action is freed from all criteria — personal loyalties, political commitments, and moral norms, for example — that are irrelevant to the pursuit of the task at hand.³³⁷

Division and separation are indeed constant themes in the theoretical discourse of modernity. The German sociologist Max Weber proposed that the separation of business from household was the constitutive act of modern economy. Because of that separation, business decisions were “emancipated” from the pressure of moral obligations and personal commitments that guide family life. In still more general terms, the significance of separation was further elaborated by Immanuel Kant.³³⁸ In reference to his division between pure reason, practical reason, and judgement, many theorists of modernity, notably Jurgen Habermas in Germany and Ernest Gellner in Britain, consider the separation and mutual autonomy of the discourses of truth, moral norms, and aesthetic judgement (setting apart the spheres of science, ethics, and arts) as the most distinctive and decisive feature of modern mentality and practice.³³⁹ Beginning with Adam Smith, division of labor and splitting of complex functions into smaller and more manageable tasks has been seen as the most conspicuous factor of modern efficiency and productivity.³⁴⁰ Emile Durkheim, French sociologist of the early-1900s, saw in the progressive, ever more minute division of labor the substance and the motive force of all aspects of historical development.³⁴¹ The more complex the division of labor, the simpler and more straightforward are separated functions; therefore they may be better mastered and more efficiently performed by specialists, who can now concentrate fully on effective means of “problem resolution.” And so, expertise becomes a trademark of modern economy, science, art, and politics alike.³⁴²

All fields of modern life, as Weber insisted, tend to become progressively rationalized. Action is rational (in the instrumental sense) insofar as it is oriented toward a clearly conceived and well-defined end, and thereafter based on the calculation of relative efficiency of alternative means to achieve it. Rational action is guided by motives and purposes, amenable in principle to conscious

scrutiny and correction, and not determined by forces of which the actor is unaware or over which he has no control. Rational action splits the context of performance into ends and means, and is guided solely by the effort to match the second against the first. Action is rational (again, in the instrumental sense) insofar as it consists of such decision-making and choice, even if a specific choice made by a given actor in the here and now is not the best conceivable one or is even the downrightly mistaken one. Indeed, most choices stop short of the ideal. Means may be miscalculated because of inadequate or erroneous knowledge. Moreover, task-oriented activity is seldom free from interference by “impure” factors — like the actor’s uncontrolled habits and traditional loyalties, affections that get in the way, or commitment to values that interfere with the efficient performance of the given task — but devoting attention to these or considering them toward the achievement of an end would be regarded as irrational insofar as they are irrelevant to the task at hand. Rationality is therefore a tendency rather than the accomplished reality of modernity — a continuous, though by and large inconclusive, trend discernible in all fields of social life. For instance, according to Weber, the rule-governed, task-subordinated, impersonally-acting organization, subjected to a meticulous division of functions, strict hierarchy of command, and scrupulous matching of personal skills of incumbents to the objective requirements of office, is the specifically modern, rational form of government.³⁴³

The other side of rationalism is the taming or suppression of everything irrational, that is, everything that interferes with the work of reason and detracts from the pragmatic effectivity of action. This irrational element in human behavior is called passion, which has been construed as the major obstacle on the road to the rule of reason. Modern civilization is prominent as much for its suppression of passions as for its promotion of the rationality of human conduct. More than in any other sphere, rational organization of society consists in controlling, defusing, incapacitating, or channeling away human instinctual drives and predispositions. A thorough analysis of this other, dramatic face of modernity is associated first and foremost with the work of Sigmund Freud.³⁴⁴ According to

Freud, modern civilization substitutes the “reality principle” for the “pleasure principle” — the first being the necessary condition of peaceful, secure coexistence, the second being a natural predisposition of humans that clashes with the first. In practical terms, this substitution means constraint: pursuit of happiness is limited by the consideration of what is possible to achieve without paying costs too excessive to conceive of the effort as worthwhile. Partial security is obtained in exchange for at least part of the individual’s freedom. Adequately civilized behavior is marked by self-constraint; society, so to speak, “leaves a garrison in a conquered city” in the form of the socially trained individual conscience that prompts the individual to suppress such urges as may fall in conflict with the socially approved norms.³⁴⁵

In his study of the modern condition, entitled *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud theorized that modern civilization inevitably breeds discontent and resistance, and that its perpetuation thus involves an element of mental or physical coercion. The picture of modernity that emerges from Freud’s analysis is far from peaceful and benign. The rule of reason has psychologically traumatic consequences. From the individual’s point of view it cannot be an unambiguous blessing, as it leaves quite a considerable part of human needs downgraded, unattended, or starved. This is why reason’s rule is continuously resented and can never be complete; it will go on prompting rebellion against itself. Again and again, people pressed to abide by the cool and unemotional rules of calculation of costs and effects will rally instead to the defense of suppressed affections, natural urges, and the immediacy of human contact.³⁴⁶

Another rendition of the inner contradiction and ambiguous impact of civilization — modern civilization in particular — can be found in Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of a spontaneous and instinctual “Dionysian” rebellion as a constant, only barely tamed threat, ever again boosted by the “Apollonian” effort to construct a logical, rational, and harmonious world order.³⁴⁷ This theme, in its Freudian-Nietzschean rendition, is directly or implicitly present in virtually all of the numerous critiques of modernity as an ambitious, but in many respects abortive, project aimed at overall rationaliza-

tion of social organization and individual human behavior. Two types of critique are particularly prominent. The first — undertaken by the “mass politics” theoreticians who were inspired, in somewhat different ways, by the “elite” theory of Vilfredo Pareto, the concept of the “revolt of the masses” popularized by José Ortega y Gasset, and the “iron law of oligarch” articulated by Robert Michels — points out that, contrary to rationalistic rhetoric, modern conditions promote a blatantly irrational, heavily aestheticized mass politics that hinders rather than promotes rational choice.³⁴⁸ The second — mainly associated with the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory, which was established by the work of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, but going back for many of its ideas to the early 20th-century German sociologist Georg Simmel — uncovers the irreparable conflict between the drive to rationalize supra-individual institutional structures and the promise to render individual decisions amenable to free rational choice.³⁴⁹

All in all, resistance to rationalization has been as prominent a mark of modernity as has rationalization itself. The history of modernity is punctuated by criticisms of its excesses or even of the vanity or evil of its motives and historic ambitions. For every intellectual expression of enthusiasm for the breathtaking vistas opened by modern science, technological expertise, and political expediency, there has been a protest against the “drying up” of individuality and genuinely human affectivity. Against the modern promise of a human species empowered in its struggle to make the world more hospitable, critics have hastened to point out that even if the species as a whole gains in freedom, its individual members do not; they are denied true choice, having been “functionalized” and transformed into “cogs in the machine.” Against the utility of reason-guided problem solving, critics have defended the values of individuality, the indivisible whole, and the all-too-human right to be different, erratic, and altogether irrational. Beginning with the Romantic poetry of the early-19th century, through decadence, the militantly “modernistic” avant-garde of the early-20th century, dadaism (a nihilistic art movement), surrealism (art and literature trying to express the subconscious), and up to present-day post-

modern culture (which proclaims normlessness the only cultural norm and calls for resistance to all authority, declining even to supply a foundation for its own practice), the modern rationalization drive has been accompanied by a stridently oppositional culture bent on the defense of individual freedom and emotional experience. Cultural rebellion against the reality of society, and virtually constant antagonism between social and political practices and advanced cultural creation, whether in philosophy, art, or literature, has been thus far an astonishing — and apparently permanent — feature of modernity.³⁵⁰

An attempted explanation of this paradox is sought in the specifically modern structure of daily life and individual experience. The most salient attribute of the latter is its fragmentariness; cast into the densely packed urban environment and bound to spend most of his life among strangers, the individual finds it difficult, perhaps impossible, to integrate experience into a meaningful whole. Within the horizon drawn by individual experience, time seems to split into unconnected events and space into unrelated spots. If there is a bond of mutual dependence that unites them into a cohesive totality, such a link eludes the individual observer, facing but brief and spatially limited episodes of the drama. Modern experience, it was first pointed out by the French poet and critic Charles Baudelaire, is a sighting of a fleeting moment.³⁵¹ To be in tune with modern experience, art ought to represent the world as fragmentary and transitory — as a collection of “fleeting moments.”³⁵²

As Georg Simmel indicated, the characteristic feature of modern experience is the lack of coordination and communication between civilization as total cultural product and the snippets of cultural achievement that individuals are capable of assimilating and using as the building material in constructing their own identities.³⁵³ The sum total of cultural products far exceeds individual absorptive capacity. This fact, on the one hand, frees cultural creation from its bonds with daily life and permits thereby an infinite specialization and infinite expansion within each specialized field (hence the logarithmic acceleration in the growth of science, technology, and the arts, which exacerbates still further the original

conflict). On the other hand, however, it leaves to individuals the awesome task of patching together “meaningful lives” out of the subjectively meaningless splinters of other, unknown, or invisible totalities. While performing this task, individuals must be able to compare the incomparable and combine elements that apparently do not belong together; for this they need a strategy that, so to speak, “imposes” comparability between wildly discrepant experiences, and thus allows them to make choices while neglecting the qualitative differences between the objects of choice. Hence the intellect (capacity for abstract, formal thinking) and money are simultaneously and inevitably products and indispensable instruments of life under modern conditions. Both address themselves solely to the quantitative aspects of experienced phenomena, and downplay their qualitative characteristics.³⁵⁴

These and related characteristics of human habitat have persisted throughout the modern era, constantly gathering force. They continue to mark present-day Western and westernized societies and continue to spread into areas of the globe until recently seen as “traditional” or “pre-modern.” Nonetheless, some observers suggest that modernity in its classic form has run its course and has been replaced, or is about to be replaced, by another socio-cultural formation, which they call post-modernity. Descriptions of this allegedly new formation (meant to demonstrate its novelty and qualitative distinction from modernity) do not differ on the whole from the above description of the modern condition. There is, however, one significant difference on which the assertions about the “end of modernity” and the advent of post-modernity tend to found their credibility: if throughout the modern era the “messiness,” ambivalence, spontaneity, and uncertainty inherent in social and individual life were seen as temporary irritants, to be eventually overcome by the rationalizing tendency, they are now seen as unavoidable and ineradicable — and not necessarily irritants. It now has been accepted that historical processes have no specific end or direction in the material world and its intellectual component; that pluralism of values and forms of life is here to stay; and that the centers of political power, most notably state governments, have

lost both the resources and the ambitions that characterize their heretofore overlordship. The all-inclusive designs of “rational society” and global social-engineering schemes and cultural crusades that backed them seem to have fallen into disrepute and have been all but abandoned. The not-so-distant collapse of the communist command economies and all-regulating states has provided a most spectacular display of this tendency.³⁵⁵

Democracy Is an Elaborate Form of *Jāhiliyah*

And if they [followers of earlier scripture] decline [His orders], then know that Allah wants to target them with some of their sacrilegious acts: for, behold, a great many people are iniquitous indeed (5:49).

In the first instance, if these pretend Christians and make-believe Jews decide to abdicate this higher human and social responsibility of factoring in Allah’s (ﷻ) laws into their active lives, then Muhammad (ﷺ) and everyone in the character of Muhammad (ﷺ) need not be unsettled over their attitude. The eternal law of responsibility sensitizes everyone to the inevitability that each shall be accountable for his own decisions and conclusions. Therefore, just because some incomplete Christians and halfway Jews, by secularizing their lives and alienating God from their social programs, fail to raise their moral character to the level of its social authentication, no Muslim of active commitment should fall back psychologically. God gave them a law that was meant for their societies and well-being. If they choose to disregard such a God-given law then they will bear the full consequences of their ill-conceived choice in this world and in the world that follows.

But this Judeo-Christian civil blasphemy has a way of getting to some Muslims. These partial Muslims look around and find a world that has omitted God from everything related to law and legality. And as this is painstakingly projected to be the “civilized” world, they think in their defeated psychology and deficient mental-

ity that they, too, should leave out Allah (ﷻ) from His authoritative position and lawgiving attribute. In today's language these quasi-Muslims are given the portraiture of "modern" or "moderate" Muslims. As for the rest of the faithful Muslims who fervently commit to Allah's (ﷻ) authority and dominance, they are labeled as "fanatics," "radicals," and "fundamentalists." The slow-minded Muslims who have caved in to secularism, no different than their Jewish and Christian equivalents, must have overlooked this *āyah* and other similar *āyāt* from one *sūrah* to the next in this eye-opening Qur'an. These secularized Muslims should take a minute and understand what Allah (ﷻ) is saying in this *āyah*: He wants such "Jews" and "Christians," who decide He is a deity and not an authority, to suffer the consequences of their own preference and penchant. When they do such things they set themselves up for unremitting repercussions. If some tag-along Muslims decide to go in that secular direction they too will be at the receiving end of Allah's (ﷻ) justice and impartiality. It is only the core Muslims who live and die by His authority, His *sharī'ah*, and His *dīn* who will be spared the destructive ramifications of secularization and secularism.

"Indeed, many people are certainly iniquitous." There appears to be a predilection in human nature toward a godless society and its offensive activities, not necessarily in the sense that society should lose its morality, but in the sense that society should not have a legal program that comes from God. The real debate that has been taken out of the public mind is whether man qualifies to devise his own legal system without reference to God and scripture. Is man the author of what is lawful and what is not? Can man understand human nature enough to accurately correct it when it goes in the wrong social and economic direction? And then is man capable of devising a legal system that will "fit" his moral convictions? Or is it only Allah (ﷻ) who is the first and final authority and reference on all legal and moral matters? This has been the test of mankind through its historical social variations and cultural blocs. And this is the issue that seldom makes it into the public arena for informed debate and intellectual input; hence these *āyāt* in this lesson of the lawful Qur'an.

To the view that societies and governments, instead of God, have the capacity and sense of fairness to originate their own social norms coupled with a just legal system to adjudicate friction, Allah (ﷻ) says,

Do they, perchance, desire [to be ruled by] the law of a *jāhiliyah* [ignocracy]? But for people of certainty, who could be a better lawgiver than Allah? (5:50).

For the thinking mind, this *āyah* goes to the heart of the matter: all forms of governance that are man-made and man-devised are a sort of *jāhiliyah*. This *jāhiliyah* when applied through the agencies of governments takes its toll on human society because of its superficiality, its amateurism, and its inexperience. What will take hold in the future is anyone's guess, but in our day and time the prime object lesson of a *jāhiliyah* is what is called *democracy*. It seems to be the catch-all of the civilized Judeo-Christian political nexus. Nearly everyone today, whether of the left, center, or right, claims adherence to democratic principles. Political regimes of all kinds throughout the world, absurdly even dictatorships, style themselves as democracies — albeit there may be vast differences between statement and execution. Democracy is inflated to appear with an aura of legitimacy on modern political life: rules, laws, policies, and decisions appear justified when they are “democratic.” The great majority of political thinkers from ancient Greece to the present day have been highly critical of the theory and practice of democracy. A worldwide acquiescence to democracy is a very recent phenomenon.

The record contains little about democracy from ancient Greece to 18th-century Europe and North America. The widespread turn to democracy as a “suitable” mechanism for organizing political life is less than a hundred years old. In addition, while many states today may be “democratic,” the history of their political institutions reveals the fragility and vulnerability of democratic arrangements. The remarkable difficulty of creating and sustaining democratic forms is borne out by the flowering of fascism and Nazism in 20th-century Western Europe.³⁵⁶ Democracy

has gone through a sequence of intensive social struggles and is frequently sacrificed in such struggles.

The word *democracy* entered the English language in the 16th century from the French word *democratie*; the word is Greek in origin, having been derived from *demokratia*, the root meanings of which are *demos* (*people*) and *kratos* (*rule*). Democracy refers to a form of government in which, in contradistinction to monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule. It entails a state in which there is some form of political equality among the people. But to recognize this is not yet to say very much. For not only is the history of the idea of democracy marked by conflicting interpretations, but Greek, Roman, medieval, and Renaissance notions intermingle to produce ambiguous and inconsistent accounts of the key terms of democracy today: the nature of *rule*, the connotation of *rule by*, and the meaning of *the people*.

When there is no recourse to God and scripture and the people become the source of laws the question arises: who are “the people”? What constitutes a “people” entitled to rule themselves? What kind of participation is envisaged for them? How broadly or narrowly is the scope of rule to be construed? Is democracy a set of political institutions or a process? How does the size of a political community affect the nature and dynamics of democracy? Must the rules of “the people” be obeyed? What is the place of obligation and dissent? Under what circumstances, if any, are democracies entitled to resort to coercion of an element of “the people” or of those outside the sphere of legitimate rule?

Within the history of the clash of interpretations about these and related questions lies a deeply rooted struggle to determine whether democracy will mean some kind of popular power (a form of life in which citizens are engaged in self-government and self-regulation) or an aid to decision-making (a means to legitimize the decisions of those voted into power — representatives — from time to time). This basic struggle has given rise to three basic variants or models of democracy.³⁵⁷

First, there is *direct* or *participatory democracy*, a system of decision-making about public affairs in which citizens are directly in-

volved. This was the original type of democracy found in ancient Athens, among other places. Second, there is *liberal* or *representative democracy*, a system of rule embracing elected officers who undertake to represent the interests or views of citizens within the framework of the rule of law. Representative democracy means that decisions affecting a community are not taken by its members as a whole but by a group of people whom “the people” have elected for this purpose. In the arena of national politics, representative democracy takes the form of elections to congresses, parliaments, or similar national bodies and is associated with the system of government in countries as far afield as the USA, Britain, Germany, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Costa Rica, Senegal, and elsewhere. Third, there is a variant of democracy based on a one-party model, although some may doubt whether this is a form of democracy at all. Until recently, the Soviet Union, many Eastern European societies, and some Third World countries have been dominated by this conception. The principle underlying *one-party democracy* is that a single party can be the legitimate expression of the overall will of the community. Voters choose among different candidates, putatively proposing divergent policies within an overall framework, not among different parties. The following expands on each of these models in turn.³⁵⁸

In the 5th century BCE, Athens emerged as the preeminent city-state, or *polis*, among many rival Greek powers; the development of democracy in Athens has been taken as a fundamental source of inspiration for modern Judeo-Christian, Western political thought. The political ideals of Athens — equality among citizens, liberty, respect for the law, and justice — have shaped political thinking through the ages, although there are some central ideas — for instance, the modern liberal notion that human beings are individuals with rights — that notably cannot be traced directly to ancient thought.³⁵⁹

The Athenian city-state did not differentiate between state and society, ruled as it was by citizen-governors. In ancient Athens, citizens were at one and the same time subjects of state authority and the creators of public rules and regulations. The peo-

ple (*demos*) engaged in legislative and judicial functions, for the Athenian concept of citizenship entailed sharing in these functions and participating directly in the affairs of the state. Athenian democracy required a general commitment to the principle of civic virtue: dedication to the republican city-state and the subordination of private life to public affairs and the common good. The public and the private were intertwined. Citizens could only properly fulfill themselves and live honorably in and through the *polis*. Of course, who was to count as a citizen was a tightly restricted matter. Women and a substantial slave population were excluded from being counted as citizens.³⁶⁰

The Athenian city-state — eclipsed ultimately by the rise of empires, stronger states, and military regimes — shared features with republican Rome. Both were predominantly face-to-face societies, oral cultures, and both had elements of popular participation in governmental affairs and little, if any, centralized bureaucratic control. Both sought to foster a deep sense of public duty, a tradition of civic virtue or responsibility to the republic — to the distinctive matters of the public realm. In both polities, the claims of the state were given a unique priority over those of the individual citizen. However, if Athens was a democratic republic, contemporary scholarship generally affirms that Rome was by comparison an essentially oligarchic system. Accordingly, from antiquity, the heritage of the classical Greek tradition, and of the model of Athenian democracy in particular, is especially important in the history of democratic thought and practice. Although the heritage of Athens received its clearest and most robust defense in the early Renaissance period, especially in the city-states of Italy, it remained a force throughout the early modern period.³⁶¹

In ancient Greece a citizen was someone who participated in “giving judgement and holding office.” Citizenship meant participation in public affairs. This classical definition is noteworthy in two respects. First, it suggests that the ancient Greeks would have found it hard to locate citizens in modern democracies, except perhaps as representatives and officeholders. The limited scope in contemporary politics for active involvement would have been re-

garded as most undemocratic. Second, the classical Greek idea of citizenship would have found resonance in few communities before, during, or after its initial elaboration. The ancient democracies are quite atypical regimes in recorded political history. The idea that human beings could be active citizens of a political order, something more than mere dutiful subjects, has had few advocates from the earliest human associations to the early Renaissance and the demise of absolutism.³⁶²

The eclipse in the West of the notion of the active citizen, one whose very being is affirmed in and through political action, is hard to explain fully. It appears though that the antithesis of *Homo politicus* is the *Homo credens* of the Christian faith: the citizen who exercised active judgement was displaced by the true believer. Although it would be quite misleading to suggest that the rise of Christianity effectively banished secular considerations from the lives of rulers and ruled, it unquestionably shifted the source of authority and wisdom from this-worldly to otherworldly representatives at one time. The Christian worldview transformed the rationale of political action from that of the *polis* or empire to a theological-cum-church framework. The Hellenic view of humanity was replaced by a preoccupation with how humans could live in communion with God. The Christian worldview insisted that the good lay in submission to God's will.³⁶³

The integration of Christian Europe came to depend on two theocratic authorities above all: the Roman Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire. During the European Middle Ages there was no theoretical alternative. The entire fabric of medieval thought had to be torn asunder before the idea of democracy could reemerge. Not until the end of the 16th century did the nature and limits of political authority, law, rights, and obedience once again become objects of European political thought. The Protestant Reformation, the most significant of all the developments that triggered new ways of thinking about political authority, did more than just challenge papal jurisdiction and authority across Europe; it raised the starkest questions about political obligation and obedience.³⁶⁴ Whether allegiance was owed to the Catholic Church, a

Protestant ruler, or particular religious sects was not an issue easily resolved. The bitter struggles that spread across Europe during the last half of the 16th century, culminating in the Thirty Years War in Germany, testified to the increasing divisiveness of “Christian” religious belief.³⁶⁵ Competing religions, all seeking to secure for themselves the kinds of privileges claimed by the medieval church, had engendered a political crisis whose only solution would be to disconnect the powers of the state from the duty of rulers to uphold a particular faith.³⁶⁶

The impetus to re-examine the nature of the relationship between society and state was bolstered by a growing awareness in Europe of the variety of possible social and political arrangements that followed in the wake of the discovery of the non-European world. The relationship between Europe and the “New World” and the nature of the rights, if any, of non-Europeans became a major focus of discussion. It sharpened the sense of a plurality of possible interpretations of political life. The direction these interpretations took was, of course, directly related to the context and traditions of particular countries: the changing nature of politics was experienced differently throughout the early modern period. But it is hard to overestimate the significance of the events and processes that ushered in a new era of political reflection, marked as it was by such dramatic occurrences as the English Revolution (1640–1688), the American Declaration of Independence (1776), and the French Revolution (1789).³⁶⁷

Modern liberal and liberal democratic theory has constantly sought to justify the sovereign power of the state while at the same time justifying limits on that power. The history of this attempt since Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes is the history of arguments to balance might and right, power and law, duties and rights.³⁶⁸ On the one hand, states must have a monopoly of coercive power in order to provide a secure basis on which trade, commerce, and family life can prosper. On the other hand, by granting the state a regulatory and coercive capability, political theorists were aware that they had accepted a force that could, and frequently did, deprive citizens of political and social freedoms.³⁶⁹

Liberal democrats provided the key institutional innovation to try to overcome this dilemma — representative democracy. The liberal concern with reason, law, and freedom of choice could only be upheld properly by recognizing the political equality of all mature individuals. Such equality would ensure not only a secure social environment in which people would be free to pursue their private activities and interests, but also a state that would do what was best in the general and public interest — for example, pursue the greatest satisfaction of the greatest number. Thus, liberal democrats argued that the democratic constitutional state, linked to other key institutional mechanisms, above all the free market, resolved the problems of ensuring both authority and liberty.³⁷⁰

Two classical statements of the new position can be found in the philosophy of James Madison and in the works of two of the key figures of 19th-century English liberalism: Jeremy Bentham and James Mill.³⁷¹ In their hands the theory of liberal democracy received a most important elaboration: the governors must be held accountable to the governed through political mechanisms (the secret ballot, regular voting, competition between potential representatives, the struggle among factions) that alone can give citizens satisfactory means to choose, authorize, and control political decisions. And by these means, it was further contended, a balance could finally be obtained between might and right, authority and liberty. But who exactly was to count as a “citizen” or an “individual,” and what his or her exact role was to be, remained either unclear or unsettled. Even in the work of James Mill’s radical son, John Stuart Mill, ambiguities remained: the idea that all citizens should have equal weight in the political system remained outside his actual doctrine.³⁷²

It was left by and large to the extensive and often violently repressed struggles of working-class and feminist activists in the 19th and 20th centuries to achieve in some countries a genuinely universal suffrage. This achievement was to remain fragile in countries such as Germany, Italy, and Spain, and was in practice denied to some groups — for instance, many African Americans in the United States before the civil rights movement of the 1950s

and 1960s. Through these struggles the idea that citizenship rights should apply to all adults became slowly established; many of the arguments of the liberal democrats could be turned against existing institutions to reveal the extent to which the principle and aspirations of equal political participation and equal human development remained unfulfilled. It was only with the actual achievement of citizenship for all adult men and women that liberal democracy took on its distinctively contemporary form: a cluster of rules permitting the broadest participation of the majority of citizens in the selection of representatives who alone can make political decisions, that is, decisions affecting the whole of society.³⁷³

The idea of democracy remains complex and contested. The liberal democratic tradition itself comprises a heterogeneous body of thought. However, the entire liberal democratic tradition stands apart from an alternative perspective — the theory of single-party democracy. It is worth saying something more about this, because it is associated with one of the key counterpoints to liberal democracy — the Marxist tradition.³⁷⁴

The struggle of liberalism against tyranny and the struggle by liberal democrats for political equality represented, according to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, a major step forward in the history of human emancipation.³⁷⁵ But for them, and for the Marxist tradition more broadly, the great universal ideals of “liberty, equality and justice” could not be realized simply by the “free” struggle for votes in the political system and by the “free” struggle for profit in the marketplace. Advocates of the democratic state and the market economy present them as the only institutions under which liberty can be sustained and inequalities minimized. However, the Marxist critique suggests that, by virtue of its internal dynamics, the capitalist economy inevitably produces systematic inequality and massive restrictions on real freedom. Although each step toward formal political equality is an advance, its liberating potential is severely curtailed by inequalities of class.³⁷⁶

In class societies the state cannot become the vehicle for the pursuit of the common good or public interest. Far from playing the role of emancipator, protective knight, umpire, or judge in the face

of disorder, the agencies of the liberal representative state are meshed in the struggles of civil society. Marxists conceive of the state as an extension of civil society, reinforcing the social order for the enhancement of particular interests — in capitalist society, the long-term interests of the capitalist class. Marx and Engels argued that political emancipation is only a step toward human emancipation, that is, the complete democratization of society as well as the state. In their view, liberal democratic society fails when judged by its own principles — and to take these principles seriously is to become a communist.³⁷⁷

Marx himself envisaged the replacement of the “machinery” of the liberal democratic state by a “commune structure”: the smallest communities, which were to administer their own affairs, would elect delegates to larger administrative units (districts, towns); these in turn would elect candidates to still larger areas of administration (the national delegation). This arrangement is known as the “pyramid” structure of direct democracy: all delegates are revocable, bound by the instructions of their constituency, and organized into a pyramid of directly elected committees. In the Marxist-Leninist model, this system of delegation is, in principle, complemented by a separate, but somewhat similar, system at the level of the Communist Party. In practice, however, complementarity has meant party domination. It was during the Gorbachev era that a pyramid of councils, or soviets, from the central authority to those at local village and neighborhood levels, were given anything more than a symbolic or ritualistic role.³⁷⁸

What should be made of these various models of democracy today? The classical Athenian model, which developed in a tightly knit community, cannot be adapted to stretch across space and time. Its emergence in the context of city-states and under conditions of social exclusivity (no female participation, a slave economy, many other marginalized groups) was integral to its successful development. In contemporary circumstances, marked by a high degree of social, economic, and political differentiation, it is very hard to envisage how a democracy of this kind could succeed. The significance of these reflections is reinforced by examining the fate of the model of

democracy advocated by Marx, Engels, and their followers. The suitability of their model as an institutional arrangement that allows for mediation, negotiation, and compromise among struggling factions, groups, or movements, does not stand up well under scrutiny, especially in its Marxist-Leninist variant. A system of institutions to promote discussion, debate, and competition among divergent views — a system encompassing the formation of movements, pressure groups, and/or political parties with leadership to help press their cases — appears both necessary and desirable in a world void of scriptural direction. Further, the events in Central and Eastern Europe beginning in 1989 seem to provide remarkable confirmatory evidence of this to those who had held high hopes of a socialist breakthrough in the political affairs of the world.³⁷⁹

The Judeo-Christian socio-political mindset winds itself down to recognizing the importance of a number of fundamental liberal tenets concerning the centrality, in principle, of an impersonal structure of public power; of a constitution to help guarantee and protect rights; of a diversity of power centers within and outside the state; and of mechanisms to promote competition and debate among alternative political platforms. What this amounts to, among other things, is confirmation of the fundamental liberal notion that the separation of state from civil society must be an essential feature of any democratic political order. Conceptions of democracy that depend on the assumption that the state could ever replace civil society, or vice versa, must be treated with the utmost caution.³⁸⁰

However, to make these points is not to affirm any one liberal democratic model as it stands. It is one thing to accept the arguments concerning the necessary protective, conflict-mediating, and redistributive functions of the democratic state; quite another to accept these as prescribed in the model of liberal democracy from Madison or Bentham onward. Advocates of liberal democracy have tended to be concerned, above all else, with the proper principles and procedures of democratic government. By focusing on government, they have diverted attention from a thorough examination of such issues as: formal rights versus actual rights; commitments to

treat citizens as free and equal versus disparities of treatment in practice; concepts of the state as, in principle, an independent authority versus involvement of the state in the reproduction of the inequalities of everyday life; and notions of political parties as appropriate structures for bridging the gap between state and society versus the array of power centers that are beyond the reach of parties.³⁸¹

The implications of these points for scripturally clueless thinkers are profound. For democracy to flourish today it has to be preconceived as a double-sided phenomenon concerned, on the one hand, with the reform of state power and, on the other hand, with the restructuring of civil society. This entails recognizing the indispensability of a process of “double democratization”: the interdependent transformation of both state and civil society. Such a process must be premised on the acceptance of the principle that the division between state and civil society must be a central feature of democratic life, and on the notion that the power to make decisions must be free of the inequalities and constraints that can be imposed by an unregulated system of private capital, as Marx foresaw. But, of course, to recognize the importance of both these points is to recognize the necessity of recasting substantially their traditional connotation.³⁸²

If this leaves many questions open, it should not come as a surprise. The history of democratic theory and practice is coterminous with conflicts of interpretation and struggles for position — and this state of affairs is inevitable when politics is free of the constraints of authoritarianism in all its forms. Democratic politics is bound to the terrain of dispute and contestation. Democracy is an ingenious political arrangement for the articulation, expression, and mediation of differences. It is a testimony to the idea of democracy itself that the battle over its constitutive elements will, in all likelihood, continue.³⁸³

One area where the battle with God as reference and authority will continue in the minds of political scientists is the idea of democracy as it connects to the larger framework of international relations. The modern theory of the democratic state presupposes the notion of a “national community of fate” — a

community that rightly governs itself and determines its own future. But national communities by no means exclusively program the actions, decisions, and policies of their governments, and governments by no means determine what is right or appropriate for their own citizens. For example, a decision to build a nuclear plant near the borders of a neighboring country is likely to be a decision taken without consulting those in the nearby country (or countries). Or the decision to permit the building of a chemical factory producing toxic or other noxious substances may contribute to ecological damage that does not acknowledge national boundaries or frontiers. In a world of global interconnectedness, mediated by modern communication systems and information technology, there are pressing questions about the very future and viability of national democracies. Regional and global interconnectedness contests the traditional national resolutions of the key questions of democratic theory and practice.³⁸⁴

Therefore, one ought not to be perplexed to hear more insistent demands that the international form and structure of politics and civil society be built into the foundations of such a democracy. At issue is the problem of specifying how democracy can be secured within a series of interconnected power and authority centers. Also at issue are rethinking the territorial boundaries of systems of accountability and how the pressing problems that escape the control of a nation-state — aspects of monetary management, environmental questions, elements of health, new forms of communications — can be brought under better control.³⁸⁵

If the history and practice of democracy has focused up until now on the idea of locality (the city-state, the community, the nation), it is likely that in the future it will be centered on the international or global domain. There are no immediate solutions to the problems posed by global interconnectedness and its complex and often profoundly uneven effects, yet an important series of questions inescapably must be addressed. Certainly, one can find many good reasons for being optimistic about finding a path forward, and many good reasons for thinking that at this juncture democracy will face a critical test.³⁸⁶

All of this muddling through the intellect of philosophers and social scientists who have been trying their best to make “democracy” the panacea of governance places us in a position to look for a light at the end of this secular tunnel. And Allah’s (ﷻ) words are final on the subject,

Do they [the Judeo-Christian decision-makers and their followers], perchance, seek [to be ruled by] the law of secular ignorance? But for people who have internal confidence, who could be a better lawgiver than Allah? (5:50)

The word *jāhiliyah* in this *āyah* refers to a *lack of knowledge*. These theoreticians, ideologues, philosophers, and intellectuals from the Athenian city-state to the American empire are simply unaware of the moral fiber that is needed to sustain laws on the one hand and the legal structure that is needed to support morals on the other. Their uninformed and unenlightened ideas eventually caused them to separate the moral from the legal, and hence the church from the state, and therefore this world from the incoming world. Human beings simply suffer from the lack of understanding and sensitivity that are needed in judging vital matters, governing social interactions, and passing judgement on substantive issues. This *jāhiliyah* is not some period of time that preceded Islam and Muhammad (ﷺ), rather it is any time period that is void of Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ). Whenever God’s scripture is taken out of thought-provoking and life-sustaining activities, man ends up having a *jāhiliyah* with all the stultifying and muddled ideas that are dressed up as “pluralism,” “nationalism,” and “democracy.” These time-failing ideologies have brought humanity to the brink of disasters not once, not twice, but numerous times in the course of our common human history.

People should understand they can either accept and affirm the authority that belongs to Allah (ﷻ) alone and mold their lives and adapt their societies to His sole authority and hence become members of Allah’s (ﷻ) *dīn*; or they can accept and affirm any

other authority besides Allah (ﷻ) and govern themselves with laws and values that have no divine origin, no scriptural basis, and no prophetic relevance and thus become members of a sensuous, crass, and grossly clumsy *jāhiliyah*. In doing so they no longer belong to Allah's (ﷻ) *dīn*. The legal system of any society is the best indicator of that society's convictions and orientation. And when a society chooses to be ruled and governed by legal procedures that come from man and not from God, it has chosen to make its boldest statement against the influence, the sovereignty, and the authority of Allah (ﷻ).

It should be reiterated and emphasized that whichever way a society goes, whether toward Allah (ﷻ) or away from Him, it does so due to its freedom of choice and not due to the coercion of arbitrary human power. And in case there are societies that choose to de-authorize or un-authorize God, they should know there can never be a lawgiver better than Allah (ﷻ). That is because there can never be a jury of a "conscience" better than a conscience shaped and formed by a relationship with Allah (ﷻ). There can never be a verdict delivered in the spirit of justice when justice is defined by nationalist priorities, the public interest, corporate expediencies, or military impositions — and not by a merciful Creator, a know-it-all divine Authority.

Who in today's, yesterday's, or tomorrow's world can claim to be a better, superior, or ascendant source of law and procedure than Allah (ﷻ)!? The proof is in the test of time. Look at human history and see for yourself that empires, imperialists, and alliances have failed miserably when it comes to running the affairs of society with justice and equity. Can the philosophers of Greece and any ancient materialistic modernity along with the ideologues of an "enlightened" Europe and an *au courant* America be placed on a higher plateau of knowledge than God the Creator? Even if all the brains of all the intellectuals in all the societies of all the time spans in the annals of all human history were coalesced together, they would not even comprise an iota on the side of man's knowledge when compared to God's knowledge, and man's mercy when compared to God's mercy.

It is a lame excuse to say that human “civilization” today and man’s technological modernity have eclipsed the ancient words of God. Man’s attempts to fabricate an argument and forge an excuse for departing from God’s authority, disregarding His mastery, and ignoring His staying power are altogether feeble. From the standpoint of understanding that Allah (ﷻ) is equitable and honorable — showing lack of favoritism and free from undue bias or preconceived opinions — this means that all human agencies, bureaus, and departments are placed in an uncomplimentary light when it comes to justice and the rule of fair law.

As we Muslims are constrained to live in a world in which powerful church-going Christians and synagogue-attending Jews have found a secular theory or a sacrilegious school of thought to rationalize to themselves a God void of authority, we may feel sorry for their godlessness and desecration since we are certain of a final reckoning of affairs. However, in the present this problem becomes compounded and difficult to overcome when there are “Muslims” lacking self-esteem who jump on the same secular and sacrilegious bandwagon. These types of dislocated Muslims say, “Well, you know, things are always evolving,” or “There are extraordinary and unusual circumstances that are forcing us to shelve Allah’s (ﷻ) laws,” or “Public opinion is not reconciled with the Shari’ah,” or “We are passing through very difficult times and our enemies are waiting for us to disagree among ourselves so that they can pounce upon us,” or the like. But was not Allah (ﷻ) aware of all these coincidences and contexts that “self-hating” Muslims are throwing up as an excuse before He assigned them an eternal set of laws that fits their eternal set of morals?

If we can agree that this Qur’an and this Prophet (ﷺ) are final and that they address the human condition with all its developments, modernities, and discrepancies, then there can be no excuse implying that God could not foresee our present “peculiar” conditions, or that He could not anticipate the changes that have taken place in our evolving human history, or that He could not envision the “internal weakness” of Muslims and the “overwhelming” power of their enemies. Learned persons, academics, and intellectuals who

are not Muslims may contrive their own excuses and they may have a point because they have lost touch with scripture — they have no firm record of the Old and the New Testament. But what can be said about the Muslims who have this crystal clear Qur'an, this time-tested *tanzīl*, and this verbatim word of Allah (ﷻ)? The Qur'an is perfect, the Muslims are not; and so when this Book of certitude issues a resounding endorsement of Allah (ﷻ) as man's only legitimate authority, then anyone who calls himself a Muslim should follow through on his commitment,

Now whenever Allah and His Apostle have decided a matter, it is not for a committed Muslim man or a committed Muslim woman to claim freedom of choice insofar as they themselves are concerned: for he who [thus] rebels against Allah and His Apostle has already, most obviously, gone astray (33:36).

The concept of legitimacy refers to a political order's worthiness to be recognized. Because the reasons offered in support of an order can differ — the preservation of customary forms of social life,³⁸⁷ the continuity of a “legally recognized dynasty,” the promotion of general welfare, etc. — one can also speak of different conceptions of legitimacy according to the kind of reason given; and this multiplicity falls outside the Qur'an and Sunnah. The general definition of legitimacy for all practical purposes in the non-scriptural world of today has more to do with power than with principle.

Legitimus, like the related *legalis*, derives from the Latin word *lex* (*law*), and in its early usage in Roman jurisprudence no clear distinction was drawn between the legitimacy and legality of a regime: an *imperium legitimum* or *potestas legitimus* designated rule according to law in contrast to arbitrary rule or tyranny. Under the influence of Church thought, in medieval jurisprudence the concept of legitimacy also remained closely tied to the notions of natural law and a normatively ordered cosmos. With the rise of absolutism in the Euro-Christian 16th century, the idea of a secular justification of political power spread rapidly and under the subsequent influence

of social contract theory and Enlightenment thought the concept was gradually democratized and aligned with the idea of popular sovereignty: "Sovereignty resides with the people, the only legitimate source of power."³⁸⁸ With the "legitimist" disputes between the ultra-monarchists and constitutional monarchists over the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in France, the concept finally entered into the mainstream of political discourse.³⁸⁹

At the beginning of the 20th century, Max Weber's distinction between traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal forms of legitimate domination paved the way for a sociological conception of legitimacy.³⁹⁰ His definition of legitimacy as "belief in the legality of enacted rules" contributed to the development of legal positivism and the decline of the classical connection between legitimacy and substantive values or worldviews.³⁹¹

If the concept of legitimacy is not severed from the need to provide reasons and is narrowly reduced to the question of the state's capacity to generate belief in its legitimacy, several distinct types of legitimation can still be identified. Substantive theories assume there is a normative natural order that provides a measure for the legitimacy of a political order. Only regimes whose policies conform to this "good old law" are worthy of recognition.³⁹²

The liberal-minimalist model, by contrast, rejects the idea that legitimacy must involve reference to substantive values in this manner. Legitimacy depends rather on the state's ability to maintain peace, under the rule of law, between individuals and groups who hold widely divergent and even conflicting conceptions about the ultimate value of life. This conception, which can be traced back possibly to Henri-Benjamin Constant de Rebeque, construes legitimacy as a *modus vivendi* in which an expanded interpretation of religious toleration replaces the search for substantive moral truth.³⁹³

A third model, which may be called discursive or democratic-proceduralist, has its roots in Rousseau and Kant and has in recent times been defended by others. Legitimacy is understood in terms of the counterfactual ideal ("regulative idea") of an agreement between free and equal citizens, and the task becomes that of designing political institutions to reflect that ideal while also

leaving them open to future criticism in light of it. Although it does not presuppose the idea of a normative natural order, this model sees legitimacy as relying on more than a *modus vivendi*.³⁹⁴

Finally, it may be possible to identify a “postmodern” model in which the search for universal legitimating grounds is abandoned in favor of a return to narrative traditions. The idea is not to develop a global theory of legitimation but to practice more immanent (occurring entirely within the mind) and local forms of critique under the banner of plurality and innovation. Whether this approach constitutes a distinctive alternative remains the function of the circumstantial views of non-scriptural theorists and governmental practitioners who keep on experimenting with their own failures while avoiding the direction and source material of the highest Authority. In this context much may depend on the capacity of one or another of the alternatives to respond successfully to the dilemmas of legitimacy in an increasingly interdependent yet functionally differentiated and pluralistic world.³⁹⁵

The intellectual and legal back and forth that has taken place over pluralism, democracy, legitimacy, the “state,” and the “people” in societies where man’s rangebound views are the reference point as opposed to scripture brings us to the Qur’anic parting line: we are taught here that legitimacy belongs only to Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ). Therefore, all these other regimes, administrations, nation-states, and governments that derive their legal system from any reference besides Allah (ﷻ) and His Apostle (ﷺ) are illegitimate and illegal. No Muslim in his right Qur’anic mind can agree with any of the secular philosophers who try to bestow legitimacy upon establishments and bureaucracies that are based upon the sovereignty of people, saying that people are the basis of governance and people are the source of power. People are definitely important — but their importance lies in affirming the encompassing Scripture of Allah (ﷻ) and understanding how it is to be applied. Even if all the peoples in the world were to agree on a secular system for their social and political arrangements, that secular system would never be a legitimate system simply because it is not issued and endorsed by Allah (ﷻ).

And this is the incontrovertible point: either it is Allah's (ﷻ) authority that people refer to in their conscience and in their courts or it is the authority of those who try to project themselves in His image. It is either a form of governance that comes from the unlimited knowledge of Allah (ﷻ) or it is a form of government that comes from the very limited knowledge of man. It is either a conviction and commitment to Allah (ﷻ) as man's authority or a conviction and commitment to kings and executives who in God's law have no authority. It is either *īmān* or *kufr*.

This is the issue that has to have the clarity and freshness of man's immediate experience, it has to be *prima facie* and prismatic. Once a Muslim grasps this fact he cannot let go of it, or else he lets go of the central fact of history around which Prophets (ﷺ) struggled and for which men of Allah (ﷻ) gave their lives. As long as this issue is swept under the rug, Muslims will continue to be second fiddle to Christians who have departed from scripture and Jews who have retrograded scripture. The onus is on the scholars and sages of Islam to carry this responsibility and enlighten the rest of us who are fumbling about from one philosopher to the other and from one set of rules to the next — without direction and sometimes without purpose.

This has been a long-winded lesson, but its detail was unavoidable due to the zigzags, the curves, and the dodging attitude of people who do not want to listen to what Allah (ﷻ) has to say about man's vital and social matters. These people, as described above, devised their own secular systems in lieu of what Allah (ﷻ) has explained to them in one scripture after another. To get a clearer mental picture of what Allah's (ﷻ) *āyāt* are addressing, this European deviation from scripture had to be recounted through the work of some of its proponents such as Kant, Rousseau, Marx, Adam Smith, and others, who themselves were the putative agents of a thesis that gestated into today's in vogue systemic departure of morality from legality. The more deleterious impact of the European divergence was felt in the field of intellectual speculation on human nature. And as this arcane and uncertain "knowledge" gradually came to inform the national, cul-

tural, and historical narrative through disciplines that came to be known as the social sciences, it is now communicated through all the various means of education and hence continues to cause all sorts of political and economic fluctuations, inevitably leading to the rise and fall of so many regimes and nation-states. For those who are not versed in following the digressions and regressions of Euro-Judeo thought, a brief synopsis will encapsulate what has been discussed above:

1. The Torah in its original form was meant to be a reference of guidance and a source of enlightenment for its adherents. Its sages and rabbis were tasked with the responsibilities of the prophets in carrying out the commands and commandments of this scripture. The scholars of the Children of Israel, though, began to falter, thereby opening up a flood of opinions and orientations that eventually parted from scripture in both letter and spirit.
2. Likewise, the Injil (Gospel) in its original and unadulterated script was meant to be a channel of guidance and a ray of light unto all who were fixed on God's superiority, His ascendancy, and His unchallenged authority. But then the Gospel's message became scrambled through the vicissitudes of that history, ultimately leading to a "Christian" world that remembers God only on Sunday — if that.
3. The purpose for singling out the Old and New Testaments as the driving force for the sovereignty and dominance of the One God was to authoritatively warn the Jews and Christians so as to put them on guard lest they go secular and sacrilegious. This was also meant to highlight the centrality of God's laws, as given to Moses (ﷺ), and the legislation that pertains to them. The Qur'an in this lesson is clear on the common ground and common purpose underlying the mutual legal foundations of all scriptures. Seen in this light, these Jews and Christians should have no difficulty identifying with and acknowledging the Qur'an and the Prophet (ﷺ).
4. The laws of retribution found in Mosaic (pertaining to Moses – ﷺ) law are also found in Islamic (Muhammadi) law,

“And in it [scripture], We have ordained a life for a life and an eye for an eye...” (5:45).

5. There has been — when Muslims were Qur’anic intellectuals — a lively debate about whether pre-Qur’anic scriptural laws are binding on Muslims. And most of the scholars involved in those exchanges concluded that pre-Qur’anic scriptural laws are binding as long as they have not been abrogated by the Qur’an itself.
6. The early dissidents in Islam (the Khawārij) used to quote the *āyah*, **“And those who do not rule according to what Allah has bestowed from on high, they indeed are deniers [of Allah’s authority]” (5:44)**, as a justification for the claim that rulers and heads of state who do not govern as per Allah’s (ﷻ) laws are *kāfirs*. This verdict is not completely off the mark and should be scrutinized further, especially in light of today’s anti-scriptural governments.
7. The fact that Allah (ﷻ) mentions amnesty and forgiveness in the context of penalties, as in **“...but he who shall forgo it [punishment] out of charity will atone thereby for some of his past sins” (5:45)**, indicates that the act of excusing a mistake or offense is central to the overall synthesis of morality and legality.
8. Those who disown and dispute the law component of scripture or anything else in scripture are *kāfirs*. Their *kufr* is more pronounced as they willfully substitute Allah’s (ﷻ) commands and commandments with their own rules and regulations.
9. There are opportunities for building bridges between the adherents of the Qur’an on one side and the adherents of the Torah and the Gospel on the other side. All are considered followers of scripture and all these scriptures are described by the Qur’anic words *hudā* and *nūr* (guidance and light). The combined and concerted components of these scriptures are the Oneness of God, His undivided authority, the fact of historical prophethood, and the return to Him. Other common features are the acts of devotion to God, which include but are not limited to man’s communion with Him, fasting, and the distribu-

tion of wealth as instructed by God. There are common moral expectations such as trustworthiness, honesty, and the proscription of adultery, theft, and plundering of other peoples' resources. All of these are to be found in the original "copies" of the Torah and the Gospel as they were communicated to both Moses and Jesus (ﷺ). The distinction the Qur'an has over its two forerunning scriptures (Old and New Testaments) is that it is all-encompassing, all-inclusive, and for all times.

10. The legal and civic status of Jews and Christians when it comes to a court of law is left up to the degree of autonomy that is worked out between them and the Islamic "supreme court." This is generally decided on the merits or demerits of their own "sect," previous history, and compatibility with the Islamic populace (not all Jews and Christians are the same in their self-motivated relationship or lack thereof with their overwhelmingly Muslim surroundings).
11. The Prophet (ﷺ) and all responsible Muslims are tasked with a binding duty to fulfill and socialize the legal component of scripture. There is no excuse for neglecting or dropping it.
12. Allah (ﷻ) is able to unify people, blend tribes together, consolidate nations, and have them all consent to one legal code; but His wisdom in permitting people to practice their free will has placed humanity in the conditions of today's seemingly irreconcilable world.
13. The social activities of men and societies can be structured on the bases of positive and favorable competition, **"Compete, then, with one another in doing good works" (5:48)**, unlike today's world where competition has been characterized by nastiness, brutishness, and the "win at all costs" attitude. Perhaps this is all a secular and godless society can offer; but when society itself is remade and refashioned according to scriptural morals and scriptural laws it will offer people all manner of constructive and gracious competition.
14. There is always a lingering and latent influence coming from people who break away from God to try to influence sincere and responsible Muslims into prohibited domains. They even

tried this with Allah's Prophet (ﷺ) and he had to be advised from on high in these words, **"...and beware of them, lest they tempt you away from any of what Allah has bestowed from on high upon you" (5:49)**. So if they had the chutzpah to try to tempt Muhammad (ﷺ) away from Allah (ﷻ), what would be their disposition regarding his followers — the rank-and-file Muslims?

15. Turning away from Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ) will cause worldly problems and social upheaval. This is true of the Jews who turned away from Muhammad (ﷺ) and it is true of any who refuse to acknowledge him and who spurn him, **"And if they turn away, then know that it is but Allah's will [thus] to afflict them for some of their sins [and crimes]" (5:49)**.
16. Arabians in their pre-Qur'anic times as "Jews" in their post-Talmudic times, as people everywhere in their anti-scriptural times, are apt to favor those who have money and power and to exempt them from the strict wording and meaning of the law. Thus if a high-class official commits a crime, he is, in all likelihood, to be punished in the most accommodating way: a lenient sentencing, a classy detention center, access to communication and public contact, liberal visitation rights, etc. However, if a low-class citizen commits the same crime, he is, in all likelihood, to be punished in the harshest manner: a heavy sentence, a hellish penitentiary, limited visits and telephone calls, and lousy food and repellent living conditions, etc. In the way that things work most of the time, rich people have it easy and poor people have it hard. And this is a partial understanding of the system of *jāhiliyyah* that is condemned in the Qur'an and the Sunnah.
17. No one can contribute to justice — its meaning and its implementation — more than Allah (ﷻ). Thus, no one can offer a system or a government that can approach the high bar of impartial justice the way Allah's (ﷻ) system does.

Before proceeding to the next lesson, it should now be understood that whatever is deemed to be lawful and legitimate by sub-

divine regimes and parliaments cannot be considered as a reference point for human behavior. The definition of that which is lawful, legal, recognized by law, or according to law has to meet the meanings and standards that are included in scripture, that is, in this precise and perfect Qur'an. No issue in today's world can be settled without first referring it to this Qur'an and to the Prophet (ﷺ). If the issue, for instance, concerns the definition of "legitimate children," then the answer can only be found in the precision of Allah's (ﷻ) words in His final Dispensation. When a debate rages about the meaning of legitimate authority, then clarity can only be provided by filtering the competing arguments through this authentic and accurate Qur'an. When people ask about the acquisition and exercise of lawful power (or anything else), then they must resolve to have the mindset that any response not conveyed first through this definitive and distinguishing Qur'an will be inadequate and in all likelihood biased. Even if there are inquiries about what constitutes legitimate sport or amusement, the committed Muslims are still expected to refer the matter to this faithful and factual Qur'an, **"And who can be better in passing a judgement [or a sound opinion] than Allah [on these and similar matters]..."** The ground has been set now for another notch of activities in which some Muslims find themselves tempted or influenced to join the political and ideological camps of those who have a "Christian" religion but go by an imperialist doctrine, and those who have a "Jewish" religion but conform to a Zionist dogma.

Kāfirs Cannot Be Guarantors of Muslims

- (5:51) O you who are securely committed [to Allah’s power]! Do not take the [political] Jews and the [political] Christians for your allies: they are but allies of one another — and whoever of you allies himself with them becomes, verily, one of them; behold, Allah does not guide an unfair multitude of people.
- (5:52) And yet you can see how those [Muslims] in whose hearts there is disease vie with one another for their [ideological Jews’ and Christians’] good will, saying [to themselves], “We fear lest fortune turn against us.” But Allah may well bring about good fortune [for the committed Muslims] or any [other] event of His own devising, whereupon those [waverers] will be smitten with remorse for the thoughts that they had secretly harbored within themselves;
- (5:53) While those who have attained a commitment to Allah will say [to one another], “Are these the self-same people who swore by Allah with their most solemn oaths that they were indeed with you? In vain are all their works, for now they are lost!”
- (5:54) O you who are securely committed [to Allah]! If you ever abandon your [scriptural] *dīn*, Allah will in time bring forth [in your stead] people whom He loves and who love Him — humble toward the committed Muslims, proud toward the deniers of the truth [of Allah’s power], who strive hard in Allah’s cause, and do not fear to be censured by anyone who might censure them: such is Allah’s favor, which He grants to whom He wills. And Allah is infinite, all-knowing.
- (5:55) Behold, your only helper shall be Allah, and His Apostle, and those who have committed themselves [to His power] — those who have conducted [a social] *ṣalāh*, and rendered [a systemic] *zakāh* while they are [in a program] of consenting [to Allah]:
- (5:56) For, all who ally themselves with Allah and His Apostle and those who are committed [to Allah’s power] —

يَأْتِيهَا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا لَا تَتَّخِذُوا الْيَهُودَ وَالنَّصْرَىٰ أَوْلِيَآءَ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَآءُ بَعْضٍ
 وَمَنْ يَتَوَلَّهُمْ مِنكُمْ فَإِنَّهُ مِنْهُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَهْدِي الْقَوْمَ الظَّالِمِينَ ﴿٥١﴾ فَتَرَى
 الَّذِينَ فِي قُلُوبِهِمْ مَرَضٌ يُسْرِعُونَ فِيهِمْ يَقُولُونَ نَخْشَىٰ أَنْ تُصِيبَنَا دَآئِرَةٌ
 فَعَسَىٰ اللَّهُ أَنْ يَأْتِيَ بِالْفَتْحِ أَوْ أَمْرٍ مِّنْ عِنْدِهِ فَيُصْبِحُوا عَلَىٰ مَا أَسْرُوا فِي
 أَنفُسِهِمْ نَدِيمِينَ ﴿٥٢﴾ وَيَقُولُ الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا أَهَؤُلَاءِ الَّذِينَ أَقْسَمُوا بِاللَّهِ
 جَهْدَ أَيْمَانِهِمْ إِنَّهُمْ لَمَعَكُمْ حَبِطَتِ أَعْمَالُهُمْ فَأَصْبَحُوا خَاسِرِينَ ﴿٥٣﴾
 يَأْتِيهَا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا مِنْ يَرْتَدَّ مِنْكُمْ عَنْ دِينِهِ فَسَوْفَ يَأْتِي اللَّهُ بِقَوْمٍ يُحِبُّهُمْ
 وَيُحِبُّونَهُ أَذِلَّةٍ عَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِينَ أَعِزَّةٍ عَلَى الْكَافِرِينَ يُجَاهِدُونَ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ
 وَلَا يَخَافُونَ لَوْمَةَ لَائِمٍ ذَلِكَ فَضْلُ اللَّهِ يُؤْتِيهِ مَن يَشَاءُ وَاللَّهُ وَاسِعٌ عَلِيمٌ
 ﴿٥٤﴾ إِنَّمَا وَلِيُّكُمُ اللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ وَالَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا الَّذِينَ يُقِيمُونَ الصَّلَاةَ وَيُؤْتُونَ
 الزَّكَاةَ وَهُمْ رَاكِعُونَ ﴿٥٥﴾ وَمَنْ يَتَوَلَّ اللَّهَ وَرَسُولَهُ وَالَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا فَإِنَّ حِزْبَ
 اللَّهِ هُمُ الْغَالِبُونَ ﴿٥٦﴾ يَأْتِيهَا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا لَا تَتَّخِذُوا الَّذِينَ اتَّخَذُوا دِينَكُمْ هُزُوعًا
 وَلِعِبَابًا مِّنَ الَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْكِتَابَ مِن قَبْلِكُمْ وَالْكَافِرَ أَوْلِيَآءَ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ إِنَّ كُفْرَكُمْ
 مُؤْمِنِينَ ﴿٥٧﴾ وَإِذَا نَادَيْتُمْ إِلَى الصَّلَاةِ اتَّخَذُوهَا هُزُوعًا وَلِعِبَابًا ذَلِكَ بِأَنَّهُمْ قَوْمٌ
 لَا يَعْقِلُونَ ﴿٥٨﴾ قُلْ يَتَاهَلِ الْكِتَابِ هَلْ تَنقُمُونَ مِنَّا إِلَّا أَنْ ءَامَنَّا بِاللَّهِ وَمَا

أَنْزَلَ إِلَيْنَا وَمَا أَنْزَلَ مِنْ قَبْلُ وَأَنَّ أَكْثَرَكُمْ فَاسِقُونَ ﴿٥٩﴾ قُلْ هَلْ أُنَبِّئُكُمْ بِشَرِّ مِمَّنْ
 ذَلِكَ مَثُوبَةٌ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ مِنْ لَعْنَةِ اللَّهِ وَعَظْبِ عَلَيْهِ وَجَعَلَ مِنْهُمْ الْفِرْدَةَ
 وَالْخَنَازِيرَ وَعَبَدَ الطَّاغُوتِ أُولَئِكَ شَرٌّ مَكَانًا وَأَضَلُّ عَنْ سَوَاءِ السَّبِيلِ ﴿٦٠﴾
 وَإِذَا جَاءَ وَكُمُ قَالُوا ءَأَمَنَّا وَقَدْ دَخَلُوا بِالْكَفْرِ وَهُمْ قَدْ خَرَجُوا بِهِ ءَ وَاللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ
 بِمَا كَانُوا يَكْتُمُونَ ﴿٦١﴾ وَتَرَى كَثِيرًا مِنْهُمْ يُسْرِعُونَ فِي الْأَثْمِ وَالْعُدْوَانِ
 وَأَكْلِهِمُ السُّحْتِ لَيْسَ مَا كَانُوا يَعْمَلُونَ ﴿٦٢﴾ لَوْلَا يَنْهَاهُمُ الرَّبَّانِيُّونَ
 وَالْأَحْبَارُ عَنْ قَوْلِهِمُ الْإِثْمَ وَأَكْلِهِمُ السُّحْتِ لَيْسَ مَا كَانُوا يَصْنَعُونَ
 ﴿٦٣﴾ وَقَالَتِ الْيَهُودُ يَدُ اللَّهِ مَغْلُولَةٌ غُلَّتْ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَلُعِنُوا بِمَا قَالُوا بَلْ يَدَاهُ
 مَبْسُوطَتَانِ يُنْفِقُ كَيْفَ يَشَاءُ وَلِيَزِيدَنَّ كَثِيرًا مِنْهُمْ مَا أَنْزَلَ إِلَيْكَ مِنَ رَبِّكَ
 طُغْيَانًا وَكُفْرًا وَالْقَيْنَا بَيْنَهُمُ الْعَدَاوَةَ وَالْبَغْضَاءَ إِلَى يَوْمِ الْقِيَامَةِ كُلَّمَا أَوْقَدُوا
 نَارًا لِلْحَرْبِ أَطْفَأَهَا اللَّهُ وَيَسْعَوْنَ فِي الْأَرْضِ فَسَادًا وَاللَّهُ لَا يُحِبُّ
 الْمُفْسِدِينَ ﴿٦٤﴾ وَلَوْ أَنَّ أَهْلَ الْكِتَابِ ءَأَمَنُوا وَاتَّقَوْا لَكَفَرْنَا
 عَنْهُمْ سَخِيبَةً وَلَا دَخْلَنَاهُمْ جَنَّاتِ النَّعِيمِ ﴿٦٥﴾ وَلَوْ أَنَّهُمْ أَقَامُوا
 التَّوْرَةَ وَالْإِنْجِيلَ وَمَا أَنْزَلَ إِلَيْهِمْ مِنْ رَبِّهِمْ لَأَكَلُوا مِنْ فَوْقِهِمْ وَمِن
 تَحْتِ أَرْجُلِهِمْ مِنْهُمْ أُمَّةٌ مُقْتَصِدَةٌ وَكَثِيرٌ مِنْهُمْ سَاءٌ مَا يَعْمَلُونَ ﴿٦٦﴾

behold, it is they, the political party of Allah, who shall be victorious!

- (5:57) O you who are securely committed [to Allah and His power]! Do not take for your allies such as mock at your [scriptural] *dīn* and make a jest of it — be they from among those who have been vouchsafed revelation before your time, or [from among] those who deny the truth [of Allah's power as such] — but remain on guard toward Allah [and His power], if you are [truly] committed [to Him].
- (5:58) For, when you publicly summon to *ṣalāh*, they [political “Jews” and political “Christians”] mock at it and make a jest of it — simply because they are people who do not use their reason.
- (5:59) Say, “O followers of earlier revelation! Do you find fault with us for no other reason than that we are committed to Allah [alone], and in that which He has bestowed from on high upon us as well as that which He has bestowed aforetime? Or [is it only] because most of you are corrupt?”
- (5:60) Say, “Shall I tell you who, in the sight of Allah, deserves a yet worse retribution than these? They whom Allah has rejected and whom He has condemned, and whom He has turned into apes and swine [imitators and gluttons] because they conformed to the [excessive] powers of evil: these are yet worse in station, and further astray from the right path [than the mockers].”
- (5:61) For, when they come to you, they say, “We are committed [to Allah],” whereas, in fact, they come with the resolve to deny the truth [of Allah's power], and depart in the same state. But Allah is fully aware of all that they would conceal.
- (5:62) And you can see many of them compete with one another in sinning and tyrannical conduct and in their swallowing of all that is felonious. Vile indeed is what they do [as a validation of what they believe].
- (5:63) Why do not their men of God and their rabbis forbid them from making sinful assertions and swallowing all that is evil? Vile indeed is what they contrive!

- (5:64) And the [contemptuous] Jews say, “Allah’s hand is shackled!” It is their own hands that are shackled; and rejected [by Allah] are they because of this their assertion. No, but wide are His hands stretched out: He dispenses [bounty] as He wills. But all that has been bestowed from on high upon you [O Prophet] by your Sustainer is bound to make many of them yet more stubborn in their overweening arrogance and in their denial of the truth [pertaining to Allah’s power]. And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [distorted] Bible, [to last] until Resurrection Day; every time they light the fires of war, Allah extinguishes them; and they labor hard to spread corruption on earth: and Allah does not love the spreaders of corruption.
- (5:65) If the followers of the [winding] Bible would but attain to [a true] commitment and observance [of Allah’s power presence], We should indeed efface their [previous] bad deeds, and indeed bring them into gardens of bliss;
- (5:66) And if they would but truly observe the Torah and the Gospel and all [the revelation] that has been bestowed from on high upon them by their Sustainer, they would indeed partake of all the blessings of heaven and earth. Some of them do pursue a right course; but as for most of them — vile indeed is what they do! (al-Mā’idah: 51–66).

A close reading of this *sūrah*, and particularly the *āyāt* above, would indicate that these instructions from on high were not revealed all at once after the Ḥudaybiyah ceasefire. Some of the divine dispatches here would suggest that they were revealed before the Ḥudaybiyah agreement and perhaps even before the Yahūdī faction of Banū Qurayzah was expatriated from the Islamic city-state of Madinah during the 5th year of the Hijrah — the year known as the Year of al-Aḥzāb (the confederate forces that laid siege on Madinah). The subject-matter domain of these *āyāt* in *Sūrah al-Mā’idah* may also encompass the climactic showdown with Banū al-Naḍīr after the military standoff at Uḥud, or even the expulsion of Banū Qaynuqā’ after the military clash at Badr.

The maturing Muslims, who will be reading this Qur'an with greater vigor as the years go by, slowly learning from their experiences (mistakes), should realize that these *āyāt*, even though they come from heaven, were informed by real-life events on earth, often in the theater of war where allegiances, emotions, and resolve are tested. The lessons therein are forged in the sacrifices and struggle of the concerted Islamic jihad, which on the one hand was the strategic bulwark against the armed enemies from Makkah, and on the other the object of domestic subterfuge by the Yahūd and the *munāfiqs* of Madinah. The lesson here points to a time when the status of the Yahūd was "attractive" to some and when they still had some influence on others within the Islamic population of Madinah.

No Muslim, or for that matter human being, would entertain the notion of allying himself with an alien faction that was weak, vulnerable, and exposed. But the context of this lesson calls attention to an atmosphere in which the civic factions of "Jews" and "Christians" had enough power so as to appear admirable and alluring for people who had less apparent and obvious power. This Qur'anic lesson has yet to be absorbed, internalized, and publicized by the masses of Muslims today. The reverberations of this lesson are far-reaching and beyond the somnambulant status quo of today's daydreaming Muslims.

The inescapable point here is that any Muslim — in a position to do so — who enters into an ideological arrangement, a political alliance, or a military coalition with political, doctrinaire, and official "Jews" and/or "Christians" becomes one of them and is no longer the independent, self-governing, and sovereign Muslim he was meant to be by virtue of his relationship with Allah (ﷻ). Once Muslims join a "Christian" imperialist or a "Jewish" Zionist power structure they lose their "Islamic" feature and assume their enemies' disposition. Only Muslims with morbid minds and ulcerated spirits would forsake their Islamic power structure to join jaded "Jews" and sanctimonious "Christians" who have morphed what was bestowed on them in the form of scriptures of justice into the laws of the jungle. The penetrating Qur'an goes deep inside the psychology of

such “Muslims,” exposing their visceral fear of having a bad fortune if they do not join the perceived powers of their time. Muslims are told by the words of this overarching lesson not to traffic with cavalier “Christians” and intolerant “Jews” whose political machinations have proven a history of hostility toward any expression of Islamic self-determination. The practical fact of the matter at the time of the revelation of these *āyāt* was that the Yahūd in Madinah could potentially swing many Muslims away from a “costly” self-determination, get them to abandon the struggle, and then join the coattails of a dominant Yahūdī status quo.

Had these Yahūd only a minimal influence upon society at that time and for all times to come there would never have been a need to etch these *āyāt* into the minds of Muslims all the way to eternity. For the Muslims to regain their influential global status, they need to consider the meanings of these incisive words, more so now than at any other time because the affluent presence of Jewish political thought (Zionism) has crystallized into a military occupation of the Holy Land compounded by a buffer-zone occupation of the surrounding countries via client regimes and governments that depend on Zionism and imperialism for survival.

It is an established fact in the books of *Sīrah* that, through the recognition of Judaism as a scriptural way of life, the Prophet of Allah (ﷺ) initiated cordial relationships with the Jews of Madinah and accorded them full economic rights on par with the committed Muslims. This is corroborated by evidence found in the fraternity document that was signed by them and the Muhājirūn and the Anṣār — *Wathīqah al-Madīnah* (the Document of Madinah). Also registered in this document were the civic rights of the tribes and clans within the jurisdiction of Madinah. Some pertinent statements from that document, pertaining to the nature of the civic affiliation between Muslims and Jews, include the following:

Article 16: And that whoever from the Jews merges with us [the Islamic civil course] shall be assisted and acclaimed; and none [of them] shall be offended or beleaguered.

Article 24: And that the Jews along with the committed Muslims are to spend [for the public interest] during conditions of war.

Article 25: And that the Jews of Banū 'Awf are a [recognized] community alongside the committed Muslims — the Jews having their *dīn* and the Muslims having their *dīn*. This applies to [all] their dependents and their own selves, except for the unjust or the criminal [those in violation of the law] — they do harm to none other than themselves and their clan.

Article 26: And that the Jews of Banū al-Najjār are entitled to what the Jews of Banū 'Awf are entitled.

Article 27: And that the Jews of Banū al-Ḥārith are entitled to what the Jews of Banū 'Awf are entitled.

Article 28: And that the Jews of Banū Sā'idah are entitled to what the Jews of Banū 'Awf are entitled.

Article 29: And that the Jews of Banū Jusham are entitled to what the Jews of Banū 'Awf are entitled.

Article 30: And that the Jews of Banū al-Aws are entitled to what the Jews of Banū 'Awf are entitled.

Article 31: And that the Jews of Banū Tha'labaḥ are entitled to what the Jews of Banū 'Awf are entitled, except if they are in violation of the law of the land [the unjust and the criminal] — for such do harm to none other than themselves and their clan.

Article 33: And that Banū Shuṭaybaḥ are entitled to what the Jews of Banū 'Awf are entitled, recognizing the accessibility of virtue and the abhorrence of vice.

Article 35: And that likewise, the affiliates of the Jews have the same [legal] standing as the Jews themselves.

Article 37: And that the Jews shall bear their own expenses as will the Muslims. And that between them is [a pledge of] mutual assistance against whomever wages war on the signatories of this document; and that their relationship shall be one of mutual advice, counsel, and virtue rather than harm and aggression. However, no man is to be held accountable for a crime committed by his ally; assistance is due to the party suffering oppression [not the one perpetrating it].

Article 38: And that the [aforementioned] Jews are to share in the financial dues alongside the committed Muslims during a state of war.

Article 39: And that the signatories to this document agree that Yathrib proper is never to become a war zone.

Article 43: And that neither the Quraysh nor any of its supporters shall be offered [any] assistance or aid.³⁹⁶

Concerning the relations between the committed Muslims and their adversaries in Madinah, Ibn al-Qayyim says,

When the Prophet (ﷺ) arrived in Madinah the *kāfirs* basically were apportioned to three different classes. As to the first class of *kāfirs*, the Prophet (ﷺ) reached an accommodation with them that they not wage war against the Islamic authority and state, that they not support any other faction against the Islamic authority and state, and that they not enter into any alliance with an enemy of the Islamic authority and state; and even if they stay *kāfirs* they are guaranteed by the Islamic authority to be secure in their lives and possessions. The second class of

kāfirs became an active enemy of the Islamic authority and seized all opportunities to express its hostility. The third class of *kāfirs* did not engage the Islamic society and state in any expression of peaceful or aggressive relations. They were just waiting to see how things were going to play themselves out: would the Prophet (ﷺ) be able to weather and survive the charged Arabian environment or would the hostile Arabian climate have its day against Muhammad (ﷺ) and his ideological state? There were some individuals within this “wait-and-see” *kāfir* camp who in their own selves desired the Prophet's (ﷺ) victory; others of them, however, overtly tilted toward him while covertly working with the enemies of Islam. By doing this they thought they could be on both sides of this polarization between *īmān* and *kufr*. These people became better known as the *munāfiqs*. And the Prophet (ﷺ) dealt with each one of these *kāfir* factions as instructed from above.

In light of these dynamics he entered into an accommodative relationship with the Jews of Madinah and codified it with a document written between both sides to that effect. In it, the Jews living in and around Madinah — belonging to the three contingents of Banū Qaynuqā', Banū al-Naḍīr, and Banū Qurayẓah — were assured of their safety and security. The unfolding experience gained through the Islamic accommodation and goodwill extended to the Yahūd in Madinah is that Banū Qaynuqā' turned hostile against the Prophet (ﷺ) and his followers after the Battle of Badr. Confirming their penchant for belligerence and foul comportment, Banū al-Naḍīr followed the treacherous Banū Qaynuqā' by reneging on their pledge with the Muslims. According to al-Bukhārī, it was only six months after Badr that these Yahūd showed their true colors of hostility. He also points out how they conspired to kill Allah's Prophet (ﷺ); the incident was cited earlier in this *sūrah*,

**O you who are securely committed to Allah!
Bear in mind Allah's bounty upon you when
some people were on the verge of extending
a [hostile] hand toward you and He refrained
their hands from you (5:11).**

Banū Qurayẓah harbored the gravest animosity toward Muhammad (ﷺ); their disloyalty and treason were exposed when they abrogated their cordial agreement with him during the travails of the Battle of the Trench (al-Khandaq). The Prophet (ﷺ) took on each faction of the Yahūd militarily and all of them lost. That the committed Muslims should never raise a Jewish or Christian political junta to the level of an ally appears to be a telling lesson from history. There is a parallel here with Arabian Christians and the Byzantines who — like the Yahūd — lost little time in demonstrating their hostility and belligerence against an Islamic government.³⁹⁷

This offers the Muslims of today an overview of how ideological and political Jews and Christians behave whenever Muslims gain their power base. And after over 14 centuries, the Muslims have still not received any clarification from these types as to why they could not reconcile themselves to Muslims having their own Islamic form of government.

Certain Islamic historical sources point to the Banū Qaynuqā' incident as the specific context for the revelation of these *āyāt*. When the Yahūdī power bloc of Banū Qaynuqā' turned hostile against Allah's Prophet (ﷺ) with the result that they were going to be expelled from Madinah, 'Abdullāh ibn Ubayy ibn Sallūl — the head honcho of the *munāfiqs* and a confidant of Banū Qaynuqā' who maintained his loyalty to them even after the Prophet's (ﷺ) arrival there — began to advocate on their behalf. Seeing this, 'Ubādaḥ ibn al-Ṣāmit went to Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) and publicly disavowed any affinity with the Yahūd. This put moral pressure on Ibn Sallūl because now his peer had severed relations with Banū

Qaynuqā'.³⁹⁸ At this point, 'Abdullāh ibn Ubayy ibn Sallūl is reported to have said, "I am a man who fears misadventure and do not exonerate myself from their [the Jews] alliance."³⁹⁹

Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Mundhir in referring to this *āyah* say that it was revealed to address Banū Qurayzah when they beguiled and broke their arrangement with Allah's Prophet (ﷺ) during the *mushrik* siege of Madinah on the occasion of al-Khandaq. They had written to Abū Sufyān requesting him and the Quraysh for protection in the *mushrik* fortifications on the outskirts of Madinah, but for whatever reason did not transfer there.⁴⁰⁰ After the siege came to an end with the Muslims outlasting the confederates (the Aḥzāb), the Prophet (ﷺ) sent Abū Lubābah ibn 'Abd al-Mundhir to call upon them to vacate their positions from within their fortresses inside of Madinah so that they could be sentenced for their high treason during a time of war. Also included in the purview of this *āyah* are those Muslims who were corresponding with political Christians in the Levant, and the Muslims who were corresponding with some political Jews in Madinah relaying to them information about Muhammad (ﷺ) so as to curry favor with the Yahūd and reap some financial benefits. Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī relates that the people who had assumed the *mushriks* would be victorious indicated they would join the Jewish so-and-so and become Jews; others of them declared they would join the Christian so-and-so and become Christians. Of course these people who wanted to jump on the bandwagon of any winner are the *munāfiqs*, and they too are subjected to the barometer of this *āyah*. Whatever the details may have been it is obvious from the established meaning of this *āyah* that committed Muslims are banned from entering into any type of political, ideological, or military alliance with those entities that harbor animosity and hostility toward the Qur'anic scripture, the Islamic Prophet (ﷺ), and the popular base of committed Muslims. It cannot be overstated enough that Muslims who are sidekicks of political Jews and Christians have no contribution to make to an Islamic tomorrow.

In reading and understanding this *āyah*, the first thing that should strike the attention of everyday Muslims is that they are in

need of a political understanding of the world around them. This lesson should force them to take a look at the political composition of those who say they are Jews and those who say they are Christians. The Muslims cannot afford to go on thinking about Jews and Christians as strictly a religious bloc of people, especially as their religious character is accompanied by a political personality. Hence, if the Muslims do not understand the political thoughts of Jews and Christians, their political plans, their political strategies, and their political ambitions, then they will not be able to make sense of Jewish and Christian political allegiances, political alliances, and political armies. In the world today, there is a concerted effort, bolstered by billions of dollars and hundreds of hours of media time, to dumb down the Muslims. They are officially and academically prohibited from generating their own Islamic political thoughts on the forces and structures around them. So long as they remain aloof of this critical area with little or no understanding of the nature of alliances and political affiliations, they will remain in the dark about what these and other *āyāt* in this Qur'an are telling them about the real and threatening world around.

Using our common sense, we the Muslims must realize that we constitute an independent and a self-governing power base. Our power structure cannot and does not rely on other governments or coalitions for its livelihood or for its survival. Knowing this, we will have to muster enough confidence in our own selves to declare to the rest of the world that we are the inheritors of the scriptural legacy. This banner of scripture has been handed down to the Muslims from the retinue of disciples who tended to the Prophets and Messengers of Allah (ﷺ). This history of scriptural self-determination peaked with Muhammad (ﷺ) and the committed Muslims who gave life and limb for Islamic self-actualization and Qur'anic fulfillment. When we Muslims advance into this position again, as we are destined to do, and when we resume our front-line positions of state-building once again, we will be the human expression of God's will on earth. Is it an honor to be in this position? Of course. Is it easy to be in this position? Of course not. Is there any other alternative? No.

The purpose of these *āyāt* is not only for them to be read and recited melodiously, but more importantly, for them to be thought through, reflected upon, and then influence behavior,

O you who are securely committed to Allah! Do not ally yourselves with [political] Jews and [political] Christians... they [political Jews and Christians] are allies of each other... and whoever of you [Muslims] enters their alliance becomes one of them [political Jews and Christians]... Certainly, Allah does not guide wrong-doing people (5:51);

O you who are securely committed [to Allah's power]! Whoever of you renounces his [scriptural] *dīn*, then Allah will bring forth a [type of] people whom He is fond of and they are fond of Him. They are sentimental toward committed Muslims but scathing against committed *kāfirs*. They strive and struggle on a course to Allah and they are not afraid of anyone's inculpation... that is the providence He gives to whomever He wills. And Allah is accordant, all-knowing (5:54);

Indeed, your superior ally is Allah, His Apostle, and the committed Muslims — those who standardize the *ṣalāh*, institutionalize the *zakāh*, while they are in reverence... and he whose superior ally is Allah and His Apostle and the committed Muslims then it is Allah's party that is victorious... (5:55–56).

When this fact settles into the Muslim common sense, public mind, and popular discourse, then the Muslims will begin to realize that they have the kind of uncompromising enemies who are hell-bent on defeating them. The reason these enemies are willing to go to war against the Muslims, to have their own sons and daughters killed in this war, to annihilate the Muslims' urban centers and infrastructure, and to "bomb them back to the stone age" is because

the Muslims have an Islamic ideology from Allah (ﷻ), a scripture that cannot be auctioned off to the highest bidder, and lives to give for this light and guidance from Him.

The stark naked animosity that worldly powers harbor against committed Muslims seeks to strip the latter of their unique social identity, their self-confidence, and their self-reliant government, so as to make them dependent on handouts from world financial powers, on metal scraps from world military powers, and on advisers from world political powers. Calling for and proceeding on a path to gain this type of independence places the intrepid Muslims in the crosshairs of Zionists and imperialists. And this fact will grow as the years go by and as the battles take their toll.

Incessant acrimony between the sons of Adam (ﷻ) will always tip the balance in favor of Satan; however Satan will have the balance all to himself when men of God remain silent about the facts. And the facts here have to do with the inability and the failure of moral Jews and virtuous Christians to uphold an ethical political order in their countries and societies,

Say, “O people of [earlier] scripture! Do you take revenge against us [the committed Muslims] just because we have committed ourselves to Allah and to what He has revealed to us [of scripture] and to what He has revealed in times past and because most of you have become fraudulent?” (5:59).

This is the crux of the matter. This is why these power maniacs who have Jewish and Christian veneers mobilize all their Jewish and Christian crowds in a war that has known no respite from the Ḥijāz of Abū Sufyān to the Ḥijāz of Ibn Sa‘ūd.

Every time the Muslims summon the courage to consolidate a power base, they fall into categories of accusations, stereotypes, and innuendo in the political lexicon of Jewish Zionists and Christian imperialists. With loaded words coming from the mouths of people whose hearts beat with an animus against Islam, the Muslims are condemned to being a natural enemy, an alien human sub-species,

and a wild sociopath that has no interest in civic comportment with others. In today's market of words, Muslims are either terrorists or terrorists in the making. Therefore, in the minds of power-hungry imperialists and power-obsessed Zionists a Muslim by definition is an enemy or a potential enemy — not because he is fasting in Ramaḍān or reciting his daily prayers, but because he is thinking or will begin to think of securing his God-given freedom, his God-given independence, and his God-given authority.

A minimal understanding of these *āyāt* bars all state-building and ideologically conscious Muslims from entering into a relationship of loyalty and aid to what in contemporary times is known as imperialism and Zionism. The simple truth of the matter is that both imperialism and Zionism are implacable enemies of Islam. This means no Muslim should be passing on what is called “state secrets” to agents or representatives of Zionism and imperialism. These Zionists and imperialists are allies and accessories of each other. This being said, leaving no room for any ambiguity, there will still be some “Muslims” who will profess an Islamic faith but practice a Zionist/imperialist master plan.

Muslims Cannot Seek Patronage from Imperialists and Zionists

**O you who are securely committed [to Allah's power]!
Do not take the (Jewish) Zionists and the (Christian)
imperialists for your allies: they are but allies of one
another — and whoever of you enters into an alliance
with them becomes, in fact, one of them; behold, Allah
does not guide people who are unjust.**

And yet you can see how those [Muslims] in whose hearts there is a pathology contend with one another for their [the Judeo-Christian Zionists' and imperialists'] endorsement, saying [to themselves], “We fear the tide will turn against us.” But Allah may well bring about a favorable tide [for the committed Muslims] or any [other] event of His own devising, whereupon those

[equivocators] will be smitten with remorse for the thoughts that they had secretly harbored within themselves; while those who have achieved a commitment to Allah will say [to one another], “Are these the self-same people who swore by Allah with their most solemn assurance that they were indeed with you? In vain are all their works, for now they are lost!” (5:51–53).

The first misunderstanding that needs clarification here has to do with the words *Yahūd* and *Naṣārā*. These are the divine words used in this lesson when Allah (ﷻ) tells the committed Muslims not to enter into an alliance with them. The common mistake made by Muslim and non-Muslim translators alike when this *āyah* (5:51) is rendered into English (as well as other non-Arabic languages) is that they say the word *Yahūd* means *Jews*, and the word *Naṣārā* means *Christians*. In a general sense these two words *Yahūd* and *Naṣārā* do allude to Jews and Christians. However in this lesson, as well as in other lessons throughout this instructive Qur’an, the words *Yahūd* and *Naṣārā* have gained a more refined meaning by the context they are to be found in. Therefore, in this linguistic and ideological context the word *Yahūd* does not refer to religious Jews per se as much as it pertains to the type of Jews who plan coalitions, set up alliances, and promote common policies. Given that this type of activity falls on the shoulders of Jews who have devised their own political agenda — an agenda that seeks to recruit or employ fallow “Muslims” naive of matters political, economic, ideological, and military — the *āyah* instructs committed Muslims to steer clear of such Jews. Further refinement of the way these types of Jews are described in contemporary times suggests that they are in fact Zionists.

The exact same rationale can be applied to the word *Naṣārā*. The advice from Allah (ﷻ) is not telling the Muslims to sever all ties, either in the personal or social domains, from those who say they are Christians — as many erroneous translations of this *āyah* may suggest. To the contrary, the inclusivist Muslims are encouraged through their experience with the unifying Qur’an and the accommodating Sunnah to have a cordial relationship with them so long

as they reciprocate in like manner. But when these “Christians” conceive of a political program that has the capacity to enlist Muslims in a larger coalition of their own forces, designated to inure people to an ambiance of injustice often to the detriment of the Muslims themselves along with the historically oppressed, then at that time, the committed Muslims are counseled to withdraw, in fulfilling the meanings herein, from such alliances and associations.

Therefore the word *awliyā'* (*superiors, chiefs, and... manipulators*) and its derivatives, among them *yatawallahum* (*he regards them to be his superiors*), as well as corresponding terms, such as *tuṣībunā dā'irah* (*lest we suffer a setback*) and *fath* (*breakthrough, liberation*) all refine or particularize the words *Yahūd* and *Naṣārā* to a point where they no longer apply to holy Jews or inspirational Christians. Instead, in context they are appropriate to Zionists and imperialists who may or may not use their version of “Jewish” and “Christian” history, interpretation of scripture, and background to justify their Zionism and imperialism. And since the Qur'anic facts of life are always current, the wayward Zionism and imperialism attributed to the Judeo-Christian context is what the Muslims are experiencing in contemporary times. In future generations, some other political and ideological outgrowth of secular Jewish thinking may be in vogue and it may go by a different ideological label besides Zionism; however the Qur'anic designation of their pattern of behavior will remain constant. It will be up to the astuteness of committed Muslims to make the correspondence in whatever day and time they are living. This holds equally true for those who say they are Christians and some of their other political and ideological postulations, past or future, that may not necessarily be designated by the term imperialism. Hence, for Muslims, the course is set in this lesson: as a political order and power base they are prohibited from entering into any type of alliance with Judaism-cum-Zionism or with Christianity-cum-imperialism.

An *alliance* is a cooperative security relationship between two or more states, usually taking the form of a written military commitment. In practice, however, the presence of a formal treaty says relatively little about the level of commitment or the extent of co-

operation. Less formal arrangements — variously known as *alignments*, *ententes*, or *coalitions* — perform similar functions and can exert equally significant influence. Efforts to explain why alliances form fall into two basic categories. Within the realist tradition in the Yahūd-Naṣārā scheme of things, alliances are seen as a way for states to increase their security in response to an external threat: the greater the threat — a function of relative power, geographic proximity, and aggressive intent — the greater the tendency for states to ally against it.⁴⁰¹

The formidable tendency for states to balance threats is the main barrier to hegemony in an international system molded by Zionist and imperialist priorities. As Louis XIV, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Adolf Hitler discovered, states that seek to dominate the system eventually provoke a powerful countervailing alliance.⁴⁰² Similarly, the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 was a response to the military power of the Soviet Union, its geographic proximity to Western Europe, and Western concerns about Soviet intentions.⁴⁰³

Liberal and idealist approaches argue that alliances result from the natural affinity of states with similar domestic characteristics. From this perspective, NATO's durability reflects its members' commitment to democracy and market economics. Although alliance members often emphasize common values in their public rhetoric, ideological affinities are less important than security concerns in some alliances. States facing a common enemy usually overlook ideological differences (as the USA and USSR did during World War II), while states proclaiming similar ideologies may be bitter rivals (as in the Sino-Soviet conflict or the various quarrels within the pan-Arabian movement).⁴⁰⁴

Alliances are often seen as a cause of war, but repeated efforts to verify this hypothesis have been unsuccessful. If anything, war is more likely when alliance formation does not proceed efficiently. If balancing coalitions form slowly or if alliance members try to exploit their partners by excessive “free-riding,” aggressors are more likely to underestimate the opposition they will face and thus may be more inclined to use force.⁴⁰⁵

The end of the Cold War altered existing alliances dramatically. Within Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (also known as the Warsaw Pact) removed NATO's principal *raison d'être*. Proposals to transform NATO into a collective security arrangement should, however, be viewed with a sense of history and the experience of other blocs of nations in the world, given the dismal record of previous attempts (such as the League of Nations) and the likelihood of increased tension within Europe as the "superpowers" gradually withdraw.⁴⁰⁶ The demise of the Soviet Union will bring superpower competition in the developing world to an end as well, and lesser powers will be forced to rely more on their own resources or on regional security arrangements such as the Gulf Cooperation Council.⁴⁰⁷ These developments may also tempt some states to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Such a step would simultaneously reduce their need for allied support and make potential partners more fearful of being drawn into a nuclear confrontation. For all of these reasons, alliance commitments are likely to become more flexible, short-lived, and limited as the world is in a new flux after the Cold War.⁴⁰⁸

This is the climate of *walā'*, *walāyah*, or *tawalli* that Allah (ﷻ) is telling the committed Muslims to stay away from. Allah (ﷻ) is not advising the Muslims to avoid the religious component of Judaism and Christianity; rather, He is counseling them to shun, by any means, enlisting into their military coalitions, political alignments, and ideological ententes. Besides, by the strength of Islamic conviction, Muslims are not inclined to come under the influence of Jewish or Christian ritual and religious practices. The temptation though does exist among some credulous Muslims to court the political structures within the Judeo-Christian West. The enticement may be so strong as to underwrite a crop of clergy that tries to justify an Islamic-Christian-Jewish political connectedness and even military confederation of sorts. There may be a perceived overlapping of interests between an Islamic state and other Yahūdī and Naṣrānī states, and this misperception will agitate into a broad public campaign to persuade an Islamic state and authority to join what are, in fact and in practice, powers and coalitions of powers that are in-

imical to Islam as a state and as a government. There may also be some nationalistic, geographical, or ethnic considerations that are used to stultify an independent Islamic state and thus pave the way for its consorting with Zionists and imperialists.

The Qur'an gives the committed Muslims a good idea of how this "affinity" played itself out during the initial years of the first Islamic State in Madinah when there were some "Muslims" who were keen on keeping pliable their "second-hand" relationship with the Yahūd. This "working relationship" between the Yahūd and these types of "Muslims" can be traced to the latter's pedestrian status before the founding of the Islamic State. Even the "neighborly relationship" between the communities in Madinah (Jews and Arabians) could not find enough in common to compete with the Islamic fellowship after the Hijrah. The words of truth here in this lesson of the Qur'an have settled this matter conclusively and permanently. Muslims as a power and as an authority cannot have an alliance with whatever political bloc of power is in vogue by the Yahūd and Naṣārā.

It baffles the mind in our time to see "Muslim" officials walking all over this *āyah* as they rush with full force into all types of second-fiddle, bush-league political arrangements with Zionists and imperialists. Indeed, it took a gargantuan effort to unplug these vital meanings from the thought processes of today's Muslims. It is outrageous to dispense with the political meanings of this lesson and then repackage them as some type of fanatical break, or even animosity, between Muslims on the one hand and religious Jews and Christians on the other hand. But this is where the Muslims are and this is what they have to deal with; therefore, now, they are required to rehabilitate their minds so that they can understand exactly what is being communicated in this profound lesson.

There is another dimension to this issue of "alliance." The Qur'anic formula of alliance even excludes an Islamic state and government from extending its political-cum-diplomatic territory so as to ally with Muslims living in a foreign domain that is not governed by an Islamic executive authority, or in other words, with Muslims who do not have the power or influence to enter into an

independent alliance with a bona fide Islamic state because of the hostile country they live in. This dimension is covered by the *āyah* in the Qur'an that speaks about the relationship between the Muslims of Madinah (an Islamic state) and the Muslims of Makkah (a non-Islamic state),

You [the empowered Muslims in Madinah] are not bound to an alliance with them (*walāyatihim*) until they [the Muslim “citizens” of a non-Islamic state in Makkah] make the *hijrah* [transition to Madinah] (8:72).

It is obvious here that *walāyah* refers to *alliance* and not to *allegiance*. Allegiance is a common denominator of all Muslims; the Muslims are attached to each other by their common allegiance wherever they are in the world. But in some cases like the one in the *āyah* above, the committed Muslims cannot extend this fundamental allegiance to a working alliance. Therefore, an Islamic state, like the one in Madinah, would have to face off with a non-Islamic state, like the one in Makkah, in the overall relationship that defines the positions of each state and how they are to interact.

This Qur'anic definition ought to diffuse the “traitor” accusation that is often saddled in today's world upon Muslim citizens who are constituents of non-Islamic states, such as the United States, France, Russia, Britain, etc. The Muslims are treated by these governments, and other citizens who have been socialized by official propaganda, as if they are potential spies, possible terrorists, or an alien population that will act in the worst interest of the country they are in. This should also serve as a wake-up call for Muslims who think they are equal citizens of the non-Islamic states they belong to. They should know that neither their “home-country” is going to treat them equally and neither can an Islamic country offer them the full-fledged civil rights they are entitled to — as they do not belong to that Islamic territorial domain.

Furthermore, this *āyah* above should be an eye-opener for Islamic states who still legislate their “citizenship” policies along nationalistic, ethnic, or even tribal lines. The Islamic State in Madinah

was the Qur'an in political motion. If there were other committed Muslims who wanted to settle there and become equal members of the new Islamic society, they had all the authorization and prerogative to do so. At that time, no one in his right Islamic mind could suggest that the rights, equality, and justice offered in the Islamic State of Madinah belonged only to the people of Madinah. Today, though, there is what may be characterized as a "restart" of Islamic states, but these "Islamic states" do not show a pronounced understanding of how this Qur'an and Prophet (ﷺ) accommodated, assimilated, and advanced the demographic and social potential of Islam. And in this vein, if committed Muslims in an Islamic state, with the leverages of power in their hands, were not even allowed to have an alliance with Muslim citizens of non-Islamic states, then how would it be possible for them to have divine permission to establish an alliance with the Yahūd and Naṣārā?

The political Sunnah of Allah's Prophet (ﷺ) still stands. He inaugurated a working arrangement between his Islamic authority and the Yahūdī influential chieftains in Madinah; this whole accommodative arrangement was violated by these same Yahūd, one faction at a time, for three consecutive rounds of betrayal and treachery. And this lesson shall remain valid so long as these Yahūd and their present-day analogs fail to come forth and explain their treachery and treason.

The aforementioned draws attention to some people confusing the tolerance of an Islamic political and social order with the issue of alliances. Being openminded and amicable with Jews and Christians is not equivalent to being their confederates and cohorts. Deplorably, when the Muslim public fails to be mature in its Qur'anic political thoughts, this issue enters a gray area of confusion and simplemindedness. It appears that the root cause for this mental confusion is the inability or unwillingness of some Muslims to understand that Islam is a *dīn* and not a religion. A *dīn*, in short, is the requirement to harmonize human moral values with man's legal system or to correspond man's legal system with his moral principles. A religion, by contrast, is the rites and rituals that people set aside or work into their heavily secular schedule that has omitted God from

its workings and objectives. Our Islam is a scripture-based devotional program that directs all human action and social activity toward the achievement of goals sanctioned by Allah (ﷻ) and substantiated by His Prophet (ﷺ). And because this Islam is unlike secular, godless, and materialistic ideologies and convictions it will inevitably disagree with them as strongly as they disagree with it. Moreover, if their disagreement reaches the level of military campaigns and political alliances, then the Muslim statesmen cannot, obviously, become a party to a collective effort that seeks their own undoing. Islam clashes with predatory sex (rape) with the same fierceness that it clashes with predatory social science, with predatory slavery, with predatory Zionism, with predatory imperialism, and with whatever other predation fits into the same vein. Islam is irreconcilable with a “morality” that tolerates and even justifies racial or class discrimination. Any political philosophy or ideological program — be it Zionism, imperialism, or the like — that imposes this level of secular dysfunction and godless anti-social degradation upon humanity is in a state of war with a “counter-religious,” but *dīn-ful*, Islam.

Under-achieving Muslims need to raise their mental understanding of this *dīn*; they have to approach it without the bias that comes from looking at Islam through “secular” eyes. Such Muslims will also have to take a closer and more objective look at how official Jews and Christians behave when it comes to Muslims taking care of their own internal affairs according to their own independent Islamic program. Muslims lacking self-confidence will only acquire it when they rely on the inside information in this holy Text and on the insightful guidance that will spare them the problems and the trouble of reinventing the wheel, as it were. If the Muslims have a history full of experiences and contacts with the political structures of “Jews” and “Christians” and if they carry with them the results and the consciousness of this history, then how can they allow some official Muslims nowadays to reach an alliance of sorts with imperialism and bilateral or multilateral arrangements with Zionism? It makes no Qur’anic sense whatsoever.

The committed Muslims are forbearing and lenient when it comes to personal and public relations with Jews and Christians

who are their countrymen, compatriots, friends, and neighbors. The Muslims recognize that Jews and Christians, the vast majority of them, have a soft spot for their religious equivalents beyond the line of skirmish. In an Islamic society, they will neither be judged stereotypically, nor mistreated because of their historical ties to their coreligionists in “doomsday scenario” Israel or in “all options are on the table” America. To positively influence them by raising their status to “People of Scripture” (Ahl al-Kitāb) is in line with the Islamic approach. In an Islamic state, as opposed to its imperial, dynastic, or Zionist alternative, people of scripture enjoy their full natural, civic, and human rights.

But let us not get carried away. This does not mean that because of the Islamic inclination toward accommodation, the committed Muslims will countenance any type of alliance, entente, or even informal ties with such evil political powers as Zionism and imperialism. We Muslims are not without our Qur’an. We were not born yesterday. And we are not dumb Muslims. We understand very clearly what the Qur’an says when it alerts us to the fact that the political structures of “Jews” and “Christians” are compatible with each other, but they will always be incompatible with an Islamic one. Over the centuries, they have been quite consistent in their alliances against the empowered Muslims; and they have demonstrated that the only reason they cannot adjust to free and independent Muslims is because the latter honor their covenant with Allah (ﷻ) and fulfill His word in theory and in practice. These official Jews and political Christians only seem to be satisfied with Muslims when they part from an ideological understanding of Islam, when they reduce Islam to Jewish and Christian definitions of religion, and when they show they are willing to enlist in the Judeo-Christian imperium. Otherwise, theirs has been a generational war against a politically ascendant Islam, an all-out war against Islamic leaders and their constituencies, and a war to the finish against Islamic self-determination.

Lest anyone think that these are little more than paranoid delusions, consider the words these Zionists and imperialists themselves use, as penned by their key intellectual ideologues, when

they turn their fury against Islam and the committed Muslims (this writer's emphasis in italics at the end of the quote),

Totalitarianism is not the only wellspring of modern terrorism. Other ideological, national, and religious movements have spawned terrorist groups. But in recent years, few terrorists have matched the international prominence of those backed by the more extreme proponents of Islamic fundamentalism and, equally, Arab nationalism.

Certain strains of Islam promote an uncompromising interpretation of the faith which divides the world into Muslim and infidel, and enjoins the former to wage unremitting warfare against the latter. To be sure, the choice of infidels is vast, not least among the practitioners of Islam itself who do not meet the stringent test of doctrinal purity. Indeed, a considerable number of Islamic terrorism's victims have been Muslim. Yet its main energies have been directed toward the outside. In the non-Muslim world, the main focus of this hatred has been the Western world. The West has been traditionally viewed by Muslims as responsible for the historical containment, humiliation, and defeat of Islam. The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in recent decades has given that ancient animus new life and, through terrorism, new expression...

Terrorism is thus uniquely pervasive in the Middle East, the part of the world in which Islam is dominant. And it is disproportionately from this region that much of the terrorism in other parts of the world emanates. It is, in fact, impossible to conceive of international terrorism without the Middle East as both locus and source of so much terrorist activity. This was not always the case in this century. Political violence, particularly the long tradition of assassinating adversaries, was given new life when independent Arab regimes emerged after World War II. Islamic fundamentalism's antagonism to modern

political institutions, and the volatile nature of Arab political institutions, gave rise to continual bloodshed and instability. Middle Eastern states arose which, with few exceptions, recognized neither the national boundaries nor the political legitimacy of their neighbors. The use of terrorism became not an incidental activity of governments but often a pillar of state policy, the principal instrument against domestic and foreign enemies...

The addition of Iran to the roster of terrorist states was a watershed development in the spread of terrorism from the Middle East, for Iran is the first full-fledged, overtly *Islamic*, terrorist state [emphasis here from the original author]. And the effects of this change are being widely felt, from the attacks against American targets by Islamic terrorists to the increased agitation in several countries of Southeast Asia by Islamic minorities and populations.

The antagonism of Islamic and Arab radicalism to the West is frequently misunderstood. It is sometimes explained as deriving from American support for Israel. But the hostility to the West preceded the creation of Israel by centuries, and much of the terrorists' animus is directed against targets and issues that have nothing to do with Israel. Indeed, the relationship is most often the other way around. Middle Eastern radicals did not develop their hatred for the West because of Israel; they hated Israel from its inception *because it is an organic part of the West* [emphasis here from the original author]. That is, because Israel represents for them precisely the incarnation of those very traditions and values, foremost of which is democracy, which they hate and fear.⁴⁰⁹

Why do we speak of Islamic terrorists? When we speak of the Tupamaros, Montaneros and other exotically named groups in Latin America, we do not speak of them as Catholic terrorists or talk of terrorism in Catholic coun-

tries, nor do we use similar denominational descriptions for terrorist groups in Europe.⁴¹⁰

Why Islam? Is it because, as has at times been stated of late, Islam as a religion is particularly conducive to terrorism or even tolerant of terrorism? I think one may affirm without hesitation that this is not so. Islam, after all, is one of the great religions of the world and shares with its sister religions a commitment to moral values, moral standards, and moral laws, and condemns the maltreatment of the innocent. Islamic law, for example, states quite explicitly that no man shall suffer for the offense of another. At a very early date, in discussing the conduct of warfare, it laid down rules which were humane concerning the treatment of non-combatants. Generally speaking, Muslims, like Christians, Jews, and followers of other religions, are against and not for terrorism, and share the sense of shock that terrorism evokes. Terrorism of the modern kind, directed against bystanders, non-combatants, and the innocent is not Islamic. It is as much an importation to the Islamic world as are the bombs and guns which terrorists use.

Nevertheless, it is appropriate to use Islam as a term of definition and classification in discussing present-day terrorism for two reasons.

The first is the essentially political character which the Islamic religion has had from its very foundation and retains to the present day. An intimate association between religion and politics, between power and cult, marks a principal distinction between Islam and other religions. Islam is a political religion. This can be seen if we compare even the sacred scriptural histories which mark the beginnings of Islam with those of other religions.

The founder of Christianity died on the cross. Moses died before being permitted to enter the Promised Land. Muhammad the Prophet of Islam, in contrast, founded a state and governed it. As the Ayatollah

Khomeini has recently reminded us, Muhammad was a sovereign. He promulgated laws. He dispensed justice. He collected taxes. He levied armies. He made war, he made peace. He did all the things a head of state does. And, therefore, politics, government, laws, war and peace are all part of the Holy Law of Islam.

The second reason is the reassertion of this association of Islam and politics at the present time. In the course of the centuries, the ways of the Islamic world were much modified, particularly in the last hundred years. In some regions modernization, westernization, and secularization brought about certain changes and a measure of separation — I won't say between church and state, since this would be a meaningless formulation in relation to Islam, but at least between political and religious matters.

The resurgence of Islam, fashionably called fundamentalist, has as one of its main grievances precisely the removal of this religious quality of political and public life, and expresses the desire to return to an Islamic society governed by Islamic law and ruled by an Islamic state.

Given this inherently religious character of politics and the inherently political character of religion, given that Islam is the basis of authority, identity, loyalty, legitimacy in power, even of an ideology of revolt against power, it is Islam that provides the most powerful critique of the old order and the most acceptable formulation of the aspirations for a new. Islam has proved itself, again and again, to be the most effective and perhaps the only really effective system of ideas, symbols, and slogans for the mobilization of the Muslim masses.

Thus it is inevitable that when the Islamic world confronts the problem of terrorism, that problem too, assumes a religious, indeed in a sense an Islamic, aspect. In traditional Islam and therefore also in resurgent funda-

mentalist Islam, God is the sole source of sovereignty. God is the head of the state. The state is God's state. The army is God's army. The treasury is God's treasury, and the enemy, of course, is God's enemy.

This formulation has fearsome consequences, which will be immediately obvious. Violent conflict as perceived in Islamic law and tradition, and as expressed in Islamic history, is of two main types: the conflict against the external enemy and the conflict against the internal enemy. And it is in connection with the second that the issue of terrorism has most frequently arisen, both in the more distant past and at the present time.⁴¹¹

This is only the tip of the iceberg of the ocean of ink and jungles of books that are churned out in the vulgar and academic circles of the Zionist-imperialist quarters of the world. They all have one thing in common: their visceral and cold-blooded hostility toward Muslims who want to determine their own God-given future by God's scripture, which is the only scripture left unmolested and unharmed.

It is in this open-ended area that Muslims are expected and compelled to be mindful of the political characters within Zionism and imperialism while keeping in touch with the religious characters within Judaism and Christendom. As for the religious, generally apolitical people, we Muslims must be patient and charitable, letting them know that what brings us together is more extensive than what pulls us apart. Equally pronounced should be our Islamic resolve not to fall under any Zionist and imperialist political umbrella, and definitely not to become their convenient sidekicks. It is in the nature of the Islamic integration of morality and legality, values and policies, ethics and strategies, as opposed to the Zionist and imperialist polarization of morality and legality, their uncoupling of values and policies, as well as their separation of church and state, that makes it impossible for an Islamic authority or government to join their political fellowship and their ideological country club. Even when Muslims are free-thinking and kind toward apolitical Jews and Christians, the latter will not be able to reciprocate in a

spirit of camaraderie and good fellowship — mainly because of how they have been hamstrung by their Zionist and imperialist half-brothers and half-sisters. These Zionists and imperialists, who at times try to justify their occupations and oppression by referring to Judaism and Christianity, will never be satisfied with the Muslims having their own independent government that is deeply rooted in the Qur'an and profoundly implanted in the Sunnah. The air of sensitivity and flexibility toward the non-political Jews and Christians that comes with an Islamic social structure and political order is still not going to be enough to thwart their Zionist and imperialist "brethren in faith" from taking hostile positions and launching calculated wars against Muslims of Qur'anic self-determination.

It is moronic, if not imbecilic, for the Muslims to think they can find common cause with Zionists, imperialists, and their equivalents. Those Muslims who spend years or even a lifetime beating a path to interfaith conferences and meetings, deluding themselves that Muslims have so much in common with "Jews" and "Christians" without ever breaching the issue of Zionism and imperialism are proof positive of how some Muslims can turn their backs on what Allah (ﷻ) is telling them in this wisdom-filled Qur'an. Many Muslims have been duped into supporting a common front of the faithful (Jews, Christians, and Muslims) against faithless materialists, Godless communists, or socialist atheists. Little do these types of interfaith and goodwill Muslims realize that when it comes to Jews and Christians of the political class, they will have no qualms joining the atheists, the godless, and the communists whenever it comes to defeating Muslims on a course to their independent authority and autonomous government.

At one time in the not too distant past the government of Saudi Arabia was in a holy alliance with the government of the United States against godless communism, the Soviet evil empire, and all liberation movements in the world that were conveniently dismissed as atheists and nonbelievers. The government in Saudi Arabia never represented Islam nor was bound by the directives of this Qur'an, but because of the billions of petrodollars it has spent in creating the opposite public image, there were and still are

uninitiated Muslims who justify an alliance of Muslims with imperialists and Zionists thinking that they are siding with truth against falsehood or with God against Satan in this political context, when in fact these types of Muslims are being used by the Zionists and the imperialists.

The political world is very fluid; things change in the blink of an eye. Even so, there are some constants. For instance, consider the way the United States imperialist government used the Saudi thimble heads in the quagmire of Afghanistan under the ruse of fighting communism. The brain-dead Saudis and their prodigious petro-wealth were “pawned” to defeat an enemy that was as godless, if not less so, as their American recruiters (capitalism and communism are two sides of the same coin). But when Muslims intoxicated with rituals, à la Banū Sa‘ūd and their court clergy, try to conduct statecraft in an arena where brains really matter, then those selfsame ritualists, who have a habit of just shuffling through the political messages of this Qur’an, make the entire Muslim world into a killing field whose resources are auctioned off to the most robust capitalist/democratic power. The average person is supposed to believe that the US and Saudi Arabia are both religious, and that people of religion should be opposed to people without religion — or so the propaganda goes. This trick can be used to fool people who are withdrawn from the Qur’an; it cannot be used on people whose every thought is an extension of these *āyāt* in this ever-truthful Text.

The Saudi regime is a prime example of high-profile “Muslims” who bury the core meanings of the Qur’an so that they can present themselves as pious Muslims despite their forbidden relationship with the Yahūd (Zionists) and illegitimate alliance with the Naṣārā (imperialists). The Saudi occupiers of the Ḥijāz and usurpers of Makkah and Madinah cannot even learn from history. During the time of Allah’s Prophet (ﷺ), was it not the Yahūd who were saying to the pagans, the *mushriks*, and the heathens of Makkah, “...that those who are bent on denying the truth [the Makkan *mushriks*] are more surely guided than those who have committed to Allah” (4:51)? And today, is it not the same Yahūd who now have Israel

as a dagger in the heart of the Muslims? Yahūdī politics of the time were instigating the *mushriks* in Arabia against the government of conscious Muslims in Madinah; and these Yahūd were informers for the *mushriks* as well as their media spin-meisters in the war between a godless Makkah and a godly Madinah. And today, are not Yahūdī politics instigating the *mushriks* not only from the Arabian Peninsula, but also from America and the European Union, against the nascent Islamic pulse emanating from Islamic Iran?

Let us not forget the potent historical specter of the Crusades when official and political Christianity via the Church fought to convert or exterminate the Muslims. Their deeper origins are found in the ecclesiastical prescriptions of the 9th century that sanctified battle against the infidel in order to protect Christians who were suffering oppression. However, when the Byzantine Emperor Nicephorus II Phocas sought to declare soldiers killed in battle against Muslims as martyrs, he met with resistance from the Church (10th century). Nonetheless, Pope John VIII granted absolution to warriors who might die defending Christians against Saracens (Muslims).⁴¹² Moving on, in 1063CE, Pope Alexander II applied this absolution to those who were fighting the Moors (Muslims) in Spain. After the Battle of Manzikert (1071CE), the threatened Byzantine Empire called on the pope for assistance but the plan failed.⁴¹³ Whether or not he was called upon by Emperor Alexius I Comnenus, Pope Urban II launched the First Crusade (1095CE), the genesis of five centuries of aggression initially intended to keep open the possibility of making pilgrimages to al-Quds (Jerusalem) and, later, to contain the thrust of the Muslim Turks toward Europe.⁴¹⁴

The vows of the Crusader were different from those of the pilgrim, which did not permit him to take up arms; St. Bernard compared the Crusader's vow to taking holy orders.⁴¹⁵ The Crusader received certain privileges while his family and possessions were placed under the protection of the Church. The expeditions against the Muslims in al-Andalus (Spain) were placed on the same footing as the Crusades to "recover" Jerusalem, and hence, the Iberian Crusaders were awarded the same privileges (1147CE). Lesser in-

dulgences, equivalent to those earned by a pilgrimage to Rome, were granted to men who fought to defend the young Christian communities in the Baltic countries. The Crusades spawned religious and military orders: the Templars, the Hospitallers, and the Knights of St. Mary's Hospital at Jerusalem.⁴¹⁶ The latter were transplanted to the Baltic, where they merged with the Knights of the Sword and the survivors of the orders of Santiago, Alcantara, and Calatrava from Spain to form the Teutonic Knights.⁴¹⁷ The Hospitallers, who took refuge in Malta, continued the fight against Islam by combating the Barbary sea rovers.⁴¹⁸ Crusades were also preached against the Albigensian heretics (1209–1231CE) and even against the temporal enemies of the Papal States.⁴¹⁹ The Crusader spirit was revived momentarily with the Turkish Ottoman threat against Constantinople (1453CE) and Vienna (1683CE).⁴²⁰

For over two centuries the ascendant and reigning Muslims were the victims of a vicious military war that came primarily from people in Europe abandoning their morals for the sake of their political ambitions. It is the political class within "Christianity" that is to be held responsible for the Inquisitions even though the Church was complicit in that atrocity and catastrophe.

Al-Andalus (Iberia) was the most tolerant part of medieval Europe, where Jews, Christians, and Muslims lived at peace with one another. By the 15th century, the antagonism grew to a point where Pope Sixtus IV was forced to bow to pressure from Ferdinand and Isabella and from Dominican monks, and subsequently agreed to the establishment of the Spanish Inquisition.⁴²¹ Its original objective was to rid Spain of the Muslims, as much in pursuit of racial purity as of Christian exclusivity; it broadened the spectrum of its activities further, however, and became the instrument of enforcing Christian orthodoxy and political loyalty.⁴²²

The cruelty of the Inquisition, compared to the standards of contemporary tribunals active in other countries, has been largely effaced from public circulation, though it was indeed similar to the 20th-century holocaust in Germany, perhaps even a precedent. From the perspective of European anti-Muslims, the importance of the Inquisition lay in strengthening royal authority and forging na-

tional unity. It took no account of rank, feudal privileges, or ancient divisions between Aragonese and Castilian, and so made all men “equal” before its slaughter laws, and it was entirely under the thumb of the monarchy, managed, not by the papacy, but by the Supreme, a royal council.⁴²³

With the Church, the Inquisition is said to have worked to raise moral and intellectual standards among the clergy. The consequent relative absence of ecclesiastical abuses in Spain helps to explain why the Reformation gained little sympathy there; it also sheds light on the Inquisition’s mere existence as a chief weapon of the Counter-Reformation.⁴²⁴ When Muslim rule in Granada, on Spain’s southern coast, refused to pay tribute to the Spanish monarch and seized a Spanish border fortress, it provoked a ten-year conflict that came to an end with Granada’s defeat in 1492CE. The last Muslim kingdom in Western Europe disappeared, and all of Spain passed under the rule of Ferdinand and Isabella.

An unrestrictive peace treaty granted the Muslims freedom to exercise their religion, but the treaty was abrogated after a Muslim uprising in 1501CE, which served to justify an edict of the Spanish crown that all Muslims in Spain must choose between Christian baptism and exile. It is said that most chose the former (while inwardly retaining their faith) and became known as Moriscos. They joined the Marranos, Jews who had made the same choice under a similar edict in 1492CE.⁴²⁵

Fast-forwarding to the present, things have not changed all that much as once again, the Zionists and imperialists are ganging up against the Muslims and stealing the Holy Land. Their common policies and joint alliances have spilled over into the entire Muslim East. The Palestinians, having no Islamic power base to rely on and having to withstand the brunt of this Zionist-imperialist cabal on their own, are now homeless and stateless. With every passing day, the political regimes in the “Christian” world from Britain to the United States to France to Russia to Australia to even smaller, less significant nation-states are all coalescing together with Israel against Qur’anic Muslims who want to walk their political *al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm*.

People who figuratively belong to churches and functionally belong to the nation-state apparatus are the ones responsible for displacing and dislocating Muslims around the world. Muslims are the largest refugee bloc of people on the planet, largely due to the oppressive, exclusionary, and discriminatory psychology and policies of the Zionist-imperialist axis of evil. Look at the condition of Muslims in the Philippines, Cyprus, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Ethiopia, just to mention a few places where there is and has been an official prejudice against the Muslim population. This pathological Zionist-imperialist antipathy against Muslims of self-determination has drawn into its ranks atheists, communists, and pagans, all of whom have combined their political muscles and military hardware to threaten and intimidate any effort by independence-minded Muslims to resuscitate their Islamic society and government. That is why there are persecuted, tortured, and socially abused Muslims in such places as China, Central Asia, India, and Thailand, not to mention others. Virtually everywhere on this planet, the political intrigue of the Zionist-imperialist junta has strong-armed many other nation-states into its bid to secure the political and economic enslavement of Muslims in their own homelands and countries.

As if this was not already enough to deal with, to add insult to injury, there is that substandard set of subordinate Muslims who skip over all these bloody details and create a dreamworld in which they hope and pray for the understanding of “Jews” and “Christians.” Such toadies and crawlers have neither the moral courage nor the high-principled spirit to look at the “Judeo-Christian” reality and sort out those among them who can take issue with Zionism and imperialism on the basis of scripture. From their obsequious looks for approval, it appears that Muslims who traffic with their Yahūdī and Naṣrānī superiors do not have an inkling about what Allah (ﷻ) is telling them in this groundbreaking Qur’an.

We the Muslims have among us spokespersons, scholars, and shaykhs who, contrary to what they read in this comprehensive Qur’an, think it is feasible to join hands and close ranks with “religious” Jews and Christians who have not disavowed their Zionist and imperialist establishments. The common enemy is not some

lesser enemy that emerges from the Zionist and imperialist conglomerate (such as socialists and communists); rather, the common enemy is the Zionist-imperialist lodge itself that begets such nuances as socialism and communism.

These Muslim “public figures” who spend their time lobbying or conferencing with the religious functionaries of Zionism and imperialism may not be reading this Qur’an at all. And if they do actually pick it up from time to time, they confuse the air of tolerance in it toward Jews and Christians, mistakenly extending that to include pro-Zionists and pro-imperialists. To reiterate, the Qur’an is clear about drawing a line between its kind and compassionate approach to moral Jews and Christians who have no hand in the Zionist-imperialist animosity toward Islamic self-determination on the one hand, and its strict directives to steer clear of any political or ideological entanglement with Zionists and imperialists on the other hand.

It is these types of “Muslims” who have not developed what may be called an ideological sense of Islam. In their world, Islam is not a full counterweight to the political systems and the economic interests that are so prevalent in their own subordinate position vis-à-vis the “Jews” and the “Christians.” It appears that these types of incomplete Muslims cannot think of Islam as the primary positive influence on the whole world. They cannot imagine their own kind constructing a world in the image of scripture — a new world unlike today’s materialistic and god-denying official structure that has engulfed the international order. Deep down inside them, these partial Muslims do not have the confidence to stand up to a historical and currently fierce hostility that fuels the totalitarian political engine at the core of the Zionist-imperialist bloc. The tears and the blood shed by the building-bloc generation of Muslims do not mean a thing to these kowtowing “Muslims.” Be that as it may, these are the eccentrics who should be exposed to Allah’s (ﷻ) eye-opening words,

**O you who are securely committed [to Allah’s power]!
Do not subordinate yourselves to Zionists and imperi-**

alists: they are an alliance unto themselves. And whoever of you is subordinate to them becomes, in fact, one of them; behold, Allah does not guide people of injustice (5:51).

Even though this *āyah* when it first materialized did so in Madinah, it still carries the same strength, the same intent and purpose, and the same direction today as it did back then. It puts those who are securely committed to Allah's (ﷻ) power presence in human affairs on alert, giving the gray areas in their minds clarity about the nature of those who call themselves "Jews" and "Christians." Some faltering Muslims at that time thought they could have a solid Islamic personality while at the same time maintain a solid working political relationship with people belonging to scripture, especially the Yahūd. Prior to Muhammad (ﷺ) and the Qur'an in Madinah these political relationships existed, along with economic and financial ties, not to mention generations of interaction and neighborly dealings. All of this was natural in the course of a pre-Islamic Yathrib (later to become Madinah) where people were tending to their own lives in the market, at cultural venues, in commercial ventures, and in the general socialization that goes on among people who belong to the same "urban center." There is no doubt that semi-normal if not cordial relations defined the Arabian and the Jewish communities of Yathrib prior to the coming of an Islamic leader, an Islamic authority, and an Islamic government. This normalization of relations, if it were to continue after the advent of an Islamic empowerment and oversight in Madinah, would have meant that the Yahūd would have had influence and even intrigue within the newly found Islamic administration in Madinah. This would have contributed to an obvious internal instability in this recently established Islamic state, especially given the character of the Yahūd and their history with scriptural authority.

The simpleminded Arabians who had no similar history or experience with the Yahūd needed this support system of information to be able to go ahead with their divine responsibilities without the static, the interference, and the troublemaking of the Yahūd. That

is partially why these conscience-raising *āyāt* were revealed — to foretell and forearm the nascent Muslim community against the potential danger with the Yahūdī mindset lurking in their midst, the precursor of today’s Zionism.

The biddable Muslims who had close working relationships with the Yahūd and who had no second thoughts about an alliance of sorts with them had to come to terms with the “break” between an Islamic authority and a Yahūdī agency within Madinah. These inexperienced Muslims had to learn that allegiance and alliance belong to Allah (ﷻ), His Prophet (ﷺ), and the growing Islamic society and state of committed Muslims in Madinah. Hence, when they realized there would be a rupture between an Islamic governance and all other forms of government around, in particular the institutions of those who claim to have some biblical background and scriptural experience, they prepared themselves for the inevitable difficulties of a mental, economic, social, and psychological nature that they would have to surmount.

Importing these meanings into our current times entails that any Islamic government coming into existence on the basis of this Qur’an and in the tradition of Madinah and with the full standards of Islam has to, by necessity, sever its dependency relationship with hostile and inimical nation-states. More clarity on this matter is superfluous as the words of Allah (ﷻ) are self-explanatory,

**O you who are securely committed [to Allah’s power]!
Do not have the Zionists and the imperialists become
your superiors: they are but a confederacy among
themselves. And whoever of you [Muslims] ranks
them [the Zionists and imperialists] as politically supe-
rior becomes one of them; indeed, Allah does not guide
people who are unrighteous and unfair (5:51).**

Muslims and Political Jews, Christians Have No Common Cause

This is the lesson of our time. If Muslims need to understand something about how the political class in the “Jewish” context and the political class in the “Christian” context operate, they need to carefully examine the meaning of this *āyah*. The first overriding consideration here concerns a frank expression of where committed Muslims stand vis-à-vis the political elites that belong inside the Judeo-Christian nexus. The *āyah* is saying in plain language that Muslims of diligence and commitment are independent of the political ways and means of the “Jews” and the “Christians.” The diligent and faithful Muslims do not belong within the political club of “Jews” and “Christians” whose nation-states and bilateral relations are cloaked nowadays in the attire of Zionism and imperialism. The eternal fact of the matter in the world of politics and social relations, specifically the all-important considerations of authority and power, is the working relationship that “Jews” and “Christians” have with each other when it comes to excluding Muslims,

**O you who are securely committed [to Allah’s power]!
Do not denominate [political] Jews and [political] Christians as your allies: they are but allies of one another — and whoever of you allies himself with them becomes, of course, one of them; incisively, Allah does not steer imperious people (5:51).**

This statement of truth is timeless. It was true in Madinah, it was true during the Crusades, it was true during the Inquisitions, it was true during the two world wars, it is true in the Holy Land, and it will remain true throughout the ups and downs and the ins and outs of history. It is true because it reflects reality. Jewish and Christian political elites can never violate the meaning of this *āyah* as it is impossible for them to find common cause or perennial purpose with Muslims of a conscientious commitment to the sovereignty and glory of Allah (ﷻ) alone.

Some uninformed and “trusting” Muslims have been content with participating in “interfaith” meetings where Christians and

Jews are in attendance. This *āyah* takes these unstudied and naive Muslims out of their artificial shell and puts them face to face with the political product of these Christians and Jews who have been living with their own political elites without demonstrating a Jewish opposition or a Christian disapproval to the blustery and heavy-handed policies and ideologies that come out of the Judeo-Christian milieu. There are now over 13 centuries of experience that are solid proof of the meanings of this *āyah*. When Muhammad (ﷺ) was in Madinah, the Yahūd and Naṣārā were closer to each other than they were to Muslims having their leader, their governance, and their state. There was an air of war during that time; and similarly, never has history been witness to a time-period when either the Jews or Christians sided with the struggling Muslims against the latter's enemies. This fact should come home to haunt all of today's officials in Muslim countries who have joined the political community of the Yahūd and Naṣārā. The accommodating Muslims challenge anyone to produce one instance in which the Yahūd and Naṣārā fell out with each other in support of Islamic self-determination, Islamic self-rule, and Islamic reign.

The Qur'anic expression is the rule; the Yahūdī and Naṣrānī political privileged class will from time to time, more often than not, find a comradeship with each other but will never find any political affiliation with *al-ladhīna āmanū*, “...some of them [political Jews and Christians] are allies of one another.”

Experience with Muslims who are trying to “fit into” the Zionist and imperialist political context, regardless of the cost, suggests a pathology in which the psychological muscle to set themselves apart from the politics, parties, and politicians in the Judeo-Christian civic, official, and governmental domain has atrophied. These types of “Muslims” don't get it. It appears they have failed to understand what this *āyah* is telling them, even if they have heard it a thousand times. In today's world, where are the Zionist or imperialist type of governments that are willing to concede the independent course of the Islamic movement? When it comes to the Islamic movement these “Judeo-Christian” political structures are intolerant, hostile, and warlike. Where are the per-

ceptive Islamic leaders who understand this and are willing to bear the consequences of moving ahead without this false notion of somehow being a part of the Yahūd and Naṣārā?

Unfortunately for the Muslims, however, there are individuals among them who are willing to peel layers off their divine commitment to satisfy the requirements of enlisting into the Judeo-Christian bipartisan political bureaucracy. And the *āyah* reveals as much about the camaraderie between such Jews and Christians, about the casual political relationship between the officials of secular “Judaism” and secular “Christianity.” Throughout the course of time since the emergence of Muhammadi Islam, the Muslims have been witness to Jewish and Christian relations that have reached at times a commonality of political purpose such that to the adventitious observer they would appear as one. Of course this has never lasted, as their opportune alliance has generally been temporarily concocted to combat a rising Islam. In the field of politics, the Zionists and imperialists of today have a grand, though unspoken, coalition against Muslims who are still not performing politically in a manner that would give their enemies cause to pay attention; far from it, the Muslims are still in their infancy when it comes to Islamic political self-determination. Nonetheless, there are political “Jews” and “Christians” who are in lockstep when it comes to this youthful expression of the Islamic movement. Even in the financial and economic sphere, Zionists and imperialists are running a consortium of interests in the world, deliberately excluding Muslims of an independent pulse. And despite the fact that this consortium is buttressed by fortunes of wealth coming from Muslim countries, the Muslims are still unwanted,

And among the followers of earlier revelation there is many a one who, if you entrust him with a treasure, will [faithfully] restore it to you; and there is among them many a one who, if you entrust him with a single *dīnār* [a gold coin], will not restore it to you unless you keep pressuring him [to repay] — which is an outcome of their assertion, “No blame can attach to us [for any-

thing we may do] with regard to these scriptureless people [those who are not one of us]" (3:75).

With all of these facts in the Qur'an and in real life pointing to this exclusive Yahūdī-Naṣrānī club that administers overlapping governmental and bureaucratic functions, there are still credulous and juvenile Muslims who shed their higher responsibilities of *īmān* and apply for a self-abasing wannabe position in this Yahūdī-Naṣrānī structure. And when this structure conducts the necessary "background" checks and secret investigations on such "Muslims," thereby qualifying them to join the Yahūdī-Naṣrānī fellowship as members of certain associations, organizations, or confederations, then these "Muslims" can no longer be considered committed Muslims. They have stepped out of Islam and abandoned their *īmān* even though they may still be attendant to the religious services and ceremonial occasions of Islam. Whenever a Muslim individual departs from the higher responsibility of *īmān*, giving up on the idea of an autonomous Islamic executive authority and government based on the Qur'an and rooted in the way the Prophet (ﷺ) exercised power, then this person is, for all practical purposes, renouncing the authority of Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ) and repudiating the historical struggle that sets Islam apart from all forms of *ṭāghūt*. In other words, any "Muslim" who constricts his Islamic social and political responsibilities to almost nothing while expanding into an active member of the Judeo-Christian federation (today, this is represented by the affiliation of Zionism and imperialism; tomorrow, it may go by some other label) has defected and deserted the Islamic bloc and is no longer a bona fide member of Islam and *īmān*, **"And whoever of you [committed Muslims] joins their [the political Jewish-Christian] alliance becomes one of them [Yahūd and Naṣārā]."** This type of person no longer has any Islamic credentials by the very words of this *āyah*. But this is not the way today's Muslims generally think and behave.

Imagine if this *āyah* defined Islamic behavior today. Would there be "Muslim" minions of Zionism and imperialism in our public crowds? How could a "Muslim" president here or a "Muslim"

king there come to a *masjid* filled with committed Muslims, who understand the words of this *āyah* in the Qur'an, and survive their denunciation, opposition, and hostility? The problem with the general Muslim public today is that it continues to elevate individual rituals and personal customary observance and practice above all other considerations. And therefore as long as a "Muslim" ruler prays every day, fasts every year, brushes his teeth with the *miswāk*, and goes to the toilet with his left foot and comes out with his right foot, he is still considered a Muslim even though he is an agent of imperialism and a broker for Zionism, and rules his country within the game-plan of Zionists and imperialists. It is going to take an overhaul of this farcical comedy to set the record straight on the difference between Muslims committed to the authority of Allah (ﷻ) and "Muslims" committed to the authority of Zionists and imperialists.

"And whoever of you [committed Muslims] links himself to the Yahūdī-Naṣrānī coalition becomes one of them; certainly, Allah does not direct biased people." This demonstrates there is a deep chasm of difference between the political direction of Islam and the Islamic movement on one side and the political direction of Zionists and imperialists on the other. One cannot belong to both of them — the Islamic and the Zionist-imperialist — at the same time and consider himself to be a faithful, full-fledged, and favorable Muslim.

Muslims are going to have to come out of their inferiority complex. They are going to have to overcome the secular "pluralism" that equates all political theories and ideologies with each other. Islam is not just another religion, nor is it just another theory or ideology to be put on par with the compendium of secular ideologies invented by man. Islam is not comparable with a Judaism and a Christianity that have succumbed to financial priorities, corporate interests, or racist assumptions. Islam does not belong in an interfaith conference that has no guts, nerves, or muscles to tackle the issue of political misrule, economic inequalities, monetary empires, and occupation armies and forces. Islam is not a religion void of justice and its principles, fairness and its morals, equality and its

necessities, and a God-given freedom and its responsibilities. Muslims are going to have to establish this fact in their hearts and minds. The Islam they have, the Islam they carry, and the Islam they project is beyond comparison and without rival when it comes to a racist Zionism supposedly extracted from “Judaism.” Their Islam and its higher standard is beyond comparison and without rival when it comes to a plundering imperialism supposedly derived from a Christian history and evolution. Their Islam is so different from, so unparalleled to, and so incomparable to a secular political Zionism and imperialism on one level and a theological religious Judaism and Christianity on another level because it infuses its political and moral character with the cement of justice.

The competent and confident Muslims of the world should be able to say with no shame whatsoever that Islam excels all other dogmas and doctrines because it comes from Allah (ﷻ). All others including Yahūdī and Naṣrānī political arrangements are the product of cliques, classes, and corporations that have no scriptural foundations for their power structures or coalitions of convenience. Islam is matchless, Islam is inimitable. Unless and until Muslims are able to reverberate with this precious truth, they will continue to owe their religious rituals to God and pay their political and economic debt to Zionists and imperialists.

This warning against enlisting in the political and ideological ranks of the Yahūd and Naṣrāá, and other non-Muslims, is to be found elsewhere in this heart-touching Qur’an as well,

O you who are securely committed [to Allah’s power presence]! Do not take My enemies — who are your enemies as well — for your fellow comrades, showing them affection... (60:1).

The context of the above *āyah* refers to the actions of Ḥāṭib ibn Abī Balta‘aḥ when he wrote to the Quraysh telling them of an impending military effort by the Prophet (ﷺ) against Makkah. Ḥāṭib’s letter was meant to gain some favor within the Makkan establishment, from which his immediate family would benefit.⁴²⁶

Ḥāṭib may have had an excuse of sorts. But the act of communicating with an enemy at times of imminent hostility survives the test of time, notwithstanding the specific explanation proffered by Ḥāṭib in this case. Therefore, the *āyāt* later in the same *sūrah* open this matter up further,

[But] it may well be that Allah will bring about [mutual] affection and tenderness between you [the committed Muslims] and some of those whom you [now] face as enemies: for, Allah is all-powerful — and Allah is much-forgiving, a generator of grace. As for such [of the opponents of Allah] as do not fight against you on account of [your] faith-commitment, and neither drive you forth from your homelands, Allah does not forbid you to show them kindness and to behave toward them with full equity: for, verily, Allah loves those who act equitably. Allah only forbids you to turn in friendly relationships toward such as fight against you because of [your] faith-commitment, and drive you forth from your homelands, or aid [others] in driving you forth; and as for those [from among you] who turn toward them in friendly relations, it is they, they who are truly wrongdoers (60:7–9).

This *āyah* clarifies that a working relationship is unlawful between the bloc of committed Muslims on one side and those who are in a state of active hostility and ongoing war against these Muslims on the other. Short of outright combat-ready hostilities, no differences in matters of religious and theological interpretations can be used to justify a rupture of relations between committed Muslims and all other peoples of whichever faith or persuasion. In other words, what some people refer to as “religious differences” are not a basis for severing social ties between Muslims and non-Muslims. This was expressed in practice when the Prophet (ﷺ) entered into a contract with the Jews of Madinah by stipulating “...the Jews have their *dīn* and the Muslims have their *dīn*.”⁴²⁷ Whenever there are

differences related to “theological” explanations or “religious” persuasion, the general rule is the Qur’anic *āyah*, “**Lakum dīnukum wa-liya dīn: You [the non-Muslims] have your dīn, and I [the Prophet] have my [scriptural] dīn**” (109:6).

Before moving on, a brief comment is merited here on the interpretation of al-Zamakhsharī, al-Bayḍāwī, and others in the same domain who have explained that the word *walāyah* in these *āyāt* (or its variations such as *yatawalla*) suggests *affection*, *good mannerism*, and *employing people of scripture*.⁴²⁸ This, in the judgement of this writer, puts a restriction on the otherwise larger range of meanings that can be accommodated by the Qur’anic word *walāyah*. Anyone who reads these *āyāt* carefully will understand the meaning of *walāyah* in the context and with the relevant events accompanying the revelation herein. The *mufasssir-emeritus* Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī comes much closer when he says,

In our opinion, it is correct to say that Allah (ﷻ) stated a prohibition upon Muslims committed to Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ) to not have the Yahūd and Naṣārā as supporters, allies, and superiors. And whichever “Muslim” considers them [the Yahūd and Naṣārā] as supporters, allies, and superiors becomes bigoted and a partisan against Allah (ﷻ), His Messenger (ﷺ), and the committed Muslims. In this situation Allah (ﷻ) and His Messenger (ﷺ) disclaim such acts and persons.⁴²⁹

The word *walāyah* in this *āyah* and other *āyāt* generally conveys the dynamic of *supporting and seeking the support of*. Thus, the behavior and policy of responsible Muslims is to refrain from supporting or petitioning for the support of, in political and military terms, the Yahūd and Naṣārā.

The overall understanding of these *āyāt* does not censor or ban Muslims from day-to-day interactions, normal social contacts, and neighborly coexistence with Jews and Christians. No Muslim located in a Jewish neighborhood or Christian district should think he or she is living in any danger. Many Muslims erroneously, and

perhaps with a tinge of superiority, tend to lump all people of scripture within the general category of *mushriks*. This is not correct and it is not accurate. For example, Muslims are permitted to marry moral women of scripture but are forbidden from marrying women of *shirk*. Marriage is a bond of *mawaddah* and *rahmah* (affection and grace) — something that cannot be infused into a Muslim-on-*mushrik* husband-wife relationship.

The Jews resided with the Prophet (ﷺ) and the first generation of Muslims in Madinah without any incident, until the exclusivist and recalcitrant element among them got involved in a larger political and military effort by the Quraysh and the *mushriks* in and around Makkah and the Arabian Peninsula to destabilize and destroy the Islamic state in Madinah. Before this Yahūdī perfidy, the Jews lived in peace with their Muslim associates and friends. The coexistence of Muslims and Jews in Madinah at that time and some years later in the Arabian Peninsula and beyond is one of the finer examples of civic equality in human history. According to the Islamic historical record, the spirit and standard of equality was so ingrained in this first Islamic society and state that when ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib and a Jew were called in to a court of law presided over by ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the latter addressed ‘Alī by his title, “*Yā Aba al-Ḥasan*,” while not addressing the Jew by any equivalent commendation; ‘Alī was disturbed by this apparent, though unintentional, “discrimination” and retorted, “You [‘Umar] have elevated and lauded me in front of my contender!” (Obviously, ‘Umar did not mean to give him a rank above the Jew; by force of habit, he was just addressing ‘Alī as he would have normally done regardless of the venue, whether in a court of law or elsewhere).⁴³⁰

Per the meanings of this *āyah*, one of the tragedies of today’s Muslims is the refusal to confer on the Yahūd and Naṣārā their group disposition and common front whenever Muslims themselves develop into a power and a state to be reckoned with. It is true that there are mortal issues between “Jews” and “Christians”; it is true that their theological understandings are contradictory; it is true that throughout most of their mutual interactions, Jews and Christians have been unable to get along with each other; it is true that

between them, there is a ghetto-chasm and a diaspora-distance; it is true that when push comes to shove, they hate each others' guts — all of that is true. But such is the way they behave toward each other when Muslims constitute no significant force or power culture. However, once the Muslims acquire a "Madinah," consolidate a *khilāfah* or *imāmah*, and become independent of all Yahūdī and Naṣrānī influence and hegemony, at that time the Yahūd and Naṣrā are allies, confederates, and political sponsors of each other, **"They are but allies of one another."**

This Qur'anic sentence could mean that, when it comes to political Islam, political Christians are allies of other political Christians, that political Jews are allies of other political Jews, or that political Jews and political Christians are allies of one another. In all these cases, Muslims of sincerity and struggle cannot expect any sort of bona fide alliance to be proffered by either the Yahūd or Naṣrā. It is not within the nature of things for cunning "Jewish" and "Christian" diplomats to offer their support and tribute to Muslims who are busy with Allah's (ﷻ) work on earth. Islamic history in Arabia demonstrates how the Yahūd abrogated their agreement with Allah's final Prophet (ﷺ). In this scenario of early Jewish-Islamic contact the politico-diplomatic as well as the politico-ecclesiastical Jews joined the Arabian-Makkan-Qurayshī war against the Islamic government and assembly in Madinah and beyond. Concomitantly, however, it should be made clear that the Islamic leadership represented by Rasūl-Allah (ﷺ) and the Islamic populace represented by all the devout Muslims in and around Madinah never initiated any hostilities or warfare against the Jews.

The *āyah*, **"...And whoever of you [Muslims] falls in with them [the Yahūd and Naṣrā] becomes, ipso facto, one of them,"** is an ultimatum and a warning to all who listen to this Qur'an. Hence, any Muslim — even if he breathes the air of Makkah, drinks the water of Zamzam, has his genes in the pedigree of prophets, prays with more humility than anyone else, fasts more than anyone else, and carries out all the personal requirements better than other Muslims — who supports the Yahūd and Naṣrā politically and practically, and receives their support in kind while

they are in a warlike and confrontational posture toward the Islamic power base, then this type of “Muslim,” in fact and in deed, is with the Zionist Jews and the imperialist Christians. A Muslim of conscience and commitment can never countenance this kind of false virtue. A “Muslim” who falls in with the Zionist and imperialist types has either reconciled himself to the insidious doctrines of Zionism and imperialism, or he assents in some way or the other to the hostilities of Zionism and imperialism against the self-progress of a forward-moving Islamic social and political order. In either case, such a “Muslim” who has hooked up with Zionists and imperialists has to be considered out of the pale of Islam.

Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī says the following,

Any “Muslim” who has gone as far as to be on good terms with the Yahūd and Naṣārā [Zionists and imperialists] is closer to their [Jewish-Christian] *dīn*, power structure, and officialdom than he is to Islam. No Muslim belongs to and becomes a part of the Zionist and imperialist crowd to this confidence level without being complacent and self-satisfied with them. When a “Muslim” reaches this level of contentment with Zionists and imperialists [political Jews and Christians] he would naturally feel an affinity with them against their enemy [the committed Muslims.] For this reason, this type of “Muslim” has set off and gone away from the people who stand for Islam and perish for Allah (ﷻ).⁴³¹

Accordingly, some well-known companions of the Prophet (ﷺ) such as ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abbās and al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī considered Banū Taghlib to belong to the Naṣārā because the former were the allies and adjuncts of the latter. The influence of the Christians was so great on Banū Taghlib, who were virtually Christians themselves, that these scholars, in regard to this tribe, observed the Qur’anic guidelines related to Muslim deportment with people of previous scripture, and hence, permitted Muslims to consume the flesh of animals they had slaughtered for meat and to marry their women.⁴³²

Even so, the dynamics of those times and places have to be factored into this picture to get a better understanding of this reasoning. The fact of the matter is that the “Jews” and “Christians” as well as *mushriks* were at war with the Islamic society and state. In this aggressive state of affairs, these political Jews and Christians exerted more influence, especially in matters of allegiance and alliance, upon the *mushriks* than the other way around. That being the case, it became a matter of sound judgement to conclude that particular *mushriks* may gain the status of the Yahūd and Naṣārā.

There may come times when blocs of people belonging to different life-orientations find common cause and join together against a common enemy, strictly for worldly purposes. There may be times when an Islamic authority may find it feasible to combine forces with a non-Islamic entity so that they can jointly take on an anti-Islamic entity. The issue here is related to aggression, oppression, and tyranny. No authority of committed Muslims can in any way, shape, or form enter into an alliance with those who fit these descriptions, **“Certainly, Allah does not escort inequitable people.”** Hence, there is no guilt in joining forces with those who do not aggress, oppress, and tyrannize against those who do. Allah (ﷻ) makes it clear He will not aid “Muslims” in league with Zionists and imperialists, who themselves are in a state of war against Allah (ﷻ), His Prophet (ﷺ), and the assertive Muslims. Such loose Muslims have misplaced their allegiance and transferred their loyalty from Allah (ﷻ) to Zionist imperialists and imperial Zionists. Such types, even if they are outwardly masquerading as Muslims, will never reach the truth and will never gain salvation.

There are those Muslims who come along calling for a dialogue of civilizations. Some of these Muslims may be sincere — though naive. Let there be no mistaking that the committed Muslims are always ready for a dialogue provided the bases and components of a dialogue are there, and the participants are genuinely interested in solving problems. The Muslims are not ready to participate in a monologue in which they simply attend to take directions and orders from the side that has the temporal power. Despite this, there are those Muslims who latch onto the “dialogue of civilizations” motto

in the name of interfaith understanding, group healing, a common front against secularism and atheism, or affirming the Abrahamic tradition. Many of these front-seat occupants in a dialogue of civilizations, who are Muslims, are not really cognizant of the relationship between “religion” and “politics” in the primarily Judeo-Christian characters who sit across the table from them, even if they now claim to be atheists, agnostics, free thinkers, or the like. Often what leaves the table after these interfaith encounters are cringing Muslims and hesitating devotees. It also appears that these rush-to-dialogue Muslims do not understand what it means to be tolerant, forbearing, and open-minded. They do not have the internal conviction to represent a scriptural *dīn* that has not been tinkered with in the way Judaism and Christianity have. Islam has been preserved with a sparkle — but who could see that through the crush of these pro-dialogue Muslims soliciting approval from their interlocutors?

We Muslims do not need to prove our understanding and practice of tolerance to anyone. The proof is in the pudding as it were. We have been so tolerant that the establishments to whom these Judeo-Christian clergymen belong have colonized us for hundreds of years. Through whatever independent communication channels that are open to Muslims, we need to show these characters we will no longer tolerate the deafening silence that Jewish and Christian clergymen display toward their own oppressive systems and tyrannical governments. These Judeo-Christian men in the cloth have to be told that our tolerance does not extend into our accommodating them to the exclusion of Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ). We will abide by our Islamic social system based upon the understanding of the Qur'an given to us by our Prophet (ﷺ). We will not countenance any erosion or intrusion upon this sacred terrain.

On a more positive note, Muslims, now for the first time in a long time, are in an ascending position. And so there is no time for interfaith coffee breaks; we should be using our time more wisely. Our *yaqīn* (certitude) cannot be negotiated or toned down to sit well with clergymen who themselves do not have what it takes to stand with God against injustice, oppression, inequality, slavery, and prejudice — all of which they have tolerated more than an

overt commitment to morality ought to permit. The firm-footed faithfuls who affirm the following *āyāt* will not be found loitering in interfaith conclaves,

Verily, the *dīn* when it comes to Allah is [only man's] self-surrender unto Him (Islam)... (3:19);

And he who seeks other than Islam [self-surrender unto Allah] as a *dīn*, it will never be accepted from him... (3:85);

And be [O Muhammad] cautious lest they [the opponents of Allah] dislodge you away from some of what Allah has vouchsafed unto you... (5:49);

O you who are securely committed [to Allah]! Do not designate [political] Jews and [political] Christians as your superiors [in alliance]: they are but [sidekick] allies of each other — and whoever of you joins their alliance becomes, naturally, one of them... (5:51).

For a long time Muslims adrift of the Qur'an have blurred the line between the religious character of the Jews and Christians and their political character. Now is the time to wake up and draw the line between both these ostensibly symbiotic, but viscerally exclusive, classes. This can only happen when we the committed Muslims express these profound meanings to our conversational partners with a confidence that comes from this Qur'an, leading, as it should, to a departure from the inferior psychology of those kowtowing Muslims who want to be "accepted" by a fudged Judaic and Christian history that long ago lost contact with scripture.

This incredibly sharp Qur'an goes yet further to deal with the flaccid psychology of the "not ready for prime time" Muslims,

And yet you [Muhammad] can see how those [Muslims] in whose hearts there is blight jockey with one

another for their [political Jews' and Christians'] favorable reception, saying, "We fear lest we fall on bad times" (5:52).

Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī has recorded the following historical reference,

When the forces [from Makkah] were defeated at Badr, the Muslims told their Yahūdī allies, "Become Muslims before Allah (ﷻ) inflicts you with a day like Badr." Mālik ibn al-Ṣayf [a Yahūdī] said, "You [Muslims] feel formidable just because you took on and thwarted a pack like the Quraysh, who are militarily unskilled! If we were to build a momentum against you, [then] you would have no ability to take us on." 'Ubādaḥ ibn al-Ṣāmit then declared, "I have Yahūdī associates who are rugged, well-equipped, and of considerable prowess; yet I, for Allah (ﷻ) and His Messenger (ﷺ), disavow my relationship with them. I have no *mawla* [benefactor] except Allah (ﷻ) and His Messenger (ﷺ). Then 'Abdullāh ibn Ubayy said, "But I do not disavow my relationship with the Yahūd. I am a man who cannot do without them."⁴³³

Another account of the incidents, events, and circumstances pertaining to the context of this *āyah*, as cited by Muḥammad ibn Iṣḥāq, discloses the following,

When Banū Qaynuqā' went to war against the Messenger of Allah (ﷺ), 'Abdullāh ibn Ubayy stood firmly for them [Banū Qaynuqā']. Then 'Ubādaḥ ibn al-Ṣāmit, being a descendant of the Khazraj, went on foot to the Prophet (ﷺ). 'Ubādaḥ and 'Abdullāh ibn Ubayy were on par in their relations with the Yahūd. 'Ubādaḥ said, "O Messenger of Allah (ﷺ)! I cast away my alliance with them [the Yahūd]. And I espouse Allah (ﷻ) and His Messenger (ﷺ) and the committed Muslims as my superiors. I hereby disclaim my alignment with the *kāfirs* and their

league.” It is to shed light on this human dynamic that the words of Allah (ﷻ) from on high were revealed, **“O you who are securely committed [to Allah]! Do not entitle the Yahūd and Naṣārā as your compatriots: they are but compatriots of one another...”**⁴³⁴

And there are other similar chronicles that detail the mental and social attitudes held by the Arabians who became Muslims toward the Yahūd and Naṣārā. The new Islamic society emerging from generations and centuries of Arabians feeling inferior to the Yahūd and Naṣārā, and dependent upon them, had to come to terms with its self-inflicted unfavorable position. These Muslims who were now reborn and remade did not come out of nowhere; they had feelings, they carried with them traditions, and they were set into a social mold that placed the Yahūd and Naṣārā above them in social rank and in military might. These Islamically progressing people in Madinah around the Prophet (ﷺ) did not have a clue as to what type of relations should continue with their pre-Islamic affiliates and what type of relations should cease to exist.

What invites attention is that the gist of these *āyāt* concentrate on Jewish-Islamic relations. At this point in the sequence of revelation, there had not been any substantial political contact between the Islamic society and state in Madinah and the Christian domains in and out of Arabia. Even though that is the historical fact, the *āyah* still binds the Yahūd and Naṣārā, as if anticipating the future, into one position vis-à-vis a politically growing Islam and a militarily robust base of the faithful in Madinah. This is because the Muslims had to (and still have to) learn that when it comes to “Jews” and “Christians” who are running the affairs of government and state, they will always side with each other against Islamic governance, sovereignty, and independence. Muslims should never lose sight of this profound Qur’anic insight into the way Zionists and imperialists coordinate coalitions, finance federations, and mobilize militaries whenever Islamic authority and military service gel together. Even the *mushriks* are located within this overlapping relationship between Zionists and imperialists in contradis-

inction to the self-determination, self-rule, and self-governance of the covenant-bearing and commitment-infused Muslims.

To be historically accurate, during the prophetic era of Muhammad (ﷺ), there was a variation of sorts between the social attitude of the Yahūd in Madinah and that of the Naṣārā in Arabia, which may be due to the fact that there were no Naṣārā to speak of in Makkah and Madinah, the two major areas of Islamic activity. Later in this same *sūrah*, the Qur'an sheds further light on the attitude of "Jews" as opposed to the attitude of "Christians" toward the committed Muslims,

You [Muhammad] will find the most hostile toward the committed Muslims to be the Yahūd and the *mushriks*; and you will find the nearest in affection to the committed Muslims to be those who say, "We are Naṣārā..." (5:82).

And even though history has unfolded during that time period with this minor detail of difference, the overall position of political Judaism and political Christianity vis-à-vis political Islam remains one in which Zionists, imperialists, and whatever other parallels there may have been or will be in the future consolidate a common interest against Islamic authority and ascendancy. The Zionist Jewish position blends in with the imperialist Christian position to produce a habitat of hostilities that is accommodating of other forces to join the fray against Islamic empowerment and administration. All of this is strictly on the level of governments versus governments and jurisdictions against jurisdictions — leading up to the inevitable conclusion that Muslims can only rely upon Muslims. In matters of power consolidation, coalition building, and popular support, Muslims who are sincere to Allah (ﷻ) and who go by this Qur'an will never find political support or military assistance through the agency of pseudo-Jews who are Zionists and pseudo-Christians who are imperialists. Names and labels may change throughout time; but if the Muslims keep their eyes on the meanings of these *āyāt*, the inference is that no Islamic state and no

Muslim ruler will ever find political relief in state structures belonging to the likes of Zionists and imperialists.

Wrong are those Muslims who think these *āyāt* and this information is peculiar to the Arabia of over a thousand years ago. This Qur'anic information is as valid and reinvigorating today as it was then. Political Yahūd and political Naṣārā have not changed their colors. The events that unfolded in history prove political Christians to be as vicious and ruthless as political Jews. The Christians in Arab countries and in Egypt may not be as insensate and deadly as their European and Western counterparts have been. The fact on scriptural paper and on geographical territories indicates that the hostilities and brutalities registered unprecedented depths of savagery and brutality against Muslims, who may have even been less than a state, an authority, or an independent domain.

Nifāq Is What Cozies Up to Zionists and Imperialists

And yet you can see how those [Muslims] in whose hearts there is a pathology contend with one another for their [ideological Jews' and Christians'] adoption (5:52).

There appears to be a unanimous point of view among the formal *mufassirs* that this *āyah* was revealed in reference to the *munāfiqs*. And if that is the case, with which this writer concurs, it is food for thought to reflect on why the words “...**in whose hearts there is a disease/pathology...**” were chosen instead of the word *munāfiqs*. Obviously, had Allah (ﷻ) wanted He could have said, “And yet you can see how those *munāfiqs* contend with one another...” The salient point here is to diagnose the deviation from a healthy or normal condition by some people who split their personalities between an outward attribution of Islam and an inward identification with *kufr*. In the social realm of things, it is not appropriate to appear a Muslim while concealing feelings and sympathies that belong to a *kāfir*. This malady has its effect on the quality of *īmān* in such people, or in other words, these types of people — *munāfiqs* —

have impaired *īmān*. They display enough *īmān* to pass as Muslims, but not enough to weather the hardships associated with turning the temporal power equation to favor a socialized *īmān* as opposed to an invasive tyranny. Their type of *īmān* is not one of confidence, freedom from doubt, trust, and security.

Some Muslims use the word *hypocrite* to try to get a better handle on the Qur'anic term *munāfiq*. The words *hypocrisy* and *hypocrite* are derivatives of Greek words for *acting* and *actor*, respectively. In Greek literature, they are metaphors for a person appearing to be what he is not. The predominant usage is moralistic; thus the hypocrite is one who *pretends* to be good or upright in certain social circles, all the while being just the opposite, either privately or among his intimates. It is often noted that there were no words comparable to *hypocrite* in Hebrew or Aramaic. Some register this fact by eliminating from earlier English versions of the Old Testament the words *hypocrisy* and *hypocrite*.⁴³⁵

Since Jesus (ﷺ) spoke in Aramaic, it is improbable that he rebuked the Pharisees for feigning piety. Several passages in the Synoptic Gospels provide alternative readings.⁴³⁶ For example, *their hypocrisy* (Mark, 12:15) is said to be corrected by St. Matthew in his use of a Greek term that is translated as *their wickedness* (Matthew, 22:18). In the Gospel of Luke (20:23), another Greek synonym is used, which is translated as *their craftiness*. In the Book of Galatians (2:13), the verb and noun translated as *acted insincerely* and *insincerity*, respectively, refer to the refusal of Peter and Barnabas, under pressure from Judaizers, to continue to have table fellowship with gentile Christians. St. Paul accuses them, not of playing a false part, but for exhibiting a *lack of principle* or a *breach of faith*. In view of the above it may be concluded that Jesus (ﷺ) accused certain scribes of being outwardly religious while inwardly profane. In this context, Jesus (ﷺ) quoted Isaiah, "This people honoureth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me" (Mark, 7:6).

The general Muslim understanding of the term *hypocrites* draws on a party in Madinah that professed sympathy to the Prophet (ﷺ) and Islam but whose members were actually supporters of the pagan Quraysh of Makkah. The Qur'an refers to them as "...propped-up

pieces of wood” (63:4) and “...those in whose hearts is a disease” (5:52). Their leader was ‘Abdullāh ibn Ubayy ibn Sallūl, who withdrew his 300 horsemen from the Muslim forces just before the Battle of Uḥud. He was an important figure in Madinah before the Prophet (ﷺ) arrived there; almost to the end of his life he was jealous of the Prophet (ﷺ) and begrudged him any help. It was in respect of him, and his use of some six of his female helots, that the following *āyah* of the Qur’an was revealed,

And do not, in order to gain some of the fleeting pleasures of this worldly life, force your dependent young women into prostitution if they desire to live in chastity; and whosoever forces them, then, surely, after they have been compelled [to submit in their helplessness], Allah will be all-forgiving, all-compassionate (24:33).

A careful student of the Qur’an should understand that this class of people — whose locus of feelings and intuition, whose disposition and substance, and whose receptiveness belong with the enemies of Allah (ﷻ), His Prophet (ﷺ), and the committed Muslims — is suggestive of more than just a bland hypocrite or a passing phony. Such a social class in an Islamic state and society is the potential executor of disloyal acts that, in today’s language, may consist of levying war against the Muslim authority or in adhering to *kāfir* enemies of the Islamic government and leadership, giving them aid and comfort. This class of *munāfiqs* harbors within it the potential for high treason and sedition, not to mention layers of faithlessness and perfidy.

There are disloyal persons whose lack of faith conviction leads them into deserting the Islamic society and state. With this dynamic at work even in an Islamic society, there will be recreants — disloyal persons who forsake the cause of Islam, *īmān*, and community for the “other” side, which appears “promising” or more powerful. The prototypical Islamic society at the time of the Prophet (ﷺ) demonstrated that hiding out amongst the committed Muslims are double-

dealers and double-crossers who will, in a heartbeat, turn against their Islamic brethren if the opportune circumstances to change sides present themselves. And because Islam intertwines the political with the “religious,” these types of recreants, turncoats, and traitors are considered to be renegades as well as renunciants.

Today, the status of these *munāfiqs* is at an all-time high as they have taken over the reigns of power. And because of this qualitative change, it would be cumbersome to continue to consider them *munāfiqs*. Remember, in the context of the two contending forces of Islam and *kufr* existing side by side, the *munāfiqs*, by definition, are those dual-loyalists who are nominal Muslims on the outside but *kāfir* sympathizers on the inside. These people, most of the time, are Muslims because of their geography, as they live within an Islamic society, but *kāfirs* because of their ideology, as they root for the *kāfirs* in their hearts and minds. In the contemporary world, however, there is what might be called a *post-munāfiq* phenomenon. These Muslims in appearance are functioning as the power mongers in lands and territories that no longer have a polarization between Islamic forces on one side and *kāfir* forces on the other. All sides now are controlled by *kufr*. And so the original *munāfiqs*, who at one time may have been quislings — traitors serving as the puppet leaders of occupying foreign powers — are now “sovereigns” ruling according to the laws and the concepts of *kufr*. The transformation is complete: from pseudo-Muslims to anti-Muslims, from *kāfir* sympathizers to *kāfir* representatives, and from being exposed by Qur’anic *āyāt* with a political content to being covered by Qur’anic *āyāt* with a ritualistic content!

The delicate line of allegiance was crossed by ‘Abdullāh ibn Ubayy who was spearheading the *munāfiqs* in Madinah. With the upward movement of the Prophet’s (ﷺ) struggle, the linkage between Ibn Ubayy and Banū Qaynuqā‘ was exposed. There were other like-minded *munāfiqs* who had ties of loyalty and attachments of interest to the Yahūd in Madinah. They were in the fast lane of materialistic interests with the Yahūd. Whenever an occasion presented itself, these substandard “Muslims” would reiterate their relations and connections with the Yahūd. The Qur’anic words

divulge this pattern, “...the [*munāfiqs*] in whose hearts there is an ailment jockey for their [Yahūdī and Naṣrānī] favor.” How do they justify this? They say, “We fear that a catastrophe will come our way.” What they are expressing is a fear of the “unknown.” They expect some cataclysm or tragedy to befall them. Had their covenant with Allah (ﷻ) and their commitment to Him been at its normal level they would have had the certitude to be able to manage this type of uncertainty. At this point of internal emptiness these semi-Muslims turn for comfort and support to their bosom allies: the canny Yahūd. They rationalize that they are wise to keep a backdoor channel of understanding open with the wily Yahūd. They think that maintaining secret contacts of loyalty with the Yahūd during “good times” will pay off during “bad times.”

What these *munāfiqs* are ultimately afraid of is the defeat of the Muslims and the failure of the Islamic state; and in doing a risk assessment of that eventuality they feel they need good relations with the Yahūd who will pay them back once the Muslims are finished off. The Yahūd played their hand at treachery during the military campaigns of the *mushriks* against the committed Muslims after Badr and at al-Aḥzāb.⁴³⁷ These dubious *munāfiqs* did not want to experience what happened to the committed Muslims as they struggled through their combat engagements. The essential reality at the end of the day is that imposter Muslims are not sure Allah (ﷻ) will give victory to His Prophet (ﷺ) and by extension to the committed and sacrificing Muslims. In their eyes, this whole affair about how Islam will prevail in the world at large in nothing but rhetoric and fantasy. Their duplicitous attitude is also indicative of their doubts about the prophethood of Muhammad (ﷺ). At their best, they cannot confirm or deny that Muhammad is Allah’s Prophet (ﷺ). Nonetheless, if exploitable circumstances permit, they will go through the motions as “Muslims” to secure their own material and market advantage. To be on both sides of the issue, they feel, is the most prudent way to survive regardless of who wins in the end, *īmān* or *kufr*.

In the domain of contemporary Muslim pseudo-intellectualism, some “bigwig” theology students who graduated from “Islamic” uni-

versities and *hawzahs*, now strutting around from country to country, some of them with “impressive” backgrounds, are complaining in private that the Qur’an has no “social theories,” no practical advice, and no conceptual framework to offer today’s Muslims in a world of advanced European social sciences, theories in the humanities, and workable models of behavioral interaction among peoples and nations. What makes this allegation all the more injurious is that it comes from “scholars” who studied the Qur’an, who spent many years building their Islamic “credentials,” and who now have nothing to offer a world that is fed up with Euro-American social models and modalities. On the contrary, these *āyāt* present a comprehensive discourse on human political behavior — one that is not constrained by the limited capacities of human intelligence and cultural evolution. Allah (ﷻ) gives man the outlines of permanent behaviors in the realm of social and transnational blocs. We Muslims have a rule to go by, independent of era and geography, from the nascent Islamic state in the Ḥijāz during the era of *tanzīl* (revelation) all the way until we reach our final days of Islamic governance on earth whenever that may be in the future. The isolated facts and incidental items peculiar to a time and place, which become “fillers” in history, are nothing more than the brush strokes on a canvas of the established concept that is wrapped around every Muslim’s thinking and working mind.

Today, wars of aggression, wars of “ethnic cleansing,” wars of occupation, and wars of genocide continue with no end in sight, even though the Muslims do not have a bona fide Islamic power base or the Islamic power structure they once had. Moreover the allegiance and alliance of Zionists and imperialists could be no more self-evident and transparent than it is in all regions and on all continents of the world. Does any Muslim need any further proof of these timeless words, “...they [Zionist Jews and imperialist Christians] are allies of each other”? Imagine for a moment if this heavenly information, this godly insight, and this timely analysis was never provided to mankind — as it is in this lesson of the Qur’an still in our possession. People would probably be fumbling around, having to learn about Zionists and imperialists from their trial-and-

error experiences, which nonetheless would not reveal the full picture that has been deliberately obfuscated by a sophisticated smokescreen composed of corporatized “presstitutes,” fraudulent academics, and bribable politicians. But, all that aside, the Muslims do have this vital information in their possession, so why do their so-called leaders behave as if Allah (ﷻ) says nothing on this matter?

For Muslims, their political, economic, and military relationships with others are defined by Islamic scripture, Islamic principles, and the authentic Sunnah of the Prophet (ﷺ). Within this body of God-given information, they need to understand that matters of allegiance and loyalty as well as management programs to defer friction and counter hostilities are defined by Allah (ﷻ). When the Muslims are part of a world filled with political parties, blocs of nation-states, and axes of interests that are distributed along a line of Zionism and imperialism, which have become so brazen as to not even hide their evil intentions and military strategies, then how is it possible for us Muslims to tolerate kings in Arabia and presidents outside of Arabia locking political and economic hands with the Yahūd and Naṣārā?

When the Muslims failed to understand these *āyāt* and take the necessary precautions, the bottom fell out. Now, the Muslims, after abdicating their divine responsibility, have experienced what it feels like when the dominant power culture is defined and inundated by the Yahūd and Naṣārā. Consider, for example, the arrangement they called the Central Treaty Organization — a multilateral defense pact involving lands that had “Muslim” titular heads of state but no Islamic authority. Briefly known as the Baghdad Pact, this was a regional alliance sponsored by the Yahūd and Naṣārā (Zionists and imperialists); it started off as the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) in 1954. As part of its global strategy to create a worldwide chain of anti-Soviet alliances, in early-1954 the United States encouraged Turkey, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to sign a Pact of Mutual Cooperation with Pakistan. Later in the same year, Washington concluded a military assistance agreement with Iraq, followed the next month by a Pact of Mutual Assistance with Pakistan. This set the scene for

the signing of a military agreement in early-1955 between Turkey and Iraq, the nucleus of the Baghdad Pact. A few months thereafter, Iran, Pakistan, and Britain joined the Baghdad Pact, which pledged military aid in the event of communist aggression against a fellow member. Zionist-imperialist pressure on Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria to join failed due to popular, nationalist, pan-Arab sentiments expressed in huge demonstrations. After the republican coup in mid-1958, Iraq pulled out of the Baghdad Pact in 1959, which was then officially, and popularly, called the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Since it was meant to provide defense against communist aggression, Pakistan's attempts to invoke the treaty in the 1965 and 1971 wars with India failed. Following the Islamic Revolution in early-1979, Iran quit CENTO, destroying its geographical continuity and military effectiveness, thereby hastening its demise.⁴³⁸

In the previous century, the Muslims were fooled into believing they were all one with "religious Christians and Jews" against atheism. This generational gimmick was sponsored by the family regime in Arabia, otherwise and henceforth to be known as Banū Sa'ūd. Many organizational efforts and structural programs were aligned to this false alignment. The whole issue came to its climax with the recruitment of tens of thousands of Muslims from far and near to go and fight the atheists (communist invaders) in Afghanistan. The Muslims became hired guns for the Yahūd and Naṣārā (Zionists and imperialists) simply because the former were not thinking Qur'anically. Had they been reading and understanding this lesson, not to mention many other lessons in this Book of wisdom, they would not have become the timber to fuel a war that neither belonged to them nor served the greater goals of the Ummah. Had the Muslims been attuned to this Qur'an they would have understood that both the Zionists and imperialists have no scriptural *dīn*, making them no different than the communists. And the irony here is that the Muslims were fighting for and against the atheists all at the same time.

The "illiterate" Muslims were not recruited in churches and synagogues to go fight and die for "faith" in Afghanistan; rather they were recruited by the intelligence agencies and the militaries of Zionists and imperialists hither and yon to fight and die on

Yahūdī and Naṣrānī political terms. In the middle of all this, there was no solid body of Islamic scholars who could see through the Saudi-sponsored “crusade” and expose it for what it was: *munāfiqs* trying to prove their loyalty to Zionists and imperialists who have long departed from scriptural Judaism and Christianity. And looking around today, one is still hard pressed to find Muslims who can come out publicly and declare that there is no longer a *dīn* of Allah (ﷻ) in this world except for Islam,

Inna al-dīna ‘inda allāhi al-islām: Verily, the dīn when it comes to Allah is [only] Islam... (3:19);

And whoever seeks other than Islam as a *dīn* will have nothing to offer [Allah] for acceptance... (3:85).

The Muslims and the oppressed people in the world need a unified Islamic voice and a united Islamic position that declares the truth in a way it matters: Islam is the only scriptural course left for mankind. All of this confusion about a “Judaism” and a “Christianity” that have been overruled and overcome by Zionism and imperialism has to be exposed and condemned. The good-hearted Jews and open-minded Christians may have a better chance at identifying this fact than the duped and doomed “Islamic” scholars who beg for acceptance by latching onto the Saudi money machine, which itself is hooked onto the Zionist and imperialist killing machine. When this fact informs the public conscience, the earnest Jews and the sensible Christians — if they have any significant presence left — will have to acknowledge the transnational nature of Islam and the multicultural assets of its composition. Because of the way Zionism and imperialism have butchered Judaism and Christianity, there is nothing left for humanity except the justice that survives in the Scripture and holy Writ of Islam. This fact is not negotiable, nor can it be put on hold when humanity itself is the victim of Zionists and imperialists.

A functioning Islam in a society with its own accommodating government does not require this fact to be rammed down the

throats of Jews and Christians; facts speak for themselves. People are entitled to continue to follow the rituals and ceremonies they feel comfortable with; however, when the discussion extends to an area in which Zionism is justified by Judaism and imperialism is justified by Christianity, then that is where the Muslims need to be heard, not to mention honest Jews and proper Christians. As far as the Muslims are concerned, Jews and Christians who are unwilling to defy Zionism and imperialism have no scriptural *dīn*. Period.

Having said this about the artificial and deceitful war against atheism, the Muslims should now be more alert to tricks that fool them into attending bogus wars and dying in counterfeit confrontations as the foot soldiers of Zionism and imperialism. They will have a chance in this regard if they keep their eyes on the lessons of the Qur'an, which is teaching them that people who say they are spiritual Jews and spiritual Christians are not spiritual in the least when they look the other way while their church-going and synagogue-attending officials are guilty of Zionism and imperialism. The same can be said of "Muslims" who want to become members of this club of the absurd.

Liberalizing the view of what exactly it means to be a "Christian" or a "Jew" in the world we live in suggests that people who originally had a heavenly scripture, people who are in a sense pagan, and others who consider themselves to be atheists all belong to the secular narrative of the departure of political Jews and Christians from scripture, rather than to the legacy of scripture in and of itself. Hence, all of them together will find a common ground and mutual benefit in teaming up against committed Muslims. To put it starkly, Muslims do not have political friends in this world. Once they get a handle of this reality, they will see it is all the more urgent for them to close ranks, shed their squabbles, and compact their forces so as to move forward from their recent ignominious history of shame. Otherwise, they can expect to remain paupers, begging the Zionists and the imperialists for acceptance and a servant status in their alliances and coalitions, as is the case with today's "Muslim" officials who are at the receiving end of marching orders from Tel Aviv and Washington.

At some point, however, the *munāfiqs*' deceitful game of stringing along multiple loyalties will have had its day and they will have to come to terms with what they did. And so Allah (ﷻ) rebuts their facile excuses of ill fortune with the committed Muslims,

But Allah may well bring about a breakthrough [for the committed Muslims] or any [other] turning point of His own devising, whereupon those [waverers] will be smitten with remorse for the thoughts they had secretly held within themselves (5:52).

This would mean that Muslims who are committed to Allah (ﷻ) are certain of His pact and assurance. If Allah (ﷻ) has promised His Prophet a successful ending of a contest of wills then He will be on the side of His Prophet (ﷺ). At that moment in time, the lines will no longer be blurred, and the Zionists and imperialists, who may have been trying to fight hiding behind *mushriks* or lodged in a fifth-column of "Muslims," will be compromised. Allah (ﷻ) may very well manufacture the conditions, circumstances, and incidents that will draw out the *munāfiqs* from their precarious position. As the momentum builds up in the clash between committed Muslims and committed *kāfirs*, and as the committed Muslims begin to turn the tide against their foes, these people of dual-loyalty may come to regret their faux-allegiance and double standards.

Allah (ﷻ) will demonstrate His auspices by, sooner or later, presenting a breakthrough (*fath*).⁴³⁹ This breakthrough or new phase represents the departure from an inferiority-laden status quo, represented by the way some Muslims feel toward Zionist and imperialist powers, and the affirmation of a changeover to a state of affairs in which the Muslims are riding a tide of confidence to resume their historical responsibilities. There is a marked difference between what Islam is in the political realm and the nature of all these other exploitative and dominating systems, including first and foremost an ideological and political "Judaism" and its counterpart, an ideological and political "Christianity," as represented by wayward Zionists and imperialists respectively.

This *fath*, or productive insight, as well as the penetration of the enemy's defenses in depth and strength will take the Muslims all the way to the strongholds of the Yahūd and Naṣārā. And ultimately, these Zionist and imperialist belligerents will pay their due, resulting almost simultaneously in the *munāfiqs'* failure of heart and their public nervous breakdown. This is the time when these turn-coats who hide beneath an Islamic skin will regret their affection to Zionists and allegiance to imperialists. All of this unraveling of political fondness between Zionists and imperialists on one side and their "Muslim" soulmates on the other side materialized when the committed Muslims finally made their way to Khaybar after all three treacherous factions of the Yahūd were deported from Madi-nah. True, the coalition of the willing *mushriks*, the Yahūd, the Naṣārā, and the *munāfiqs* seemed at one time invincible, but Allah (ﷻ), the Prophet (ﷺ), and the Muslims of continual commitment eventually prevailed. And this can be the case today if the complexed Muslims can only get their act together by shedding their inferiority through the simple act of preferring the loyalty and allegiance of Muslims over Zionists and imperialists.

In what has become the global Islamic movement of our times, the emphasis of this lesson is indispensable in that it teaches the committed Muslims not to latch on to Zionists, imperialists, and all other *mushriks* in an emotional sense or in a political arrangement. A salient point in this lesson is that "adverse" conditions are not a permanent feature of human societies. Social circumstances will change. Power will not always be monopolized by overbearing and high-handed governments as is the case today; they too will go through the cycle of "gaining and losing" power. If the steadfast Muslims can withstand the "setbacks" or "reversals," which are transitory, they will eventually reach a point of "breakthrough."

The lesson also teaches the Muslims of today that their history will always have its share of less-than-commitment-conscious Muslims who will not partake in shared social responsibilities. Some people will always dress up like Muslims but when it comes to bearing the social burden, they will stall and stonewall, with some of them seeking to break out of an Islamic social order alto-

gether. With all of this being a part of Islamic history, the committed Muslims should be better prepared to deal with these types of people when they make their move or raise their swords.

The confusion being what it is around this subject, one point should be clarified so as to leave no doubt: the committed Muslims who are the emotional and rational product of this Qur'an are duty-bound to treat, interact with, and behave toward less-than-political Jews and Christians with respect, honor, and sensitivity. So-called "Jews" and "Christians" only incur a military showdown with the Muslims when they set out to do them harm through physical confrontations and warfare of one type or the other. The Muslims are required to be good-natured and accommodative toward those who cling to whatever is left of scripture, so much so that marriage is permitted to their morally-shielded women (*muḥṣanāt*). Marriage is the most intimate relationship in society, and if the committed Muslims are allowed to marry women of previous scripture who are virtuous and chaste, then obviously they will have no problem or complex toward Jews and Christians. But going this far in their personal and romantic relationships does not extend into matters of political loyalty, economic discrimination, and racial bigotry. Sound and healthy interpersonal and social behaviors are one thing; political alliances, ideological affiliations, and military coalitions are something else. Just because the Muslims are kind and nice toward apolitical Jews and Christians does not mean they have to acknowledge Zionism and imperialism as legitimate ways of life or legitimate forms of governance.

From its very inception during the time of Muhammad (ﷺ), Islam has been a correction to everything that has gone wrong with the Jewish and Christian faiths and doctrines, as well as a flawless criterion for the followers of other religions and philosophies. The representatives of Islam and the spokespersons for Islam have to have enough confidence and courage to express the fact that only Islam is left in the world as Allah's (ﷻ) *dīn*. All these other religions have been worn down, battle-scarred, and thereby rendered empty vessels. When the Yahūd realized they were not selected by Allah (ﷻ) to be the bearers of this Islam, and when they could not

psychologically tolerate the Arabs being the executors of His final Scripture, Allah (ﷻ) speaks directly to them, through the *āyāt* of the Qur'an, to assume their responsibilities at this ideological and political level, and if they decline this open-hearted invitation, then they become *kāfirs*.

And, indeed, Allah accepted a solemn pledge from the Children of Israel when We caused twelve of their lookout men to be sent [to Canaan as spies]. And Allah said, “Behold, I shall be with you! If your *ṣalāh* becomes the established social norm, and your charity becomes a social institution, and you are committed to My apostles and aid them, and offer unto Allah a goodly loan, I will surely efface your bad deeds and bring you into gardens through which running waters flow. But he from among you who, after this, denies the truth [pertaining to Allah’s power and authority], will indeed have strayed from the right path.” Then, for having broken their solemn pledge, We rejected them and caused their hearts to harden, [so that now] they distort the meaning of the [revealed] words, taking them out of their context; and they have forgotten much of what they had been told to bear in mind; and from all but a few of them you will always experience treachery. But pardon them, and forbear: verily, Allah loves the doers of good (5:12–13).

Toward this end all Muslims are called upon to present these illuminating facts to the Jews and Christians, as well as to seculars, atheists, and pagans. No one is to be forced to adhere to Islam. Convictions cannot be imposed on a human conscience; Islam cannot be force-fed to those who are not convinced. Islam’s objective is to liberate the consciences and circumstances of the ordinary man who has been oppressed through the ages by kings, princes, presidents, chosen races, religious orthodoxies, and those who consider themselves to be created in God’s image. And hence in order

to set things aright, it is not looking for disgruntled and tyrannized adherents who are ready to turn on Islam at a moment's notice when the power pendulum swings against it. Rather, Islam is looking for those who voluntarily and rationally, of their own free will, acquiesce to its legal and moral principles. This is the only kind of commitment that can overcome the desire to subvert it, and that can endure the resurgence and punishment of age-old social forces inclusive of racism, elitism, nationalism, and the like.

To a thinking Muslim it makes no sense to elevate the unsound, discredited, and tarnished position of a Judaism under the influence of Zionism and a Christianity under the influence of imperialism to the position of Allah's (ﷻ) *dīn*. If there was enough legitimacy, accuracy, and currency left in Judaism and Christianity, there would have been no need for the revelation of the Qur'an, the mission of the Prophet (ﷺ), and the advent of Islam. Why would the Muslims bother themselves with Jews and Christians seeing the merits of Islam when their own "Judaism" and "Christianity" are equally valid or at least equivalent stand-ins for Islam? It only makes sense for Muslims to present the Jews and Christians with Islam when they know that Islam is Allah's (ﷻ) *dīn* and Christianity-cum-imperialism and Judaism-cum-Zionism are not. Once this simple fact is established, there could not be a more visible example of a formalized schizophrenia than those shaykhs and imams who are walking the imperialist walk and talking the Zionist talk while they continue to believe they are on the religious side of Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ).

Clearly, this counsel from Allah (ﷻ) draws an obvious demarcation line between an allegiance belonging to Allah (ﷻ), His Prophet (ﷺ), and the committed Muslims on the one hand and a counter-allegiance belonging to Zionism, imperialism, and any other form of *kufr* and *shirk*, on the other hand. The chasm is so deep and wide that neither individual nor government can straddle both of these opposing sides. Moreover, any serious Muslim who is on a Qur'anic course of action cannot waste his time being involved in Zionist and imperialist programs — often attended by religious overtones or undertones — that, in the end, are meant to

frustrate and overpower the *dīn* of Allah (ﷻ). With such a transparent declaration from Allah (ﷻ), how is it possible for any Muslim to cooperate with parties who at the end of the day will disregard Islam as they did a Judaism of justice and a Christianity of compassion? Muslims should be mature enough not to entertain any fantastic notions about the nature and objectives of politically-minded and materialistically-motivated people of previous scripture. It is impossible for Qur'anic Muslims in the cast of Rasūl-Allah (ﷺ) to blend in with the Yahūd and Naṣārā. The political programs of Muslims as opposed to “Jews” and “Christians” are diametrically opposed and the divine doctrines are irreconcilable, not because they are irreconcilable in their origins but because of how “Judaism” and “Christianity” have been mutilated by their own political classes and moneyed elites.

When he said, “I’m a man who fears the tide’s turn. I’m afraid that a time will come when we [the Muslim public] will succumb to adverse conditions,” ‘Abdullāh ibn Ubayy ibn Sallūl spoke for all like-minded double-dealers and dual-loyalists who want their cozy relations with Zionists and imperialists to remain intact. This man was supposed to have been a Muslim, with the Muslims, and for the Muslims in good and in bad times, equally. But what he was saying in a roundabout way is that he wanted to be with the Muslims in good times and not in bad times, preferring to be with the enemies of the Muslims in the latter’s good times. This is the sickness and morbidity that makes them the *munāfiqs* they truly are. It occurs not to these characters that their superior is Allah and that the victor is Allah (ﷻ). Begging for superiority and victory from other temporal authorities who try to rival Allah (ﷻ) amounts to humiliation, a state of disgrace, and a loss of self-respect. This unwholesomeness and infirmity is the complexion of all Ibn Sallūls and all *munāfiqs* from that time until the Final Day. Contrast Ibn Sallūl’s attitude with that of ‘Ubādaḥ ibn al-Ṣāmit who straightaway annulled his ties with the Yahūd once he saw how they were behaving with hostility toward the Islamic struggle in Madinah.⁴⁴⁰ His was the act of a committed heart that entertained no option but to side with the committed Muslims against the hostile position of the

Yahūd. As much as Ibn Sallūl was intent on maintaining ties with the Yahūd, Ibn al-Ṣāmit was intent on cutting these ties,

But Allah may well bring about a breakthrough [for the committed Muslims] or any [other] issue of His own devising, whence those [vacillators] will be smitten with remorse for the thoughts they concealed within themselves (5:52).

With this inevitable breakthrough (*fath*) — the significant military setbacks of the *mushriks*, the routing of the Zionists, and the humiliation of the imperialists — the masks will fall, the *munāfiqs* will stand exposed, and their hidden agendas will surface. At this precious moment in time, the committed Muslims will take a second look at these chickenhawk “Muslims” (the *munāfiqs*) and rebuke them for their cowardice and equivocation,

While those who have attained an honored commitment to Allah will say [to one another], “Are these the self-same people who swore by Allah with their most solemn oaths that they were indeed with you? In vain are all their workings, for now they are lost!” (5:53).

This whole lesson with all of its scenarios can be placed on the dynamics of today’s political climate where an Islamic movement that is committed to Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ) and that is composed of dedicated Muslims is finally beginning to gather some momentum. But as this Islamic movement is part of the real world, that it is infested with the generational descendants of the first generation of *munāfiqs* is not an unreasonable expectation. The mugginess of this climate is exacerbated by those who have historically cultivated the dual-loyalist element within the Islamic domain, the Zionist and imperialist governments and states who are acting out their deadly opposition to the Islamic movement. And to round out the actors on this global stage, there are the Arabian *mushriks* — the scions of Quraysh and Makkah represented by the erstwhile

rulers in Arabia — flanked by *mushriks* ruling in Asia and Africa. As the Islamic pulse beats with the kind of resolve that will preclude its being summarily dismissed, the increasing polarization between the two inimical sides will culminate in a breakthrough. And the day will finally come when the false facade of forces and the propaganda of petty powers will come crumbling down as the Muslims will carry the day.

Ibn Sallūl's Contemporary Analogs Are Still *Munāfiqs*

O you who are securely committed [to Allah's power]!
 If you ever abandon your [scriptural] *dīn*, Allah will in time bring forth [in your stead] people whom He loves and who love Him — [who are] humble toward the committed Muslims, proud toward all who deny the truth [of Allah's power], [people] who strive hard in Allah's cause, and do not fear to be censured by anyone who might censure them: such is Allah's favor, which He grants to whom He wills. And Allah is infinite, all-knowing (5:54).

The meaning of “abandoning the *dīn*” in this context is contingent on allegiance and alliance with the political blocs of Jews and Christians. There is, then, a direct connection between those who are in a working relationship with Zionist and imperialist politicians on one end and their forsaking or deserting this *dīn* on the other. When a “Muslim” allows himself to fit into the political schema of Zionism and imperialism, he can no longer be called a Muslim; as he is now a member of Zionism and imperialism, he is outside of the *dīn* of Islam. Islamic personal rituals will no longer vouch for this person's scriptural *dīn* because he has decamped and departed from his pledge to Allah (ﷻ). His core sympathy is with the Yahūd and Naṣārā and thus no amount of spilling water on the body, *ṣalāh* calisthenics, or yoga Ramaḍāns will be a proxy for earnestly belonging to the *dīn* and joining the ranks of its ardent *mujāhids*, “**And**

whoever of you [Muslims] joins them [the Jewish and Christian political elites] becomes, ipso facto, one of them...”

Just in case anyone is still confused about this issue — namely, that no Muslim can remain a Muslim while he is a card-carrying Zionist or closet imperialist — an approach from another angle should drive the point home. There may be some theological differences and arguments between secular people and their less-than-scriptural regimes and institutions. However, what they do is no basis for the way in which Muslims should be acting; therefore, when it comes to abidance, loyalty, and obedience, any Muslim who vacates them insofar as they pertain to Allah (ﷻ), His Messenger (ﷺ), and the community of committed Muslims has joined the enemies of Allah (ﷻ), whomever they may happen to be. No theological, religious, or ritualistic differences among these anti-Muslims are of any value or consequence in this regard,

O you who are securely committed [to Allah]! If you ever desert your [scriptural] *dīn*, Allah will in time bring up [in your stead] people whom He loves and who love Him — [who are] modest toward committed Muslims, awesome toward all who deny the truth [of Allah’s power], [people] who strain hard in Allah’s cause, and do not fear to be censured by anyone who might censure them: such is Allah’s favor, which He grants to whom He wills. And Allah is infinite, all-knowing (5:54).

It appears from this *āyah* that the psychological and social strain on those who are committed to Allah (ﷻ) and His Messenger (ﷺ) at this level of responsibility is immense. Conflicting allegiances will cause a good number of Muslims to go over to the enemy’s side, leaving the Islamic camp in dire straits. As worldly considerations and risk assessments begin to creep into the human mind, those who are left around Allah and His Messenger may begin to doubt their chances and count their blessings; the Muslims who owe their allegiance to Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ) may even go to the point of saying that all logic indicates they will be overrun by the enemies.

To respond to this profound human position the words of Allah (ﷻ) are unequivocal, **“If you ever abandon your [scriptural] *dīn*, Allah will in time bring forth [in your stead] people whom He loves and who love Him...**” The struggle and the sacrifices that escort a loyalty to Allah (ﷻ) and His Messenger (ﷺ) will cause many people to reconsider their role in such an Islamic society. The nature of *ṣabr*, *qiyām*, *qitāl*, and jihad in general is so exacting and taxing that a social “backlash” is an unavoidable event.

Many of the recognized early *mufasssirs* (exegetes) have said that this *āyah* was revealed in anticipation (as Allah (ﷻ) has foreknowledge of events) of many people relinquishing their higher Islamic responsibilities,⁴⁴¹

When Allah’s (ﷻ) decree to return Muhammad (ﷺ) to heavenly company took hold, most of the Arabians renounced the *jihādī* and taxing duties of Islam — except for three congregational assemblies: the people of Madi-nah, the people of Makkah, and the people of Bahrain... They [the renegades] said, “We will pray but we will not pay our *zakāh*. By Allah! We will not have our wealth expropriated.” This was brought to the attention of Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq who would not tolerate this social behavior. No excuse could deter Abū Bakr from doing what had to be done. He said, “By Allah! I will not accept a cleavage in what Allah (ﷻ) has assembled and combined. Even if they [the renegades] were to withhold a tether [leash] that Allah (ﷻ) and His Messenger (ﷺ) has mandated I would wage a fight to attain it.” A contingent accompanied Abū Bakr who fought on the standard of Allah (ﷻ) and His Messenger (ﷺ); the consequences were the same as in all wars: captivity, killing, and even people being incinerated for their high treason (*irtidād*) and for their subtracting the *zakāh* from the Islamic society and state.⁴⁴² War continued until they honored their responsibility of paying the *mā’ūn* [financial assistance] after they had lost their self-esteem...⁴⁴³

Keeping an eye on this moving picture suggests that the higher responsibilities of conviction and commitment have to be discharged. If there are some Muslims who are looking for circumstances and developments to wiggle out of their Islamic higher-character then, **“Allah in good time will replace them with those who love Him and whom He loves, those who will show meekness toward committed Muslims and preeminence toward the committed *kāfirs*.”**⁴⁴⁴ According to another narrative the people who love Allah and whom Allah (ﷻ) loves in return are from Yemen, the people of Abū Mūsá al-Ash‘arī.⁴⁴⁵ Another hadith narrative relates that they are the people of Saba’.⁴⁴⁶ Regardless of whomever the *āyah* pertains to in particular and whomever the people are according to Islamic *tafsir* literature and history, it is generic and fits all people who exhibit the highlighted behaviors.

To drive the point home yet further, and for the general Muslim public to get a sense of how people who claim to be “Muslims” want to throw off duties of struggle and sacrifice, it would behoove the reader to consider the time of Allah’s Prophet (ﷺ). The books of *Sīrah* and history record that during the incumbency of Rasūl-Allah (ﷺ) and the successorship of Abū Bakr there were eleven groups that broke away, or sought to break away, from the civic, political, and financial responsibilities of Islam, two or three of them during the Prophet’s (ﷺ) life.

The first such attempt was by Banū Mudlij and their chief Dhū al-Khimār, otherwise known as al-Aswad al-‘Ansī. He was a clergyman who, after claiming prophethood, took control of a large part of Yemen and in so doing expelled the deputies of the Prophet (ﷺ). Consequently, the Prophet (ﷺ) corresponded with Mu‘ādh ibn Jabal and other prominent Yemenis to put an end to this insurrection. After al-‘Ansī met his fate at the hands of Fayrūz al-Daylamī, the Prophet (ﷺ) was informed of this development posthaste. Of course, the Muslims felt relieved in the way this event shaped out with al-‘Ansī finally gone. It is said that Allah’s Prophet (ﷺ) passed on soon thereafter.⁴⁴⁷

The second attempt at deserting Islam came from Banū Ḥanīfah, the folks of Musaylamaḥ al-Kadhdhāb ibn Ḥabīb. He also

claimed to be a prophet, per his bold communiqué to Allah's Messenger (ﷺ),

From Musaylamaḥ the Messenger of Allah to Muhammad the Messenger of Allah. Peace be upon you. Hence, I have been assigned to share the mission [of prophethood] with you. Due to us is half the land, and what is due to Quraysh is half the land, but Quraysh are people of aggression.

Two people delivered this message to Allah's Prophet (ﷺ). After the Prophet (ﷺ) read the message, he inquired of them, "And what do you say about this?" They said, "We reiterate what he says." And so the Prophet (ﷺ) responded, "Had it not been for the established tradition of honoring emissaries, I would have had both your necks struck." Then he added the following,

From Muhammad the Messenger of Allah to Musaylamaḥ the Liar. Peace be upon he who abides by guidance. Wherefore the land belongs to Allah, He causes whomever He wills of His subjects to inherit it, and the final outcome dwells in those who are conscious of Allah [and His power presence].⁴⁴⁸

This occurred during the tenth year of the Hijrah. The responsibility of confronting this imposter fell to Abū Bakr who proceeded to confront him with an army of Muslims. He was killed by Waḥshī, who had earlier killed Ḥamzaḥ in the Battle of Uḥud, while he was still in the employ of Hind, the wife of Abū Sufyān. Waḥshī commented on this effort, saying, "In my *jāhiliyah* I killed the best of men, and in my Islam I killed the worst of men." It is also said that 'Abdullāh ibn Zayd al-Anṣārī participated in putting an end to Musaylamaḥ.⁴⁴⁹

The third attempt was prosecuted by Banū Asad, the people of Ṭulayḥaḥ ibn Khuwaylid. This happened during the reign of Abū Bakr who sent an army led by Khālīd ibn al-Walīd to quell the rebellion. Ṭulayḥaḥ was defeated and retreated to the Levant, where

it is said, after a while, he repented and became a straightforward and virtuous man.⁴⁵⁰

Seven groups of “Muslims” renounced the civic and higher responsibilities of *imān* during the tenure of Abū Bakr:

1. Fuzārah, the folks of ‘Uyaynah ibn Ḥiṣn;
2. Ghaṭafān, the people of Qurrah ibn Salamaḥ al-Qushayrī;
3. Banū Sulaym, the people of al-Fujā’ah ibn ‘Abd Yālīl;
4. Banū Yarbū’, the people of Mālīk ibn Nuwayraḥ;
5. Some of Banū Tamīm, the people of Sajāḥ bint al-Mundhir al-Kāhinaḥ, who also claimed to be a prophetess and got married to Musaylamaḥ; information has it that she became a virtuous *muslimah* after that fling with *kufr*;
6. Kindaḥ, the people of al-Ash‘ath ibn Qays; and
7. Banū Bakr ibn Wā’il in Bahrain, the people of al-Ḥuṭam ibn Zayd.⁴⁵¹

Wanting to break away from the consolidated brotherhood that extends into civil duties, economic fairness, social security, and military obligations, all of these groups from different quarters in Arabia were infected with the *nifāq* pulse, which was duly nipped in the bud by Abū Bakr.

During the reign of ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the second successor (*khalīfah*) to Allah’s Prophet (ﷺ), only one group — Ghassān, the people of Jablaḥ ibn al-Ayham — tried to withdraw from the Islamic civic order. Jablaḥ, who had become a Christian after accepting Islam, went to Damascus and remained a defector until he died. It is said that ‘Umar corresponded with clergymen in Damascus concerning Jablaḥ after the latter arrived there. ‘Umar wrote to them explaining the background of Jablaḥ’s fleeing to Damascus,

Jablaḥ came to me [‘Umar] with the well-to-do of his folks. He announced his Islam; that is, he became a Muslim. I showed him due respect. Then he went to Makkah and made his religious rounds around the Ka‘bah. In doing so a person from Banū Fuzārah [inadvertently] stepped on Jablaḥ’s garment, wherefore Jablaḥ struck

him and broke his nose and teeth [in another narrative of this same event, it is said that Jablaḥ gouged the man's eyes]. The Fuzārī victim understood this to be an act of hostility and sought justice by bringing this issue to my attention. I passed judgement that either the Fuzārī forgive Jablaḥ or else insist on punishment. Jablaḥ objected to this by saying [to me], "Do you punish me — a king — on account of a hobo?" I answered, "But both of you are in the fold of Islam, and you are no better than he is except [for Allah's] favorable reception." Jablaḥ then asked for a postponement [of the judicial process] until the following day. It was that night on which he accompanied his cousins and fled to Damascus.⁴⁵²

In some chronicles it has been reported that Jablaḥ regretted what he did. Nonetheless, his small band of renegades was not the object of any Islamic military activity. It was Abū Bakr along with the loyal Muhājirūn and Anṣār who militarily dealt with the phenomenon of multiple *munāfiq* groups trying to renege on their Islamic commitments.

Returning to the rest of the *āyah*, how does Allah (ﷻ) speak about real-life and society-first Muslims who nurture the public Islamic sentiment, preserve the social Islamic fabric, and uphold the Islamic faith? These socially conscious Muslims are described through six portraits, the first of which is that Allah (ﷻ) loves them. The fact that Allah (ﷻ) loves is reiterated in the Qur'an and in the Prophet's (ﷺ) words. He loves and hates; but His love and hate are unlike what we humans experience; they are features that befit His majesty and loftiness. Hence not one of His attributes can be evaluated or appraised using a human being (or for that matter, anything else) as a reference, **"Nothing is similar to Him" (42:11).**

Allah's (ﷻ) knowledge is not like the knowledge of man, Allah's (ﷻ) power is not like the power of man. Some Muslim thinkers and scholars, dating back to the Mu'tazilīs and many Ash'arīs, sought to get a mental grip on what it means when Allah (ﷻ) says He loves, so they interpreted His love as His generous and

honorable payback of man or His redoubling of man's good deeds.⁴⁵³ The problem with the human mind when it wants to think about Allah's (ﷻ) attributes is that it can only draw on its human experience and knowledge, but human experience and knowledge are not enough to satisfy the queries of "who" Allah is, "what" Allah (ﷻ) does, and "how" He relates to us.

Trying to understand Allah (ﷻ) as "attributes" as opposed to understanding Him as "self" or "essence," or vice versa, presents a major problem to the limited human intellect. When Allah (ﷻ) speaks of Himself, He leaves our minds with an open-ended and positive understanding of Him, so much so that none of us can insist upon a final definition or understanding of the divine, especially one that is not subject to other intellectual inputs, all of which may be consistent with His majesty, glory, and uniqueness. Allah's (ﷻ) love for man may be expressed by His amnesty or His generosity, **"Say, 'If you love Allah, then follow me [Muhammad], Allah will love you and forgive you your sins...'" (3:31).** The *āyah* is clear that following the Prophet (ﷺ) is cause for Allah's (ﷻ) love and forgiveness. Where do we draw the line between His love and His forgiveness? Who are we to draw this type of line when He is not human and we are not deities?

The second description of these socially conscious and selfless Muslims is that they love Allah (ﷻ). The love of committed Muslims toward Allah (ﷻ) is a permanent feature throughout the Qur'an, as illustrated by the following *āyāt*,

And yet there are people who choose to equate others with Allah, loving them as [only] Allah should be loved; the committed Muslims, though, are more intense in their love of Allah... (2:165);

Say, "If your fathers and your sons and your brothers and your spouses and your clan, and acquired wealth, and a trade you fear may flounder, and dwellings you are satisfied with — [if all these] you love more than Allah and His Messenger and a jihad on a course to

Him, then wait for Allah to come through with His summons...” (9:24).

The committed Muslims’ love for Allah (ﷻ) is corroborated in a hadith of the Prophet (ﷺ),

There are three [elements] that if combined in a sincere Muslim’s heart he shall enjoy the sweetness of being committed: to love Allah and His Messenger more than anyone else, to love a person strictly for Allah, and to hate going back into kufr after Allah has rescued him from it [kufr] as he would hate to be bounced into the Fire.⁴⁵⁴

In another incident, an Arabian nomad came to Allah’s Prophet (ﷺ) and asked, “O Messenger of Allah! When shall the Final Hour occur?” The Prophet (ﷺ) queried in return, “And what have you prepared for it?” The man said, “No significant ṣalāh or ṣiyām, although I love Allah and His Messenger.” The Prophet (ﷺ) replied, “A person is in the company of the ones he loves.” To this, Anas ibn Mālik is reported to have said, “I have never seen the Muslims more delighted after becoming Muslims than for this conversation.”⁴⁵⁵ Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī saturated the topic of loving Allah and Allah’s (ﷻ) love in his book *Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn (Reinvigorating the Knowledge of the Dīn)*.⁴⁵⁶

The third and fourth impressions of the inveterate Muslims point to humility in the company of other committed Muslims and preeminence over the *kāfirs*. Another *āyah* in the Qur’an puts it this way,

Muhammad is Allah’s Apostle; and those who are [truly] with him are firm and unyielding toward the *kāfirs*, [yet] full of compassion toward one another (48:29).

The fifth characterization of committed Muslims — “a struggle on a course to Allah” — is a core feature of all those who honor their pledge to Allah (ﷻ), even at the expense of life, limb,

and possession. *Al-jihād fi sabilillāh* includes all strenuous and over-arching efforts. When one exerts himself and then goes through hardships for the cause of Allah (ﷻ), at that point, he is on a course to Allah (ﷻ). The climax of jihad is the expenditure of self and possessions in a military effort to defeat the enemies of truth and justice. The best way to look for true and undaunted Muslims is to apply this measure of jihad. In contradistinction to this portrayal is the depiction of the *munāfiq*, a rather unflattering snapshot in Allah's (ﷻ) reflective words,

Had these [*munāfiqs*] set out with you [O committed Muslims], they would have added nothing to you save the evil of corruption, and would surely have scurried to and fro in your midst, seeking to stir up discord among you... (9:47).

People who are of a low level of commitment may attempt to struggle, to endure some pressure and rigor, but more often than not, their struggle is for personal interest and not for the cause of Allah (ﷻ). If they see immediate financial and material benefit, they will stay the course, but if they encounter a relative setback and physical losses, they will withdraw, trying to escape the “close calls.”

The sixth feature of these committed Muslims is that they have no regrets and they do not waste their time engaging in the “blame game.” This is a jab at the false Muslims (*munāfiqs*) who were afraid of what the Yahūd would say about them if they were “caught in the military company” of the committed Muslims whose unflinching allegiance to Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ) had already annulled any allegiance to His enemies. Beyond the specifics here, this description is applicable to all committed Muslims who are absolutely unmoved about what people may or may not say concerning the principled position of the Qur’an and Islam. The fact of the matter is that these hard-core Muslims are not working for a class of people, they are not employed by a corporation, and they do not report to any nationalist or racist boss. So they are unreservedly oblivious to the accusations, reproaches, and

disapprovals of those who are not on a course to Allah (ﷻ). Accordingly, for the committed Muslims, the task at hand is about demolishing the *munkar* and effectuating the *ma'rūf* in its place; everything else is just chatter and noise, or a mainstream media spinning its yarns. These six portraits are privileges Allah (ﷻ) gives to those who are with Him, for Him, and from Him, **“Such is Allah’s favor, which He gives to whom He wills. And Allah is infinite, all-knowing.”**

By now, there should be little doubt that individuals and clans who are beholden to the enemies of Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ) are no longer part of the Muslim camp of commitment. The ruling classes all over the territories that were once ruled by an Islamic standard, that lived by an Islamic code, and that honored an Islamic independence, in light of these *āyāt* here, have crossed the line from Islam into *kufr*. There is not enough space here to consider each ruling class in the Muslim world as a subject unto itself, but due to a consistent pattern among them, it should suffice to look at the establishment in Arabia to have a sense of where these characters are on the spectrum of Islam versus *kufr*.

No popular vote, or any other mechanism used to appraise public sentiment, has ever been employed to endorse the rulers of Arabia. Therefore, the rulers there rely upon the Yahūd and Naṣārā for their political survival and monarchical longevity. Britain was the first Naṣrānī-imperialist nation to recognize King ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Āl Sa‘ūd; it did so as part of the Treaty of Jeddah (1927), an Anglo-Saudi pact formalizing relations between Britain and ‘Abd al-‘Azīz after he had declared himself king of the Ḥijāz and sultan of Najd and its dependencies in 1926.⁴⁵⁷ London, the hub of the imperialist Naṣārā, recognized ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and his realm, and he in turn accepted Britain as protector of Oman and the principalities in the Persian Gulf. As if he had a choice!

Going beyond the archetypal *munāfiq* ‘Abdullāh ibn Ubayy ibn Sallūl, in the degree of his treachery and disloyalty, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz was not content with cordial diplomatic and sycophantic political relations. On behalf of British imperialism, he stabbed in the back the very Ikhwān he himself had a hand in creating, and who

were his erstwhile supporters and foot-soldiers when he occupied all of Najd and the Ḥijāz.⁴⁵⁸ ‘Abd al-‘Azīz’s duplicitous tactics led to a rebellion by the majority of the Ikhwān. At this point the British backed their man, the monarch, by providing him motorized weapons, which were duly used to slaughter the Ikhwān. This Zionist/imperialist support enabled ‘Abd al-‘Azīz to defeat the Ikhwān in 1929 and consolidate his power, ultimately culminating in the birth of the nation-state called the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1932). But later, when ‘Abd al-‘Azīz tried to enlarge his domain by attacking Yemen in 1934, the British opposed him and he had to retreat to the borders assigned to him by his temperamental Naṣrānī enablers. In general, the British, the chief executives of European colonialism (the Naṣārā), were determined to have their Arabian proxy understand his limitations. He wanted to bring all of Arabia under his control but he could not have it his way because his expansionist ambitions conflicted with British geostrategic priorities, and being a card-carrying member of the Yahūd and Naṣārā, he had to take orders from the Zionists and imperialists who had given him his kingdom to begin with.

This type of ruler who is under the tutelage of the Yahūd and Naṣārā cannot be considered a person who belongs to the community of committed Muslims. The *āyah* says as much,

Wa-man yatawallahum minkum fa-innahu minhum:
And whoever from among you [Muslims] joins them
[Zionists and imperialists, in matters of political priorities, ideological affinities, and economic interests] becomes part of them (5:51).

This *āyah* so neatly corresponds to the rulers of Arabia that it is astonishing how they continue to behave as if they are the protectors of the holy precincts in Makkah and Madinah.

The contemporary history of the scheming Banū Sa‘ūd is replete with detail upon detail about how they are affiliated with the Yahūd and Naṣārā, caring not one iota for the contemporary struggle of Muslim peoples, the incremental successes of the Islamic

movement, and the day-to-day suffering of Muslim masses. One page out of this shameful history chronicles the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, which sealed the deal so to speak in transferring Saudi surrogate status from British colonialism to American imperialism.⁴⁵⁹ King Sa'ūd endorsed it, as political clients should. He then became the recipient of personal subventions (funds) by the CIA to help him fight "international communism." The kings in Arabia make Ibn Sallūl look good, as they have gone beyond just expressing sympathies and congratulatory remarks to the Yahūd and Naṣārā. They reach understandings with American (Naṣrānī-imperialist) officials on oil production targets — resources that belong to the Muslims and not to the *kāfirs* — so that the subjects of imperialism and Zionism in Europe and America have cheap gasoline for their cars while the majority of Muslims have no fuel to heat their homes, power their hospitals, and open their schools. Aramco is proof positive of how the Yahūd and Naṣārā rob the Muslims of their God-given natural resources with the facilitation and endorsement of the inheritors of Ibn Sallūl who sit on the throne in Riyadh and Jiddah.

When, in the aftermath of the 1973 war between Israel and the Arabian countries, the king in Arabia thought of using oil as a weapon, he was made to know who should be giving orders and who should be taking them. Edward Heath, sent by the British government as a personal emissary to King Fayṣal in late-1973, used the argument, which was certain to appeal to the king, that any prolonged oil squeeze will, by weakening the West, strengthen communism.⁴⁶⁰ Fayṣal responded as a surrogate should. He agreed among other things not to withdraw Saudi deposits at the Bank of England and thus weaken the British pound. Some weeks later, expressing his concern for the "economy of the whole world," Saudi oil minister, Shaykh Zakī Yamānī, said, "We don't want in any way to destroy it." Given this dynamic, it did not take long for Anwar al-Sādāt, then "president" of Egypt, who had become a personal friend of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, to convince King Fayṣal to lift the oil embargo.⁴⁶¹ Fayṣal and al-Sādāt then prevailed upon the other members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OAPEC) to do the same as “a token of Arab goodwill” to the West.

In any case, the oil boycott had left diplomatic, military, and (non-oil) economic relations between Riyadh and Washington virtually unaffected. Following the dramatic rise in its oil revenue, the Saudi regime went on a buying spree, which benefited the Euro-American-Zionist axis. To offer the world proof of how convenient and compliant the Saudis are to their Yahūdī and Naṣrānī masters, during the period of less than three years after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Saudi purchases of American weapons soared to \$12.1 billion — more than 20 times the sum spent by Riyadh on American arms during the period 1950–1973. Banū Sa‘ūd’s Ibn Sallūls aided the American economy in other ways: by purchasing US Treasury certificates on a large scale, they helped to bolster the sagging American dollar. The Saudi example was sycophantically copied by other Arabian peninsula subordinates. The irony of all this is that the amount of Muslim wealth invested and deposited in Yahūdī and Naṣrānī financial institutions is so high, while that of the Zionist occupiers of Palestine is so low, that it is classified information, and few public officials have the courage to talk about it in public. And despite all this, US foreign policy overwhelmingly supports Israel.

How much more evidence do the Muslims have to see before they understand that the current stock of Ibn Sallūls do not belong in any way, shape, or form to the Islamic domain. Washington and Riyadh reinforce their intelligence services periodically and cordially. Raymond Close, CIA station head in Saudi Arabia from 1971–1977, worked intimately with the Saudi security chief, Kamāl Adham (brother of King Fayṣal’s only wife), to develop a special intelligence service to “protect the monarchy.” In his step-by-step approach to Middle East peace, the aforementioned Henry Kissinger accorded as much importance to Riyadh as he did to Cairo and Tel Aviv. It was in Riyadh in early-1975 that he reportedly secured Fayṣal’s backing for a plan meant to replace the 1974 Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, before leaving for Israel; three days later came the assassination of King Fayṣal — an event that still has no convincing and satisfactory explanation.

History Does Not Accept an Absence of Scripture-Bearers

O you who are securely committed [to Allah's power]! If you ever abandon your [scriptural] *dīn*, Allah will in time bring forth [in your stead] people whom He loves and who love Him — humble toward the committed Muslims, proud toward all who deny the truth [of Allah's power], [people] who work hard on a course to Allah, and do not fear to be censured by anyone who might want to censure them: such is Allah's favor, which He grants to whom He wills. And Allah is infinite, all-knowing (5:54).

The historical test of divine revelation has always culminated in a deficit of the courage of conviction in the people around their Prophets (ﷺ) when the latter were called to prosecute the acquisition of power, the administration of power, and the fair distribution of power. Every time power was within the reach of disciples and followers of Allah's Prophets (ﷺ), death was also impending and menacing. Hence, many people when it comes to being a hair's breadth away from power, given the fact that it is attended by being the same distance from death, prefer to stay away from it all, seeking safety in their passivism and apologetics.

This is a visible feature in the history of Banū Isrā'īl. The long chronology of Israeli failure to live up to the selfless and death-courting responsibilities of the covenant caused the historic shift they dreaded: the responsibility of the covenant, the duties of the prophets, and the commands of scripture would now be assigned to those others whom they felt were less than human — the Gentiles, the goyim. And to complicate things even further for this historical foundering of Banū Isrā'īl, the legacy of the covenant, the heritage of scripture, and the struggle of prophets was now, by the advent of this Qur'an and this Prophet (ﷺ) the responsibility of the Muslims. The whole event was all the more disturbing in the Yahūdī racial mentality because the initial adherents of this new reassignment of duties went to the Semitic Arabians. And

they can only blame themselves for this turn of events and for this self-inflicted comeuppance.

Today, the same holds true for the Muslims. In times past, the committed Muslims acquired their power by God-given legitimate means and they reached that point through a struggle of “bloodshed” and wars in obedience to Allah (ﷻ). However, today, if they fail to assume the responsibilities of a justice-minded acquisition and distribution of power and give up their leading position of conscience in this regard, then they too will find themselves looking at “others” filling the void they vacated. All of this is tantamount to abandoning the scriptural *dīn*.

People are taught in secular schools of thought that the world cannot tolerate a political vacuum; if there is a political void somewhere in the world some other political power will move in and take over. The knowledge of this disproportionality of power coupled with the proportionality of morals helps to restore the balance of power.⁴⁶² Human history from a divine and Qur’anic understanding does not accept an absence of scripture-bearers. Whenever there are people who prove their failure at being the scriptural humans Allah (ﷻ) intended them to be, then He substitutes them with others who are more capable, **“Allah will in time bring forth people whom He loves and who love Him...”**

Some reflection is in order for what is implied here: the enduring relationship that makes people surmount the “impossible” is their love of Allah (ﷻ). It is, on the face of it (in the way Israelis and their like-minded adjuncts weigh the worldly odds), impossible to defeat a gentile war machine, or to beat a goyim hyper-power, or to overcome a *kāfir* superpower; but when there is a love for Allah, which is reciprocated by a love from Allah, then these worldly powers from way back then in biblical times all the way to the present and into the future until the end of time are insignificant because Allah (ﷻ) is the determining power. But for this determining power to work in favor of those who make a secure commitment, they have to have a love for Allah (ﷻ). But this is not a static, reclusive, or mystical love; it is a love that works for Allah on a path that leads to Allah with all the effort that is needed for

Allah (ﷻ). And if that means the lovers of Allah (ﷻ) will have to sacrifice, they do so with a love for Him; if they have to fight, they do so with a love for Him; and if they have to die, they do so with a love for Him. This love is not irrational; the lover knows he will have Allah's (ﷻ) love. And what else can be better than that?

In the strategic scheme of things, when this love for, by, and to Allah (ﷻ) is a fact of life, human populations and land masses of people will interact with this love of Allah (ﷻ) in whichever way they choose. There may be countries and peoples who can see the merits and validity of it and therefore be nonviolent and amicable, and conversely there will be others who cannot live with this infusion of Allah (ﷻ) into the human condition, so they will choose to be hostile and inimical. This is part of the nature of the irreconcilability between loving Allah (ﷻ) and hating Him, between loving His teachings and detesting them. Our Islamic and Qur'anic responsibilities are not mechanized ones, wherein the Muslims behave as if they are emotionless and mindless automatons. When we, the committed Muslims, want an Islamic order, an Islamic social conscience, an Islamic moral society, an Islamic legal system, an Islamic *sharī'ah*, an Islamic government, and an Islamic state, then we want all of that out of our love for Allah. And when we acquire all that, we do so with the love of Allah. And when we honor all that, we do so with the love of Allah (ﷻ). This is the kind of love that permeates the *āyāt* of this holy Writ,

Whereas those who are committed [to Allah] love Allah more than all else... (2:165);

And if My servants ask you [O Muhammad] about Me, indeed, I am near; I respond to the call of him who calls, whenever he calls unto Me... (2:186);

Say [O Prophet], "If you love Allah, follow me, [and] Allah will love you and forgive you your sins; for Allah is much-forgiving, merciful" (3:31);

[Said Shu‘ayb], hence, ask your Sustainer to forgive you your sins, and then turn toward Him in repentance: for, verily, my Sustainer is merciful, a fount of love! (11:90);

Verily, those who are committed [to Allah] and do righteous deeds will the Most Gracious endow with love (19:96);

And He alone is truly-forgiving, all-embracing in His love (85:14).

Despite these *āyāt* and many more, there are still deceitful writers and malevolent “scholars” who try to make the point that “those Muslims” are hardheaded and cold-hearted. They do not tire of telling everyone that the Muslims’ relationship with Allah (ﷻ) is one of force and duress, and that they have to live a life of penalties and revenge — unlike Christians who have a love relationship with God. These types of media voices will never be able to change the fact that this Qur’an is a book of love as it is a book of justice. Love cannot be complete without justice and justice cannot be done without love.

What the Muslims should own up to and what the world needs is a new or renewed breed of committed scripturalists who are not too chastened or sorry to say that the only scripture left intact without any human tampering is this Qur’an. And they should take this Qur’an into their human souls and inside the very heart of their human societies, and to the boundaries of human existence — word by word, idea after idea, step by step, and one phase at a time until they have “God’s kingdom” on earth. In doing so they will act with all affection and understanding toward everyone who has confidence and certitude in this divine process, and they will censure all who try to undermine it. This new breed of committed scripturalists will strive, struggle, and sacrifice on this course to Allah (ﷻ) and they will not be bothered or deterred by anyone or any system that fabricates allegations, plays the blame game, and casts aspersions.

If we, the committed Muslims, claim that nothing is comparable to the Qur'an as a guide for human behavior, then it is we who have the best chance to be this new breed of scripture-bearers. If it is the Qur'an that informs whatever we do, then we shall do none of what we are doing for our egos, or our ethnicities, or our interests. We shall do what needs to be done in the way it needs to be done because Allah (ﷻ) told us to do it and His Prophet (ﷺ) showed us how to do it. This whole effort we make for our love of Allah (ﷻ). If some critics see us in a different light, then they will have to reconsider their evaluation criteria. Yes, this is a jihad but it is not a definition of jihad polluted by imperialist and Zionist spin. Rather our jihad is an ethical one in which we exert all the virtuous effort we can muster in a direction toward Allah (ﷻ).

Political Yahūd and Naṣārā decked out in their imperialist and Zionist wardrobes cannot scare us with their atomic weapons and weapons of mass destruction. They cannot intimidate us with their international organizations and United Nations resolutions. They cannot impress us with their consumer gadgets and industrial toys. They cannot move us with their depraved modernity and so-called civilization. When they parted company with God they became the ravaging, directionless, and empty mega-governments that steal, occupy, and “shock and awe.” The world needs meaning, people need content, and humanity needs a savior. This can only happen when people are infused with the love of Allah (ﷻ) as His guidance, here in this time-tested Scripture, shows them the way. If the people of previous scripture can momentarily come out of their imperialist Zio-mania and gain a modicum of mental balance so as to join us in this quest, then they are most welcome and all shall be equal with no exclusions. But if they insist on their path of God-denial, then they will meet us before they meet their Lord, for His will through His love is our forte, **“Such is Allah’s favor, which He grants to whom He wills. And Allah is infinite, all-knowing.”**

Hate Speech Is a Prelude to Crimes without Contrition

Behold, your only helper shall be Allah, and His Apostle, and those who have committed themselves [to His power] — those who have conducted [a social] *ṣalāh*, and rendered [a systemic] *zakāh* while they are [in a paradigm of] consenting [to Allah] (5:55).

This is the support system of the “go-it-alone” committed Muslims: Allah (ﷻ), the Prophet (ﷺ), and the pool of courageous and covenant-bearing Muslims. All are integral parts of a counter-offensive against the *mushriks* and *kāfirs*, the Zionists and the imperialists. This obviously excludes those centers of earthly power composed of corporate *kāfirs* and the moneyed *mushriks* who are sought out for support and sustenance by faint hearts and feeble minds. If a critical mass of committed Muslims places its trust in Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ), it will come out winning in the end whatever the intervening details may be. What distinguishes these committed Muslims is the fact that, unlike the talk-first Muslims, they are Muslims who have taken their faith into the public space, they have taken upon themselves the social dimensions of what it means to yield to Allah (ﷻ), and they are in a social consciousness more than they are in a private piety. Hence, their *ṣalāh* is sociable, their *zakāh* is a supportive civic institution, and their acquiescence to Allah (ﷻ) is a public mindset.

Thus, they stand apart from the *munāfiqs* who say they are Muslims, but when the social responsibilities of being a Muslim beckon, they are nowhere to be found. These *munāfiqs* are the types of Muslims who, when they pray, are only true to the bodily motions of *ṣalāh*; their *ṣalāh* has no motivation, it carries no social responsibilities, and it has no meaning. Many such “Muslims” come to *ṣalāh* when congregational *ṣalāh* is a part of everyday life the same as going to work, as if they are being dragged to the *maṣjid*. They come to satisfy the public eye, not because they want to please Allah (ﷻ) and enhance their consciousness of Him. The *iqāmah* of the *ṣalāh* is the consummation of it from being a personal affair between an individ-

ual and his Creator to being a social duty between and among all *ṣalāh* attendees who resonate with the revealed and recited words of Allah (ﷻ). Ensuing from such a *ṣalāh* is the social solidarity founded in part upon the free flow of finances and the equitable distribution of wealth. It is unconscionable for an individual who is a privately “pious” Muslim to belong to a publicly poor and impoverished Muslim society. Likewise it is unconscionable for the class of “Muslim” one-percenters to live side by side with the multitudes of poverty-stricken and stone-broke Muslims, all of whom are ostensibly participating in *iqāmah al-ṣalāh* and *itā' al-zakāh*.

“For, all who ally themselves with Allah and His Apostle and those who are committed [to Allah’s power] — behold, it is they, the *ḥizb* of Allah, who shall be victorious.” This relationship between Allah (ﷻ) and His Apostle (ﷺ) on one side, and the committed and loving Muslims on the other is one in which the Muslims place their trust in Allah (ﷻ) and entertain no doubts about His presence and support in all they do for Him. Allah (ﷻ), for His part, aids His Prophet (ﷺ) and the committed Muslims who are with him.

The next two *āyāt* verify a type of political elitism that expresses its ill will toward the committed Muslims in a peculiar way, and this disqualifies its proponents from any type of working relationship with the committed Muslims and their representatives. The *āyāt* make it clear for all committed Muslims,

O you who are securely committed [to Allah and His power]! Do not take for your allies such as mock at your [scriptural] *dīn* and make a jest of it — be they from among those who have been vouchsafed revelation before your time, or [from among] those who deny the truth [of Allah’s power as such] — but remain on guard toward Allah [and His power], if you are [truly] committed [to Him]: for, when you publicly summon to *ṣalāh*, they [political “Jews” and political “Christians”] mock at it and make a jest of it — simply because they are people who do not use their reason (5:57–58).

That the elites in the political decision-making circles of the Yahūd and Naṣrā are but allies of one another when it comes to an Islamic movement, an Islamic state, and an Islamic government has already been established. No one within an Islamic state and society may continue to have political affinities with them, though there are those “Muslims” lacking self-esteem and self-respect — the generic *munāfiqs* — who retain such contacts with the declared enemies of Islam. Here, the penetrating words of the Qur’an look at yet another nuance of this anti-Islamic structure: organized and publicized defamation of Islam and the committed Muslims. Are they so civilized that they would never do such a thing? Of course not. Mocking Islam and Muslim symbols is so prevalent and perennial that one would assume it is part of Yahūdī and Naṣrānī culture.

Before going into some detail on this matter, let it be noted that Muslims are skeptical when it comes to the goodwill of those who will not open their minds to Islam. Therefore, when the card-carrying members of this Zionist, imperialist, and *mushrik* alliance — its politicians, its talk-show hosts, its comedians, its writers, its media commentators, its soldiers and officers, and its think-tank scholars — make fun of what is holy in Islam, naturally a Muslim feels insulted when his *dīn* is treated with contempt. A Muslim does not have a “side activity” called rituals; his whole life, his everyday life, his every movement is an expression of conformity unto Allah (ﷻ). Thus, when some unbalanced minds want to poke fun at the social institution of *ṣalāh*, obviously a Muslim will be incensed. The *ṣalāh* is that moment in time when the individual hearts of people are combined and they are all in the precious presence of Allah (ﷻ); and so any politically motivated or malicious attempt to lampoon it would have to be considered a deliberate act of incitement.

The point here is that there can be no *walā’* (affinity, allegiance, and alliance) between Muslims and these types of people. Even though there is intent and purpose in their derision of Muslims, what is disconcerting, per the *āyah*, is that they do so with a lack of rationality. What meaningful purpose is served when the media or a government launches into or condones the contemptuous and disrespectful presentation of Islamic practices? A Muslim

cannot digest a liberal argument that gives license to anyone who wants to ridicule and scoff at Islamic social institutions or Islamic revered figures. Thinking minds try to evaluate reality and learn from it, but they try their best not to degrade what is sacred to others. It should have been enough for these Yahūdī and Naṣrānī elites to have spoiled their relationship with God, with nature, and with so many other societies on earth — even with themselves — but they cannot tolerate anyone successfully assuming the responsibilities they were not able to handle, and so they pick on innocent Muslims whose only concern is to live a full and wholesome life according to scripture and God's covenant.

This Qur'an is the final word on human relations. In this context, it is telling the Muslims that people of previous scripture, as well as people who are opposed to Allah (ﷻ) while belonging to no scripture, will laugh to scorn Islam and the Muslims. This information is part of a sequence of "red-flag" *āyāt* pertaining to the political clout and power of the Yahūd and Naṣārā (Zionists and imperialists). By inference, these Zionist and imperialist power centers are apt to ridicule the Muslims when the former feel unsettled at the latter having their own Islamic institutions, their organized social life, as well as their independent character and military might. This attitude could not be more evident today with the prolific output of books, articles, cartoons, and film productions that attempt to make fun of and laugh at the Muslims. These Zionist-sponsored and imperialist-supported events are multiplying as the Muslims in the world are reinstating themselves and growing more and more confident of their relationship with Allah (ﷻ).

The latest broadsides in this sequence of Zionist-imperialist defamation of Islam, or hate speech, are the cartoons caricaturing the Prophet of Allah (ﷺ) with a bomb-infused headdress.⁴⁶³ After the expected, or perhaps incited, protests erupted all over the Muslim world, the vitriolic mouthpieces of the Yahūdī-Naṣrānī (Zionist-imperialist) propaganda apparatus went into overdrive. They used the opportunity to highlight what is right with the secular neo-liberal West and what is wrong with the Muslim East, chiefly that Islam is inconsistent with the most fundamental tenets of civil

society, key among which is the freedom of speech — a so-called principle they routinely violate in their military occupations and exploit to shape election results in underdeveloped countries, but of which they are the most vocal self-righteous advocates. They argued that because of their secular, liberal values, they had to allow — nay, uphold — the publication of those offensive cartoons, the principled position of one-third of the world’s population be damned. In a transparent attempt to distance themselves from their own and to ingratiate themselves to those they offended, no doubt fearing a depreciation of their material interests, some of them were disingenuously apologetic as they contended that even if the speech is abhorrent, insulting, odious, and ugly, they still have to defend the “right” to express it.

When they deliberately choose the dearest person to the hearts of two billion Muslims, portraying him as the archetypal terrorist, and then say they are doing this to exercise their freedom of speech, are they so naive as to expect the Muslims to make believe that Allah (ﷻ) is not telling them about the true intents and purposes of such acts? If they are that credulous, then they are obviously ignorant of who the Muslims are and what they will be capable of in the course of time with Allah’s (ﷻ) help. The Muslims are no longer in their historical hibernation. They are awake and they see exactly what is happening around them. If a Muslim of any repute was to ridicule what the Zionists and imperialists hold to be holy, the immediate rebuke would be “hate speech” or “defamation.” Why, then, are not their vile arts, their malevolent talents, and their ugly media guilty of hate expressions when they come out with all this filth about the Prophet (ﷺ)? The answer is obvious.

Hate speech and hate language are precursors to hate action and hate murder. Their hate may take them all the way to the deployment of deadly weapons and acts of annihilation. How then can any Muslim in his right mind entertain the idea of having these types of people as political partners, financial guarantors, or military confederates? In the time of Allah’s Prophet (ﷺ), such caustic remarks and banter were confined to the circles of the *mushriks* and Yahūd. Islamic historical sources contain no solid ex-

amples from the circle of political Christians. However, due to the clarity in these *āyāt*, when they all become political and military allies of each other, the Naṣrānī religious character on this issue is eclipsed by the political and military crimes they commit in connivance with the Yahūd and *mushriks*.

Imperialism, which has grown out of the “Christian” context, was around long before it came to be known as “imperialism.” It was a monster then, as now. No one can minimize the monstrous animosity that has come from this historical beast against the Muslims of scripture. Political elites in the Christian domain have preyed upon Muslims from century to century. Their predatory instincts began attacking the Islamic society and state as early as the first generation after Allah’s Prophet (ﷺ) passed on. Shortly thereafter came the infamous Crusades.

Then came colonialism, along with its “Christian” missionary foot-soldiers.⁴⁶⁴ They wanted to “civilize the savage” by “promoting” the Christian faith; in reality, they were laying the groundwork for colonialist occupation. Missionary activity has been a permanent feature of a Christianity deployed by imperialist elites, particularly through the agency of the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches. In the past, Christianity was frequently associated with the expansion of European or American power, but modern missions have tried to go beyond that to the more reliable permanence of establishing indigenous churches, with worship expressed in terms of local culture. Colonialism itself morphed into neocolonialism, a disguised form of imperialism, by which a power elite in a particular militaristic regime may grant formal independence to another country, usually one of its previously colonized territories, but it will continue to dominate that country through control of markets for goods or raw materials, and proxy rulers beholden to the imperial master.⁴⁶⁵

And now finally, in our current age, there is an all-out global war on “terrorism.” This war has been in progress for 14 centuries. But never have the Zionists, imperialists, and their allies and cronies been so candid about it. This four-legged creature of Zionism, imperialism, the *mushriks*, and the pagans has declared

open season on all committed Muslims in the world, to such an extent that the entire majority Muslim world is a war zone and all “military-age males” are enemy combatants.

The Qur’an gives us the information we so desperately need. This information never expires. It is always current. It is important not only for our well-being, but sometimes even for our survival. Once again, we are taught by this same Qur’an to be easygoing and friendly with moral Jews and Christians in the same breath that we are taught to be strident and defiant with the Zionists and imperialists. The former are, by and large, the uninitiated masses and the latter are the elites.

Zionists and Imperialists Cannot Tolerate Independent Muslims

The Qur’an turns now to Allah’s Prophet (ﷺ) and implores him to ask these people who identify with scripture about what makes them strike at the committed Muslims. Could they have something on their minds other than the Muslims’ covenant and commitment relationship with Allah (ﷻ), something besides the Muslims’ *īmān*? Are they jealous at the fact that what was once their responsibility has now become the responsibility of Muhammadi Muslims? Is it possible that all these acts of war and the “clash of civilizations” are related to the Muslims’ honoring their relationship with Allah (ﷻ) while they (“Jews” and “Christians”) have deteriorated, diminished, and demeaned their God-given responsibility? The *āyāt* point out their pulse of hostility,

Say, “O followers of earlier scripture! Do you find fault with us for no other reason than that we are committed to Allah [alone], and in that which He has bestowed from on high upon us as well as that which He has bestowed aforetime? Or [is it only] because most of you are [scripturally] decomposed?” Say, “Shall I tell you who, in the sight of Allah, deserves a yet worse retribution than these? They whom Allah has rejected and whom He has condemned, and whom He has

turned into apes and swine [imitators and gluttons] because they conformed to the [excessive] powers of evil: these are yet worse in station, and farther astray from the right path [than the mockers]" (5:59–60).

In a sense, the question in the first *āyah* above is rhetorical. The Prophet (ﷺ) and everyone with a vision know the answer. But, still, the motives associated with their aggressive manner have to be illuminated by this truthful Qur'an for all times to come. On another level, the same question serves to protest the Zionist-imperialist mindset and status quo. If the Muslims are listening to these words of wisdom, they would have nothing to do with these epicenters of evil.

The consistent fact of the matter is that neither the Zionist biblicalists nor the imperialist evangelicals have had "problems" with the Muslims except when the latter express themselves as a social order and protect themselves with a military force — with all the validation that comes from scripture and revelation. Scripture and uncorrupted people attending to its morality and legality, in the eyes of racist Zionists and their evangelical enablers, are a volatile and threatening combination, and hence, feeling that there is no other way to turn the circumstances in favor of their corrupt status quo, they leverage their truculent and resentful instincts into the declaration of war.

The Qur'an tells the Muslims the facts of life, and thus for them, there can be no other explanation. The Zionists and imperialists obviously hate them with a passion and are willing to concoct genocidal wars against them because they are the Muslims Allah (ﷻ) wants them to be — not because they are *kitābī* Muslims and not because they are potential "Jews" or potential "Christians." The iniquitous elites in their conspiratorial minds know that they are not worthy of God, that they are degenerate, and that they have not one iota of attachment to scripture. But they also know that the Muslims are the only ones around who have what it takes to be fair and just, something these aristocratic upper classes have been trying to circumvent and short-circuit for

ages. They know this because they refuse to accept this Qur'an and its impeccable Prophet (ﷺ). Arguing that they are just "liberal" people looking for the truth does not hold water because they have had over 14 centuries to find it here in this open Qur'an. However these elites and power mongers are not looking for truth; they are looking for control and exploitation. And following through on this attitude, they feel they have to do something about this irritating fact, so they play out their feelings with the destructive means that culminate in real wars.

These political Jews and Christians have not laid their animus to rest throughout 1,400 years because they cannot stand to see Muslims being independent of and un-reliant upon the Yahūd and Naṣārā. The Muslims have their own central political authority.⁴⁶⁶ This war will continue in many forms and shapes, with differing degrees and at multiple levels, as long as the Muslims maintain their autonomy and honor their covenant with Allah (ﷻ). Nothing will disarm the Zionists and imperialists besides the Muslims withdrawing into a private Islam, recoiling into a lifestyle that is macro-managed by their enemies, and abandoning this *dīn* of Allah (ﷻ). In other words, any Muslim can go to whatever extent he chooses in fulfilling his personal commitment to God, but if he wants to socialize that commitment by having a society that functions on the same principles, then at that point he is impinging on "foreign" territory. Zionists and imperialists cannot tolerate seeing Muslims succeed where the former have failed. Muslims are showing signs of success in applying the full range of Islam that comes with this Qur'an and Prophet (ﷺ). The "Jews" and "Christians" flunked this historical test; and now they want to see the Muslims flunk it as well. This incontrovertible fact comes to the Prophet (ﷺ), and to the committed Muslims by extension, in another *sūrah* where Allah (ﷻ) says, **"And the political Jews and political Christians will not be satisfied with you [O Muhammad] until you enlist in their worldview" (2:120)**. Here, in *Sūrah al-Mā'idah*, the Prophet (ﷺ) is told to confront these types with the truth about their intents and purposes,

Say, “O followers of earlier revelation! Do you take revenge against us for no other reason than that we have become committed to Allah [alone], and in that which He has bestowed from on high upon us as well as that which He has bestowed aforetime? Or [is it only] because most of you are corrupt?” (5:59).

This is the fact no one wants to talk about. There are many things happening in this world: political jockeying, economic “competition,” dozens of wars of hot pursuit, and a scheme of frictional encounters between Muslims on one side and Zionists and imperialists on the other. No one in the Zionist-imperialist, Euro-American world will state categorically and frankly that the wars they are launching against Muslims around the world are because they see an existential scriptural threat to their egos, their interests, and their exploitative modus operandi. Caught up in the web of deceit and deception are some “Muslims” who should know better. Yesterday, the game was to win over the majority of Muslims by a flimsy and fabricated war against communism. Today, the game is to win over the majority of Muslims by a flimsy and fabricated war against terrorism.

Articles, books, academic papers, and even political theories and ideologies are contrived to smother this fact. The influential Zionist and imperialist blocs within Judaism and Christianity are doing their level best to conceal or obliterate this damning truth right here in the pages of this aboveboard Qur’an. They want to fudge this fact at a time when it is beginning to open some eyes, and Muslims are starting to see through the lies and propaganda that are now beginning to run out of steam.

The Muslims now more than ever need this political consciousness. With it, they will be able to reconstitute the *ummaḥ* that has been absent for far too long, that can work miracles and deliver results, and that will reverse their misfortunes by defeating their nemeses. The Crusades were defeated because the Muslims were able to bounce back and regain their political consciousness. When that consciousness began to erode, the door was opened to

the inflictions of colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, and now globalization. Zionists and imperialists overran Muslim countries, occupying them, after they overran Muslim political consciousness, occupying it. They lie when they impute that there is no such thing any longer as “religious wars.” And some anxiously liberal Muslims have actually believed them. They fooled these ingratiating Muslims into giving credence to their claim that religious wars were a developmental stage in human history, which is over now, and that today we are all in the age of enlightenment, scientific objectivity, and technological breakthroughs. They go on to contend that people who think religiously are backward and savage. They may be concealing libraries of information to convince Muslims that even thinking about their *dīn*, and any conflict imposed by them because of the Islamic understanding of *dīn*, is regressive and stupid. In the meantime, these Zionists and imperialists use all the “religious argument” munitions in their bigoted arsenal and their biased history. They are racing headlong for natural resources, markets, and investments — not for justice, peace, and harmony. The only thing in their way is the cluster of Muslim peoples in the world who have this Scripture that does not back away from the social value of Islam and the pivotal issue of justice.

The intellectual war will heat up because the Muslims are beginning to look at this Qur’an with their minds and hearts, instead of with their hearts only. In this milieu, imperialism and Zionism will want to buy time to diffuse the Islamic yearning for self-determination, and so “scientists” will reason against Islamic self-determination, “public figures” will argue against it, and “Muslim scholars” will debate against it. By now, after serial wars, dislocations, occupations, and interminable oppression, the Muslims should have had enough of their mental state of deep and prolonged political oblivion. If, may Allah (ﷻ) forbid, the Zionists and imperialists win the war of ideas, then they will make headway into the naturally rich Muslim territories (as they have), they will own Muslim resources (as they do), market Muslim products, and exploit the Muslims unrelentingly (as they are). Once they disarm the Muslims of their scriptural *dīn*, they take away the latter’s strength enabling

the former to penetrate as deep as they wish. The Zionists and imperialists have no morals, no sense of justice, and no scripture, **“Because most of them are degenerate.”**

The agents of Zionism and imperialism are also alive and well. They work hand in hand with their Yahūdī and Naṣrānī (Zionist and imperialist) cohorts and masters. They act as sounding boards for the ideas of secularism, *kufr*, and blasphemy. Today, and probably for some time to come, there is a Zionist-imperialist welcome wagon looking for “moderate” Muslims as opposed to “extremist” or “fundamentalist” Muslims. These moderate Muslims are called as such because they have been conditioned to see the world through the Zionist and imperialist prism, and therefore will sound more credible if they can sugarcoat Zionist and imperialist theories with their own “Islamic” logic.

There are now in the bastions of Zionism and imperialism those naive Muslims who think they are doing the world and civilization a service by denouncing other committed Muslims who are living and dying for justice. They are led to believe that the majority of Jews, Christians, and Muslims are all people of the Abrahamic tradition in a way that the so-called extremist and radical Muslims do not belong, and thereby should be opposed. So these impressionable Muslims are enlisted in this war against “terrorism” when in fact it is a war against Islamic self-determination. Taken out of this equation altogether are the two fundamental elements of, firstly, the corrupting and corrupted elites within the “Jewish,” the “Christian,” and the “Muslim” contexts; and, secondly, the absence of a keen sense of justice that belongs to all human beings. This new chapter of recruiting sluggish and senseless Muslims is reminiscent of the time when the Zionist and imperialist bosses were successful in recruiting for a war against atheism and communism. Zionism and imperialism have never had any serious disagreements with communists, atheists, and pagans when the “file and folder” in their bilateral and multilateral discussions is concentrated on the Islamic movement for Islamic liberation. Even at the time when the polarization between communism and capitalism was at its peak during the Cold War, it still does not compare to the “threat” posed by Islam. The

Zionists and imperialists know that communism and atheism, both recent arrivals on the scene, are manageable and even beatable; but Islam has a historical depth and an ideological appeal, and it has proven itself to be an enduring and formidable champion that has always had the potential to defeat all competitors, even those who claim superpower or global hyper-power status.

One other element thrown into this combustible brew is that of democracy. Some Muslims are being lured into a strategy to democratize the Muslim world. And in their simplemindedness, these unsuspecting and artless Muslims fall for an argument that equates democracy with *shūrā*. In justifying their position of locking democratic hands with the Zionists and imperialists, they say this is a step forward in ridding the Muslim countries from dictators, authoritarian rule, oppression, and tyranny. If only these imprudent Muslims could stretch their field of view a little bit, they would realize that the same Zionists and imperialists who are behind today's call for democracy in the Muslim world are the same ones who are behind the dictators, autocrats, and tyrants ruling with Zionist-imperialist approval.

There is a new crop of Muslims who are enlisted by the international Zionist-imperialist war against Islamic self-determination, always referred to in their media as terrorism. There are some crafty but nonetheless witless Muslims who are caught up in this scheme. The most dangerous tactic they are deploying is the confusion of Zionism with Judaism and of imperialism with Christianity. They blur the lines between the two when it suits their purpose and then they tantalize some novice and unseasoned Muslims into this master plan. Once these fledgling Muslims become attached to Zionist and imperialist insiders, they begin to use *āyāt* and hadiths out of context, specifically concerning the good-mannered approach toward religious Jews and Christians in general as opposed to the military attitude that is required toward political-cum-military Jews and Christians. The Qur'an is unequivocal: there is no common ground between the Islamic movement for self-determination and the Zionist and imperialist forces of exploitation and injustice. It simply does not exist.

In the eyes of the Zionists and imperialists who have made it their business to know scripture, it turns out that these moderate Muslims, whom they employ, are nothing more than disposable and useful fools. And this is because such Muslims have sacrificed a loyalty to the Qur'an and the Prophet (ﷺ), which are perfect and immaculate, for a fleeting loyalty to opportunistic Zionists and unscrupulous imperialists, to whom they will never belong because they are not raw-material "Jews" or "Christians." Ask any one of these naive "Muslims" — who jump the line and join the Zionist-imperialist camp, which is camouflaged by Judaism and Christianity — to explain the meanings of this lesson in the Qur'an, and he will either give you a general linguistic rendition of the words, or he will find a way to de-contextualize these *āyāt*. These are the types of people who go over to the other side — the side that is at war with Islam — with their own rationalizations. All of their arguments, though, crumble when their thoughts and decisions are filtered through the valuable information that comes courtesy of Allah (ﷻ), who knows better than anyone else what the "Jews" have done to scripture, what the "Christians" have done, and what the outcome of that means today.

To close out this section, Allah (ﷻ) reminds the Muslims that **"...most of you [political Jews and Christians] are degraded."** This is part of the problem. When some people know they are mis-directed and perverted, they carry a grudge against those who are honorable and straightforward. Anyone who goes off course cannot tolerate seeing others who stay with it. Just being reminded of honest and trustworthy Muslims makes a dishonest and crooked scripturalist frantic — as if honesty and integrity are an automatic condemnation of his degeneracy and depravity. He will do anything to derail a transparent and straightforward Muslim. Such dysfunctional behavior is highlighted by the way the Yahūd and Naṣārā dealt with the Prophet (ﷺ) in Madinah and Arabia, and by how they deal today with Muslims in Africa and Asia. It is also observable toward any moral person in their midst or even toward indigenous revolutionaries for justice.

The Israeli History of Incompatibility with God

There is a false impression and an incorrect assumption by an unassuming Muslim public that people of virtue, folks of goodness, and common people of morality will be left to their own accord. They think that as long as they are minding their own high-principled lifestyle, the people on the other side of this applaudable and ethical conduct will not bother or try to interfere with them. Some of these naive people of honor believe they can avoid a clash or confrontation with the disreputable side of human behavior, known for its moral degeneracy as well as its public greed. To add trouble to indignity these simpleminded people think that cordial relations or an “understanding” can exist between a social side of society that stands with Allah (ﷻ) and the others who stand against Him. It would behoove these types of people to take note, understand their opposites, and prepare for an unavoidable showdown. Committed Muslims do not hug their enemies and appease criminals. They understand that when the jaws of predators are opened, these predators are not yawning.

As part of their adherence and abidance to the Almighty, the committed Muslims are required to follow through on the Qur’an’s counsel. Allah (ﷻ) instructs His Messenger (ﷺ) to face up to those who ride the scriptural bandwagon — the so-called Jews and Christians. The Qur’an takes a strategic approach, not leaving the Muslims to react to the symbolic maneuvers of these types; Allah’s (ﷻ) words penetrate their social psychology and advise the Prophet (ﷺ) of their motives. The bottom line here is that their combative disposition is instigated by an aversion to the committed Muslims. Here, the facts are Qur’anically reproduced with the length and depth of this historical and ancient revulsion. These scriptural failures have always had a knack for breaking with God. Their anticipated destiny shall be unbearable condemnation,

Say, “Shall I tell you who, in the sight of Allah, deserves a yet worse retribution than these? They whom Allah has rejected and whom He has condemned, and whom He has turned into [the likes of] apes and swine

because they conformed to the [extreme and uninhibited] powers of evil: these are yet worse in station, and farther astray from the right path [than the mockers]” (5:60).⁴⁶⁷

These words are specific to the Yahūd, as they refer to the “Israeli” history of incompatibility with God. Because this information comes out of their own history, it provides an insight into the Yahūdī nature. They are the ones who have been condemned by Allah (ﷻ). They incurred His aggravation. Thus they mutated into intelligent and somewhat arboreal apes, as well as stout-bodied, short-legged omnivorous animals. This historical anomaly happened because their psychology refused to adapt to God, their minds refused to be shaped by God, and their societies refused to adhere to God. They, in their own argumentative ways of avoiding the intent and purpose of God’s revealed word, acceded to and accommodated the worldly powers of times past and present. It is the issue of “power” that causes otherwise right-minded people to lose sight of God, and to prefer the company of the ancient power structures (in the Egyptian exile) as well as the modern power structures (in the European diaspora).

The disrepute of these Yahūd is legendary insofar as they are strangely flippant about things divine. People who indefatigably mock and ridicule God, His prophets, and His pioneers are not to be taken lightly. It is their sardonic irreverence that led them away from being God’s people. The company of biblical prophets demands a rigor and a responsibility that cannot reduce scripture and God into a comical and clownish affair. This bantering and buffoonish attitude coming from a people tasked with the higher responsibilities of scripture is yet another indictment of Banū Isrā’īl and their simultaneously spineless and divisive social character. It is because they manufactured all sorts of excuses to relieve themselves of the demanding responsibilities assigned to them that they were slapped with the most advanced penalties. This is what brought about their moral and physical transmutation as they were cursed and condemned by God for what they did to their own

selves. Their subservience to temporal political powers, military might, and economic empires, all of whom tried to rival Allah's (ﷻ) authority, climaxed with their genetic retrogression and spiritual degradation. Their assimilation into these ungodly structures amounted to an abandonment of and defection from the Almighty.

The reason for Allah's (ﷻ) disapproval and denunciation of these types of Yahūd is mentioned in both *Sūrah al-Baqarah* and *al-Nisa'*.⁴⁶⁸ Also, within *Sūrah al-Mā'idah*, there is enlightening information pertaining to the posturing of these scripture deserters. Other *āyāt* in this clarifying Qur'an decry the Israeli historical and social departure from scripture. The Qur'anic reiteration of their denunciation comes in the words of Dāwūd and 'Īsā (ﷺ), in a general as well as a specific castigation of their time-tested disloyalty and deceit. One of them was their failure to honor their covenant with Allah (ﷻ). Another was due to their contrived charges against the virgin Mary, the mother of Jesus (ﷺ). Yet another reason for Allah's (ﷻ) harsh rebuke against them was their failure to oppose social vice as a society. There is also blame and censure of those who tried to play tricks with the Sabbath (*aṣḥāb al-sabt*). Though some of these offenses were touched upon in *Sūrah al-Baqarah*, more details from *Sūrah al-A'rāf* will round out the picture.

In reading the Qur'an, sometimes Muslims do not take enough time to closely consider the words of the *āyāt*. In this instance, the words of the Qur'an indict certain members of Banū Isrā'il, "**They whom Allah has damned.**" The wrath of Allah (ﷻ) and His damnation go together. Hence those people who set off God's wrath are the ones who invoke His excommunication and exclusion. It is a terrible experience with horrible consequences to promise God to do His will and then cut and run. The worldly effects are appalling and the afterlife's outcome is unspeakable.

The fact that these types of covenant defectors were reduced to *qiradah* and *khanāzīr* (apes and swine) was mentioned in *Sūrah al-Baqarah*, and further down the road it will be mentioned in *Sūrah al-A'rāf*. In the former *sūrah*, Allah's (ﷻ) words are,

And you [the Children of Israel] were certainly aware of the Sabbath transgressors, whereupon We said to them, “Become inferior [life-levels of] apes” (2:65).⁴⁶⁹

In *Sūrah al-A'rāf*, the following is mentioned concerning the violation of the Sabbath,

And when they [the Children of Israel] absolved themselves of what had been proscribed unto them [on the Sabbath], We said to them, “Become lower-life apes” (7:166).

Most *mufasssirs* (interpreters of the meanings of the Qur'an) hold the view that these deserters of Allah's (ﷻ) orders literally became apes and swine, though they did not reproduce. According to this widely-held opinion genetic mutations from “human to animal” do not live on.

Another understanding of these *āyāt* suggests that the hearts or the psychology of these Children of Israel were scaled down and reduced to that of apes and swine. This is a figurative form of speech not unlike another *āyah* in the Qur'an likening these types of people to a donkey loaded with books,⁴⁷⁰

The parable of those who were graced with the burden of the [responsibilities of the] Torah, and thereafter failed to bear this burden, is that of a donkey that carries a load of books [but cannot benefit from them]... (62:5).

Similarly, in this case, becoming an ape means acquiring apelike instincts, and becoming swine means acquiring the swine's gluttony and selfishness. A good case can be made for this latter interpretation. It is not uncommon in the Arabic language to employ metaphors that transfix features from the animal kingdom upon human beings. A facile expression in Arabic may be conveyed in the following words,

Rabbā fulānun al-maliku qawmahu aw jayshahu ‘alā al-shajā‘ati wa-al-ghazwi fa-ja‘ala minhum al-usūda al-ḍawārī wa-kāna lahu minhum al-dhi‘ābu al-muftariṣāh: A particular ruler has disciplined his people and army to a lofty status of courage and assault attacks, thus having them become torrential lions and wild wolves.⁴⁷¹

Obviously this does not mean that people have become real animals in the form of lions and wolves; it is merely an expression of speech conferring on these people the best known attributes of such creatures.

The following description unravels the underlying cause for this instinct-over-intellect deterioration in human nature, “...***wa-‘abada al-ṭāghūt: ...because they conformed to the [extreme and uninhibited] powers of evil.***” These apparent people of God were being primed for the highest honor ever: bearing the covenant all the way to God. However the bestial turn of events ensued when these very same covenant holders decided to place deities above God and to promote other powers above the power of God. They did the unthinkable: they conformed to “overwhelming” worldly powers instead of conforming to the Almighty. These worldly powers may at times be military powers, at other times in history they may be political powers, and yet at other times they may be economic powers, or any combination thereof. The switching of allegiance and trust from the heavenly God to temporal false gods set into motion the Israeli fall from grace. Man is not capable of a more disloyal act. In a sense, it is an aggression against God.

The word *‘abada* here does not mean *to worship*. The crime of these Israelis and their likes in scriptural history was not that they literally worshiped kings, governments, and superpowers who are described as the *ṭāghūt*. Rather the word *‘abada* means they *conformed and complied with the norms and laws* of these anti-Godly structures and systems of power.

It is in the nature of worldly powers to pull into their sphere of influence peoples and populations. This is especially true of people who are clueless and uninformed of what is really at work in

life. In this case, however, the focus is on Banū Isrā'il (the Children of Israel) — people who were supposed to have a scriptural culture, people who had gained some experience in this area, and people who were in the company of perpetual prophethood. Unfortunately, none of this helped them as they eventually succumbed to the levers of power and fell into the traps of hegemons. Never did the Children of Israel prostrate themselves to Pharaohs, nor did they kneel to dictators. Never did they consider the kings and tyrants in their history to be divine. That is not the issue. The issue is that by accepting the status quo and the system preserving the status quo, these Children of Israel were devoted to gods besides *the* God, sovereigns along with *the* Sovereign, and authorities in addition to His authority. When they became subjects of oppressors and despots they lost their claim to being the subjects of God. And in this sense they no longer belonged to the *dīn* of Allah (ﷻ).

The unfolding meanings here guide Allah's Prophet (ﷺ) to confront these types of scripturalists with their own history and to alert them to their deplorable destiny. This character of theirs has become trans-generational, and with every passing generation, they have become more insolent in taking issue with God's authority, His power, and His impending corrective justice, which they feel will not be applied to them. Even with their long history of mocking God and His representatives on earth, still no public Yahūdī voice that carries any weight is prepared to take issue with these contemptible crimes against God,

Say [O Muhammad], “Shall I tell you [Jews and Christians deviating from scripture] who, in the sight of Allah, deserves more retribution than these [who ridicule scripture with a satire]? (5:60)

This ridicule is expressed in the way some Jews and Christians make fun of committed Muslims. The political program against committed Muslims by these people who say they belong to the Bible is well known, but deceptive. How much will the committed Muslims have to put up with just because they want to honor their word and their

relationship with Allah (ﷻ)? And how long can the Zionists and imperialists continue to camouflage their war of words and war of weapons with a facade of Judaism and Christianity when they cannot tolerate other people of scripture, especially those who are true to their commitment to God? The divine retribution on the horizon will dwarf their contrivances and conspiracies. That they will find themselves in a bottomless pit is a just desert of their own making, **“These are yet worse in position, and farther astray...”**

The multiplicity of *āyāt* on this subject not only point to its importance, but also to the fact that a comprehensive appraisal of the real nature of these people cannot be achieved without it. This copious Qur’an divulges their inner selves. And so, armed with all this vital information, would it not be obnoxious to think about breaking bread with such people in the political sphere? It turns out that the Yahūd were the ones who were pivotal in this drive against the enlightened Islamic center of command in Madinah, and today they are the most vocal and vitriolic opponents of any kind of established Islamic order,

For, when they [the Yahūd and company] come to you [O Muhammad], they say, “We are committed [to Allah],” whereas, in reality, they come with the resolve to deny the truth [of Allah’s power], and depart in the same state. But Allah is fully aware of all that they would conceal. And you see many of them compete with one another in sinning and tyrannical conduct and in their swallowing of all that is felonious. Vile indeed is what they do. Why do not their men of God and their rabbis forbid them to make sinful assertions and to swallow all that is evil? Vile indeed is what they contrive!

And the [insolent] Jews say, “Allah’s hand is shackled!” It is their own hands that are shackled; and damned [by Allah] are they because of this, their assertion. No, but wide are His hands stretched out: He dispenses [plentiffulness] as He wills. But all that has

been bestowed from on high upon you [O Prophet] by your Sustainer is bound to make many of them yet more stubborn in their unbridled arrogance and in their denial of the truth [pertaining to Allah's power]. And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [distorted] Bible, [to last] until Resurrection Day; every time they light the fires of war, Allah extinguishes them; and they labor hard to spread corruption on earth, and Allah does not love the spreaders of corruption (5:61–64).

These are the Yahūd who were the residents of Madinah and its outskirts. At a distance they are their true selves, but when they are forced into close encounters at social occasions, they say they are also “believers” in scripture and in the Prophet (ﷺ). Their words may be reassuring but their behavior is chilling and disquieting, “... in fact, they come with the resolve to deny the truth [of Allah's power], and depart in the same mood.” Their core cause was and remains the denial of Allah's (ﷻ) power in the affairs of man and his society. If only today's “Muslim” negotiators and interlocutors with Zionism could understand this Qur'an-based fact, they would see that these Yahūd come and go for the purpose of evasion and misrepresentation. This social behavior of Banū Isrā'īl was mentioned previously in *Sūrah al-Baqarah*,

And if they encounter the committed Muslims they say, “But we [also] are committed [to God]. And when they are amongst themselves they say, “Are you [the Children of Israel] conversing with them [the committed Muslims] on issues first revealed to you? (2:76).

“And Allah is aware of their confidentiality...” Even though the circumstances pertaining to these *āyāt* may be over 14 centuries old, the Qur'an moves this reality into the present by placing the reader in the milieu of Madinah so to speak, so that he can experience first hand the Yahūd's act of deception and dissimulation.

They, and the *munāfiqs* orbiting around them, inaugurated their touch-and-go act with bald-faced perjury in front of Allah's Prophet (ﷺ), **"We are also committed [to God]."** Going and coming as they did, they were cloaking their *kufr*. The extent to which these fast-and-loose Yahūd would go is mind-boggling: they would venture to express commitment to God at the beginning of the day and then revert to denying Him at the end of the day. All of this was done to try to dilute the *īmān* of a nascent Muslim community in its formative stages. They were hoping that their "on-again, off-again" attitude to faith would generate confusion, doubt, and instability — and it may have taken its toll on some infirm Muslims. Though their perfidious and wicked character sought to do precisely that, nonetheless **"Allah is thoroughly cognizant of what they are up to."**

Allah (ﷻ) reveals this information so as to rivet the committed Muslims' attention on His knowledge in the same way they are focused on His power. Riding on the crest of Allah's (ﷻ) power and knowledge, the Muslims can rest assured they are above all these Yahūdī devices and stratagems. And just as the Muslims are gaining confidence with Allah's (ﷻ) knowledge, imagine the reverse impact on the Yahūd themselves when they hear the Qur'an divulging their dark secrets and hidden plans. This Qur'an does not relent in making public the nefarious and offensive plans of these Yahūd,

And you [O Muhammad] see many of them compete with one another in iniquity and aggressiveness and in their consumption of illegal assets (5:62).

And whoever is in the mode of the Prophet (ﷺ) is also privy to the way these scripture-perverters vie with one another in acts of crime and spurning scriptural laws. Not satisfied with satirizing the *dīn* of Allah (ﷻ) and marginalizing it, they contend with one another in doing what is wrong by the standards of conscience and by the standards of the Qur'an. But they do not even stop there: they take their act yet further, launching into wars of aggression and acts of

hostility — the rest of humanity be damned. Their program cannot be interrupted by some moral argument or ethical theory. Yahūdi society had become a breeding ground for all acts of treason against God and scripture. Here, in the concluding chapter of prophethood, they were in the presence of Allah's final Prophet (ﷺ), seeing him, hearing him, and observing him. This should have been enough to positively influence them in the right direction. But these were a people who had already made up their minds; the racist distance between them and the Arab Semites was enough to justify their lies to the Prophet (ﷺ) and their unbecoming social conduct.

“Foul indeed is what they do.” This is their world, a world of competition and rivalry, or a race in which the entire prize is awarded to the winner. At one level it is a world of sweepstakes; at another level it is a competition or tournament in which all the contestants compete against one another in turn — the league system that has no reference to God and His ordained way of life. Their business dealings, infused with the “survival of the fittest” proposition are meant to accumulate illegal wealth with total disregard for the underclasses of society. This degenerate level of social management is not consistent with a moral orientation, a sensitive conscience, or a godly system in man's life. And when it is on, even the lower classes of society want to enter this mad race, as they too no longer are concerned with God, conscience, and ethics. The power madness that is detached from God takes on a life of its own, and virtually everyone in society gets caught up in this frenzy of conflict and strife.

When the socially deprived classes in society begin to clash with each other to win the material upper hand, they lose sight of the powerful elites, who nurtured the degrading condition of their society to begin with, and so, not having the wherewithal and cohesiveness among each other to take on their exploiters, they turn against themselves. The materialistic and criminal trend is so overwhelming and pervasive that they find it impossible to resist. Aggression, contentiousness, and foul play become fair play when a class or segment of society becomes so powerful as to become estranged from the rest. This fast-track, destructive social locomotive

was too much for the Yahūd to stop, so they jumped on board. The difference is that Muslims are required to stay with Allah (ﷻ), defy this false power, stop this social insanity, and revitalize the value of being with Him.

Aristocratic “high society” would have a hard time achieving this level of social pathology were it not for the willing acquiescence, perhaps even patronage, of certain “influence peddlers,” and so the Qur’an moves to expose this segment of society that has been corrupted. It assails the silence of the scholars who are supposed to be the defenders of a moral social order and the promoters of the common good and the public interest. When clergymen, reverends, and spiritual leaders, who are supposed to know better, passively accept or actively endorse the way the “world turns” when a society and its government compete for material gains, sidelining all human values and all divine instructions in the process, then they are simply purchasing tickets on this runaway train and are no better than all the rest,

Why do not their men of God and their rabbis forbid them from making sinful assertions and consuming embezzled earnings? Vile indeed is what they contrive! (5:63).

This silence of the sermonizer, muteness of the minister, and servility of the scholar, who have been given the compelling responsibility of being the shepherds of society, are craven behaviors to be exposed. In a sense, “religious” scholars and the sages of the faith are the immune system of society. If there are psychological germs, social microbes, and behavioral contaminants infesting a society, it falls upon the scholars of faith to tackle these foreign bodies and expel them before it is too late and society succumbs to a particular pathology — be it of whatever variant that is at odds with God and His ordained way of life. It happens to be a trait of the Children of Israel that, **“They would not cooperate to diffuse a *munkar* committed by them [in their society]: vile indeed was what they were wont to do! (5:79).**

A vibrant, robust, closely, and firmly networked society is one that extends its moral affirmations and convictions into its social scope and arrests its unjust propensities even as they try to gain favor. In other words, such a society is healthy because it promotes the *ma'rūf* and demotes the *munkar*. However, a society is made up of people, and so for this to happen, responsible people within the society, who are willing to do whatever it takes to contain the *munkar* and bolster the *ma'rūf*, will have to go public with this critical task. The high moral standards of such a society cannot be bottled up in temples, smothered in churches, or suffocated in *masjids*. Woe to the society that cannot permit or does not tolerate people of conscience, scholars of scripture, and men of God who are brave enough to rally against the *munkar* and for the *ma'rūf*.

The masses of Muslims, once they rebound into a social order moving in one direction under a unified leadership, will become the *ummaḥ* that meets the Qur'anic criteria,

**You are the best *ummaḥ* to interact with humanity:
you authorize the *ma'rūf* and you decommitment the
munkar and you commit to Allah... (3:110).**

Compare this with the Qur'anic evaluation of Banū Isrā'īl, “**They did not cooperate to annul a *munkar* done by them...**” (5:79). This also brings to the fore the tension that inevitably sets in between these two antithetical social orders.

The Qur'an emphatically censures rectors and rabbis who remain passive and indifferent when their own societies are in a materialistic competition, in a high-speed chase for planetary resources, and in an arms race. There is a world of financial irregularities, economic dislocations, monetary usury, and corporate malfeasance swarming all around spiritual leaders of the Jewish faith as well as evangelical characters of the Christian faith. Then, if their claim to being men of God is to be taken seriously, should they be standing around as mere observers of this money mania and financial prioritization or should they be standing up in public denouncing this new god of materialism? In the spirit of their prophets, they are the

ones who have been entrusted by God to take His scripture into the halls of worldly power to challenge fiscal deities and budgetary divinities, which themselves compete with the authority and power of God.

The Jewish and the Christian as well as the Muslim peoples abound with qualified and capable personalities — well-known figures in education, politics, and “religion” — who are expected to state the Qur’anic and biblical truth about the issues of the day. And if there is a runaway class in society, a breakaway faction in politics, or a walkaway race among humanity, then these trusted sages of God should be able to give the rest of their congregations the accurate word of God on the matter. If lying is a way of life it should be condemned by these men of God publicly and systemically. If unethical financial transactions are practiced they and their practitioners should be condemned as well. And if the rabbis, the pastors, and the imams are not able to do so with an indignation that is authorized by God, then who in society is capable of holding social and political abuses to account?

God’s moral system and its corresponding legal framework collapse when these individuals who are supposed to be the conscience of society begin to tolerate, or even bless, the moral decay and the economic profiteering as they are wont to spread if left unchecked. In today’s world there are executives who are making personal profit derived from public office; this graft is not exposed or excoriated by the parsons, preachers, and pastors of our time. There are funds used for bribing public officials and for other corrupt activities; these slush funds are not the sermon topics of Jewish rabbis, Christian priests, or Muslim shaykhs. In today’s world there are powerful and politically corrupt organizations at the city, state (provincial), and federal (national) levels, and still there is no loud, bold, and organized “religious” voice that takes issue with these criminal exploits on the basis of the Bible or the Qur’an. It is mandatory for these human Bibles and human Qur’ans to speak truth to power. It is also compulsory to take it a step further and organize people around the will of God to eradicate a “dog-eat-dog” society.

“Why do not their men of God and their rabbis forbid them from misconducting themselves and devouring illegitimate wealth?” This is the most remedial and stern *āyah* in the Qur’an.⁴⁷² It represents a word of advice and a warning to the ‘*ulamā*’, for if they are lax or fail to advise and lead in such conditions, then the entire social order organized around God’s principles is doomed. We live in a world at a time when almost all public officials are guilty of misconduct and wrongdoing. But this malfeasance does not figure into the sermons and lectures of clergymen or scholars. It does not require much attention to realize that crimes, offenses, and wrongful acts of a serious kind are abundant in all the institutions of state and the decisions of their executives; so why are we, the people, in a bubble of silence concerning these felonies? Even misdemeanors, delinquencies, and violations of a minor type are kept off the public radar screen by pulpit personalities and church characters. The crimes of forcing money or favors from someone by blackmail, violence, or the like are carefully omitted from weekly sermons or seasonal lectures. From these religious quarters, none dare speak about extortion, which has become part of everyday life. The crimes of fraudulently appropriating or misusing someone else’s property or funds entrusted to one’s care cannot be factored into a church service or a religious rite because these houses of God need not interfere in the affairs of state. The crime of having sexual relations with a girl who is not yet of the age of consent; the crime of kidnapping; the crime of marrying a second, third, or fourth wife without the consent of the first; the crime of passion, typically a murder provoked by sexual jealousy — all these crimes of statutory rape, abduction, social discomfiture, and homicide — are off limits to state-controlled scholars, especially as they apply to the violations of kings, princes, presidents, prime ministers, and chief executives.

There are more crimes in society: the crime of trying to influence a judge or jury outside the usual courtroom procedures, as by bribes or threats; the crime, or offense in some places, of stirring up quarrels or bringing groundless lawsuits repeatedly; the crime of contempt of a scriptural court (wherever or whenever there is one), as by failing to appear in court or disregarding a court order; the

crime of giving false evidence, especially in court while under oath; the crime or offense of homelessness insofar as it leads to theft or is tolerated by a well-off society; and the crime or offense of sexual intercourse between two very-close relatives (*maḥārim*) among others. Should not these crimes of embracery, barratry, contumacy, perjury, vagrancy, and incest be discussed by scholars of scripture? Unfortunately, the opposite is the case: when the powers that be give orders, regardless of what they demand, right or wrong, these so-called scholars obey them and by doing so disobey God.

When Allah (ﷻ) speaks about *ma'rūf* and *munkar*, He places the committed Muslims at the hub of social movement. The irritating, but nonetheless befitting, word of truth is that there is a class of Muslim scholars who have joined their Jewish and Christian counterparts; they have succumbed to political establishments and military powers and in the process they are no longer the thinkers, mentors, and masters they were supposed to be. We Muslims have to tackle a complex problem in that we have to deal not only with the consequences of what they have done, but also those associated with our role in enabling them to institutionalize all humanity's departure from God. Had we been the Qur'an-centered Muslims we were intended to be, it would have been enough for us to read about the deviations and social corruption of Banū Isrā'il and their rabbis. But unfortunately we favored man's constitutions, magna cartas, and dialectics over Allah's (ﷻ) incomparable words, and so now we too are guilty of their crimes.

The word *yanhāhum*, meaning to *forbid them*, as it is used in the Qur'anic discourse means that the *nahy* (restriction) has to be done with the force of an authority. In an Islamic society, it is the '*ulamā*' who are endowed with this authority. But what happens when the congregation or the faithful no longer acknowledge the authority of the '*ulamā*'? What happens when this authority now belongs to officials, politicians who come to power via financial channels, and rulers who grab power by the use of brute force? The only way to resolve this is to place scripture in the middle of this "mess" so that the people can use it as a reference to make a deliberate and conscious decision as to whether they agree with the

'ulamā' having authority or the non-'ulamā' having it. The committed Muslims should have enough confidence that if the political environment in question is relatively unpolluted, if there is enough freedom of expression and thought, and if there is equal access to the public airwaves, the media, and public opinion, then the secularists will be defeated. The only time the ungodly secularists are triumphant is when they are in control of the media and the military and everything in between while the committed scripturalists are left with primitive means of communication and limited access to the media. And even in worst-case scenarios, when a particular people vote for a society without scripture and a government without God, they will in due time face the consequences: either a collapse of their community or a crash of their civilization.

They Had the Chutzpah to Say the Owner of All Is Poor

At this point, the Yahūd demonstrate the depth to which they are willing to sink in their mockery of Allah (ﷻ), His Prophet (ﷺ), and the committed Muslims around him. No people in history could have been more impudent, and so the Qur'an registers the plain-spoken and outspoken truth about the Yahūd. These Yahūd would like the words in this Qur'an to go away — but the Qur'an is here to stay, and all the information in it is here forever,

And the Yahūd say, "Allah's hand is shackled!" It is their own hands that are shackled; and damned [by Allah] are they because of this their assertion. No, but wide are His hands stretched out: He dispenses [plenty] as He wills... (5:64).

Due to their brashness and impulsiveness, these Yahūd have never backed down from vapidly expressing their thimble minds on issues related to the Divine and His assignees on earth. As a case in point, this *āyah* illustrates how foggy-minded these Yahūd actually are about Allah (ﷻ). They literally came out and said that God is poor and they are rich! After they were asked to spend for the cause of

God, they began to scoff at what kind of a god needs to ask for contributions when He is supposed to be the supreme provider. Here, they said that God's hands are chained, and in so doing, they were trying to justify their own stinginess. They claimed that either God does not give to people at all, or if He does, then only a little; and that being the case how can anyone expect them to make a donation or spend in charity?

When confronted with their own cheeseparing attitude and lack of generosity, instead of taking a hard look at their own selves and being critical of this selfish character of theirs, they had the gall to say that God's hands are in chains. Allah (ﷻ) immediately responded to their insolent and abrasive language, **“It is their own hands that are in chains; and damned [by Allah] are they because of this, their assertion.”** This is the Yahūd: the archetypal selfish, uncharitable, and ungenerous people.

In the unfolding course of 23 years of an incrementally expanding Islamic reality, the Yahūd would be evaluated with precision and accuracy. They were ostensibly in a much better position than the *mushriks*, because they had a scriptural reference, scriptural history, and scriptural potential. The Prophet (ﷺ) and the Qur'an acknowledged these forward features of the Jews in Madinah. But when they themselves could not live with this flowering of the truth, due to their racism, the Qur'an, for the record, divulges their de facto and genuine self — a depiction splashed onto the pages of their history that betrays their failure of duty. They could not hide their internal self from Allah (ﷻ).

Man owes Allah (ﷻ) his utmost respect. But most men are quite unlike these Yahūd, who have throughout their history been conversant with expressing words of indecency and defiance. When it comes to Allah (ﷻ), the Yahūd seem to be very foolhardy, contrary to their cowardly character when it comes to worldly powers. And the Yahūd say, **“Allah's hands are in fetters!”** These are offensive and insulting words. It is evidence of the Yahūdī psychology that thinks it can take on Allah (ﷻ) with loaded words and outrageous language. Some chronicles in early Islamic literature attribute such statements to Fanhās, the chieftain of Banū Qaynuqā'.

Whether he was the actual person who uttered these views is hard to confirm or deny. One person or a few coming out with spiteful remarks in this manner is not the issue; rather, that they were said at all within a Yahūdī community, which could not and would not forbid such public statements, is the unforgiveable breach of Allah's (ﷻ) sovereignty and omnipotence. Therefore, these Yahūd en masse are guilty of such blasphemy, even if they try to give it a "freedom of speech" gloss.

In order to deflect the opprobrium issuing from their arrogant conduct, these Yahūd argue that their preposterous words should not be taken literally. What does this mean? Are they suggesting that their implication of God being miserly is not an offensive and obnoxious traducement against Him? As is the case with all the history of Banū Isrā'il and Yahūd, some of them would want people to believe that the Yahūd as a whole do not agree with this type of statement; and many from the latter, who have a sort of reverence for the "chosen" people, would be tempted to give the former the benefit of the doubt and believe them. That they themselves have not said something like this in recent years is not the problem, and no one is suggesting that if one of them said it, they all should be held accountable. The problem is that this type of indecent language was expressed at some time or another by one or more from the Yahūd. The issue would have died there had the rabbis, sages, and public opinion of the Yahūd denounced such statements. The fact of the matter is that they have not, and moreover, they seem to feel at ease when these types of things happen.

Consider today's climate. There were riots by millions of Muslims around the world (2005–2006) because of the aforementioned caricatures of Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ), first published in the Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*, and then later given more press as they were posted in major European newspapers. The cartoons incensed the Muslim public into protests and rallies against this unacceptable form of expression. In the middle of all this, were there any Jewish rabbis, public figures, or men of God who expressed their solidarity with the Islamic position and Muslim people of scripture? To the contrary, in their impassioned defense of secularism, they said these

drawings are a form of freedom of expression, and withholding their publication would curtail the freedom of the press — as if to say that blasphemy, profanity, and sacrilegious communication is a matter of enlightenment, progress, and modernity. As for the billions of Muslims, for whom no offense could be more hurtful, if they cannot understand this, then they need to abandon their archaic ways so that they can join the civilized world. The Yahūd are who everybody thinks they are. They are on the wrong side of scripture. And they never fail to offer proof of their godlessness.

The heavenly words of truth cannot let such an outrage just go by unchallenged, and so they debunk the Yahūd's felonious allegation, **"No, but wide are His hands stretched out: He dispenses [largesse] as He wills."** It is Allah (ﷻ) who is generous and unlimited in His grace. His magnanimity is overwhelming. If anything, the moving words of the Qur'an demonstrate that Allah (ﷻ) has extended His oversight and custody into human life with copiousness and munificence. These Yahūd impute He has chained hands but here He says His hands are open, extended, and always giving. The world and life itself is cradled by His benevolence and kindness.

The fact of poverty and misery on earth exists less because He has not provided enough food or natural resources than because of man's greed, selfishness, and discrimination. The many are needy because the few are greedy. Those who are affluent and rich become so not because of their own talents and achievement, but because it is Allah (ﷻ) who offers them the qualities to develop those talents and reach those achievements. But man — who so frequently chooses to ignore this basic fact of life — when he reaches a status of affluence, he begins to attribute his success to his own abilities and creativity, forgetting that it is Allah (ﷻ) who equipped him with whatever it took to gain such a position to begin with. To get a better feel for this Yahūdī psychology, how it has not gone away, and what goes into such a social attitude, it would behoove the committed Muslims to examine the recent history of the Yahūd when it comes to wealth and possession.

Over the course of the 19th century, most of the Yahūd of Central and Western Europe moved to large cities to shepherd the

rise of capitalism. They did it in their own way though, partly because other avenues to affluence remained closed but also because their own way was very effective, as well as well-rehearsed. Regardless of where they went, a higher proportion of Jews, relative to non-Jews, were self-employed, demonstrating a clear preference for trade and commerce, and for economically independent family firms. Most Jewish wage laborers (a substantial minority in Poland) worked in small Jewish-owned shops, and most great Jewish banking houses, including the Rothschilds, Bleichroeders, Todescos, Sterns, Oppenheims or Oppenheimers, and Seligmans, were family partnerships, with brothers and male cousins — often married to cousins — stationed in different parts of Europe (in-laws and out-marrying females were often excluded from direct involvement in business).⁴⁷³ In the early-19th century, 30 of the 52 private banks in Berlin were owned by Jewish families; 100 years later many of these banks became shareholding companies with Jewish managers, some of them directly related to the original owners as well as to each other. The greatest German joint-stock banks,⁴⁷⁴ including Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, were founded with the participation of Jewish financiers, as were the Rothschilds' Creditanstalt in Austria and the Pereires' Credet Mobilier in France. Of the remaining private — that is, non-joint stock — banks in Weimar Germany, almost half were owned by Jewish families.⁴⁷⁵

In late-19th-century Vienna, 40% of the directors of public banks were Jews or of Jewish descent, and all banks but one were administered by Jews (some of them members of old banking clans) under the protection of duly titled and landed *Paradegoyim*.⁴⁷⁶ Between 1873 and 1910, at the height of political liberalism, the Jewish share of the Vienna stock exchange council (the *Borsenrath*) remained steady at about 70%, and in 1921 Budapest, 87.8% of the members of the stock exchange and 91% of the currency brokers association were Jews, many of them ennobled (and thus, in a sense, *Paradegoyim* themselves). In industry, there were some spectacularly successful Jewish magnates, such as the Rathenaus in electrical engineering; the Friedlander-Fulds and the Monds in chemical industries; and the Ballins in shipbuilding.⁴⁷⁷ There were some areas with

high proportions of Jewish industrial ownership (such as Hungary), and some strongly Jewish industries (such as textiles, food, and publishing), but the principal contribution of Jews to industrial development appears to have consisted in the financing and managerial control by banks. In Austria, of the 112 industrial directors who held more than seven simultaneous directorships in 1917, half were Jews associated with the great banks, and in interwar Hungary, more than half and perhaps as much as 90% of all industry was controlled by a few closely related Jewish banking families. In 1912, 20% of all millionaires in Britain and Prussia (10 million marks and more in the Prussian case) were Jews. Between 1908–1911, in Germany as a whole, Jews made up 0.95% of the population, yet 31% of the richest families (with a “ratio of economic elite over-representation” of 33, the highest anywhere, according to W.D. Rubinstein). In 1930, about 71% of the richest Hungarian taxpayers (with incomes exceeding 200,000 pengo) were Jews. And of course the Rothschilds, “the world’s bankers” as well as the “Kings of the Jews,” were, by a large margin, the wealthiest family of the 19th century.⁴⁷⁸

Generally speaking, in their formative years in Europe, Jews were a minority among bankers, and besides, Jewish bankers competed too fiercely against each other, associating too closely with erratic and mutually hostile regimes to be able to have permanent and easily manageable political influence. Still, it is obvious that European Jews as a group were very successful in the new economic order; that they were, on average, better off than non-Jews; and that some of them managed to translate their Mercurian (ingenuity, thievishness, shrewdness) expertise and Mercurian familism into considerable economic and political power. The pre-WWI Hungarian state owed its relative stability to the active support of the powerful business elite, which was small, cohesive, bound by marriage, and overwhelmingly Jewish. The new German Empire was built not only on “blood and iron,” as Otto von Bismarck claimed, but also on gold and financial expertise, largely provided by Bismarck’s — and Germany’s — banker, Gerson von Bleichroeder.⁴⁷⁹ The Rothschilds made their wealth by lending to governments and speculating in government bonds, so that when members of the

family had a strong opinion, governments would listen (but not always hear, of course). In one of the most amusing episodes in Alexander Herzen's *My Past and Thoughts*, "His Majesty" James Rothschild blackmailed Emperor Nicholas I into releasing the money that the father of Russian socialism had received from his serf-owing German mother.⁴⁸⁰

If this exposé of the Yahūd were to come from any other source — from any human quarters — it would lead to the kind of abrasive and merciless finger-pointing that turns legitimate criticism into "propaganda," "conspiracy theories," and "anti-Semitism." The fact here is that these features of the Yahūd are presented to man by the Creator and the All-Knowing who is sure of what He says. And therefore, when it comes to the Yahūdī mentality about money, assets, wealth, and their circulation, the Muslims who gain their information and certainty from this divine Book have access to the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The mere fact that committed Muslims are in possession of this valuable information is reason enough for the following warning,

But all that has been bestowed from on high upon you [O Prophet] by your Sustainer is bound to make many of them [the Yahūd] yet more stubborn in their unbridled arrogance and in their denial of the truth [pertaining to Allah's power] (5:64).

The truth damages people with egos, people consumed with greed, and people who think they can get away with their underhanded schemes. The point here is that Muslims who understand this Qur'an are in possession of the unvarnished evaluation of these Yahūd. There can be no second thoughts on this matter. This is what causes the Yahūd to feel envious, anxious, and begrudging. Their real selves are brought out into the open by Allah's (ﷻ) words. And they should feel embarrassed for who they really are. As the two main socio-political realizations — the fact that we the Muslims know who they are, and the fact that they now know of our awareness of them — surge and begin to face off against each

other, the Yahūd in particular will reinforce their confrontation with God by redoubling their earthly power and using it as if they can get away with it. And in so doing they will accumulate the fetid laurels they deserve.

These Yahūd are not going to take a critical look at their own history and machinations. They will retrench their spurious position because their sense of entitlement inures them to evade listening to the truth when it comes from the “other,” that is, the Gentile. They will recoil into their racism and justify everything they do on the fallback position that they are God’s chosen race. One who is in a position of always looking for the truth is little concerned about where it comes from, and thus would be openminded about the person expressing it, regardless of whether or not he is “chosen” or belongs to a certain class. The truth is self-validating and exonerates its advocates from any charges of fabrication and misrepresentation. Such an attitude would have been far better for them.

Moreover, a little common sense would have sufficed. The Yahūd of Madinah should have realized that a nomad from the barren lands of Arabia was not going to be able to reproduce in such great detail this historical narrative of their pathological psychology. The candid formulation of these facts can only be an indicator of Muhammad’s (ﷺ) prophecy and the Qur’an’s legitimacy. The undiluted truth is that their denial of God is proverbial. Furthermore, their racism is legendary. Therefore, this matter of committing themselves to God on account of this Qur’an and this Prophet (ﷺ) is well beyond their consideration. Perish the thought. And so, when it comes to the close-minded Yahūd, who among them can be reasoned with? If they had the temerity to reject Muhammad (ﷺ), why would they lend an ear to someone less than a prophet?

Muslims will have to read and learn. These Yahūd cannot abide by the fact that Arab Semites are now the covenant carriers. Even though the Prophet (ﷺ) and the Qur’an transcended the racial and tribal impediments that historically frustrated the infusion of the covenant into the lives of ordinary people, these Yahūd have made little mental progress, still being stuck in their racism and bloodlines. To add affront to harm they have the

prophecy of the advent of this Messenger from God (ﷺ) in their own scripture, but still they prefer their errant way and will never come to terms with Muhammad (ﷺ) and this scriptural Qur'an.

And so We have cast enmity and hatred among them [followers of the garbled Bible], [to last] until Resurrection Day; every time they light the fires of war, Allah extinguishes them... (5:64).

Some thinking minds who qualify to render valid explanations here, from the first generation of *tafsīrs*, say that “among the followers of the [warped] Bible” refers to both “political Jews” and “political Christians” as this alludes to the previous *āyah*, “Do not ally yourselves with political Jews and political Christians...” (5:51).⁴⁸¹ Second- and third-generation *mufasssirs* suggest that it refers to the Yahūd only. If this is so, then the meaning would be that the Yahūd among themselves, for their own “religious” or “individualistic” reasons, are very hostile to each other.

At times, the relationship among the Yahūd seems to be cordial, kind, and of a kindred spirit. At other times their own racism induces them to be disagreeable and offensive among themselves. The issue of the Ashkenazi versus the Sephardi Jew is well pronounced in the occupied Palestinian territories.⁴⁸² But the political atmosphere of these *āyāt* points to the notion that this hostility, animosity, and belligerence prevails between political Jews and political Christians. In today's world there are strong currents of mutual antagonism and ill will between these two apparently scripted peoples. This is true in Russia, it is true in France, it is true in America, and it is true in occupied Palestine. The more a Jew is political the more he intensely dislikes a (political) Christian, and the opposite is also true. What is complicating this issue even more than just the theo-political disagreements is the fact that Zionist Jews are in virtual control of the concentration of wealth and the flow of money in the “Christian” domain.

Zionist Jews are high up on the corporate ladder in the industrial and capitalist countries of Europe and America. Only those

who intentionally blind themselves to the reality so as to be able to “fit in” are incapable of seeing this. Zionist Jews also retain a heavy presence in the highest political and decision-making offices — the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary — in these Euro-American countries. And despite all the interfaith activities and meetings, there is still a strong and threatening current of anti-Jewishness in what are called Christian countries. From time to time this revulsion inadvertently breaks through the veneer of a carefully manicured public image of harmony and compatibility, as some have been noted to observe, “Well, he is a Jew and the other person is a German,” when both of them were born and raised in Germany.

Among the Jews themselves, even though now they are living in their golden era, they still cannot get along. With their worldwide networks of finances and political alliances, they have succeeded in imposing wars of occupation and attrition on the Muslims, yet they within themselves are acrimonious and contentious. This, though, is an atypical or upside-down period in history as the Zionist Jews happen to be in a position of unchallengeable power and influence. However, they are not to be judged by this aberrational moment in their otherwise schismatic, argumentative, and ignominious history. In their long chronology, before and after Islam, the Yahūd have been living a life of isolation, separatism, and humiliation. Their future is more of the same. The only difference today is the weakness of the Muslims, which has given them this time period of relative relief from the public recognition of their crimes, deceitfulness, and disloyalty. The ups or downs of the Yahūd are contingent on the strength or weakness of the committed Muslims to a large degree. When the committed Muslims are weak, the Yahūd are rising; and when the committed Muslims are strong, Yahūdī authority and leverage are in decline. The un-publicized fact is that the committed Muslims are the repository of Allah’s (ﷻ) will and the extension of that will into the affairs of man. Once this divine will takes its course in human society the people who failed Allah (ﷻ) will themselves fail.

What awaits the Islamic Ummah is its inevitable reawakening, with a sense of higher responsibility and an initiative to lead

peoples, populations, and the public. When the Muslims are able to translate their moral quality into a *sharī'ah* and their Qur'anic principles into a way of life, at that time those Zionists — God's worst creatures — will come to bear the brunt of His just will. This certainty, well known to both the Yahūd and the committed Muslims, is going to be realized sooner or later. The Zionist knowledge of this has driven them mad with megalomania and totalitarianism. That explains why they are fighting on all fronts to ensure that Muslims never extend their resolve into a power base. They are busy trying to corrupt some wayward Muslims with the carrot of power, while they are simultaneously trying to hold down the committed Muslims with the stick of power. The former are the types of Muslims who have surrendered to the status quo and are willing to squeeze Islam into a comfortable Zionist-imperialist, church-versus-state cubbyhole. The latter are the Muslims who will use all their resources to fight against the evils of Zionism and imperialism. The contemporary generation of revolutionary and uncompromising committed Muslims are currently public enemy number one of the Zionist-imperialist axis. The United States and Israel are the "anti-Christ" in this declared and undeclared war against Muslims of self-determination and self-governance. Washington and Tel Aviv will use ambassadors, agents, and arbiters, who have Muslim names and cultures, in this larger-than-life war. Abū Ghurayb (Abu Ghraib), Guantanamo, and Bagram are only footnotes in this unrelenting and savage oversized war.⁴⁸³ But Allah (ﷻ) will finally defeat these forces of inequality, racism, and imperialism,

And so We cast enmity and hatred among them [the followers of the skewed Bible], [to last] until Resurrection Day; every time they light the fires of war, Allah extinguishes them... (5:64).

Anti-Semitism: an Enduring Form of Jewish-Christian Enmity

To garner a sense of how deep and desperate Jewish-Christian relations are, a look at their interface in the political discourse will be instructive — and where better to look than in the United States, which is said to have the most collegial Jewish-Christian relations in history and the world. The following is an excerpt from the applaudable and quotable book, *The New Jerusalem — Zionist Power in America*, by Michael Collins Piper. The quote is somewhat lengthy, but necessary, as it brings to the surface the tension and aversion that underscore the goings-on between those who belong to the political rivalry between Zionists and imperialists. The word that describes and circulates within this uneasy interaction is *anti-Semitism*,

...Serious questions... demonstrate why a study of precisely what wealth and power has been captured by the Jewish elite in America is fully within the realm of thoroughly acceptable and logical public discussion, despite what the well-funded and often hysterical demonizers at the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) might say to the contrary.⁴⁸⁴

To be sure, it is not only in foreign policy that Jewish influence makes its presence felt. The influence of Jewish organizations in shaping modern-day (and most disastrous) US immigration policy was paramount.

Likewise with Jewish influence in issues such as separation of church and state and the institution of “thought control” measures that infringe on First Amendment freedoms. The range of issues is endless.

However, of course, those who raise questions about Jewish influence are hit with the always damaging charge of “anti-Semitism.”

And — at least in the past — those who have been tarred with that ugly label have faced the most egregious forms of public censure and opprobrium, not to mention economic sanctions and, on more than one occasion,

acts of terrorism, the last of which is of no surprise considering the fact that modern-day terrorism has its origins in the activities of the so-called Jewish “defense” organizations that drove the British out of Palestine prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948.

In recent years, however, if groups such as the ADL are to be believed, anti-Semitism has grown by leaps and bounds. In the past several years, dozens of books and thousands of magazine articles have raised the specter of a “new anti-Semitism.”

And even the esteemed *Webster’s Dictionary* has now broadened the definition of anti-Semitism to include “opposition to Zionism” and “sympathy for the opponents of Israel” — two categories that would probably include literally billions of people all across the face of the planet. In that regard it is perhaps no wonder that some years ago, even before the purported “outbreak” of the “new anti-Semitism,” the most popular song in Israel was “The Whole World Is Against Us,” reflecting a mindset that is most revealing, to say the very least.

The fact is that the “anti-Semitic” bugaboo that the ADL has profited from so immensely has become so tired and worn that it now seems — if the ADL is to be believed — that virtually everybody is an anti-Semite (or at least potentially one)!

History shows that a wide-ranging array of individuals have been accused by the ADL — or by like-minded “hater hunters” such as the Simon Wiesenthal Center — of either being “anti-Semitic” and/or insufficiently supportive of the demands of the Jewish people and, in more modern times, of the state of Israel.⁴⁸⁵ And we’re not talking about Adolf Hitler here! Instead, the list of those standing accused of “anti-Semitism” is impressive indeed, virtually a catalogue of some of the most respected personages of their respective eras. While the list is by no means complete, it is representative.

First of all, there is an extensive list of former public officials of recent years — liberal and conservative alike — who have been dubbed as “anti-Semites” outright, accused of making “anti-Semitic” remarks, or otherwise charged with hostility to “tiny Israel.” In addition to presidents, the accused are a virtual who’s who in the United States:

- President Richard Nixon
- President John F. Kennedy
- President Jimmy Carter
- President George H.W. Bush
- President Gerald Ford
- President Harry Truman
- Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-New York)
- Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Arkansas)
- Senator Charles Percy (R-Illinois)
- Senator Jim Abourezk (D-South Dakota)
- Senator Adlai Stevenson (D-Illinois)
- Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D-South Dakota)
- Representative Paul Findley (R-Illinois)
- Representative Pete McCloskey (R-California)
- Representative Ed Zschau (R-California)
- Representative Mary Rose Oakar (D-Ohio)
- Representative Mervyn Dymally (D-California)
- Representative Gus Savage (D-Illinois)
- Representative John R. Rarick (D-Louisiana)
- Representative Steve Stockman (R-Texas)
- Representative Jim Traficant (D-Ohio)
- Representative Earl Hilliard (D-Alabama)
- UN Ambassador Bill Scranton
- UN Ambassador Andrew Young
- Governor John B. Connally (D-Texas)
- Defense Secretary James Forrestall
- Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger
- Secretary of State James Baker

At least three current members of Congress (as of the 2004 elections) have been hit with the smear of “anti-Semitism” at one time or another:

- Representative Fortney “Pete” Stark (D-California)
- Cynthia McKinney (D-Georgia)
- Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-New York)

Yes, even Hillary! And do recall that in the 2004 US presidential campaign, no less than former Vermont Governor Howard Dean — whose own wife is Jewish — was suspected of being less than loyal to the interests of Israel. As a consequence, Dean saw his hard-driving presidential campaign sabotaged in the Iowa caucuses by — according to the Jewish newspaper *Forward* — a substantial turnout of Jewish voters in favor of Senator John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) whose own campaign had, until then, been faltering.

The Jewish elite simply could not accept the idea that a maverick politician such as Dean — who opposed the Iraq war that the major American Jewish organizations (and Israel) supported — could be within striking distance of winning the Democratic presidential nomination. Thus, the switch to Kerry who — as we now know — just happens to be of Jewish extraction himself.

In the past — aside from the politicians — there have been some rather well-known American military figures accused of being “anti-Semitic” or somehow hostile to the state of Israel. They include such notables as:

- General George Patton
- General George C. Marshall
- General George Stratemeyer
- General Albert Wedemeyer
- General George V. Strong (Chief of Military Intelligence, 1942–1945)
- Major General George Moseley (US Army Assistant Chief of Staff)

- Colonel Sherman Miles (Chief of Military Intelligence)
- General George Brown (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)
- Admiral Thomas Moorer (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)
- General Pedro Del Valle (US Marines)

In recent years, several well-known entertainers, literary figures, commentators and others — including at least one Jewish rabbi and one Jewish newsman — have also been charged with “anti-Semitism,” or being hostile to Israel, in one form or another. They include:

- Mel Gibson
- Marlon Brando
- Michael Jackson
- Steve Carlton
- Gore Vidal
- Robert Mitchum
- Mark Lane
- Alfred Lilienthal
- Rabbi Elmer Berger
- Dr. Billy Graham
- Mike Wallace (“Sixty Minutes”)
- Peter Jennings (*ABC News*)

Several Black leaders have also been accused (or suspected) of being “anti-Semitic.” They include:

- Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.
- Reverend Jesse Jackson
- Minister Louis Farrakhan
- Malcolm X

And not that on April 28, 1993 the *San Francisco Weekly* reported that a former ADL official, Henry Schwarzschild, had revealed that King was one of those under regular

surveillance by the ADL, which then turned the fruits of its labor over to the FBI.

In fact, while the FBI was indeed engaged in spying on Reverend King, the ADL was doing likewise, considering King a “loose cannon,” according to Schwarzschild. So not even an esteemed African-American civil rights leader was immune from the suspicions of the ADL!

The truth is that anyone — repeat anyone — who has any substantial point of view on any subject and chooses to express it in a public forum is considered subject to surveillance by the ADL, acting as the unofficial “thought police” for the Zionist elite in America.

To even begin listing the array of current non-American world leaders who have been charged with anti-Semitism (in the *Webster* definition of the word) would belabor the point, although Malaysia’s world-renowned former Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Muhammed is probably among the best known of those who have been hit with this smear [Piper is partially right; the full range of accusations by the ADL and its Zionist nexus is allocated to the Islamic leaders of the Islamic movement, such as Imam Khomeini, Imam Khamenei, President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, Sayyid Ḥasan Naṣrullāh, Ramaḍān ‘Abdullāh Shallāh, and others].

The roll call of notable figures of the past accused of “anti-Semitism” is worth citing. The list includes such writers, philosophers, artists, composers and inventors as:

- Walt Disney
- Thomas Edison
- Charles A. Lindbergh
- Henry Ford
- H.L. Mencken
- Theodore Dreiser
- Nathaniel Hawthorne
- Ernest Hemingway
- Lord Byron

- Thomas Carlyle
- Henry James
- Henry Adams
- T.S. Eliot
- George Eliot
- Washington Irving
- Truman Capote
- Carl Jung
- F. Scott Fitzgerald
- Jack Kerouac
- Percy Shelley
- Rudyard Kipling
- H.G. Wells
- D.H. Lawrence
- Franz Liszt
- James Russell Lowell
- Somerset Maugham
- Henry Miller
- Eugene O'Neill
- C. Northcote Parkinson
- Sir Walter Scott
- Ezra Pound
- George Sand
- George Bernard Shaw
- Johannes Brahms
- Richard Wagner
- William Faulkner
- Robert Louis Stevenson
- George Orwell

Oh, the list goes on and on... And as we've seen already, the Jewish power elite in America don't have much to brag about when it comes to bigotry and exclusion, as demonstrated by the little-known story of America's first Jewish congressman, Lewis Levin... This is a congressman who fought to keep Irish Catholics out of

the Unites States, it was Levin who truly pioneered very real bigotry in America.⁴⁸⁶

Per this *āyah*, these Yahūd and Naṣārā have oppressed the world with some of the worst examples of discrimination, prejudice, bigotry, racism, and xenophobia,

And so We have cast enmity and hatred among them [Zionist Jews and imperialist Christians] to last until Resurrection Day; every time they light the fires of war, Allah extinguishes them; and they labor hard to spread corruption on earth... (5:64).

They definitely do not have a monopoly over such behaviors of exclusivism but they have no excuse for acting in this manner as they claim to be followers of scripture and revelation. There is something distinctive in the extraordinary persistence of their mutual antipathy and animosity toward each other. Anti-Semitism, mostly expressed by “Christians” against “Jews,” is a chronic manifestation of their enmity and hatred. A wholly disproportionate amount of the attention given to the existence of Jews has been critical in character, irrespective of any specific behavior. Or it has focused for varied and often contradictory reasons on the alleged negative characteristics of Jews. No other group of people has suffered from a regime like that of Nazi Germany (or so it is said by those who are disposed to the Zionist narrative of history), whose leaders had the “total extermination” of an entire people as a defining ideological motivation. Throughout history, Jews have suffered from massacres, burning, expropriation of property, expulsions, forcible wearing of special badges, imposition of quotas, legal and social discrimination, and denial of and limits on freedom.⁴⁸⁷

At times it seems like anti-Semitism has emanated from all political persuasions, from holders of all religious beliefs, from those critical of Christianity or Judaism, and from all social groups. Hatred of Jews has been manifested when they lived in segregated ghettos and when they shared emancipated environments with

non-Jews. It has persisted in an age of universal suffrage and change in the nature of economic systems.⁴⁸⁸

What distinguishes anti-Semitism from the ever-present prejudice or hostility directed against other (non-Jewish) people and groups is not so much the strength and passion of this hatred and its multifaceted character, but the range of arguments and doctrines that see the Jews at best as peripheral in society and at worst as destructive monsters and forces of evil. Some arguments — whether of a political, economic, social, religious, or psychological nature — make a claim to rationality; that is, the Jews, because of their religious customs, insistence on monotheism, dietary habits, and tribal exclusiveness, are alien to the traditions and ways of life of the societies in which they live, are actively trying to subvert those societies, or are able to control both those societies and other diabolical forces in the world.⁴⁸⁹

“And We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [deformed] Bible...” The uniqueness of anti-Semitism is that no other group of people in the world has been charged simultaneously with alienation from society and with cosmopolitanism; with being capitalist exploiters and agents of international finance and also revolutionary agitators; with having a materialist mentality and with being the chosen people; with acting as militant aggressors and with being cowardly; with adherence to a superstitious religion and with being agents of modernism; with upholding a rigid law and also being morally decadent; with being a chosen race and also having an inferior human nature; with both arrogance and timidity; with both individualism and communal adherence; and with being guilty of the crucifixion of Christ while at the same time held to account for the invention of Christianity. Even in ancient Greece and Rome, the refusal of Jews to recognize pagan gods, their different rituals, their practice of circumcision, their observance of the Sabbath, their dietary laws, and intermarriage only among Jews set them apart. Christian hostility was based on the responsibility of Jews, who rejected Christianity and the Messiah, for the crucifixion of Jesus (✝), which justified their “perpetual servitude.” From early-modern European history onward, Jews were castigated

for their ethnic separation, culture, and autonomous community.⁴⁹⁰

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [distorted] Bible...” Logically, it might have been expected that the criticism of Jewish particularity would cease in the era of European emancipation and the gradual rejection of many traditional restrictions and forms of discrimination. Emancipation would, it was believed, bring with it assimilation, if not religious conversion, and the elimination of supposedly Jewish behavioral characteristics.⁴⁹¹

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [misrepresented] Bible...” The religious element of anti-Semitism, resting on Jewish rejection of the true faith, may indeed have been reduced, if not eliminated, it would seem. But in its place, greater prominence was given to Jewish characteristics, which were partly genetic in nature and partly the result of alien cultural and ethnic traditions. Purported characteristics such as moral insensitivity, superstitious habits, lack of social graces, and cultural inferiority would render Jews incapable of true citizenship.⁴⁹²

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [perverted] Bible...” Unexpectedly, the Enlightenment helped produce a new rationale for anti-Semitism. Some of its major figures, especially Voltaire, were instrumental in providing a secular anti-Jewish rhetoric in the name of European culture rather than religion.⁴⁹³

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [inexact] Bible...” Not surprisingly, the visibility of the Jewish community, especially in central Europe, buttressed the argument that Jews were cultural aliens who were disproportionately prominent in elite positions. Envy of economic success achieved by Jews, resentment of their position in certain businesses and professions, criticism of their central role in the sphere of distribution and of their crucial role as intermediaries, and jealousy of their conspicuous role in cultural and intellectual life led to the charge that Jews were subverting the economic basis of society and were responsible for its problems, economic crises, dislocation of individuals, and any reduction in the standard of living.⁴⁹⁴

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [delusory] Bible...” Reinforcing this charge of the alien nature of Jews has been a second, more recent one of racial inferiority. The very coining of the term anti-Semitism by Wilhelm Marr in 1879 suggests that opposition was being registered to racial characteristics rather than religious beliefs. Secular racial anti-Semitism has never really been anything other than antagonism to Jews. The myth of Jewish biological inferiority justified the continuing attacks in a more secular age because evils in society supposedly were traceable to the presence of the Jewish race. The argument of biological differences marks the emergence of the genocidal strain in modern anti-Semitism. The world, it was concluded, must be saved from Judaization.⁴⁹⁵

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [ill-defined] Bible...” In other words, Jews were considered, in the largely Christian affair, a threat to culture itself, as the materialist spirit of their race presumably eroded true values. Much of the original support for Nazism rested on its claim that it was defending the true European values against the threat to Aryan virility — a claim that stemmed from the inculcation of the 19th- and 20th-century German ideology of the Volk in both racial and non-racial forms. The Volk must overcome and reject the materialism and capitalism symbolized by the urban and rationalistic Jews.⁴⁹⁶

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [vague] Bible...” Paradoxically, the charge that Jews were a separate ethnic group, thus justifying denial of their individual rights, did not lead to a recognition that they were also members of a collective entity with its own self-consciousness and interest in collective self-determination as a nation-state. The price of civil and political equality in this view was renunciation of any collective identification by Jews. For two centuries this argument was made, but in the present, it has another dimension. The question of Jewish nationhood or collective identity is now linked with the nation-state of Israel.⁴⁹⁷

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [ill-proportioned] Bible...” In world politics, after

the Jews acceded to a vice-grip of sorts on world decision making, the principle of Jewish self-determination as a people with the right to form their own nation-state has often been regarded less sympathetically than is the case with other peoples. Not only has the creation of the nation-state of Israel been opposed by its immediate Muslim and Christian victims and other peoples who can see the injustice of the whole issue, but its claim to legitimacy as a sovereign nation-state also troubles left-wing Euro-American intellectuals who have no similar difficulty with the claims of other groups.⁴⁹⁸

“And We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [inaccurate] Bible...” The establishment of that nation-state led in part to the transformation of the traditionally perceived image of Jews. That image — of the sinister economic force, usurer, moneylender, landlord, parasite — still survives, if in an impotent fashion, but it has now been superseded by that of the Israelis, or Zionists, who are rightly criticized as arrogant, colonialist, imperialist, and racist. In one aspect of it, political anti-Zionism is not synonymous with traditional anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, many current examples show that one belief is not readily distinguishable from the other.⁴⁹⁹

“And We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [knotted] Bible...” In addition to the castigation of Jewish particularity, a historical source of antagonism has proceeded from the concept of Jews as the “chosen race.” The concept was meaningful for the early leaders of scripture who understood this within its historical context. For those who are labeled “anti-Semites” nowadays, the chosen-race concept embodies fanaticism, evil, or an attitude of superiority toward other peoples. They perceive the Old Testament as the source of Jewish fanaticism, tribal nationalism, and communal exclusivism, and now as the basis for the aggressive attitude of the nation-state of Israel.⁵⁰⁰

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [windblown] Bible...” To explain what Jews believe to be a pathological obsession with Jews, some have resorted to psychological factors, as did Jean-Paul Sartre in his famous definition of the anti-Semite as a person who is afraid. Troubled people project their own

anxieties, drives, impulses of which they are ashamed, and negative self-images onto Jews, who are then seen as aggressive, competitive, and secretive; are resented as a “chosen people”; and are made a scapegoat for the failures of society and themselves.⁵⁰¹

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [corrupted] Bible...” Suspicion of a worldwide Jewish plot or conspiracy has been manifested in a variety of ways, whether Christian, Enlightenment, socialist, Marxist, Third World, or Nazi in form. The Nazi version cited the Jews as destroyers of culture, which in and of itself, constituted the basis of a worldwide conspiracy. The conclusion was that the Jewish race was a microbe or bacillus that had to be eliminated so that purification could be achieved. Thus did the Nazis justify the policy of total extermination of the Jews whom they perceived to be at the root of their national problems.⁵⁰²

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [imprecise] Bible...” Today, the intuition and distrust of a Jewish conspiracy continues to grow with the rhetoric and actions of heterogeneous groups: “religious fundamentalists,” elements of the political right, minorities, elements of the political left, the Third World, oppressed peoples, and those who are critical of liberal democratic systems. Christian hostility toward Jews has been going through its ups and downs. But the 2,000-year-old “Christian” prejudice, with its negative moral and spiritual conception of Jews, has still not ended. In Western societies, now that Jews, the former pariahs, have moved into the center of society and compete on equal terms for its key positions, prejudice has become fused with resentment.⁵⁰³

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [incomplete] Bible...” Hostility toward Jews has also come from the political left, a source one would be hard-pressed to accept as Jews have been such an integral part in the development of its concepts and ideological orientations. With the socialist movement in the 19th century came sharp criticism of the role of Jews in capitalist systems. In this criticism, Karl Marx (among others) was an influential figure in arguing that Judaism

constituted the essence of capitalism. The contemporary hostility toward Israel from the left, which has associated it with imperialism, pronounced it a racist state, and regarded Zionism as the only national liberation movement that is “reactionary” rather than progressive, suggests deeper emotions.⁵⁰⁴

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [fractional] Bible...” Anti-Semitic attitudes in the United States are higher in the African-American community than among whites. Unlike American whites, “black” anti-Semitism is inversely related both to age (the strongest is expressed by young blacks) and to educational level, as better educated blacks are more aware, thus more sensitive to Jewish disproportionality of clout than the less educated. Typically, black leaders (other than members of the US Congress) and the more politically conscious African Americans are more frequently uncompromising with Jews than the majority of blacks. Although analytically quite distinct, this more unsupportive attitude toward Jews overlaps internally with a less sympathetic attitude toward Israel than that held by whites.⁵⁰⁵

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [twisted] Bible...” To the Muslim world, Jews no longer conform to an image of a tolerated but constricted minority. Muslim treatment of Jews has historically been less harsh than that in European countries, partly because Jews never were a serious military threat as were the Crusaders and the Mongols. But now Jews rule over Muslims. To this has been added the growing hostility toward Zionism. Intolerance for Jews in the Muslim world is correlated with the movements and military activities of the Zionist nation-state of Israel.⁵⁰⁶

“And so We have cast enmity and hatred among the followers of the [disfigured] Bible...” In what used to be the Soviet Union, anti-Semitism flourished for a variety of reasons: resentment of Jewish overrepresentation in certain occupations, annoyance at Jews who were critical of the system or who struggled for human rights, inherited prejudice from tsarist times, rancor at the desire of Jews to emigrate, and the use of anti-Semitism as an instrument for the regime to gain popularity among the population

and to deflect attention from the country's pressing problems. Soviet anti-Semitism directly infected current thought in the rest of the world through its criticism of Jewish traits and behavior; moreover, until they abated during the Gorbachev era, Soviet attacks on the actions of Israel affected the international community, especially the United Nations, which reached its lowest point with the 1975 "Zionism is racism" resolution.⁵⁰⁷

In the post-WWII period, there has been a significant decline in democratic countries in discriminatory attitudes and in the numbers of those who are prejudiced against Jews, even though this is beginning to show signs of reversal in what appears to be a growing anti-Jewish public sentiment. At times, anti-Semitism is not politically or intellectually respectable, while at other times it seems to make a comeback. No important political organization in the United States or in other Western countries openly advocates anti-Semitic views, nor are Jews denied civil or political rights in those countries. But the phenomenon of anti-Semitism has still not disappeared either in attitudes and beliefs or in patterns of behavior.⁵⁰⁸

Yahūd Are in the Business of Igniting Instability

Every time they light the fires of war, Allah extinguishes them; and they labor hard to spread corruption on earth: and Allah does not love the spreaders of corruption (5:64).

War is the opposite of peace; this does not mean that war is perpetually an active combat operation; there are squalls and lulls. The *āyah* informs that these Yahūd are in the business of igniting instability while doing away with stability. Insecurity and instability are part and parcel of their attempts to ignite the fires of war. Forceful human and material dislocations may also count among their attempts to touch off a war, without any armed combat operations; and the same can be said of sedition and subversive activity. The Yahūd had a history of tinkering with the stability of Babylon, and

puttering with the permanence of the Romans. Besides that, they had their run-in with the Islamic State in Madinah. In a sense, this *āyah* is letting the committed Muslims know that the Yahūd can always be caught red-handed in trying to instigate war, as if such incitement is part of their social character. The bottom line, however, is that Allah (ﷻ) will see to it that they will not get away with their warmongering. This is not achieved so much by Allah (ﷻ) utilizing whatever means are uniquely available to Him to terminate their war advocacy, but more so by the committed Muslims becoming His will on earth.

It is well known in the Sīrah of the gracious Prophet (ﷺ) that the Yahūd were stirring up the *mushriks* to go to war against him and the committed Muslims under his authority. There were even some Yahūdīs who were at it with the Byzantines, trying to prod them into a showdown with the Islamic leadership and state in the Ḥijāz. Other influential Yahūdīs were even giving relief and comfort to the enemies of the committed Muslims, as is known of Ka'b ibn al-Ashraf.

Most of this Yahūdī animus toward the committed Muslims can be traced to a form of political racism and jealousy that has no justification in divine sources. The persuasive and eminent status the Yahūdī sages enjoyed made them feel that sooner or later they will be able to mobilize all of Arabia against Islam and the Prophet (ﷺ). The *mushriks* certainly held them in high esteem as People of the Book, even though the religious difference between the former and the latter was pronounced. It turns out that centuries later, when the Jews were being persecuted in Iberia by the Inquisition, they would turn to the Muslims for justice and shelter. Similarly, political Christians were opposed to the first-generation Muslims on political grounds. Friction was very high in a Byzantine-occupied Egypt and Syria as the Muslims sought to extend scripture (the Qur'an) into these lands. After the average Christian realized the element of justice in Islam, it was only a matter of a short time before Islam won the hearts of these Christians. The Syrian and Egyptian Christians preferred Muslims over their "Christian" coreligionists, who were tyrants and imperialists.

“And they [Yahūd] labor hard to cause destruction on earth: and Allah does not love destructive people.” This shameful lot of people, in an expression of hostility toward the Prophet (ﷺ) and the committed Muslims in his company, was intent on animating friction among the constituencies of the nascent Islamic society, not to mention outright sabotage and subversion of its principles and key objectives. These Yahūd were willing to do anything and everything that would lead to fighting and armed conflict. They were definitely not promoting morals and good deeds, nor were they involved in social emancipation or raising the quality of life. The bulk of their efforts, given their own lack of integrity and honesty, were channeled into fomenting moral perversion of all kinds.

At this early stage in the formation of the Islamic social order in Madinah, what concerned the Yahūd most was the real possibility of Arab unity.⁵⁰⁹ The transformation of Arabians into Arabs was something the Yahūd wanted to thwart at whatever price. They could not tolerate the fact that this Prophet (ﷺ) and the Qur’an were transforming nomads of no scripture into a people of God with scripture. Looking back at their long history of disruption, it is amazing how far the Yahūd will go to spoil man’s relationship with God. In Madinah, when the Prophet arrived there, they began to seed the public mind with doubts about Muhammad (ﷺ) and the Qur’an. They took on the Islamic order by instigating forces composed of *munāfiqs* and *mushriks* against it. And sustaining all this maneuvering and angling was their deep-seated malice and resentment of the committed Muslims. This raw Yahūdī hatred has fueled its objection and displeasure with the hard-working, committed Muslims throughout the world and across history. But Allah (ﷻ) does not like these agents of destruction who are roaming the world with their rancor and bitterness against a people who only want to be in compliance with Allah (ﷻ). Howsoever unfortunate it may be, it is this compliance with Allah (ﷻ) that causes the Yahūd to go crazy! They will never succeed in their strategy, and they can never be at peace — as they are contrary to Allah (ﷻ), **“And they labor hard to stir up breakdowns and devastation on earth: and Allah does not love the multipliers of destruction.”**

Notice that the *āyah* places the Yahūd in a world arena, **“they... stir up breakdowns and devastation on earth...”** To get a better sense of the Yahūd’s global reach, consider their impact in the domain of international affairs. Take the United Nations (UN), for instance.⁵¹⁰ This is supposedly where the influence of all constituencies (nations) in the world is reflected. The United Nations, despite the pompous rhetoric that attended its establishment after WWII, can effectively be considered a ghost of the past. The UN has been shelved, sidelined, and consigned to the trash heap — at least temporarily — by one-world cheerleaders who at the outset saw the global body as the means of establishing a world hegemony. Today’s imperialists now envision Uncle Sam (the United States) as their officially-designated world policeman or, in their more academic parlance, the center of a new international system. The goal is a world that looks like America, and is therefore safe for all. However, despite the rhetoric — which might please the ears of many who have a false dream of a worthy and Victorian America or those who fancy themselves that — it is not quite so simple. There is more to this agenda than meets the eye.

What might be described as “The Grand Scheme for a New World Order,” in the wake of America’s new imperial role, was imparted in quite a candid fashion in a major two-part policy paper in the Summer 2003 and Winter 2004 issues of *The Journal of International Security Affairs*, house organ of the uber-influential Jewish Institute for National Security Policy (JINSA). Once a little-known Washington think tank, JINSA is now often publicly acknowledged as perhaps the most persuasive guiding force behind American foreign policy today. So when something appears in a JINSA publication, it carries significant weight.

The author, Alexander H. Joffe, a pro-Israel academic, has been a featured writer in the pages of this JINSA publication, and the fact that he was given so much space to tout his theories certainly reflects the high regard in which his views are held. Joffe, in his two-part series entitled “The Empire That Dared Not Speak Its Name,” frankly admits that “America is an empire” and asserts that, yes, this is a very good thing. Joffe goes on to say that when the UN

dared to take on Zionism, this marked the demise of the UN in the minds of the internationalists, "The end of the General Assembly as a credible body may plausibly be ascribed to the infamous 'Zionism is racism' resolution in 1975." The JINSA author contends that the world should be grateful that the UN has been discredited, reduced to a farce, and ultimately ground to a halt, referring, of course, to UN positions that the Zionists and their allies in the world empire movement find offensive.⁵¹¹

As a result of the UN being shelved as a world government vehicle, writes Joffe, "We now have the opportunity, and obligation, to begin again." However, he warns that the emerging European Union (EU) is a threat to the dream of a global empire. The JINSA writer asserts that the EU is an alternative vision for the international community, one that, as he puts it, is the authentic counter-vision to an American empire. According to the Zionist writer, the biggest problem with Europe and the EU is that culture remains at the core of Europe's problems. Nationalism was a doctrine born in Europe, as were its vicious mutant offsprings: fascism and communism.⁵¹² As a fervent advocate of Israeli super-nationalism, Joffe does not sense the duplicity in his attack on other peoples' nationalism, but then, again, honesty has never been integral to the hard-line Zionist point of view.

Joffe complains that although the new European empire is multicultural in theory, in reality it is dominated politically and culturally by France and economically by Germany. Today, in the EU, he says,

...driven by a sense of post-colonial guilt and postwar ennui the doors have been thrown open to all ideas. At the most sinister levels it has permitted and even legitimized a vast explosion of unhinged thought and action, namely anti-Americanism, and anti-Semitism, and a wide variety of conspiracy theories.⁵¹³

The so-called conspiracy theories that so alarm this Zionist theoretician are those that dare to challenge the official views of what

really happened on September 11, 2001 in New York. He is inflamed that millions of people in Europe and the majority Muslim world, not to mention the United States itself, have raised questions about Israeli foreknowledge and/or involvement in that seminal event.

In any case, what Joffe describes as the “other kind of liberal internationalism” is what the Zionist movement favors,

The American empire has no real or theoretical competitors. The goal of the American empire in the 21st century is not territorial control or the exploitation of resources but political and economic leadership which defends and advances American interests, and which promotes the development and well-being of all nations. Given our history and our values, that future lies in leveraging the American empire in such a way that it becomes the basis of a new democratic international system.

Ultimately the only answer for a stable and prosperous planet will be a global system that is structurally and morally similar to the American union — semi-autonomous states with secular, liberal democratic systems; where states have both prescribed rights and agreed upon responsibilities in a larger secular, liberal democratic framework; one equipped with checks and balances and meaningful institutions; with governance based on rule of law and tolerant and pluralist values.⁵¹⁴

In the second-part of his extended essay, published in the Winter 2004 issue of JINSA’s journal, Joffe pursued this line of thought further, expanding on his call for what he described as an empire that looks like America. Amazingly, Joffe frankly talks about the United States engaging in massive imperial conquests in the trouble-torn regions of Africa, presumably after the United States has already wreaked havoc in the Arab countries of the Muslim East,

The conditions under which America and its allies would simply take over and restore African countries are far from clear. What are the thresholds for intervention? What are the procedures and outcomes? Who will fight and who will pay? The restoration of Africa would involve long-term commitments and immense costs, of the sort that could only be paid for by Africa itself. That is to say, it would probably require American economic control, to go along with political and cultural control. Colonialism is always pay as you go, and it is not pretty. The question is both whether Africa can pay the price (or afford not to) and whether America has the stomach.⁵¹⁵

Of course, Africa is not the only target of Joffe and his like-minded schemers — and that is precisely what they are, however “extreme” that term may be perceived. In fact, Joffe talks of a wide-ranging global agenda, well beyond the African continent.

In the end, however, insofar as the real intentions of those who are using US military power as the mechanism for a more sinister agenda are concerned, Joffe lets the cat out of the bag. New arrangements, he says, must come into being under American leadership to provide an alternative for states that are willing to accept rights and responsibilities. Joffe dreams of a United Nations that has been re-made under the imperial force of the United States. And ultimately, he predicts the possibility of a world government, writing,

Possibly, after a period of chaos and anger, which in any event would simply intensify existing states of being, the institution [the United Nations] might be bludgeoned into changing [note his use of the term *bludgeoned*].

Rather than a club that admits all, the 21st-century United Nations might — someday, somehow — be re-made into an exclusive, by invitation, members-only group, of free, democratic states, sharing similar values. Or in the end, replaced by one. That day, however, may be decades off.⁵¹⁶

Should there be any doubt that he is talking about world government, note his concluding words,

The best way to preserve the American empire is to eventually give it up. Setting the stage for global governance can only be done with American leadership and American-led institutions of the sort schematically outlined here.⁵¹⁷

And so there it is. Despite all the high-sounding rhetoric about “democracy,” what it all comes down to, in the words of this pro-Israel ideologue, is the use of America’s military power to advance another (secret) agenda altogether. Even many of those grassroots American flag-wavers and genuine patriots, who relish the notion of an American empire, may find Joffe’s concepts somewhat different from what they otherwise might have had in mind. But here, in the pages of a devotedly pro-Zionist journal, readers are apprised with precisely what the “story behind the story” actually happens to be. It has nothing to do, really, with a “strong America” or, for that matter, even with America itself. The United States of America is simply a pawn in the game — albeit a powerful one — being ruthlessly shifted about in a scheme for world dominance by a super-elite operating behind the scenes.⁵¹⁸

And Allah (ﷻ) has spoken the truth when He opened the committed Muslims’ eyes to the way this human pathology operates in the social milieu,

Every time they [Yahūd] light the fires of war, Allah extinguishes them; and they labor hard to spread destruction on earth: and Allah does not love the spreaders of destruction (5:64).

There has to come a time, sooner rather than later, when the Muslims who are reading this precious information are able to see the whole picture and not sequester the Qur’an to a particular time of history or inflate the Yahūd into some humanitarian group of offi-

cially who actually have a concern for their fellow human beings. Far from it are the Yahūd.

No Separation between the *Ākhirah* and the *Dunyā*

If the followers of the [winding] Bible would but attain to [a true] commitment and observance [of Allah's power presence], We should indeed efface their [previous] bad deeds, and indeed bring them into gardens of bliss; and if only they [Jews and Christians in their political roles] would but truly observe the Torah and the Gospel and all [the revelation] that has been bestowed from on high upon them by their Sustainer, they would indeed partake of all the blessings of heaven and earth. Some of them do pursue a cultivated course; but as for most of them, abhorrent indeed is what they do! (5:65–66).

“Truly observing the Torah and the Gospel” means having these divine meanings permeate the core civic activities of man after they have settled in his heart and flourished through his hands. That would include proper faith and cognizant conformity to God, followed by social movements and global programs that fit into the spirit and the letter of the Bible. A true reading of the Torah and the Gospel — before the distortions and deformities that later set in — would reveal the good news of a coming prophet descended from the prophetic line of Ibrāhīm through Ismā'il (ﷺ). The word *Paraclete*, which means *the essence of truth*, was deformed by political Christians so that it could be redefined to avoid reference to the final Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ).

In this Qur'an is “...all [the revelation] that has been bestowed from on high upon them [political Jews and Christians] by their Sustainer.” The Qur'an is the only criterion man can confidently rely on to measure social behavior, historical trends, and political scheming or planning. Had these types of Jews and Chris-

tians taken this to heart, blessings in torrential volumes would have come their way from the sky above and from the earth below. The generosity of “nature” would not have been more prolific had they come to terms with this gracious Qur'an.

If they would have honored the Torah and the Gospel, they would have been spared the history of the Babylonians, the history of the Romans, and the history of the Byzantines. They, though, preferred to part company with God and incurred all the desecration and profanity that is now part of their Judeo-Christian history. Because of their own decisions, God's divine program for man on earth disintegrated into rigid rituals, tense traditions, and inherited incompatibilities in matters of religion and creed. Subsequently these Judeo-Christians, akin to a pendulum, were swinging between one extreme and the other — à la hard-headed conservatives here or bleeding-heart liberals there.

This *āyah* and lesson speaks directly to people of scripture — all people of scripture, including Muslims. If only they would commit to Allah (ﷻ) in their minds and deeds and then factor into their societies and modalities a serious consideration of Allah's (ﷻ) power presence in human affairs and interactions, then “... [He] will blot out your misdeeds and usher you into gardens of bliss” — this being the compensation in an approaching world. The Torah and the Gospel, in their original, untainted form, were meant as a framework for social planning, economic equality, and financial transparency in a justice-centered and a justice-pursuing society. All that was needed from the faithful was for them to order their lives according to the scripture that was given to them. Life in the frame and fabric of scripture is abundant, plentiful, and gracious. Food and provisions are ample if only people are able to see the value in fitting their lives into God's revealed and organized program. This program from scripture is encumbered by neither ego in the individual, nor vanity in society. And this makes for copious productivity, a fair distribution of wealth and resources, and a general fairness in life. The problem with people who claim to be followers of scripture is that they have no devotion to its “post-self” or “beyond-self” meanings; they downplay the power of God in the

rise and fall of cultures and civilizations, and in general they do not want to extend the meanings and guidelines of God's scripture into God's world. There is an exception to this; there is a small number of people in this crowd and history who maintain a clear head with a sanguine conscience. However, **"...as for most of them, insidious indeed is what they do!"**

It appears from these two *āyāt* that commitment to Allah (ﷻ) and serious attention to His power involvement in human societies are not only an accreditation for bliss in an upcoming life, but also a precursor to good and prosperous developments in this life. The lively picture in the words of the Qur'an are arresting, **"...they [followers of scripture] would have been eating [what comes] from above their heads and from beneath their feet..."**

The more the *āyāt* in this Qur'an are read and then etched on our hearts, the more evident it becomes that the relationship we temporary beings have with the Eternal Being is not one of hard-and-fast beliefs, or an out-of-bounds faith, or a stilted piety that, once achieved, allows us to close the Book and go to heaven. This life-absorbing relationship with Allah (ﷻ) is, in fact, a temporally organized plan for matters to be attended to; it becomes an elaborate and systematic plan of action. But none of this can it become if we sit back and relieve ourselves of this responsibility, or if we allow some people in positions of worldly power to strip Islam of this vital and necessary range while they socialize the public to the notion of Islam being a "religion," a "creed," or a "belief" that cannot be tainted with politics, economics, or ideology. What these *āyāt* are telling those who have revamped and defiled their scriptures is that had they not done so, they would be enjoying a life of abundant resources and plentiful provisions. The world's output would have been phenomenal and they could have reaped the copious bounty from beneath and from above.

People should never be put in a position to pick between the life of the hereafter and the life of the here and now, between happiness in this world and happiness in the world to come, or between a path onto the afterlife and a path onto this life. This is not the correct way of understanding and living scripture. This separation

of God's domain from man's domain in the concepts and practices of secularists and materialists forces a type of schizophrenia on an otherwise integrated human nature, which renders such separation wholly unnecessary. People today are living in this gray area, not being able to blend the two spheres together. And this is what enables a few powerful, rich, and influential people at the top of society to get away with a level of greed and exploitation that relegates billions of people to a life of poverty.

The general notion, the public mind, and the mainstream attitude is that there is no connection between the life man is in and the life he will be in. The generalized impression "out there" is that a person has to choose between prosperity in this world and prosperity in the post-world. Man's state of nature cannot countenance such a proposition. The reason people have now reached this "conviction" is because the powers that be have engineered their thoughts, manipulated their psychology, and structured the material world along lines that divide them from their Creator and separate this life from the following life. This lifestyle of materialism and secularism is a popular *jāhiliyah* and an elitist system of *kufr*. Built into this *jāhiliyah* and *kufr* is the perception that if one wants to make it in this world, he is going to have to forget about life after death. He is going to have to sacrifice "religious principles" for the sake of getting ahead in life. All that talk about morality and ethics has to be shelved if he wants to compete in this world. Likewise, people who are looking for "salvation" in the hereafter are going to have to step out of life's competitive stream, they will have to disengage from the "untoward" and offensive activities of this life. Furthermore, they will have to forget about a prosperous condition and an economic state of growth with rising profits and full employment when they are on their way to the aftermost life.

People have been conditioned to think that wealth and well-being in this life are obtained through illegal means, dirty tricks, and lies and cheating. They have been habituated to conclude that nothing can change the way this world is operating, and hence if they want to be part of this ungodly world they will forfeit the rewards and bliss of what comes after this world; and vice versa. In

the middle of all this mental and social transfixion there is no “faith-system” capable of exuding enough confidence to motivate enough people to change this status quo except the Qur’an, the Prophet (ﷺ), and the core of committed and coordinated Muslims — hence the powers that be going to war against Islam, camouflaged as the war on terror.

A profound understanding of Allah (ﷻ), His Prophet (ﷺ) and Islam affirms that the world was not meant to be bifurcated into a religious and a secular sphere. In the nature of things — the way Allah (ﷻ) created life and existence — there is no enmity between Allah (ﷻ) and life, there is no separation between *dunyā* and *ākhirah*, and there is no departing point between acquiring the benefits of this life and the goodness of the one to come. Even though the world today has been reworked to make people think there can be no integration of scripture with society, the truth is contrary to this impression and whim. The very fact that life has been separated into two incompatible spheres (the sacred and the secular) goes against the very grain of life itself. This artificially structured separation of God from government, scripture from society, and conscience from community is an aberration — a temporary abnormality that cannot last.

A consolidation of man’s immediate life with his distant life is the way things were meant to be. A lifetime spent in obtaining the fruits of the *ākhirah* should also have the positive effects of obtaining the yields of this *dunyā*. If people are on a course of prosperity, production, and plentifulness in a life they are sure is approaching, then this does not mean that the greedy in this world should have their way; it does not mean that ordinary people have to tolerate a life polarized by a super-rich class on one end, who are few and becoming relatively fewer, and a super-poor class on the other end, who are many and becoming relatively more. What is needed to overturn this anomaly is a strong, preponderant, and public sense of *taqwā* — the certainty that Allah (ﷻ) will present Himself by the use of power in man’s social engineering, so to speak. *Taqwā* is positioned between *īmān* and *al-‘amal al-ṣāliḥ*, that is, between commitment and doing what is right and good. Man’s commitment to do what is cor-

rect and worthy will not produce the long-term anticipated results if man does not have in his feelings and in his thoughts the central fact that Allah (ﷻ) is the power to be reckoned with.

This stands at the formative stages of every social order and civilization. It is the natural way of being and living. All this, though, takes on a growth aspect when it conforms to and complies with the words of knowledge and *āyāt* of wisdom that the Muslims have in their scriptural possession. The Qur'an and the Prophet (ﷺ) actively demonstrate that work in and of itself is an act of devotion to Allah (ﷻ). The grand work of organizing human life on a global scale in fulfillment of scripture becomes an integral part of Allah's (ﷻ) will. This rearrangement and reorganization of the whole world to suit the standards of scripture become very supportive of a fruitful and productive life. As this reorganization begins to bear fruit, there will be plenty for everyone, poverty for none, and justice for all. The world will familiarize itself with the fair distribution of resources and riches. Everyone will have access to abundance coming from above and from below.

Man's function on earth is thus quite clear: to do God's will with His permission according to His consideration. This comprehensively describes man's status as Allah's (ﷻ) *khalīfah*, "***Innī jā'ilun fī al-arḍi khalīfah: Indeed, I shall render a successor on earth***" (2:30). Allah's successor — the human adaptation to Allah (ﷻ) — shall be at the center of works and labor that are fertile and productive. The human condition on earth benefits from this successor who utilizes all the raw material and resources in the service of human life, even if these accessories and resources are to be found in the greater universe beyond the confines of the Earth. Being in charge of human integration on this level with an unmistakable focus on justice is an act of devotion and obedience to Allah (ﷻ). Extracting, producing, and distributing all these possessions, and supplements in a manner foretold by Allah (ﷻ) is the fulfillment of man's role as Allah's (ﷻ) successor.

According to this Qur'anic concept of *khilāfah*, any human instrument of governance that is not concerned with maximizing the benefits yielded by the earth and does not look for new frontiers in

the service of man is derelict and defiant. In this regard, Allah (ﷻ) says, **“*Wa-sakhhkharā lakum mā fī al-samāwāti wa-mā fī al-arḍi jamī’an minhu: He has deployed for you all that is in outer space and all that is on earth — all of that for you (45:13).***

Man is quickly approaching cataclysmic and apocalyptic developments if he does not put the earth and its societies back in a divine frame of reference. There is a pattern of increasing natural irregularities as well as social instability all around him. Consider some of the developments accompanying man’s breaking away from God that have resulted in unsettling natural and social occurrences. Most people take for granted the stability of the earth under their feet. They plan their lives and build their cities and roads on that assumption. Many languages have such phrases as “solid as a rock” or “on safe ground.” The fact is, however, that we stand on a restless earth — not terra firma at all.

It is because the steadiness of the ground itself cannot be trusted that the experience of an earthquake is uniquely terrifying. On average, the world experiences a million earthquakes annually — about two per minute. The majority can be detected only by instruments; about 300,000 are strong enough to be felt; 20 are sufficiently violent to wreck a town — but do not because they occur in thinly populated areas; around five cause destruction and death. Since 1900, over one million people have been killed as a result of earthquakes. If a way exists to reduce this fearful toll, it must come through a fuller understanding of the still mysterious forces that cause the earth to quake.

What has been absent from consideration in this natural-cum-social tragedy is the relationship between the way man arranges — or to be more precise, the way he disorganizes — his society and the outbreak of natural disasters? The answer is still in the making because secular governments and ungodly scientists are not willing to correlate the social with the natural.

A short list of cities that have been totally or partially destroyed include the following:

1. Shensi, China (1556), 830,000 deaths;
2. T’ang-shan, China (1976), 655,000 deaths;

3. Aleppo, Syria (1138), 230,000 deaths;
4. Sumatra, Indonesia (2004), 227,898 deaths;
5. Haiti (2010), 222,570 deaths;
6. Damghan, Iran (856), 200,000 deaths;
7. Haiyuan, China (1920), 200,000 deaths;
8. Ardabil, Iran (893), 150,000 deaths;
9. Kanto, Japan (1923), 142,800 deaths;
10. Ashgabat, Turkmenistan (1948), 110,000 deaths;
11. Lisbon, Portugal (1755), 100,000 deaths;
12. San Francisco, USA (1906), 3,000 deaths;
13. communities in Italy (1976); and
14. villages in the Andes Mountains, Peru (from an avalanche, 1970).

All of these events and others since then, in light of the *āyāt* in this eye-opening Qur'an, should force people to draw a comparison between what is naturally happening and what is socially happening in the context of cultures and civilizations.

The closest man has come to acknowledging this social trigger of natural disasters is the era of Prophet Noah (ﷺ). All living forms and all living processes require the presence of water if they are to survive. Yet this necessity and requirement of life also possesses a terrible power to destroy. It is a power that is recognized in the literature of scripture of the main religions of the world. Scripture describes how a humanity in prolonged and premeditated disobedience to God was punished by a deluge that overwhelmed the earth. Irrespective of whether or not this fact dwells in the human conscience today, there were actual, sweeping floods in man's history that show at least the extent to which humanly structured societies — structured along patterns alien to God — are vulnerable to the volatility of sea waters and sea levels as well as the fury of tempests. Some storms, though initially destructive, bring long-term benefits. For centuries, Egypt survived on the annual flooding of the Nile River. But these are atypical cases. Ruin and desolation are the usual results of what has become a figure of speech “come hell or high water.”

From time to time human complacency is rocked by a tsunami (a hydro-shock wave caused by a submarine earthquake), and its path of death. In 1953, the world was a witness to the North Sea overflow, which killed over 2,500 people, drowned 30,000 animals, and destroyed over 10,000 buildings. The flood in Florence, Italy (1966) was another attempt at penetrating the human ho-hum self-satisfaction. The Bay of Bengal is known as being a disaster-prone region. The tsunami resulting from the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake, with the epicenter near Sumatra, Indonesia, was responsible for nearly 180,000 deaths and 1.7 million displaced people in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India. And the continuous lineup of tornadoes and hurricanes that ram into the coastlines and the interior of the United States have not budged that secular and materialist society an inch closer to realizing that something has to be done about official policies, social engineering, and the absence of justice, all of which are tied into the frequency and severity of natural disasters.

Another socio-natural encroachment upon the carefully crafted, non-scriptural status quo is the eruption of volcanoes. An exploding volcano is the most awe-inspiring and amazing spectacle on earth's terrain. The ground shakes as dense clouds of ash and hot gases soar into the air, sometimes accompanied by flashes of lightning and the crack of thunder. Within the crater, incandescent lava (molten rock) gushes forth in fountains of brilliant fireworks. Pieces of rock hurtle through the air, and down the sides of the mountain flow rivers of liquid rock, overwhelming all in their path.

Volcanoes in one sense are destructive; they have been liable for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of humans as well as animals, plants, and other organisms. Yet, in another sense, they also bring inestimable benefits. Volcanic ash and lava are rich in minerals, and throughout the world crops flourish in the fertile soil that comes from eroded volcanic rock. Equally significant, deposits of gold, copper, silver, and many other valuable ores are associated with volcanoes, both active and extinct. The story of volcanoes is intimately bound up with the story of man.

What slips through the void that secularism and materialism have left in man's conscience is the connection between such blasts

of nature and the attending relapses of society. In 1470BCE a civilization called Thera was destroyed.⁵¹⁹ Closer within the era of scripture, there was the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius in Pompeii.⁵²⁰ Europe's Iceland and America's Hawaii are considered to be volcanic islands. Some consider the most cataclysmic eruption to be the Indonesian volcano of Krakatoa in 1883, which caused some 120,000 people to die and average global temperatures to drop 1.2°C in the year following the eruption.⁵²¹ The worst volcanic disaster of the 20th century (1902), killing over 30,000, came from the explosion of Mont Pelee in the Caribbean Island of Martinique.⁵²²

Another socio-natural infliction of the human condition is drought and famine. Even though these cannot be placed in the same category as what are called "natural disasters," they are still products of man's social failures, which cannot be uncoupled from his provocations of "nature." Unlike other natural catastrophes, famine is not a sudden disaster but a long, drawn-out process passing through several stages. When the rains fail, vegetation withers for lack of water, and so the food supply gradually dwindles. Shortage becomes scarcity and eventually complete dearth. It may take many months before this final, dreaded stage is reached. Drought is still the main traditional cause of famine, though some famines have followed in the wake of calamitous floods. There have been cases — fortunately rare — when a new disease attacks the main food crop of a people, as in the terrible Irish Potato Famine (1845–1852).⁵²³ Occupying armies have intentionally killed the men who should be working the land or deliberately laid waste to the land itself, hence famine has been an inevitable ramification of warfare.

In this century, a new danger looms, one that threatens not a single unfortunate region but the entire world: what elites call overpopulation. The world's population at present (2016) is reaching 7.4 billion of which, it is estimated, two thirds are undernourished or malnourished. Human population is expected to exceed 10 billion by the year 2056. Fearing for their own survival more than anything else, these elites, who are alien to scripture, ask if there will ever be enough to feed them all; perhaps they would be wise to consider these *āyāt*,

And if they would but truly observe the Torah and the Gospel and all [the revelation, this Qur'an included] that has been bestowed from on high upon them by their Sustainer, they would indeed partake of all the blessings [and abundance] of heaven and earth... (5:66).

A mind dislocated from its scriptural moorings, as is the case in our secular world, has little space to consider incidents in history that have the potential of realigning the human social self with the natural world. Hence little attention is devoted to what may have been deficient in man's public and civic activities that would have resulted in an event like the Irish Potato Famine, or in the prevalent condition of India, with its starving millions. In 1967, a famine was averted in Bihar.⁵²⁴ Places that are not expected to experience this kind of affliction are themselves not exempt from the repercussions of human social dysfunction as in the ravages of war, for instance, the "Imposed Starvation" on the Netherlands (1944–1945). There are always "African emergencies" where populations are at the very brink of existence, struggling at the survival level. The African Sahel had a crisis of this sort from 1968–1974.⁵²⁵

Another secularly inexplicable affliction is fire. The roar of the flames, the searing heat, the wild uncontrollable terror of a forest on fire, were probably man's first introduction to an energy that can change in minutes from a gently flame to a monstrous killer. As the centuries passed man learned to harness fire to warm his primitive domicile and to keep away wild animals at night. Later he used it to cook food, cauterize wounds, shape weapons, and change clay into pots. But though fire is useful, it remains a dreadful enemy to those who cause it to burn with a rage. As man congregated first into settlements, then towns, then great cities, accidental fires have destroyed what he had so painstakingly built up. Most of the world's cities have had at least one major conflagration in their past, and many have had a regular history of smaller ones. In modern times, wars and earthquakes are the most likely cause of large-scale fires; however, accidental fire in single buildings can still produce tragically high death tolls. And forest fires, the oldest fire

danger of them all, continue to be a seasonal danger in many parts of the world.

The Great Fire of London in 1666 is probably to the secular social scientist just a fire.⁵²⁶ To the scriptural social scientist such an incident should be placed within the governmental and social orientation of the British Empire at the time. In the great city that was to be Napoleon's prize, Moscow's infamous fire (1812) was deliberately set alight and Napoleon found himself surrounded by ruins. The American city of Chicago was mostly destroyed by the fire of 1871. Now the United States in its mode of imperial empire has to suffer from almost inexplicable forest fires. From year to year these fires ravage hundreds of thousands of acres of green forestry and fertile areas in states as scattered as California, Texas, and Florida. The cynical secular person cannot put these happenings in context. The Qur'an to them is a remote Book; they cannot hear these *āyāt*,

And if they truly observe the Torah and the Gospel and all [the revelation, including this Qur'an] that has been bestowed from on high upon them by their Sustainer, they would indeed partake of the thriving blessings of heaven and earth... (5:66).

The blind secular belief in relatively advanced science impels most of the people in such societies to expect a long life span. Relatively few expect to die young, and then usually only through some kind of accident. Before the advent of modern chemical medicine (allopathy) the selection process for those who would live on was stern in the first years of life. Many times an outbreak of disease could ravage town and countryside, striking down families to untimely graves. For thousands of years diseases have unpredictably cut down swathes in the world's population, bereaving millions, impoverishing millions more. Often the almost continual warfare that swept back and forth through the known world provided all the conditions for the diseases that followed in its wake. As pestilence struck trader, soldier, and ruler, it helped dictate the rise and fall of

nations and empires. In some rush-to-judgement quarters in our secularly dominated world, the practice of chemical medicine has largely freed the world from such catastrophes. But lethal pandemics live on in certain poorer or Third World nations. Most of the lethal pathogens of old are only subdued, not vanquished. Man's bacteriological and viral enemies deserve continuing heedfulness, for some remain potentially as great a threat to life as global war.

The secular mind that has equated the absence of God with the presence of man does not want to be bothered with placing events in their proper context. Recall the crisis in ancient Athens (430BCE) when the plague reached its peak and the crowded citizens of the besieged city died in their thousands. Hardest hit were the refugees and the poorer classes, but eventually everyone suffered. Is it sustainable for man steered by secularism to believe that there is no connection between what he calls natural disasters and social upheavals? Is it advisable, given the current fragility of his future survival, for him to try to detach nature from society in the same way he detached church from state? Looking back in history at the Black Death, so far the agnostic anthropologists and the secular epidemiologists have provided no satisfying answer as to its underlying cause(s). The Black Death is the name given to the virulent bubonic and pneumonic plague that swept through western and central Europe (1347–1351). Approximately 25 million people, about a third of the population, perished; some 13 million Chinese also died. This catastrophe was not solely responsible for causing or accelerating important socio-economic change; probably more decisive was the subsequent pandemic recurrence of the plague (1361–1363, 1369–1371, 1374–1375, 1390, and 1400). Even so, the consequences, recriminations, and subsequent solutions varied from region to region.

Not to be forgotten is the Yellow Fever War in St. Dominique (1794–1804). Soon after the Spanish colonization of the Caribbean islands in the early-16th century, Spanish settlers began to be hit by outbreaks of yellow fever.⁵²⁷ Their slaves, forcibly imported from Africa, were only lightly affected by the deadly disease. The socio-natural world is from time to time vulnerable to epidemics and pan-

demics, one of which is the recurring cholera pandemic.⁵²⁸ From 1918–1920, a worldwide influenza pandemic killed an estimated 21.5 million people across the world.

Man may never be able to reach what he considers to be a logically satisfactory answer to the explanation behind natural disasters as long as he is entrenched in his secular psychology and godless thinking. But there is an area that may cause some thinking people to pause and reflect. That area is strictly within the range of what man can and cannot do as a matter of his own free will. Take the issue of profit and loss. This is a market issue, and man, if he decides to do the right thing, can begin to contemplate what is reasonable profit and what is reasonable loss; what is unacceptable profit and what is unacceptable loss; and what is tolerable profit and what is tolerable loss. In this area of human activity, the advantage of honing in on a fair answer to this question exists. That fair answer, even in the preliminary absence of scripture, may lead to the definitive answer in scripture. There is no contradiction between man's approximate answers based on justice and Allah's (ﷻ) authoritative answers based on unaltered scripture (the Qur'an). And so it can be said with good confidence that the ongoing perversion of man's social behavior has something to do with the warnings he gets in the form of natural disasters, famines, and pandemics,

[Since they have become oblivious of Allah], corruption has appeared on land and in the sea as an outcome of what men's hands have wrought: and so He will let them experience [the evil of] some of their doings, so that they might return [to the right path] (30:41).

This Qur'an does not permit a cleavage between what is good for the individual and what is good for society. They go hand in hand: what is to the benefit of an individual is to the benefit of all society and what is to the benefit of all society is in the benefit of its singular individual. Both these components (individual and society) are tied to Allah (ﷻ) through free will, voluntary sacrifice, and a justice that knows no discrimination. This Islamic type of so-

ciety has to lead and show the way. It cannot do so, though, if it remains paralyzed by its own ignorance or indifference.

Once Muslims acquire the certitude to part with their state of *jāhiliyyah*, they will have to show everyone who is now in this induced and pervasive trance of secularism that this world is not a substitute for the coming one and the coming one is not a substitute for this world. Rituals, belief, faith, and piety are not stand-ins for work, production, growth, and raising the standard of living. This Islam-in-motion is not about Allah (ﷻ) leading man to a final paradise while his secular leaders show him the way to a worldly paradise. Work, production, growth, and raising man's standard of living constitute the responsibility of *khilāfah* and *taskhīr* as outlined in the *āyāt* of this godly Book. Rituals, belief, piety, and faith are disciplinary features that help man along the way to his final goal. And along this continuum, there is no place for a split personality or a split society, part of which is selfless and utopian and the other selfish and practical. The secular *jāhili* society has a bipolar character, but we the Muslims who live under the protective umbrella of this Qur'an do not suffer from such a disorder.

Much of the world, most of the Muslims included, has been dragged into the European experience, which segregates between God and man. This European dissociation from God need not be the fate of Muslims. They — whether Yahūd or Naṣārā — have mutilated their scriptures; the Muslims have not. The Muslims still have scripture, at least in theory; the only thing they need to do is put it in practice, and they are on their way. No Muslim should think that the Yahūd and Naṣārā feel good about what they have become. They may try to appear outwardly confident, but in reality they are confused, uncertain, and nervous; some of them are virtually disintegrating. They have nothing to fill their hearts, they have nothing to satisfy their minds, they have nothing to show them the way, and they have nothing that gives them meaning in life — so they are suffering. They are in distress because to begin with, hundreds of years ago, they decided to untie their affiliation with God as they rebelled against their own religious hierarchy. They convinced themselves for a time that the only way to social

success and industrial production was to get rid of religion. And now they wind up irreconcilable with their own internal selves. They seem to be at war with human nature. They are in need now of what they have disposed of in their history. Their souls cannot take it any longer; they suffer from the hunger of the spirit. They dwell in a vacuum of their own making. All their social theories, philosophical assumptions, and artistic talents could not substitute for a lost scripture. They are now starving for Allah (ﷻ), and they are too arrogant to admit it.

Addiction to drugs is a symptom of people who are looking for meaning and satisfaction. In the United States, heroin, a derivative of opium poppy, has been challenged by crack cocaine in recent years as the illegal addictive drug of choice.⁵²⁹ An estimated half-million Americans are addicted to heroin; a like number are presumed addicted to crack. Many more are addicted to legal drugs such as alcohol and tobacco.⁵³⁰

This social alienation from God breeds depression, an emotional state characterized by sadness, unhappy thoughts, apathy, and dejection. Sadness is a normal response to major losses such as bereavement or unemployment. After childbirth, postnatal depression is common. However, clinical depression, which is prolonged or unduly severe, often requires treatment, such as antidepressant medication, cognitive therapy, or, in very rare cases, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), in which an electrical current is passed through the brain. Periods of depression may alternate with periods of high optimism, over-enthusiasm, and confidence. This is the manic phase in a disorder known as manic depression or bipolar disorder. A manic depressive state is one in which a person switches repeatedly from one extreme to the other. Each mood can last for weeks or for months. Typically, the depressive state lasts longer than the manic phase. This is a very serious problem that has debilitated a social mass of people.

A three-piece designer suit, a dab of cologne, and what appears to be a normal, if not perky, personality are deceptive features; the truth of the matter is that deep inside the psyche of many of these characters there is a person who finds life disturbing, un-

settling, or annoying. The socio-political analog of this picture is the superpower that displays its military might, scrambles its fighter-bombers in the air, and sends its submarines into the abysses of the oceans. Its embassies project an air of superiority and its economic infrastructure seems sound. However, this too is deceptive as all these are just so much appearance; deep inside the crevices of these nation-states there is an emptiness, a void, and a weakness that cannot be undone by their fancy and flashy cosmetics.

The backbone of any society is its human being — the confidence, stamina, and willpower of this human citizen. Sad as it may be, the secular societies no longer have that type of human constituent. Indulging in a materialistic lifestyle has drained their human pool of its intellectual edge and endurance. What will follow is a precipitous decline in production and sub-quality labor. These types of societies will economically self-destruct after having self-destructed morally.

A world void of God in its public persona is bound to be gripped by fear — a fear that is evidenced by the pile-up of weapons, the military-industrial complex, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In such an ambiance, the people so affected begin to manage their lives with this specter hanging over them all the time, and so they fall prey to a mania with terrorism, an obsession with doomsday scenarios, and a nuclear conflagration that will destroy planet earth. This all comes back to take its toll on public health and the quality of life. Is it any wonder, then, that suicide and homicide, heart attacks and strokes, cancer and AIDS are mowing down the human props of these materialistically “advanced” societies that have dispensed with divinity. Listen to what Patrick Buchanan says about this condition in his book, *The Death of the West*,

And ye shall be left few in number, whereas ye were as the stars of heaven for multitude; because thou wouldest not obey the voice of the Lord thy God (Deuteronomy, 28:62).

The cultural revolution in the Euro-American context amounts to the victory of secular humanism over whatever scriptural religiosity was left. It triumphed in the minds of millions and is beyond the power of politicians to overturn, even had they the courage to try. Half a nation [the US] has converted. The party of working-class Catholics [the Democratic Party in the US] is almost 100% “pro-choice” and pro-gay rights. The party of the Moral Majority and Christian Coalition [the Republican Party] has thrown in the towel on social issues, going out now to do the Lord’s work by growing the US Department of Education. Young people are not concerned about their souls; they are more worried about the Nasdaq.⁵³¹ Most of the intellectual and media elite are demagogic allies of the revolution or fellow travelers, and many conservatives are trolling for their own survival by pushing for an armistice of sorts with the revolutionaries.

What a tiny band of secular humanists declared in a manifesto in 1973 has become the moral compass of America and is becoming the law of the land.⁵³² Americans have listened, absorbed, and embraced the tenets of a revolution that scandalized their parents and grandparents, calling to mind the insight of Alexander Pope,

Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As to be hated needs but to be seen;
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.⁵³³

Only a social counter-revolution or a religious awakening can turn the West around before a falling birthrate closes off the last exit ramp and rings down the curtain on Western man’s long-running play. But not a sign of either can be seen on the horizon.

What force can resist the siren’s call of a hedonistic culture that is so alluring and appealing and is promoted

by almost all who speak to the young — Hollywood, MTV, the soaps, prime-time TV, the hot magazines and the hot music, romance novels and bestsellers? How do parents compete when even teachers and preachers are handing out condoms? What is going to convert American women to wanting what their mothers wanted and grandmothers prayed for: a good man, a home in the suburbs, and a passel of kids? Sounds almost quaint.

In *Caesar and Christ*, Book III of his *Story of Civilization*, historian Will Durant argues that “biological factors” were “fundamental” to the fall of the Roman Empire,

A serious decline of population appears in the West after Hadrian... A law of Septimus Severus speaks of a *penuria hominum* — a shortage of men. In Greece the depopulation had been going on for centuries. In Alexandria, which had boasted of its numbers, Bishop Dionysius calculated that the population had in his time [250AD] been halved. He mourned to see “the human race diminishing and constantly wasting away.” Only the barbarians and Orientals were increasing, outside the Empire and within.⁵³⁴

How did Rome reduce its population? “Though branded as a crime, infanticide flourished... Sexual excesses may have reduced human fertility; the avoidance or deferment of marriage had a like effect.” Adds Durant, “Perhaps the operation of contraception, abortion, and infanticide... had a dysgenic as well as a numerical effect. The ablest men married latest, bred least, and died soonest.” Christians were having children, the pagans were not, “Abortion and infanticide, which were decimating pagan society, were forbidden to Christians as the equivalents to murder; in many instances Christians res-

cued exposed infants, baptized them, and brought them up with the aid of the community fund.”⁵³⁵

Irony of ironies. Today, an aging, dying Christian West is pressing the Third World and the Islamic world to accept contraception, abortion, and sterilization as the West has done. But why should they enter a suicide pact with the West when they stand to inherit the earth after the West is gone?⁵³⁶

History teaches that the correlation between power and population is *not* absolute. A few million British conquered a fourth of the world. Tiny Portugal and Holland seized territory and implanted colonies in lands far larger and more populous: Brazil, India, China, Africa, and the Indies. But population is a component of power. Soldier for soldier, the American Confederacy was the equal of the Union in the US Civil War [1861–1865], but there were not enough Confederates, and too many Yankees. France’s paranoia over a soaring German population after Versailles [1919] proved justified. Hitler’s Wehrmacht may have been the superior in arms over the [Russian] Red Army, but 80 million Germans ruthlessly organized under Hitler could not defeat 197 million Soviets ruthlessly organized under Stalin. A Soviet Union of 290 million could control a world empire; but an aging, shrinking, dying Russia of 145 million will be fortunate to hold on to what it has. Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find in history any example of a family, a tribe, a people, a nation, or a civilization, whose population has grown old and whose numbers have begun to shrink, that did not have taken from it what it once took from others.

The death of the West may already be baked in the cake. The baby boom that began in 1946 and ended in 1964 was the most prolific generation in US history. But it failed to reproduce itself. With its oldest now 69, and its youngest 51, that generation is about done having

children. The eldest have begun to look toward to retirement, when families pay down debt, curb spending, and lower consumption.

Japan, where the median age is five years greater than in the United States, hit the wall in 1990. Real estate and equity markets collapsed and have yet to recover. In October 2001, Japanese stocks were 75% below their 1989 peak, and Japan's economy was as dormant as her population growth.

Europe's populations have already begun to shrink. With fewer children entering the workforce, and the number of seniors and elderly soaring, Europe must raise taxes and retirement ages and cut benefits to seniors — or import new workers. Europe will try both. As Europeans are forced to work longer for less, to support the idle elderly, generational tension will increase; and as Arabs and Africans pour in, social tensions will rise. The race riots in the Lancashire mill town of Oldham, and in Leeds, Burnley, and Bradford; the fights between Spaniards and Moroccans in El Ejido; the bloody battles between French and Algerian youth in Paris; and skin-head attacks on immigrants and Turks in Germany are harbingers of the “long hot summers” that are coming to Europe. But should Europe reject immigration, and European women refuse to have children, the continent will soon stare senescence in the face.⁵³⁷

In light of this dead-end attitude of secular societies who may have had their justification for running away from an oppressive church but no justification whatsoever for running away from God, the *āyah*, worth repeating, that should concern them is,

And if they [Jews and Christians] would but truly observe the Torah and the Gospel and all [the revelation] that has been bestowed from on high upon them by their Sustainer, they would partake of all the blessings

of heaven and earth. Some of them do pursue a balanced course; but as for most of them — vile indeed is what they do! (5:66).

And Allah (ﷻ) the Most High has spoken the truth.

The Common Cause of *Mushriks* and *Ahl al-Kitāb*

- (5:67) O Apostle! Announce all that has been bestowed from on high upon you by your Sustainer: for unless you do it fully, you will not have delivered His message [at all]. And Allah will protect you from [adversarial] people: behold, Allah does not guide people who refuse [His power presence in the affairs of men].
- (5:68) Say, “O followers of the Bible! You have no valid ground for your beliefs unless you [truly] observe the Torah and the Gospel, and all that has been bestowed from on high upon you by your Sustainer!” Yet all that has been bestowed from on high upon you [O Prophet] by your Sustainer is bound to make many of them more stubborn in their overweening arrogance and in their denial of the truth [pertaining to Allah’s power presence in human affairs]. But sorrow not over people who deny [such] truth:
- (5:69) For, verily, those who are committed to Allah [via this divine Writ], as well as those who follow the Jewish faith, and the Sabians, and the Christians — all who are committed to Allah and the Last Day and do righteous deeds — no fear need they have, and neither shall they grieve.
- (5:70) Indeed, We accepted a solemn pledge from the Children of Israel, and We sent apostles unto them; [but] every time an apostle came to them with anything that was not to their liking, [they rebelled]: to some of them they gave the lie, while others they would slay,
- (5:71) Thinking that no harm would befall them; and so they became blind and deaf [of heart]. Thereafter Allah accepted their repentance; and again many of them became blind and deaf. But Allah sees all that they do.
- (5:72) Indeed, the truth denies those who say, “Behold, Allah is the Christ, son of Mary” — seeing that the Christ [himself] said, “O Children of Israel! Conform to Allah [alone], who is my Sustainer as well as your Sustainer.” Behold, whoever ascribes divinity to any being beside Allah,

يَتَأْتِيهَا الرُّسُولُ بَلِّغْ مَا أُنزِلَ إِلَيْكَ مِنْ رَبِّكَ وَإِنْ لَمْ تَفْعَلْ فَمَا بَلَغْتَ
رِسَالَتَهُ، وَاللَّهُ يَعْصِمُكَ مِنَ النَّاسِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَهْدِي الْقَوْمَ الْكَافِرِينَ
﴿٦٧﴾ قُلْ يَتَاهَلِ الْكِتَابِ لَسْتُمْ عَلَى شَيْءٍ حَتَّى تُقِيمُوا التَّوْرَةَ
وَالْإِنْجِيلَ وَمَا أُنزِلَ إِلَيْكُمْ مِنْ رَبِّكُمْ وَلِيُزِيدَكُمْ كَثِيرًا مِنْهُمْ مَا
أُنزِلَ إِلَيْكَ مِنْ رَبِّكَ طُغِينًا وَكُفْرًا فَلَا تَأْسَ عَلَى الْقَوْمِ الْكَافِرِينَ ﴿٦٨﴾
إِنَّ الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا وَالَّذِينَ هَادُوا وَالصَّابِغُونَ وَالنَّصَارَى مَنْ ءَامَنَ
بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ الْآخِرِ وَعَمِلَ صَالِحًا فَلَا خَوْفٌ عَلَيْهِمْ وَلَا هُمْ يَحْزَنُونَ
﴿٦٩﴾ لَقَدْ أَخَذْنَا مِيثَاقَ بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ وَأَرْسَلْنَا إِلَيْهِمْ رَسُولًا
قُلْنَا جَاءَ هُمْ رَسُولٌ بِمَا لَا تَهْوَى أَنْفُسُهُمْ فَرِيقًا كَذَّبُوا وَفَرِيقًا
يَقْتُلُونَ ﴿٧٠﴾ وَحَسِبُوا أَلَّا تَكُونَ فِتْنَةٌ فَعَمُوا وَصَمُّوا ثُمَّ تَابَ
اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِمْ ثُمَّ عَمُوا وَصَمُّوا كَثِيرٌ مِنْهُمْ وَاللَّهُ بَصِيرٌ بِمَا
يَعْمَلُونَ ﴿٧١﴾ لَقَدْ كَفَرَ الَّذِينَ قَالُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ هُوَ الْمَسِيحُ
ابْنُ مَرْيَمَ ۗ وَقَالَ الْمَسِيحُ يَبْنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ ۗ اعْبُدُوا اللَّهَ رَبِّي وَرَبَّكُمْ ۗ
إِنَّهُ مَنْ يُشْرِكْ بِاللَّهِ فَقَدْ حَرَّمَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ الْجَنَّةَ وَمَأْوَاهُ النَّارُ وَمَا
لِلظَّالِمِينَ مِنْ أَنْصَارٍ ﴿٧٢﴾ لَقَدْ كَفَرَ الَّذِينَ قَالُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ

تَالِثُ ثَلَاثَةٌ وَمَا مِنْ إِلَهٍ إِلَّا إِلَهُ وَاحِدٌ وَإِنْ لَمْ يَنْتَهُوا عَمَّا
 يَقُولُونَ لَيَمَسَّنَّ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا مِنْهُمْ عَذَابٌ أَلِيمٌ ﴿٧٣﴾ أَفَلَا
 يَتُوبُونَ إِلَى اللَّهِ وَيَسْتَغْفِرُونَ لَهُ وَاللَّهُ عَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ ﴿٧٤﴾ مَا
 الْمَسِيحُ ابْنُ مَرْيَمَ إِلَّا رَسُولٌ قَدْ خَلَتْ مِنْ قَبْلِهِ الرُّسُلُ
 وَأُمُّهُ صِدِّيقَةٌ كَانَا يَأْكُلَانِ الطَّعَامَ انظُرْ كَيْفَ
 بُيِّنَ لَهُمُ الْآيَاتِ ثُمَّ انظُرْ أَنَّي يُؤْفَكُونَ ﴿٧٥﴾ قُلْ
 أَنْعَبُدُونَ مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ مَا لَا يَمْلِكُ لَكُمْ ضَرًّا وَلَا نَفْعًا
 وَاللَّهُ هُوَ السَّمِيعُ الْعَلِيمُ ﴿٧٦﴾ قُلْ يَا أَهْلَ الْكِتَابِ لَا تَغْلُوا فِي
 دِينِكُمْ غَيْرَ الْحَقِّ وَلَا تَتَّبِعُوا أَهْوَاءَ قَوْمٍ قَدْ ضَلُّوا مِنْ
 قَبْلُ وَأَضَلُّوا كَثِيرًا وَضَلُّوا عَنْ سَوَاءِ السَّبِيلِ ﴿٧٧﴾ لُعِنَ
 الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا مِنْ بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ عَلَى لِسَانِ دَاوُدَ وَعِيسَى ابْنِ
 مَرْيَمَ ذَلِكَ بِمَا عَصَوْا وَكَانُوا يَعْتَدُونَ ﴿٧٨﴾ كَانُوا لَا
 يَتَنَاهَوْنَ عَنْ مُنْكَرٍ فَعَلُوهُ لَبِئْسَ مَا كَانُوا يَفْعَلُونَ
 ﴿٧٩﴾ تَرَى كَثِيرًا مِنْهُمْ يَتَوَلَّوْنَ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا لَبِئْسَ مَا
 قَدَّمَتْ لَهُمْ أَنْفُسَهُمْ أَنْ سَخِطَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِمْ وَفِي الْعَذَابِ هُمْ

خَالِدُونَ ﴿٨٠﴾ وَلَوْ كَانُوا يُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَالنَّبِيِّ وَمَا أُنزِلَ
إِلَيْهِ مَا اتَّخَذُوهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءَ وَلَكِنَّ كَثِيرًا مِّنْهُمْ فَسِقُونَ ﴿٨١﴾

- unto him will Allah deny Paradise, and his goal shall be the Fire; and such evildoers will have none to support them!
- (5:73) Indeed, the truth denies those who say, “Behold, Allah is the third of a trinity” — seeing that there is no deity whatever save the One God. And unless they desist from this, their assertion, grievous suffering is bound to befall such of them as are bent on denying the truth.
 - (5:74) Will they not, then, turn toward Allah in repentance, and ask His forgiveness? For Allah is much-forgiving, a dispenser of grace.
 - (5:75) The Christ, son of Mary, was but an apostle: all [other] apostles had passed away before him; and his mother was one who never deviated from the truth; and they both ate food [like other mortals]. Behold how clear We make these acts of Allah [in men’s affairs]: and then behold how perverted are their minds!
 - (5:76) Say, “Would you conform, beside Allah, to any that has no power either to harm or to benefit you — when Allah alone is all-hearing, all-knowing?”
 - (5:77) Say, “O followers of the Gospel! Do not overstep the bounds [of truth] in your religious beliefs; and do not follow the errant views of people who have gone astray aforetime, and have led many [others] astray, and are still straying from the right path.”
 - (5:78) Those of the Children of Israel who were bent on denying the truth [concerning Allah’s active presence in men’s affairs] have [already] been cursed by the tongue of David and of Jesus, the son of Mary: this, because they in-

- teractively rebelled [against Allah] and persisted in transgressing the bounds of what is right.
- (5:79) They would not prevent one another from doing whatever hateful things they did: vile indeed was what they were wont to do!
 - (5:80) [And now] you can see many of them allying themselves with those who are bent on denying the truth [of Allah's power]! [So] vile indeed is what their passions make them do that Allah has condemned them; and in suffering shall they abide.
 - (5:81) For, if they [truly] were committed to Allah and the Prophet and all that was bestowed upon him from on high, they would not take those [deniers of Allah's power and truth] for their allies: but most of them are iniquitous (al-Mā'idah: 67–81).

This lesson moves the Muslims with their Qur'anically tuned hearts deeper into the clandestine territories of the Yahūd and Naṣārā (Zionists and imperialists). The rigorous meanings unfold to showcase their deviation at the level of "convictions" and "beliefs." Their uneasiness with committed Muslims, besides being an established fact of political life, has a mooring in their tenets and feelings. Their history, especially that of the Yahūd, is replete with how tense and high-strung they are when it comes to committed Muslims. These Yahūd and Naṣārā showed their hand in the way they interacted and socialized with the Prophet (ﷺ) and the society of committed Muslims around him. If the Muslims can mature enough to see the facts of life in light of the meanings here in this foolproof Book they can proceed to develop their policies and conduct themselves appropriately vis-à-vis these types of covenant defectors and Bible deserters. A copious conceptual framework rationalizes the hostile behavior of the Yahūd and Naṣārā, who have used tainted scripture to "legalize" their antipathy toward the only remaining remnant responsible for upholding scripture: the committed and covenant-bearing Muslims. Absent from the Muslim public mind is the courage and staying power to place the

committed Muslims where they belong and to relocate the Yahūd and Naṣārā to where they belong in a modern world that has become a place of misunderstanding between these two blocs.

The lesson begins with a public notice to the Prophet (ﷺ) to communicate and spread all that has come to him from His Sustainer — and that means everything, with nothing excluded, and nothing postponed or delayed because of some local issues or interfering circumstances. Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) is required to pass on this revelation in its entirety and make it known to the widest audience possible — without fear and without covetousness. No other consideration of whatever nature should interfere with this declaration of scripture and enunciation of faith. The truth has to be spoken. That there would be some people who disagree, or some classes who are in opposition, or some interests that will not tolerate this are not valid excuses for holding back on the contents and the components of this final Book from Allah (ﷻ). Failing to transmit and transfer this scripture in its entirety is tantamount to a thorough failure.

Part of communicating the whole and indiscriminate scripture is to stand up to the Yahūd and Naṣārā by telling them that they are on flimsy “scriptural” grounds if they do not understand how morals become laws, how scripture becomes society, and how the Bible is the backbone of their lives. The Torah and the Gospel were meant to be their daily political reference, their inclusive human strategy, and their brotherly blueprint for cordial human and social relations. Today's Jews and Christians with all the “funny” definitions they give themselves should not be permitted to get away with claiming to be God's people when their governmental machineries are busy tearing apart and mowing down virtually all other peoples in the world. This Qur'an demands that the Yahūd and Naṣārā be advised of who they are supposed to be instead of who they have become; this has to be done frankly, directly, and thoroughly.

Furthermore, the Yahūd will have to come to terms with their “kufṛ” — that is, their denial of Allah's (ﷻ) immediate and tangible power in the social issues and political affairs of man. Even before the revelation of the Qur'an, a review of the misguided Yahūdī char-

acter was long overdue; they, per this Qur'an, will have to account for their abandonment of the covenant as well as their participation in the assassination of Prophets (ﷺ). Those who say they are Christians will have to realize they are in the wrong when they say that the Messiah Jesus, the son of Mary (ﷺ), is God; or when they say that God is a trio or a constituent thereof. The truth of the matter is that Jesus (ﷺ) himself warned the people of Israel not to diminish God by arguing that He has contenders, accessories, or rivals. The good life of the afterlife does not belong to those who waste away the majesty of God in this world by their false ideas and shifty beliefs. The Children of Israel, who deny God His power presence in human social and daily affairs, have been condemned by the words of David and Jesus (ﷺ) because of their faithlessness and belligerence.

The lesson winds down by exposing how people of previous scripture would rather side with secular *mushriks* when it comes to the alternative of forming an association with committed Muslims. This is proof positive, if one still needs it, of how those who say they are Jews or Christians have no real affinity to scripture and its people (the committed Muslims). If they cannot reconcile their "faith" with the certainty, authenticity, and accuracy that has come to them through Muhammad (ﷺ) then they are beyond redemption. They are not committed to God in any meaningful way.

Overreaching Things in the Concept of *Imāmah*

"O Apostle! Announce all that has been bestowed from on high upon you by your Sustainer..." The phrase, O Apostle (*yā ayyuhā al-rasūl*), has been used twice in this *sūrah* as an address to the Prophet (ﷺ). This is the second time. In both instances it is used in the course of tasking the Prophet (ﷺ) to speak to the people of scripture to convince them of the genuineness of this Qur'anic revelation and as a form of constructive dialogue. Islamic historical narratives regarding the time and occasion on which this *āyah* was revealed vary. Some narratives indicate that this *āyah* was revealed at the beginning of the Islamic mission's public relations and communication.⁵³⁸ In this instance, it would appear that an earlier

(Makkan) *āyah* was placed in a later (Madinan) *sūrah* for the purpose of reminding the Muslims of the initial and permanent feature of spreading the honest word and the good Book as far and wide as possible, without hesitations or covering-up the facts therein. There are other narratives indicating that this *āyah* was revealed on the day of Ghadīr Khumm in reference to Imam 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib.⁵³⁹

There are narrations that Imam Muḥammad al-Bāqir explained the Qur'anic words “**..all that has been bestowed from on high upon you by your Sustainer**” as a textual statement endorsing the immediate successorship of Imam 'Alī to the Prophet (ﷺ).⁵⁴⁰ He argues that the Prophet (ﷺ) was worried about a direct (or blunt) endorsement of 'Alī as successor being too much for his companions to accept; thus, his rationale suggests the *āyah* was revealed to prod the Prophet (ﷺ) to declare this appointment.

In a narration by 'Abdullāh ibn 'Abbās, it is said that Allah (ﷻ) ordered the Prophet (ﷺ) to break the news to the people concerning 'Alī's *walāyah*, but he was hesitant to do so fearing the people's suspicions, who would say that Muhammad (ﷺ) was showing a nepotist favoritism to his cousin, thereby discrediting 'Alī not because of a lack of merit, but because of his family relationship to the Prophet (ﷺ).⁵⁴¹ So when this *āyah* was revealed at Ghadīr Khumm, it is said that he took 'Alī's hand and said,

*For whomever I am a paramount [mawlā], [then] 'Alī is his paramount; O Allah! Augment he who champions him and act in opposition to he who opposes him.*⁵⁴²

This understanding at substantiating the immediate successorship of Imam 'Alī has a long and thought-out narrative for those Shi'īs who are convinced of this interpretation. And as is the case with such “sectarian” and sensitive issues, there are some narrations that go from the logical to the emotional and therefore have to be dismissed and dropped from the discourse.

The hadith “*For whomever I am a paramount [mawlā], 'Alī is his paramount...*” seems to be an authentic hadith without any doubt,

as is the second half, “*Augment he who champions him and act in opposition to he who opposes him.*”⁵⁴³ In one narrative, the Prophet (ﷺ) gave a public address informing people of the foundations of Islam, the essentials of *dīn*, and then he referred to his family circle saying,

*I retained within you two paramounts: the Book of Allah and my family chamber, the folks of my household. Be considerate in the way you succeed me pertaining to them; they will not part company until they approach me at the fount. Allah is my Superior, and I am the patron of every committed Muslim.*⁵⁴⁴

Then it is recorded that he held ‘Alī’s hand and said what is referred to as Hadith Ghadīr Khumm.

In the non-Shi‘ī understanding of this hadith, ‘Alī was shown to be right and absolved from any wrongdoing pertaining to his involvement in Yemen. The occasion upon which these prophetic words are said to have been uttered concerns the Prophet’s (ﷺ) appointment of ‘Alī as head of a military expedition to Yemen. During the military engagement there, some people were killed, and subsequently others became Muslims; and in both cases Imam ‘Alī was actively involved. Thereafter, upon deputizing one of his men to oversee the remaining clean-up operations, Imam ‘Alī hastened to join the Prophet (ﷺ) at the latter’s Hajj. This deputy, however, proceeded to award each Muslim soldier with an extravagant attire. When the military contingent returned back to home base, Imam ‘Alī noticed the soldiers wearing upscale apparel, and so he objected, ordering them to surrender their fancy garments. The strict military discipline Imam ‘Alī had observed in the engagement apparently did not correspond with the expectations of many of the Muslim troops who were anticipating greater reward for their military service; so these soldiers began to complain and express unhappiness with Imam ‘Alī’s austere standards.

When this exchange reached the attention of the Prophet (ﷺ), he took this public position, according to this narrative, and expressed his statement of approval concerning the character and

principles of Imam 'Alī so as to quell what may have become a serious anti-'Alī public sentiment. Thus, the Prophet (ﷺ) made it very clear that Imam 'Alī's assignment and orders were as to be expected: right, fair, and pleasing to Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ).⁵⁴⁵ It is said that Ghadīr Khumm is located somewhere between the two Ḥarams (Makkah and Madinah), near a place called Rābigh. This is the place where the Prophet (ﷺ) addressed the public on the 8th of Dhū al-Ḥijjah. It appears that those who consider themselves Shi'īs began to celebrate this day in the fourth *hijrī* century, around 400AH.

Those who count themselves as Sunnis do not consider the above hadith as binding on the Muslims or an "automatic" appointment of Imam 'Alī either as a *khalīfah* or as an imam. Obviously, in the *āyah*, neither the word *imam* nor the word *khalīfah* has been used. Accordingly, the word *walāyah* means *support* and *affection*, as is its general usage in the Qur'an when it refers to both *mu'mins* and *kāfirs*, "**ba'duhum awliyā'u ba'd: they [the Yahūd and Naṣārā] are supporters and allies of each other.**" Therefore, the meaning of the hadith is "For whomever I happen to be a champion and booster, then 'Alī is also his champion and booster," or "Whoever adopts and supports me should adopt and support 'Alī." The inference is that 'Alī is a follower and promoter of the Prophet (ﷺ); therefore, whoever stands for the Prophet (ﷺ) and considers him his patron should also consider 'Alī in a likewise manner.

The conduct of Imam 'Alī in his relationship with the *khalīfahs* — Abū Bakr, 'Umar, and even 'Uthmān — was to uphold this standard of supporting the Prophet (ﷺ) when others succeeded him with good will and the absence of malice. 'Alī in the world of merits and worthiness may have been more qualified to lead the Muslim Ummah after the Prophet (ﷺ), but the political involvement of an Arabian society-in-transition, as it tried to employ a (flawed) *shūrā* for the first time without the benefit of the Prophet's (ﷺ) guiding hand, could not see it that way. Thus, Imam 'Alī did not break with those who tried their best to uphold their responsibilities in a society that had to choose between the merits of an imam or the *shūrā* of an *ummaḥ*. This, though, cannot be said about Mu'āwiyah

who usurped power as he bypassed the *shūrā*, fought the Ṣaḥābah (the Prophet's Companions), and promoted Arabian nationalism.

It would be very mature of both those who call themselves Sunnīs and those who call themselves Shī'īs to agree on the legitimacy of the *khalīfahs* before Imam 'Alī and the illegitimacy of the kings after Imam 'Alī. If this is accomplished, there will be more solidarity among Muslims the world over. However, what makes this task formidable is the 13 intervening centuries that have been filled with super-sectarianism, nasty nationalism, and the absence of a Qur'anic culture.

The issues of *imāmah* and *shūrā*, as they relate to this early portion of Islamic history, have had two polarizing effects on the subsequent generations of those who truncate their Islam into a "Sunnism" or "Shī'ism" that is alien to those early years of Islam. No doubt the words *imam* and *shūrā* are Qur'anic words, and hence Qur'anic concepts. On the one side, did the concept of imam get mutilated by the dynasties and monarchies that followed the era of the *khalīfah* in an attempt to secure their "legitimacy," and hence the Shī'ī emphasis on it — with all the overstatements that come with the politically disadvantaged in their long centuries of political incompatibility with the powers that be? Or on the other side, does the concept of imam have any direct and *extra-shūrā* textual inscription in the Qur'an and hadith, as is generally understood in the literature of Sunnīs? This is augmented by the (passive or active) *bay'ah* Imam 'Alī expressed to his colleagues Abū Bakr, 'Umar, and 'Uthmān.

Had there been a binding verse, textual matter, or written document about this, from the Qur'an or hadith, then Imam 'Alī would have assumed the leadership of the Muslims on the day the Prophet (ﷺ) passed on. He would have stood up with all his known courage and devotion, and spoken to all about this well-grounded, validated, and legitimate matter — had it been that. This would have been his personal responsibility had he understood the matter of *imāmah* in the same way some latter-day "followers" of his understand it. If his *imāmah* had been an order from Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ), Imam 'Alī would not have caved into any other con-

sideration, whatever that may have been. The succession to the Prophet (ﷺ) proceeded as it did without Imam 'Alī quoting this *āyah* (5:67); generations of his devout followers also stood their ground against the dynastic usurpers of power (Umayyads and 'Abbasids) without quoting this *āyah* to substantiate their position. This writer has not come across any historical narrative, neither on the Day of Saqīfah (Banū Sā'idaḥ), nor on the Day of Shūrā after 'Umar's demise, nor on any other landmark day in that early Islamic history when this *āyah* was quoted to prove that 'Alī was the first and only legitimate successor to the Prophet (ﷺ), absent the mandatory *shūrā*.

Anyone who is familiar with Imam 'Alī's character and commitment knows that he would never compromise on matters of principle when he himself was the hero and champion of principle throughout his illustrious and selfless life. Not one incident in his life when he was apologetic about principle comes to mind. Not one incident in his life when he disguised himself with *taqīyah* (ideological dissimulation) is recorded in any Islamic historical text. The whole intensity and forcefulness of expression, the vehemence and accentuation of *imāmah* developed through the generations of Islamic political opposition to the kings and monarchs who seized power and used it to stifle legitimate opposition and freedom of conscience, speech, and assembly. The idea of *imāmah* became even more important to its adherents due to the syndication of illegitimate rulers and their court clergymen.

Supplanting this type of idea over the Qur'anic context that is primarily and thoroughly addressing the Yahūd and Naṣārā is out of order to put it mildly. It just does not fit into the divine flow of ideas, unless there is an absent component in Islamic written history in which the Yahūd and Naṣārā were directly and effectively involved in the dismantling of the *khilāfah* into *mullk 'aḏūḏ* and *mullk jabrī* (monarchy and authoritarianism). It would appear that if the *imāmah* supersedes the *shūrā*, the Prophet (ﷺ) would have reiterated its precedence over the *shūrā* in his farewell address at Ḥajjah al-Wadā'. This is when he asked all who gathered there as spectators and listeners to second his voice and bear witness,

*Allahumma hal ballaghtu? Allahumma fa-ashhad: O Allah!
Have I not communicated, spread the word, and gone public?
O Allah! Then bear witness!*⁵⁴⁶

Notice that the Arabic word *ballaghtu* in the hadith is the same as the one chosen in this *āyah*, *balligh*, with the latter being in the imperative form. So if there is a central theme to be associated with *tabligh* or *balāgh*, and that central theme is *imāmah*, then this would have been the time and occasion to draw peoples' attention to it and have them all bear witness to its mandatory and affixed meaning as later generations of "Shī'is" have understood it to be. Political oppression, though, has a way of causing the political underclass to lose sight of proportionality and balance. And this is not true only of those who are within the general fold of Shi'ism, it is also true of some Sunnī Islamic movements in contemporary times that are considered by the former to have placed more emphasis on *bay'ah* (allegiance), *imārah* (executive bureau), or *jamā'ah* (Muslim public).

As for the hadith about the Book of Allah (ﷻ) and the Prophet's (ﷺ) family circle, all Muslims honor its meaning as they are in support of Imam 'Alī, and on his side against those who were trying to expropriate power. The clan and class Arabians who were thwarting Imam 'Alī's positions at the battlefield and in the Ḥarams are not only his enemies but our enemies also. All Muslims consider their sympathies and struggle with Imam 'Alī to be a contribution to the sacrifices and struggle of Rasūl-Allah (ﷺ). They cling to the fact that the Prophet's (ﷺ) family circle will never part company with the meanings and objectives of Allah's (ﷻ) Book, which was revealed to him in their company. Indeed, the Book and the *'itrah* (the Prophet's posterity) are the endowment of the Prophet (ﷺ). There are hadiths, beside the one at Ghadīr Khumm, that corroborate this fact. The consensus of the *'itrah* is binding on all Muslims — without question or doubt. But if they, the *'itrah*, had their internal differences, then, per the usual Islamic approach, the affair has to be referred to Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ).

The Prophet (ﷺ) Delivered All of What Was Revealed to Him

Returning now to the general meaning of the *āyah*, the Prophet (ﷺ) is being counseled to announce to all and sundry the whole of revelation, the totality of scripture, and the entirety of Allah's (ﷻ) word. This applies to the Prophet (ﷺ) from the beginning of his mission until his final day. By extension, it also applies to his followers and all those in succeeding generations who commit to this Qur'anic message, as they proceed to acquaint new peoples in distant regions with this divine guidance. A prophet's disposition of mercy precludes him from unnecessarily hurting anyone's feelings; however, when the truth is at stake, delicate feelings have to take a back seat, especially where Yahūdī and Naṣrānī political and ideological deviations repackage the truth to uphold their elitist and exclusivist posture. Speaking truth to power comes with its own hazards, and so a prophet recognizes the fact that as he goes about doing his part, matters of safety and security will be handled by Allah (ﷻ), who will guard him from the relatively insignificant human agitation and commotion.

Telling the truth does not suggest that its presenter ought to be arrogant, condescending, or holier than thou; but having said that, he should be self-confident, have certitude in Allah's (ﷻ) words, and employ a manner of speech and behavior that aids in the transfer of ideas and concepts to the Yahūd and Naṣārā who, for all practical purposes, are no longer in touch with God or scripture. The truth can be expressed with an understanding of the other, or by exemplary behavior, or through normative forms of "civilized" speech.

Two issues normally become muddled here. There is the "substance" of Islam and there is the way of communicating it. The substance should never be diminished, diluted, or destroyed; it has to be spoken and explained exactly as it was meant to be by its source — Allah (ﷻ). The method of communication though may have its standard of wisdom and common sense. It may also have context specific details. Whatever the case may be, there is no conflict between an irrevocable substance and a variable means of communicating it. The substance, principles, and foundations of Islam

tolerate no alterations or mutilations. If Islam expresses the incompatibility between combining “governmental power” with “financial affluence,” then this fact has to be conspicuous in all discourses on the Qur’an, Islam, and the Prophet (ﷺ). The public declaration of these types of facts should be done with wisdom and engaging speech. Essential Islamic facts cannot be presented with distortions or distractions. Slicing away some of the truth to deliver another part of the truth so as to satisfy those who will not accept the whole truth denies the very meaning of truth to begin with.

The Prophet (ﷺ) in his approach to disseminating the truth was perceptive and prudent, engaging and communicative with the human potential around him. Correspondingly, he was never one to “negotiate” on matters of principle. He was ordered to say, **“O deniers [of Allah’s power]! I conform not to that which you conform” (109:1–2)**. In the unavoidable polarization between those who affirm Allah (ﷻ) and those who deny Him, the Prophet (ﷺ) was not so silly as to disregard those who would turn their verbal insults into physical assaults against him. Even so, he did not begin his mission by telling his people that they would only have to make a slight change in their lifestyle or an incremental modification of their culture. The truth of the matter was — and is today — that this opposition to God and prophet is dead wrong in its traditions, culture, and policies. Islam is the only thing right in life. If today’s Muslims cannot state this simple fact they will not be able to communicate the full range of this Message, according to the order here in this *āyah*.

There are those Muslims who say that some of Islam is vintage scripture whereas other parts of it are traditions, that some *āyāt* in the Qur’an are current but others are specific to that particular time in historical Arabia. Such types cannot tolerate being Muslims independent of the Yahūd and Naṣārā, they cannot think of themselves as pioneer Muslims who are blazing the way for the rest of humanity. Their “Islam” is wed to the powers that be; thus their definition of Islam borrows from those in power. They lack the confidence generated by being with Allah (ﷻ) — a confidence that sees an Islamic direction leading to prosperity and paradise, and an

anti-Islamic direction leading to doom and damnation. If ever in life there is a “we” and a “they,” it is here: we who affirm Allah (ﷻ) and they who foreswear God.

With this understanding and demeanor, the Muslims can say to the Yahūd and Naṣārā, **“You have no valid ground for your beliefs unless you [in word and deed] observe the Torah and the Gospel...”** And this is consonant with the directness and unequivocal comportment of Allah’s Prophet (ﷺ), as described in the following narrative,

The Messenger of Allah (ﷺ) was asked, “Which āyah, revealed from heaven, seems to you to be the most demanding?” He said, “I was at Miná on one occasion when the Arabian mushriks and many other people were there. Then Gabriel [the Archangel] came to me and conveyed the āyah ‘**O Apostle! Declare all that has been bestowed from on high upon you by your Sustainer: for unless you do it to the full, you will not have delivered His message [at all]...**’” The Prophet (ﷺ) went on to say, “I stood up at ‘Aqabah and said, ‘O people! Who will help me impart the messages of my Sustainer in exchange for Paradise? O people! Proclaim that there is no deity/authority except Allah and that I am Allah’s Messenger unto you — you will be successful and prosperous and gain Paradise.’” He then said, “It seemed like every man, woman, bond-servant, and child were throwing soil and stones at me, and saying, ‘You are a liar and a dissuader.’ Then came a passerby who said, ‘O Muhammad! If you are Allah’s Messenger, then it is time to invoke a calamity upon them as Noah did with his people.’” Finally, the Prophet (ﷺ) said, “O Allah! Guide my people, for they do not know [what they do]; and help me bring them to Your obedience.” Then al-‘Abbās, the Prophet’s (ﷺ) uncle, came and dispersed these people.⁵⁴⁷

“For unless you do it fully, you will not have delivered His message [at all]...” The general meaning of having to communi-

cate this scriptural message to all peoples and the particular meaning of having to communicate the truth about the failures of the Yahūd and Naṣārā go hand in hand. The latter is a detail of the former. So if the Prophet (ﷺ) and the committed Muslims were to withhold doing this to the full extent of its meaning and implications, they would have, in a sense, aborted their mission. Therefore, they are not given license to conceal some theological or political meanings that have come to them because they may be afraid of injury or harm. They are tasked with delivering the full range of meanings throughout this Scripture — *all* of its *āyāt* — to everyone and anyone, with no exceptions. For the more astute readers/thinkers, keeping back any particular portion of this scriptural package is an act of sabotage against the integral rest. Hiding some of it is like hiding all of it. This is parallel to another *āyah* in which Allah (ﷻ) says,

Because of this did We ordain unto the Children of Israel that if anyone kills a human being — unless it be [in punishment] for murder or for spreading corruption on earth — it shall be as though he had killed all mankind... (5:32).

Muslims lacking in self-confidence should by now understand that there are real people out there who need to hear the unadulterated word of Allah (ﷻ); they are looking for the truth in its full expression, and they cannot stand idly by while half-hearted Muslims express half-baked truths. Sincere listeners in the world are being turned off by Muslims who are playing around and avoiding the frank and direct expression of Allah's (ﷻ) message. Many Muslims do not or cannot appreciate the optimum truth in this Islamic discourse, which is decisive, definitive, and deliberately designed. No conscientious Muslim should be concerned with the consequences of going public with the full meanings in this Message (the Qur'an).

This issue has to be put in perspective. The Qur'an was revealed in increments spanning the course of 23 years. One incre-

ment was necessary for its succeeding one; and the ensuing one “rounded out” its preceding ones. In this overall continuum there can be no obscuring of any of these sequential constituents. The immediate reason is that the whole project of an Islamic way of life would be impaired if there was some information deleted from this deliberate and projected struggle and *tabligh*. The secondary, but not necessarily less important, reason is that if any revealed information was to be deleted, it would undermine the potential of future generations restarting this whole process anew along the lines of the *Sīrah* and Scripture, when they have to overcome paralyzing circumstances of tyranny. All of this should be available to them without deletion and omission. The wholesomeness and integrity of this 23-year mission in Arabia, or the thousands of years of prophetic history before Arabia, is complemented by other reinforcing *āyāt*,

Indeed, those who are in opposition to Allah and His Messenger’s [power presence] and want to separate Allah from His Messengers and then say, “We are committed to some [of scripture] and we are in denial of some [of scripture],” and seek to find a way out [of this integral relationship between Allah and His messengers], it is they, they who are the true *kāfirs* (4:150–151).

Were the impossible to become reality, if there was an *āyah* that the Prophet (ﷺ) would have wanted to hide, it probably would have been the *āyah* in *Sūrah al-Aḥzāb*,

And lo, [O Muhammad] you did say to the one to whom Allah had shown favor and to whom you had shown favor, “Hold on to your wife, and remain conscious of Allah [and His power presence]!” And [thus] would you hide within yourself something that Allah was about to bring to light — for you did stand in awe of [what] people [might think], whereas it was Allah alone of whom you should have stood in awe! [But]

then, when Zayd had come to the end of his union with her, We gave her to you in marriage, so that [in the future] no blame should attach to the committed Muslims for [marrying] the spouses of their adopted children when the latter have come to the end of their union with them. And [thus] Allah's will was done (33:37).

This *āyah* will be covered in detail in a later volume; nonetheless it speaks to the fact that Zayd and Zaynab, who were husband and wife, were to be informed by the words of heaven, along with everyone else in the world, that the Prophet (ﷺ) was attracted to Zaynab. This is the most subtle and simultaneously discomfiting feeling in the life of men; and as Umm al-Mu'minīn 'Ā'ishah and Anas ibn Mālik said, "If the Prophet (ﷺ) were to hide anything in this Qur'an, it would have been this *āyah*."⁵⁴⁸

It could be inferred that if every messenger was selected by God to communicate all of the scripture revealed to him, then such an *āyah* seems superfluous. However, the issue here is not so much the failure of messengers to communicate everything they receive from Allah (ﷻ) — they will obviously do that — but that of a roaming idea to "postpone" disseminating some of this God-given information for "an appropriate time" or "conducive conditions." This is why the *āyah* was revealed. It may occur to even Allah's Messengers (ﷺ) to pick the most advantageous time to break scriptural news to their own society and people. They may think that it would be "wise" to delay going public with certain *āyāt* until a gathering danger dissipates. And so, ordinary people have to realize that messengers do not have the prerogative of shelving some of the *āyāt* for what they may consider to be opportune or convenient times. In a sense, what is being implied here is that an *āyah*, once revealed, is not anyone's private possession, not even a prophet's; it is immediately in the public domain — no holds barred.

Expressing the ideological content of scripture should never be curtailed. Scripture has to be delivered to the whole world sans the apology that Islam is more than just a religion. The absent attitude in Muslim circles today is their inability to express the truth

because “the time is not right,” the “circumstances do not permit,” it should be “left to another day,” or “we are better off keeping our silence,” etc. Even after decades of a contemporary Islamic movement, most Muslim foot soldiers have not learned that the expression of truth is not contingent on pleasing elites or satisfying power centers. No committed Muslim’s personal desire or judgement ought to prevent him from divulging all that has been revealed from heaven above. The force and confidence of expressing and transmitting Allah’s (ﷻ) word have the effect of chipping away at the edifice of *kufr* or penetrating the hearts that await it.

In the highly sensitive issue of Zayd’s and Zaynab’s marriage, Zayd being the Prophet’s “adopted” son, Muhammad (ﷺ) would not compulsively grant permission for divorce, even to his own adoptee, knowing the marital difficulties between husband and wife. Thus, the Prophet (ﷺ) was firm in advising them to try their best to stay together and work out their difficulties. But this episode in the goings-on of Madinah had grown into a divinely-sanctioned, social teaching moment in which the Prophet (ﷺ) would lead by example, annulling previous traditions about an adoptee’s wife being proscribed to the adoptee’s guardian after divorce. The historical and cultural Arabian tradition concerning adoption considered such an act a “crime.” The Prophet (ﷺ) would be the first to set the record straight on this type of marriage relationship. And even though he had to pioneer this break with tradition and culture, he still feared what some people would be saying about Muhammad (ﷺ) marrying the divorcee of his “son.” Of course Zayd was not his (biological) son; but nonetheless Arabian cultural norms regarded the relationship of Muhammad (ﷺ) to Zayd as one of “father and son.” Zayd had been adopted by Muhammad (ﷺ) before the commencement of his prophethood.

In these intricate and delicate relationships the Prophet (ﷺ) showed a character discipline that coincided with the higher standards of Islam; that is, he discouraged the divorce. Therefore, every time Zayd would come to the Prophet complaining about Zaynab, the Prophet (ﷺ) would encourage him to continue on with his wife, while being conscious of Allah’s (ﷻ) power. The Prophet (ﷺ),

though, would internally repress what his mind would be telling him about the real possibility of Zayd and Zaynab ultimately settling for a divorce; and that he may eventually get a chance to marry her. With all the interlinking and fragility of emotions in the mix, the Prophet (ﷺ) was nonetheless inclined to delay the divorce as much as possible. But no prophet, especially the last one who was sent to all mankind, can truly have a personal or private life, as every aspect of his life, both private as well as public, is the ideal model of a social pattern (*sunnaḥ*) that the rest of his community is expected to abide by. And so, when this important aspect of the Prophet's (ﷺ) presumably "personal" life came under the supervision and direction of Revelation, the Prophet (ﷺ) could no longer extend what he would have preferred — the marriage of Zayd and Zaynab — as the aftermath of the divorce may have led to sustaining a cultural practice that had no validity in the divine scheme of things.

The Prophet (ﷺ) in all this was not under the influence of or crazed by his attraction to Zaynab; at the same time, he was keenly aware of the pacesetting trend he himself would have to set, notwithstanding the prevalent culture and normative traditions of the Arabians. So when the time came for him to marry Zaynab, and by doing so to break with the cultural norms about adoptees, he did so as a matter of obedience to Allah (ﷻ), as these *āyāt* in *Sūrah al-Aḥzāb* highlight. Therefore, the public character of the Prophet (ﷺ) — his Sunnah as it were — overruled his personal appraisal of the situation, and he moved forward with communicating this divine message as he was ordered to do — even as it defied the cultural "standards" of the day.

To go to the essence, pushing aside all cultural and traditional accretions, the fact of the matter here is that the Apostle of Allah (ﷺ) announced and publicized all that was revealed to him from the very first revelation at the Grotto of Ḥirā' to the very last one in his final days at Madinah. No *āyah* in the Qur'an, nor any reliable historical record indicates that he held back information, which he gave only to some in exclusion of others. This Scripture and this Prophet — the Qur'an and Muhammad (ﷺ) — are acces-

sible to everyone. The keys to understanding them thoroughly are a degree of proficiency in the Arabic language and acquiring the correct information about the formative years of Islam in Makkah and Madinah. To produce a deeper understanding of the moving *āyāt* and a polished apprehension of the momentous *Sīrah*, the many minds of the committed Muslims need to be working together as they unlock their potential with this treasure. The Qur'an and the *Sīrah* that took shape in its wake are the fountain-head of life-saving and life-giving meanings that we need, probably now more than ever.

“And Allah will protect you from [adversarial] people...” A historical account relates that the Prophet (ﷺ) had guards to protect him from the belligerence of his opponents during most of his time in Makkah.⁵⁴⁹ Abū Ṭālib, his uncle, was the one who was most concerned with his safety. Another uncle, al-'Abbās, was also his bodyguard. Other narrations say that the Prophet (ﷺ) was attended by some bodyguards from Banū Hāshim who were sent via the agency of Abū Ṭālib.⁵⁵⁰ When this *āyah* was revealed, the Prophet (ﷺ) said to his uncle, “O Uncle! Allah is protecting me; you need not send anyone to guard me henceforth.”⁵⁵¹ This, of course, did not impede the *mushriks* from their verbal and physical attempts to harm the Prophet (ﷺ). After Abū Ṭālib passed away, the *mushriks* met at Dār al-Nadwah and decided to assassinate Allah's Messenger (ﷺ), **“But then Allah will protect you...”** In Madinah after the Hijrah, assassination attempts on the Prophet's (ﷺ) life continued, with the Yahūd taking a decisive role.

“Behold, Allah does not guide people who object [to His power presence].” People opposed to the notion that God is involved in man's social decisions are the ones who will try to inflict injury on the Prophet (ﷺ), and by extension, on his dedicated followers and true disciples. But the words of Allah will find their way, the *āyāt* of Allah will take their course, and the will of Allah (ﷻ) will be triumphant.

Ahl al-Kitāb Can Save Their Scriptural Legacy with the Qur'an

O Apostle! All that has been bestowed from on high upon you by your Sustainer, for unless you do it absolutely, you will not have delivered His message [at all]. And Allah will secure you from [adversarial] people: behold, Allah does not guide people who deny [His power consequences in the affairs of men].

Say, “O followers of the Bible! You have no valid ground for your beliefs unless you [sincerely] observe the Torah and the Gospel, and all that has been bestowed from on high upon you by your Sustainer!”

Yet all that has been bestowed from on high upon you [O Prophet] by your Sustainer is bound to make many of them yet more stubborn in their overweening arrogance and in their denial of the truth [pertaining to Allah’s power presence in human affairs]. But anguish not over people who deny [such] truth. For, verily, those who are committed to Allah [via this divine Writ], as well as those who follow the Jewish faith, and the Sabians, and the Christians — all who are committed to Allah and the Last Day and do righteous deeds — no fear need they have, and neither shall they grieve (5:67–69).

The introductory *āyah* above sets a tone for the ones that follow and concentrate on Ahl-al-Kitāb (People of Scripture). The sequence and cadence in this Qur’anic discourse places the burden of communicating the whole truth to those who are partial in their approach to scripture: the Yahūd and Naṣārā. Outfitted with these *āyāt* of the Qur’an, the Prophet (ﷺ) and the committed Muslims of all succeeding generations are required to have the courage of conviction to declare that when it comes to the Torah and the Gospel, the beliefs du jour of the Yahūd and Naṣārā are, for all intents and purposes, baseless, groundless, and indiscriminate. One only needs to look around and see how keen these “Jews” and “Christians” are when it comes

to honoring the Old and New Testaments. Certainly, insofar as their collective and social behavior demonstrates, God's testaments may well have ceased to exist. And as to the Qur'an, these so-called people of scripture do not even want to talk about it, much less view it on par with preceding scriptures like the Bible and Torah. So, how can the Muslims, who are bound by the truth, consider these erstwhile scripturalists to be a people of God? Can the "Muslims" of hither and yon stand up and voice these words of truth,

Say, "O followers of the Bible! You have no valid ground for your beliefs until you [honestly and forthrightly] simulate the Torah and the Gospel, and all that has been bestowed from on high upon you by your Sustainer!" (5:68)

This is not an easy task, even in today's world, where some Muslims are supposed to be enjoying the freedoms of speech and public assembly. Muslims, who are expected to assuredly declare, **"You have no valid ground for your beliefs unless you [honestly] put together the Torah and the Gospel,"** have abdicated the moral high ground to the very same (Zionist) Jews and (imperialist) Christians who are lost in their detachment from Sustainer and scripture. Many Muslims act as if they are living the life of Muhammad (ﷺ) but when they are told to step into these Muhammadi footsteps and tell the Yahūd and Naṣārā that they are not supported by reason or evidence, they cringe, receding into the bogus comfort zone of a trivialized and inconsequential "Islam," made so by favoring *du'ā'* (supplication) and *'ibādāt* (rituals) to the important work of engaging tyranny.

There is a reflex in the words that go back and forth between "Muslims" on the one hand and "Jews and Christians" on the other. If a Muslim were to tell them that there is really nothing much left of Judaism or Christianity in their lives, or even in their synagogues and churches, they will respond by denying such an assertion. But when a "Jew" tells another "Jew" about how empty, meaningless, and impractical their faith has become, or a "Christian" does the

same with another “Christian,” they all nod in passive or active acceptance. If the egos of all these so-called Muslims, Christians, and Jews would not be preventing their minds from going to work on this issue, they would all probably reach the conclusion that attending to scripture is an endangered practice on earth. And save for the theoretical integrity and continuity of the Qur’an, there is nothing else left for mankind.

True, at the time this *āyah* was revealed, there still may have been traces of Judaism and Christianity that retained some degree of fidelity to the original revelation. The Jews and Christians of those times had a more intense experience with whatever was left of their holy books. Compared to their contemporary scriptural heirs, they may have felt more pride in their “Jewishness” or “Christendom.” However, not unlike today, they may have also tried to get away with saying that they are “truly committed to God.” But this scriptural Qur’an and the Prophet’s (ﷺ) communication of it exposed the camouflage of such claims.

The working level of sacrificing Muslims does not permit Allah’s (ﷻ) *dīn* to be reduced to liturgy, ceremonial observances, and religious services. Allah’s (ﷻ) eternal scripture as distilled in its final form in this eternal Qur’an is not meant to be mere words uttered here and there, nor is it meant for prayer formulas on weekends. Furthermore, it is not a “religion” that is acquired through inheritance or hereditary conveyance. Allah’s (ﷻ) *dīn* is the engagement and infusion of man’s sincere efforts with divine instructions and counsel to the end of having a trouble-free working arrangement among societies. That of course would include a conviction molded by Allah in the conscience of man followed by a congregation endorsed by Allah (ﷻ) in the community of people. This standard of living and this influence of scripture is absent in both “Jewish” and “Christian” societies. Thus, they have no scriptural *dīn*. Therefore, someone is going to have to challenge these shadow Jews and Christians with the verity that their whole concept of “religion” is faulty, indefensible, and wrong. The first person to be tasked with this responsibility was none other than Muhammad, the Prophet of Allah (ﷺ).

Unfortunately, many of the “Muslims” living in today’s erroneous pax-Biblica are not following suit with the civic advocacy and persona of Muhammad (ﷺ), as they are too scared to say the one thing that will actually give the public discussion on the matter the direction it needs: if the “Jews” and “Christians” were to reconstruct the Torah and the Gospel in their lives, then they will have to affirm the inclusiveness of the Qur’an and its final word on all things scriptural. The world is rapidly shrinking, and those who still consider themselves Jews and Christians are going to have to look at the Qur’an with their minds and not with their emotions and historical biases; they are going to have to summon an intellect unfettered by age-old prejudices when trying to understand this Last Testament.

Ancient scriptures repeatedly recount the now long-lost pledge of “believers” to cast their support behind God’s Prophets and Apostles (ﷺ). The description of Muhammad was an integral part of the Torah and the Gospel, but for reasons traceable to the exclusivity and group interests of both “Jews” and “Christians” there no longer is a description of Muhammad (ﷺ) in their holy books. It follows that a sincere demonstration of commitment to the values and meanings of the Torah and Gospel will by necessity lead the faithful to the acknowledgment of Muhammad (ﷺ) as prophet and the Qur’an as scripture. And when that is done all people will understand how inclusive the Qur’an is and how validating it is of both the revealed Torah and the unadulterated Gospel, before they were appropriated by religious classes and market barons. This is the remarkable task the Prophet (ﷺ) had to perform; otherwise the *dīn* of Allah (ﷻ) would have become, à la the experience of people of previous scripture, another mishmash of human disfigurement — something that could not be delineated to its full extent in a way that demarcates it from a pruned Judaism and an ill-proportioned Christianity.

Today, the vast majority of Muslims are gripped by the frame of mind that they ought not to provoke Jews and Christians by dwelling on the latter’s failure to abide by the Torah and the Gospel in their lives; that it does not serve the purposes of the *da’wah* to

belabor the breakdown of Christians and Jews as regards their covenant relationship with God. These types of “Muslims,” who have the Jews and Christians on their minds while not having Allah (ﷻ) in their hearts, should honestly be smarter. They should realize that Allah (ﷻ) knew this type of frank language will cause many Jews and Christians to recoil into their shells of prejudice and into their defiance of Islam and committed Muslims. Jews and Christians of this ilk may even feel hurt to the degree of fostering hostility toward and bad relations with Muslims.

All this may be partially or completely true; but the flip side of this would be for the Prophet (ﷺ) and the committed Muslims to withhold statements of truth, conceal the fact of the matter, and overlook matters of principle and scriptural doctrine. Muslims of sincere commitment do not perceive themselves to be in a war theater with Christians and Jews; they are, strictly speaking, only expressing their God-given *āyāt* and ideas about facts on the ground. Jews and Christians of whatever level of religious devotion have all the right in the world to respond to this presentation of facts. If all of us live in an open world of sincere dialogue, then why should anyone be upset with someone else’s point of view, especially as all of us want the truth to inform our lives? Why is it so hard for Jews and Christians to rise to this mental level and answer the committed Muslims, instead of becoming emotionally irritated or socially agitated? That some so-called followers of the Torah or the Gospel feel offended by the Muslims echoing the words of this Qur’anic scripture is certainly cause for anguish. However, the Islamic intent was never directed toward intentionally hurting anyone’s feelings, even though this may be the inevitable consequence of ego intruding into a rational consideration of issues. According to Allah’s (ﷻ) orders on the matter, the Prophet (ﷺ), and by extension the committed Muslims, are required to proclaim the truth on matters of principle, scriptural doctrine, and the political orientation thereof.

Such an open declaration of truth may hurt particularly those who abandoned it for whatever reason in times past. But what should also be clear is that concealing or silencing this truth hurts

everyone even more. Hence if we are going to be hurt either way — by expressing the truth or by repressing it — then it is better for us to follow our Lord's instructions and express this truth, come what may. After the truth becomes an important deliberative issue in the public domain, then the people may choose to accept or reject it, and to validate their selection (vote), they may go a step further to either enlist with its advocates or to join its opponents. Regardless of the ultimate decision to accept or reject, the choice itself can only follow the unimpeded circulation of the truth and not its suppression and concealment.

Yet all that has been bestowed from on high upon you [O Prophet] by your Sustainer is bound to make many of them [Jews and Christians — Zionists and imperialists] yet more stubborn in their [expression of] concentrated and excessive power and in their denial [of Allah's power presence in human affairs]. But do not be sorry over people who deny [such] truth (5:68).

This is how committed Muslims can learn the true mettle of people, the discernment between those who are sincere to Allah (ﷻ) and those who are pretending to be honest with Him. They will be able to recognize who His diehard enemies are. People are supposed to be comforted by the truth, but here the committed Muslims are given the understanding that there are people who are offended and incensed by the truth. Hearts that cannot accommodate the truth turn to muscles that are protective of egos. None of these dynamics would ever surface if the word and the statement of truth were never to go public. It is the proclamation of truth that brings out the true nature of people; conversely, it is the silencing of truth that disguises their true nature.

In the middle of this standoff, which has to do with voicing and broadcasting the truth, Muslims need to be astute about the nature of their political relations with blocs of power pertaining to “Jews” and “Christians.” In the first instance, how is it possible for some “Muslims” to rationalize a political fraternity with Zionists

and imperialists knowing, after understanding these *āyāt*, that they have no scriptural *dīn*? Can members of the Islamic movement who are on loan to some less-than-Islamic-governments state for the record that neither Zionists and their Jewish religious justifiers, nor imperialists and their Christian religious justifiers have a scriptural *dīn*? Or are they more prone to say that they do not want to upset the “Jews” and “Christians”? By not calling into question Jewish and Christian attitudes toward their own scriptures, and by selectively presenting the *āyāt* of the Qur’an, are such Muslims behaving as if they have more compassion than Allah (ﷻ), who in these *āyāt* says that the truth will raise Jewish-cum-Zionist rage and double Christian-cum-imperialist denial of God? Are they not prepared to endure the consequences that follow the promulgation of truth on matters of principle, much as the Prophet (ﷺ) did when he took the first step?

The conflicting considerations that race through the minds of Muslims are puzzling. There should really be no question about whether to prioritize the “feelings and sensitivities” of the Yahūd and Naṣārā or the words and will of Allah (ﷻ). With these clear-cut instructions, there ought to be no second thoughts about who — other than Allah (ﷻ) — deserves precedence and priority. The distance between Allah’s (ﷻ) *dīn*, as presented by the Qur’an and the Prophet (ﷺ) on one side, and the mannerism and collective behavior of the Yahūd and Naṣārā (Zionists and imperialists) on the other side is so striking that it is obvious the latter have no scriptural *dīn*. They may have rituals, religious ceremonies, hymns and choruses — but they definitely have no scriptural *dīn*. Therefore, from this basic understanding of the final word in the Qur’an and the conclusive prophetic precedent, no license has been given to “Muslims” to join hands with Zionists and imperialists in a 20th-century war against atheism and communism much in the same manner that no justification has been given to them to work with Zionists and imperialists against international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. These wrong-headed policies may be workable only when there is no reference to the integrated program of this Qur’an and the voluminous lessons from the Prophet’s (ﷺ) 23-year struggle.

The Qur'anic facts are undeniable: Zionists and their Jewish underlings as well as imperialists and their Christian subordinates are not concerned with the Torah and the Gospel as their lifelong social reference or as their guide to social justice and human equality on earth. They ditched the Torah and the Gospel when they embarked on their centennial and global path of subjecting other peoples to their militaries and pervading them with ideas that justify imperialist expansion and Zionist expropriations. If the "Jews and Christians" no longer refer to the Torah and Gospel in their political relations with others or in the constitutions of their societies, then on what basis do we Muslims confer upon them the title of people of scriptural *dīn*? They have proven their infidelity to their own scriptures. So why are we behind the times in understanding this well-established and time-proven fact? All the ruling classes in the Zionist and imperialist spheres of the world have to be excluded from Judaism and Christianity even though they may habitually go to their temples and chapels, insisting they are "fervent Jews" and "pious Christians." Allah (ﷻ) has spoken the truth about these who deny Him, and as for us Muslims, **"...do not be sorry over people who deny [such] truth."**

If the Muslims settle on the fact that Allah (ﷻ) has spoken the conclusive and binding word on this matter, and that they themselves have to propagate this meaning in a factual and rational way, then they should not be concerned with how it plays out among those who want to consider themselves people of scripture. Because of this, the Yahūd and Naṣārā may go through some fits. Be that as it may, the Muslims are not seeking to rattle their nerves and they are not going to get excited watching these so-called people of scripture lose their composure. However, if that is how the Yahūd and Naṣārā choose to respond to God's words of truth, then they themselves should bear the consequences of their choice. And if these truth-telling words of the Qur'an and this echo of Scripture lead the heads of state in the world of Judaism and Christianity to declare out-and-out war against the maintainers of scripture (the Muslims) then the latter should be ready and alert for such an eventuality.

It is not in the character of committed Muslims to underplay the truth and facts coming from Allah (ﷻ), and by so doing demean themselves as they curry favor with people who have trivialized God's standard and criteria while they selfishly pursue their materialistic objectives. No Muslim who is sincere to Allah's (ﷻ) words here can ever seek their "recognition" or approval at the expense of these precious heavenly facts. These Zionist Jews and imperialist Christians have gone so far off the scriptural course that to say they are Jews or Christians would be dubious. Islam is threatened neither by "Islamic fundamentalists," nor by impoverished and oppressed peoples; hence, there is no rationale for "Islam" to seek some kind of affiliation with Zionism and imperialism.

Allah (ﷻ) has drawn a red line between committed Muslims on the one hand, and aggressive Zionists and abusive imperialists on the other. No king, council, or convention has the power to blur this line or to jump over it. Unlike the committed Muslims who have their program for social justice, human equality, and a fair distribution of wealth and resources, the Zionists and imperialists have their own program for transnational theft, cross-border plundering, and global greed; and this program, which they "religiously" prosecute, excludes them from any worthwhile or practical relationship with God. Any political figure or religious institution that wants to obfuscate this issue is going against the grain of scripture and the core of the Qur'an,

You [Jews and Christians who have replaced Torah and Gospel with Zionism and imperialism] have no valid ground for your beliefs unless you [wholeheartedly and practically] set up the Torah and the Gospel, and all that has been bestowed from on high upon you by your Sustainer! (5:68).

To those who may be quick to point to the inconsistency of assailing Jews for becoming Zionists and Christians for becoming imperialists, but not censuring "Muslims" for surrendering to their secular systems and materialistic states, let it be said that the same

general rule applies to all cases. Though there is no equivalent to Zionism and imperialism within the Islamic context, the ruling classes within geographical and cultural Islam nonetheless have sold themselves out to either Zionism, imperialism, or both, and thus are something on the order of Zionist proteges or imperialist clients. Therefore, with equal candidness, Muslims who are incapable or unwilling to bring out, set up, and put together this Qur'an in its social perimeters, to the full range of its economic and political meanings, do not have a scriptural *dīn*. They may saturate themselves with the private performances of Islam or even some weekly or daily rituals such as *ṣalāh*, *ṣiyām*, and Hajj, but for the historical and practical purposes of socializing scripture, they are void of a scriptural *dīn*. People of scripture — any scripture — are responsible for the real-life implementation of its meanings and purposes. If they ignore, neglect, or defy such responsibilities and choose to cover themselves with the veneer of scripture while retaining their secular, godless, and selfish preferences, then they should not be able to fool anyone into believing their claims to being at the heart of scripture.

The history of prophets and men of God has always been their struggle to take scripture beyond the personal and into the social, from within the internal thoughts of individuals to the public behavior of society. This is a matter of principle, it is a matter of historical depth and significance, and it is also a matter that distinguishes people who want God to be more than an imaginary idea, who want Him to work His will through their practical devotion to Him in everything they do in all fields of life.

Knowing that this Qur'an is the only genuine thing left in the history of revelation and scripture, it becomes binding on all seekers of God to discover this treasure of meanings and to distribute its wealth of guidance. Talking about Islam night and day is not going to do it; an accumulation of billions of Islamic names is not going to do it. There has to be a solid, coordinated, and structured mass effort that gives economic and political meaning to Islam. This is what will go a long way to explaining what Islam is all about. This structure and system, which requires the efforts and involvement of dedicated Muslims, is what is referred to as *dīn*.

Will there come a day when Jews and Christians will regroup and resume a biblical public orientation in life? Will their rededication to the Torah and Gospel cause them to think through their responsibilities of justice, equality, and the brotherhood of mankind? And will they, after doing that, come to realize that the Qur'an offers them all the main answers they are looking for in this regard, and that the Qur'an, after all, is authenticating and expanding the true meanings of scripture and the inevitable objectives for man's life on earth? The answers to these questions may not be known at this time. However, what is known is that human nature desires to know the truth, that human beings are fed up with a materialistically deadlocked world, and that the way out of this global phobia is right here in this Book of books and in this Scripture of scriptures. Is the prejudice of the "Jews" and the power of the "Christians" enough to thwart their search for the truth and salvation? Only time will tell. But as long as these people — those who are Zionists first and Jews second, and imperialists first and Christians second — have no scriptural anchor and no scriptural compass in their social and transcultural relations, they cannot be included in the definition of Torahic Jews and Gospelian Christians.

Allah's (ﷻ) *dīn* is neither a slogan nor something hereditary (an attribute that automatically passes from parents to offspring). The *dīn* of Allah (ﷻ) is an interplay between a conscience that wants to become a social norm and a society that is rooted in the depths of man's conscience. The powerful words and meanings of Allah (ﷻ) germinate in man's fertile sense of right and wrong, from there they grow within congregational and community solidarity, and from there they naturally develop to become the government that springs from the normal and daily lives of its own constituents. Allah's (ﷻ) *dīn* permeates all these levels and spheres of life. If people — Jews, Christians, and Muslims — fail to move forward with this essential definition of *dīn*, then they have no scriptural *dīn*. The only difference between the Muslims and the people of previous scripture is that the former, who have lagged behind all these years, are still in a position to restart this *dīn* simply because they have not corrupted their scripture, are not beholden

to the interests of the elites, and are not the automaton citizens of imposed establishments and governments that they know are illegitimate and oppressive. The secularization of religion and the religiosity of secularism have not consumed the Muslims as they have the Jews and Christians. For this reason there is still hope that from within the Islamic context there will be, sooner or later, a reinstatement of Allah's (ﷻ) *dīn*.

One of the more demanding problems facing today's Muslims is their perception of the difficulty associated with stripping the Zionists of Judaism and the imperialists of Christianity. Many Muslim scholars today cannot sustain an intelligent, much less a brave mental assault, on Zionism and imperialism. The plug has to be pulled on the clever and cunning interplay, which has dominated public discourse since the eclipse of Islamic political authority, between Judaism and Zionism on the one hand and Christianity and imperialism on the other hand. This task falls on the Qur'anically enlightened Muslims. It cannot be accomplished in the *zawāyā* of *masjids* (recesses of *masjids*). Rather it has to be a full-blown, total-immersion campaign that sinks into and pervades the mass public mind and common culture of the Muslim people. Of course this will require the Muslims to be experienced in the areas of public broadcasting, mass media, and all other means of communication and transmission of information. Zionist- and imperialist-controlled establishments are not going to altruistically give freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press to Qur'anic Muslims so that they can observe their commitment to Allah (ﷻ). That is why it becomes an Islamic duty for the committed Muslims to establish their own radio and television stations, their own press and journals, and their own broadcasting stations and satellites. There is no other way to do this. Distilling this issue down to its very essence, the Muslims will come to realize that to fulfill the meanings of this one *āyah*, they will have to be in possession of their own Islamic state.

This should not upset the Jews of the Torah or the Christians of the Gospel, but it should disturb the Zionists who hide behind the Torah and the imperialists who hide behind the Gospel. The

Qur'anically-informed Muslims should be aware of this; they should even be prepared for it, but they should never be excessively concerned about it when they know that Allah (ﷻ) is their *'āṣim* (protector) and that He will not lead the *kāfirs* in the right direction.

We the committed Muslims understand very well the intended meanings of this Qur'an when it comes to Zionists and imperialists; hence, when we fail to tell them who they really are just because we do not want to hurt the feelings of Jews and Christians, when we fail to state the facts about Zionists and imperialists candidly, then we in a sense become traitors to the responsibility we carry. And we, in fact, fool them into believing their own claim of being Jews and Christians when they are in reality Zionists and imperialists. This apologetic attitude of far too many Muslims may even hurt everyone, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Being honest about the truth can only improve things and being dishonest about it can only worsen things.

The truth has to be delivered. The method of delivering the truth though has to be one that makes it possible for the other side to reason and think. The truth itself should not be permitted to be undermined by an arrogant individual or an aggressive elite. In some instances a thorough knowledge of the target people will be necessary. The basis though for communicating these truths and principles should remain one of wisdom and an engaging and appealing form of speech.

If we, the committed Muslims, were to take a look at the religious, ideological, and political landscape of today's world, we may notice that secular, God-denying, and hypocritical types of peoples have the upper hand — militarily and philosophically. We may recoil at this circumstance and conclude that we stand no chance as we ourselves have failed to live up to our Qur'anic, scriptural, and prophetic duties. How can a small and menial expression of this Qur'anic truth make a difference? How can we stand, virtually, in front of the whole world and say that everyone is on shaky ground when it comes to revelation and scripture? How can we expect them to listen to us, for when they look at the vast majority of Muslims throughout the world, they will see a people who have nothing

to offer except grinding poverty, a scarcity of equality, an absence of justice, and a rampage of instability?

Actually, the nature of our cozy relationship with Allah (ﷻ) should make all the above “negative appearances” incentives for us to move ahead with our God-assigned responsibilities. We should even have more courage in these types of circumstances to point out that almost all of humanity is moving in the wrong direction. The theories and practices that deny God amount to a *jāhiliyah*, an impending disaster, and a satanic state of affairs. Even if all societies on earth were to turn their backs on God and there were only a few individuals left who could see how false and erroneous everyone else is, the former would still be wrong. The weakness associated with human deviations away from God can only make us more attentive to our Qur’anic responsibilities, which are reinforced by the momentum of truth. It may seem to some that we are back to square one, as there are only a handful of committed Muslims, but a planet full of people off course. Yet this is how most of Allah’s Prophets (ﷺ) began their missions, and so this has to be the way forward. No amount of turmoil and turbulence in the human condition can dilute our drive to Allah (ﷻ) by virtue of His driving force in us,

O Apostle! Go public with all that has been revealed to you from on high by your Sustainer: for unless you do it [without concealing anything], you will not have delivered His message [at all]. And Allah will protect you from [hostile] people: behold, Allah does not guide people who reject [His power position in the affairs of men]. Say, “O followers of the Bible! You have no valid ground for your beliefs unless you [indeed] observe the Torah and the Gospel, and all that has been given to you from on high by your Sustainer!” (5:67–68).

Extending these meanings in a related direction, consider those who say today they are Christians, and whether or not they live by what they say. The Bible says that if someone aggresses against another, then the latter should not aggress in turn; are they

observing this biblical standard? The Bible tells them to turn the other cheek; are they turning the other cheek? The Bible preaches one thing, while its supposed adherents are in a mad arms race to see who can accumulate the largest stockpile of apocalyptic weapons. They biblically bid people peace on earth but simultaneously deliberate on the many war theaters they are responsible for around the world. The Bible speaks about the poor and how the faithful ought to be caring for them; but where is the greatest amassing and hoarding of treasures, resources, and Wall Streets of wealth, if not in the Christian world? The Bible says that a wealthy person will not enter the heavenly kingdom until a camel can pass through the eye of a needle, but then it is their domain that contains the largest number of millionaires and billionaires. Everything they are practically doing contradicts all the passages of justice and peace in their holy script. The fact of the matter is that they do not want to be bothered by scriptural standards and the rules of revelation. In fact, if someone strikes a “Christian” on one cheek, he does not turn the other cheek; instead, he turns on his machine guns, artillery pieces, and weapons of mass destruction to obliterate the “hell out of” the offender. Today, they go from continent to continent, and now from planet to planet, looking for new frontiers, potential resources, and the strategic military advantage thereof. All the talk in the Bible about God’s kingdom and the life to come amounts in their eyes to fairy tales and legendary myths. Therefore, how can anyone, let alone Muslims, believe a word they say about this conjectural Bible, which they themselves have “junked”?

Muslims are advised with these *āyāt* that this Qur’an will only exacerbate the attitude of many cosmetic Jews and costume Christians. The Qur’an’s truth will cause many of them to abuse power, to concentrate wealth, and to theorize even farther their distance from God. These “Jews” and “Christians” of convenience cannot extend the love of God from their hearts to care for the poor, to help eliminate starvation, to put a roof over the homeless, or to show compassion to orphans and widows. That is because God’s love has no place in their hearts. Paganism, prejudice, and perversion is what undergirds their “Jewish” and “Christian” symbolism.

This, in some ways, explains why they cannot take a closer and less biased look at the Qur'an. They no longer have the basic elements of a scriptural *dīn*, and so they are ill-equipped to read and consider the Qur'an; hence they have a hard time realizing that in it is the essence of their distorted Judaism and lost Christianity. Zionists look at Islam and the Qur'an from an angle of prejudice, and imperialists look at it from an angle of aggression. This aggravates their *kufr* and their *ṭughyān* (uncurbed abuse of power). It would seem that the further Jews are from Zionism and the further Christians are from imperialism the better their chances are of identifying the authenticity of this Qur'an and the guidance therein.

The Qur'an Shows Ahl al-Kitāb How to Get Back on Course

For, verily, those who are committed to Allah [via this divine Writ], as well as those who follow the Jewish faith, and the Sabians, and the Christians — all who are committed to Allah and the Last Day and do righteous deeds — no fear need they have, and neither shall they grieve (5:69).

The phrase “...those who are committed to Allah” is a reference to the committed Muslims. “Those who follow the Jewish faith” refers to the Jews. The Sabians are, in all likelihood, those who renounced paganism before the advent of Muhammad (ﷺ) and devoted themselves to the reverence of the One God without any particular set of rituals; among the pre-Islamic Arabians there were a few of these Sabians. And “...the Christians” are the followers of the Messiah, Jesus (ﷺ).

The gist of this *āyah* says that the peculiar ritualistic practices or particular forms of worship of people — be they Muslims, Jews, Sabians, or Christians — cannot be a cause of division so long as they are all devoted and committed to the One Deity/Authority, the Last Day, and do what is right and righteous. All of this cannot be in contradiction to what the last Apostle (ﷺ) has presented to

humanity, as it is a reaffirmation of scripture and an inclusive one at that. If that is the case, then **“...no fear need they have, and neither shall they grieve.”** This is the redeeming feature of scripture: an active commitment to God, a conscientious feeling for the Last Day, and a lifetime of good and salutary deeds. In light of the Qur’anic discourse here, this means the dis-establishment of all systems and structures that interfere with the one divinity and one authority of Allah (ﷻ). This is obviously a well and undisguised feature of Islam; the issue, though, is that it is not an obvious and transparent feature of other beliefs, religions, and creeds. Therefore, if these others do not allow for this vital component of scripture, then they cannot be included in the list delineated by this *āyah*.

The discourse then returns to the history of the Children of Israel, as these are the ones who have laid a claim on Judaism. The upcoming Qur’anic exposé demonstrates that they have no legitimate ground for whom they claim to be. There is also a sense of how important it is for the committed Muslims to tell them the truth about themselves. They, too, need to know about Islam and how it is the one and only scriptural *dīn*. In the continuing Qur’anic account of Banū Isrā’īl, the reader discovers more about them and their innate features. The more that is known about them, the more notorious they become. No true Muslim with a Qur’anic mind can advance any rationale for a working political relationship with these types of people. Such racists have no appreciation for, and thereby do not consider, issues of consummate justice and inclusive truth. And so, with the words of Allah (ﷻ), Banū Isrā’īl stands exposed,

Indeed, We accepted a solemn pledge from the Children of Israel, and We sent them apostles, [but] every time an apostle came to them with anything that was not to their liking, [they reneged]: to some of them they gave the lie, while others they would slay, thinking that no harm would befall them; and so they became blind and deaf [of heart]. Thereafter, Allah accepted their repentance, and again many of them became blind and deaf. But Allah sees all that they do (5:70–71).

Because people, even within the same generation, have a tendency to lose sight of the character of these scripture pretenders, here is yet another chapter in this sordid history that has its roots in antiquity. The Yahūd of Madinah were not configuring a new character when they showed their true selves to Muhammad (ﷺ); they were merely revealing their ancient temperament and ethos. Their narrative is a record of dissension and contention. Slipping away from God's commandments and covenant is second nature to them. They appear to elevate their personal preferences above everything else, even above God's books and counsel. Their solidarity, in their own judgement, is more important than prophets and apostles. These Children of Israel have accumulated over the eons a windfall of aggressive attitudes and offensive behavior toward divinity and prophethood,

Indeed, We accepted a solemn pledge from the Children of Israel, and We sent apostles unto them, [but] every time an apostle came to them with anything that was not to their liking, [they went back on it]: to some of them they gave the lie, while others they would kill... (5:70).

Israeli history is replete with their accusations and renunciations. They have an eccentricity of intimidating and killing prophets, opting instead for their leanings and lusts.

The history of the Children of Israel is so replete with tortured details that it is no surprise to find the Qur'an full of their mistakes, misconceptions, and miscalculations. Muslims should take note — lest they themselves become the duplicate copies of Banū Isrā'īl. Today, there are some “educated” Muslims who think it is smart to imitate the “Yahūd” and do what they did to become influential and powerful. There are already “mini-chapters” in our recent past in which we, the Muslims, have rulers who behave like the Children of Israel as they falsify the true character of struggling Muslims and condemn devout Muslims to death for no reason at all except that they are expressing truth to power.

The false psychology of the Children of Israel arrogates them to try to play elaborate tricks on God and His Prophets (ﷺ), with the accompanying thinking that they can get away with it. Little do they realize that God has loaded their misdeeds with a rebounding effect. They have always, in some sense or the other, gotten a taste of their own misbehavior in this world as a prelude to what is coming in the following world. They could never get a feel for the way God's will operates through the course of human history as well as their own history. That, to a certain degree, is due to their own assertion that they are "God's chosen race," **"...thinking that no sedition would come their way, and so they became blind and deaf."**

The combination of religious prejudice and material prosperity has been an omen in their bedeviled history. Religious bigotry and monetary wealth can blind people to the subtle and delicate forces at work — in society and in self. They have eyes without a vision and ears without an aural faculty. Despite all of this, in His infinite grace, **"Allah accepted their repentance."** But they did not appreciate His free pardon and they did not appraise their costly sins; thus, their own experience was of no value to them, **"And again many of them became blind and deaf. But Allah sees all that they do."**

This is the monitoring device the Children of Israel were not tuned into. They would go about doing their own "thing" unconscious and unmindful of God's ever-presence and watchful eye. Knowing this ought to be enough for committed Muslims to keep their distance from Zionists in Jewish skin. If Muhammadi history is to teach the Muslims an enduring lesson, it is that they will have their 'Ubādaḥ ibn al-Ṣāmits who annulled all relations with the political Jews of Madinah; and they will concurrently have their 'Abdullāh ibn Ubayy ibn Sallūls who will appear as Muslims in the presence of committed Muslims and disappear as *munāfiqs* in the presence of the Yahūd.

After bringing to light the unsavory characteristics of the Yahūd, the Qur'an proceeds to do the same with the Naṣārā, as they too have gone off the scriptural course. Previously in this *sūrah*, the *āyāt* (5:17–19) indict those who say that God is the Messiah, the son of Mary (ﷺ), disgracing them with *kufr*. This now is reiterated

as it describes those who say that God is a portion of a trinity along with those who say that God is the Christ, son of Mary (ﷺ). Here, Jesus' (ﷺ) own testimony and his account of their *kufr* reinforces the case against them. Jesus, or 'Īsá (ﷺ), tells them not to ascribe divinity and authority except to the One God and he states that Allah (ﷻ) is his Sustainer as well as theirs. Then Allah (ﷻ) commands them to desist from all their misconceptions and misunderstandings that condemn them to blasphemy. What these "Christians" say about God and divinity has neither scriptural basis nor heavenly approval,

Indeed, the truth denies those who say, "Behold, Allah is the Christ, son of Mary" — seeing that the Christ [himself] said, "O Children of Israel! Conform to Allah [alone], who is my Sustainer as well as your Sustainer." Behold, whoever ascribes divinity to any being beside Allah, unto him will Allah deny Paradise, and his retreat shall be the Fire; and such evildoers will have none to support them! Indeed, the truth denies those who say, "Behold, Allah is the third of a trinity"— seeing that there is no deity whatever save the One God. And unless they desist from this their assertion, grievous suffering is bound to befall such of them as are bent on denying the truth. Will they not, then, turn toward Allah in repentance, and ask His forgiveness? For Allah is much-forgiving, a dispenser of grace.

The Christ, son of Mary, was but an apostle: all [other] apostles had passed away before him; and his mother was one who never deviated from the truth; and they both ate food [like other mortals]. Behold how clear We make these acts of Allah [in men's affairs]: and then behold how perverted are their minds!

Say, "Would you conform, beside Allah, to anyone who has no power either to harm or benefit you — when Allah alone is all-hearing, all-knowing?" Say, "O followers of the Gospel! Do not overstep the bounds

[of truth] in your religious beliefs, and do not follow the errant views of people who have gone astray aforetime, and have led many others astray, and are still straying from the right path” (5:72–77).

Christians have gone to the other extreme in trying to understand who Jesus (ﷺ) was. The Jews satanized him while the Christians deified him. Both of these positions, at once erroneous, fallacious, and blasphemous, are extremes and at odds with the truth and the facts. The Jews have uttered nonsensical fabrications about Jesus and his mother (ﷺ), and by contrast, the Christians have countered with hyperbole and idealization. Both of these erratic positions are tantamount to *kufr*. The Christian belief in a trinity that is made up of three components — the father, the son, and the holy spirit — does not appear in historical scriptures before the Injil (Gospel), it does not occur in the Gospel itself, and it is refuted in this Qur’an, “Indeed, the truth denies those who say, ‘Behold, God is the third of a trinity...’”⁵⁵²

It is not only the denial of the truth that these Christians are guilty of; they are also guilty of denying God’s will and power in the affairs of men. The birth of Jesus (ﷺ) was not meant to be the beginning of a “trinity”; it was meant to be the continuation of *tawhīd*. Jesus (ﷺ) said to them, “O Children of Israel! Conform to Allah [who is] my Lord and your Lord.” This runs contrary to all the assertions that come from the Christian positions on Jesus (ﷺ). These quotes in the Qur’an deliver the exact words of Jesus (ﷺ) who acknowledges that Allah (ﷻ) is his God as He is the God of the Children of Israel and the God of everyone else. This is a testimony from Jesus (ﷺ) that he is human, mortal, and a person subject to Allah (ﷻ) — that he himself is not God. He goes on to motivate the Children of Israel to comply with Allah’s (ﷻ) words and meanings.

In the Gospel is corroboration of the same, “And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent” (John, 17:3). If only today’s Christians could come to realize — above all the intrusions of the church and

the empire — that Jesus (ﷺ) was preaching the Oneness of God, the mistaken notion of a perpetrated “trinity,” along with its dangerous precedent of exceptionalism arising from being “created in God’s image,” could be surmounted. The end of this *sūrah* details more of the words of Jesus (ﷺ) as he describes what he said to the people around him, **“I did not say to them [the Children of Israel] except what You [O Allah] ordered me to say [and that is], ‘Conform to Allah, my Sustainer and your Sustainer’”** (5:117).

Certainly, whoever associates others with Allah, then Allah will deny him [access to] Paradise, and his abode shall be the Fire; and such offenders will have none to support them (5:72).

If people are reasoned enough to come to terms with the fact that all of God’s Apostles and Prophets (ﷺ) had but one task — to refer their societies and peoples to the divinity and authority of the One God — then it can be easily understood that the mission of Jesus (ﷺ), not unlike others in the prophetic continuum, was to do exactly that. He also was to caution people, as did the prophets before him, from elevating humans or things to the status of divinity and deity, and from subsuming Allah’s (ﷻ) divinity and authority to humans and things. This demotion of divinity and promotion of humanity goes against the grain of Allah’s (ﷻ) superiority and man’s inferiority as they relate to each other. The elevation of man to the status of a god is unacceptable; it is so unacceptable that it has become the *shirk* for which there is no pardon.

In the present day, corporate elites, governmental officials, and military commanders have, among others, been raised to the status of gods, even though the public propaganda around does not explicitly say so. The practical pursuits in life all confirm this fact. And therefore, anyone who gives these conglomerates, controlling interests, or confederations the prerogative to become the source of values, the fountainhead of standards, and the scripture of laws will have committed the unspeakable sin of *shirk*. This sin is so serious that its perpetrator will have to suffer being banned from the bliss of

the life to follow. There will be nowhere else to go for these inculpatory individuals except to the Fire and its humiliation and torment.

Hence, what ended with the global oppression of most men by other men started sequentially with, first, the denial of the truth about Allah (ﷻ), a truth that rejects the assertion of Him having a “son” or a “chosen race.” This led to a mal-conformity with God, ultimately effectuating a degradation of God altogether. And in the end, this is what became injustice and oppression to the human condition on earth. And so the Qur’an reiterates the Naṣrānī incompatibility with the facts, **“Of course, the truth denies those who say, ‘Behold, Allah is the third of a trinity.’”** It is contrary to the truth to say that God, who is the creator of heaven and earth, is one of three entities within a trinity, defined as a father, a son, and a holy spirit.

The first five centuries of the Christian Church saw many debates, controversies, and “heresies.” As a result of these, Church councils (a conclave of bishops and cardinals) formulated creeds or statements of belief that set forth the parameters of orthodoxy. Heresy often preceded orthodoxy, in that it forced the Church to state what it considers to be correct belief. For example, the Nicene Creed of 325CE stated that there is only one God (monotheism) and that this God should be understood as a *trinity*, namely father, son — Jesus Christ (ﷺ) — and holy spirit (this is the concept that is still operative within the Church and most individual Christians). However, father, son, and spirit should not be understood as three modes or manifestations of God (modalism), and nor should they be understood as three separate divinities (tritheism), but should rather be understood as three persons (*hypostasis* in Greek) sharing a single divine substance (*homoousios* in Greek), each being fully God. Hence, God is “correctly” understood as a *tri-unity*.

This, of course, raises further questions. For example, if Jesus (ﷺ) is divine — “of one substance (*homoousios*) with the father” — does this mean that he was not fully human? Perhaps, according to others, he only seemed to be fully human (docetism). But there were positions that did not agree. A further council held at Chalcedon in 451CE insisted that, without thinking of him as some

strange hybrid being or a being with a split personality, Jesus (ﷺ) should be understood as having two “natures” in a single unified person, a fully human nature and also a fully divine nature.⁵⁵³

As unusual as all the discussions on the “trinity” have been, there is yet a more bizarre explanation concerning the nature of God and His relationship with man, the interpretation of scripture, and the future life of man. This one maintains that there is one God and that the trinity is not of persons but of aspects of the divine nature. God, according to this interpretation, took on human form in Christ, his humanity being glorified through his constant resistance to temptation and his conquest of the powers of evil, thus ensuring the redemption of man.⁵⁵⁴

Some “Christians” regard God as a person, but reject the doctrine of the trinity. They take the view that Jesus (ﷺ) was not eternal — he came into existence at the incarnation — and died as a “representative” rather than as a “substitute” for the sins of the human race. Christian Scientists believe God is “All-in-all” and think of Him in terms of Principle rather than as a person. They reject the idea of God as three persons in one, but accept the trinity, defined as three in one — the same in essence, though multiform in office: God the Father-Mother, Christ the spiritual idea of sonship, and divine Science or the Holy comforter. Jehovah’s Witnesses believe in one God, whom they call “Jehovah.” They reject the doctrine of the trinity, seeing Jesus (ﷺ) as “a mighty one but not almighty as Jehovah God is.” Jesus (ﷺ) is seen as “the first of Jehovah God’s creations” (Colossians, 1:15). The holy spirit is not regarded as a person but rather as “God’s active force” that enables God’s people to live for Him.⁵⁵⁵

In other Christian denominations, beliefs are drawn from what are considered unusual combinations such as Dispensationalism, Arianism, and Pentecostalism.⁵⁵⁶ They separate history into periods of “divine administration,” with the current “period of grace” beginning at Pentecost.⁵⁵⁷ Some Christians may affirm Christ’s status as son of God and saviour, but deny his full divinity, and therefore also deny the trinitarian orthodoxy of Western (European) Christianity.⁵⁵⁸

Anyone who has bothered to screen the opinions held within what passes as Christianity will at the end be convinced that these Christians have no knowledge of what they are talking about. Their human opinions on this matter have no scriptural foundations and no rooting in scriptural history. Abraham, Noah, Moses, David, Solomon, Isaac, Jacob, and other prophets (ﷺ) never preached a trinity; hence, if the concept of trinity and a sonship of God is a fact of life and a stepping stone to heaven, then it would have taken up an important part of the history of prophethood and the pages of scripture. Rather, the notion of a trinity appears to have some parallels in non-Semitic religions in Greece, India, Egypt, and other places.

The response to all this mental instability is found in the well-preserved words of Allah (ﷻ) when He says, **“And there is no deity except for the One God.”** All this uncorroborated talk about a trinity is neither confirmed by history nor by logic. Existence, life, and being are not disposed to two gods, three gods, or multiple gods and mini-gods. There is only *the* God who is one without procreating and without disintegrating. This God is Allah (ﷻ). He is not compounded, nor is He combined by multiplication. There are no numbers attached to His essence and no diluted or concentrated shades to His attributes. The One God — Allah (ﷻ) — does not have diminishing qualities nor contributing quantities. He is not the dividend or divisor of a fraction. It appears that the concept of a trinity leaked into Christianity through the surrounding world of paganism and pagan religions. More rational “Christians” try to “simplify” or “thin out” the trinity idea. Some intellectual Christians are caught between their rational selves and their traditional church, unable to find a “Christian” way out. Some of them even go as far as confessing that the concept of the trinity is not meant for the human mind. The best they can do is to try to play mental games by saying that the trinity is a unity of three, like the Sun, which has its physical mass, its light, and its thermal component; or like the variant physical states of water: liquid, vapor, and solid (ice). This is what happens to a human mind that begins to look for an excuse or explanation to a simultaneously un-scriptural

and illogical premise. The descriptions of the Sun can be numerous, but they are just descriptions and not the essence of the matter. The Sun, in and of itself, remains one. Its descriptions have no diminishing effect on its essence; similarly with water. But all of this is misguided to begin with as it presupposes that God is definable in materialistic terms. Or that a better understanding of God can be ascertained by shrinking Him into the physical world, **“And unless they desist from this, their assertion, grievous suffering is bound to befall such of them as are bent on denying the truth.”**

The wording of this *āyah* makes it clear to those who keep on arguing about their firm belief in the concept of the trinity that they do not belong to the people of scripture. Their insistence on this misleading concept of the trinity places them in the definition of *al-ladhīna kafarū* — those who are bent on defying and denying the truth. And this state of God-denial they are in (the trinity) triggers the awful consequences of a very uncomfortable life to come.

“Will they not, then, turn toward Allah in repentance, and ask His forgiveness? For Allah is much-forgiving, merciful.” This is the beauty and grace of the Qur’anic scripture: it states the truth about Allah (ﷻ) without assigning an inferior position to those who are theologically wrong in their understanding of God. Rather, it turns to them and encourages them to correct their ideas and ask for His forgiveness as they had entertained the wrong impression or conception about God.

The Christ, son of Mary, was but an apostle: all [other] apostles had passed away before him; and his mother was one who never deviated from the truth; and they both ate food [like other mortals] (5:75).

This is a reply to those who may come to acquiesce to the oneness of God, but still have to come to terms with whom Jesus and his mother (ﷻ) were. Were they humans? Or were they something more? Is there any room to raise them above the status of human beings, to make of them super-human beings who may not be “exactly divine”? The answer here goes directly to those who still want

to elevate Jesus and his mother (ﷺ) to a semi-divine position. In point of fact, Jesus (ﷺ) was special, but he was only as special as all the other apostles and prophets of God. This is an honor in and of itself. He was in the special care of God as were the preceding prophets and apostles. He received revelation, inspiration, and scripture. This is how Jesus and his brethren prophets (ﷺ) were distinctive and unique. His mother was clean-living, immaculate, and virtuous. She was not a prophet, per se, but she comes as close to being one as can be.

The correct and accurate understanding of Jesus and Mary (ﷺ) is that they were of the highest quality, insofar as human beings are concerned. The contested point between Muslims and Christians is that the latter ascribe divinity to Jesus and Mary (ﷺ). Muslims, however, go by the Book, and the Book says that Jesus and Mary (ﷺ) were persons who both consumed food. They had to be fed and nurtured just like everyone else. They could not live without the physiological necessities that are part of human life. This would also mean that they had to “use the toilet.” Thus, biologically and physically, they were individuals and mortals. Eating and drinking is a dependency relationship. And God, the Creator and Sustainer, is not subject to a dependency relationship. The whole issue has to be placed in the public mind, exposed to the common sense of reasoning and thinking: God is God and man is man. No accuracy is going to emerge from the blurring or fudging of this issue.

“Behold, how clear We make these acts of Allah [in men’s affairs]: and then behold how distorted are their minds!” In other words, Muhammad (ﷺ) and the readers of the Qur’an are expected to see how Allah (ﷻ) clarifies things pertaining to Himself as He works His will in human society; however, despite this evidence, Allah (ﷻ) says that their minds will remain misdirected. Allah (ﷻ) shows them these things through the faculty of their reasoning, by the virtue of their thinking, but these benighted Christians choose to turn off the very channel through which He is explaining the truth pertaining to Himself, that is, their human minds. Allah (ﷻ) tells them that the Messiah Jesus (ﷺ) is not what they build

him up to be, but they do not want to listen. They just do not want to consider the truth that has come to them and to the rest of mankind through this heavenly Script. The *āyāt* of truth here overturn their centuries of fallacies about Jesus (ﷺ); yet they abide by these fallacies instead of honoring the common-sense truth. The conglomeration of false traditions has always been a major obstacle to the acceptance of the truth. Even active minds can be stonewalled by centuries of trumped-up theology. This happens to be the case with the Christians, **“Say, ‘Do you accede to, in omission of Allah, persons or things that can do you no harm or good, when Allah is all-hearing, all-knowing?’”**

The Qur'an establishes the fact that neither Jesus nor Mary (ﷺ) were gods or divines. They were in the special rank of prophets and holy people, yet they were, in the general and customary sense, human beings. The contrast between the clear meanings of these *āyāt* about Jesus and Mary (ﷺ) and the cluttered explanations of an equivocal “trinity” in Christian theology leaves the mind and intellect no choice but to immediately take refuge in the Oneness of God.

Allah's Prophet (ﷺ) and the committed Muslims around him are advised to query the trinitarians, **“Say, ‘Do you adorn, in exclusion to Allah, things that cause you no pain or relief?’”** In other words, Muhammad (ﷺ) and the Muslims are told to ask the Christians and their equivalents, who idolize objects and mortals besides Allah (ﷻ), why they worship things that if not revered can bring them no retribution and, likewise, no salvation. These human and nonhuman objects of veneration are essentially baseless, worthless, and useless. Contrast that with Allah (ﷻ) who hears and knows everything; He hears people speak to Him and He responds, He knows their condition and He accounts for it. Therefore, it should behoove them to adhere only to Him and no one else.

The way Christians have a fancy for and venerate Jesus (ﷺ) can only be matched by the way the Jews denigrate and lash out at him. The Christians give him the status of an ever-living God, while the Jews want to forget about his life altogether, wishing he never existed, hence their involvement in the attempt to kill — or

crucify — him. These two extremes are equally wrong. This Christian fanaticism and Jewish dogmatism is what the following *āyah* is referring to,

Say, “O followers of the Bible! Do not overstate and overdraw your belief system by breaching the truth; and do not follow the obsessions of people who have gone astray aforetime, and have led many [others] astray, and are still straying from the balanced course (5:77).

The wording here admonishes the extremists not to hyperbolize the facts on the ground and exaggerate the facts in scripture. When these two opposing sides (Jews and Christians) adopt their own fanatical points of view about Jesus and his mother (ﷺ), they either minimize or magnify, overstate or understate, and dehumanize or deify the two of them. None of this is warranted, correct, or rational. No prophet or saint is a god; therefore, they do not have the power to avail the good or cause harm in the manner and from the position of the divine. Placing such human beings on par with God removes them from their own “cause and effect” humanity. This is particularly true of Christians who refer to Jesus (ﷺ) as “God, Lord, or Savior.” The Qur’an came to tell the Christians of those times and the Christians of all times to break with this extravagant exaggeration and vehement impersonation of Jesus, son of Mary (ﷺ). The first generation of disciples and pupils of Jesus were not trinitarians; they did not believe Jesus and his mother (ﷺ) were gods, and they have no affinity with the types of Christians who have polluted the faith with all this nonsensical talk about a trinity.

A look at the larger picture will give the reader a better feel for the discourse being presented here. The ongoing effort in this abiding Qur’an is to set the theological and ideological record straight. *Tawhīd* is both ideological and theological. Allah (ﷻ) is a divinity as well as an authority. Man’s relationship with Him disintegrates when he separates what is ideological from what is theological. Society suffers when its sole divinity is no longer its sole

authority. That is why it is of paramount significance for the proper standard of living (Islam) to set this record straight.

Finally, what is also evident in this discourse is that those who say God is Christ, the son of Mary (ﷺ), are *kāfirs*. If a person says point blank that God is Jesus (ﷺ), while he is totally convinced of what he is saying, then there can be no doubt that he is a *kāfir*. The Qur'an is concerned less with an individual saying that God is Jesus (ﷺ) than with institutions, governments, and a worldwide church saying it. In the words of Allah (ﷻ), they are *kāfirs*. The same is applicable to those foundations, establishments, and religious organizations that describe God as a third of three. The committed Muslims are not being overly judgemental with these types of people who are convinced in their own selves of what they are saying. The word is Allah's (ﷻ) word — and He is the one who says they are *kāfirs*. If this is the case, why are today's wheeling-and-dealing Muslims, who have little to no self-respect, saying that Christians and Jews belong to the same frame of reference that the committed Muslims belong to? *Kāfirs* cannot be inserted into Allah's (ﷻ) *dīn* when they mis-characterize Him, secularize their religion, and then express their rage and anger against committed Muslims who are going by the Book.

Even though we Muslims are “liberal” enough to not coerce anyone to become a Muslim, we are not so “liberal” as to enlist in Allah's (ﷻ) *dīn* those who cannot accept the integrated divinity and authority of Allah (ﷻ). We are sure — dead sure — that the Qur'an is Allah's (ﷻ) undiluted and unpolluted scripture, which has survived the challenges of time, the intrusion of dictators, and the efforts of religious classes to manipulate it for their own interests, as has happened in Christianity and Judaism. Given all this, there can be no ground for public-relations “Muslims” to find common purpose with “Jews” and “Christians” and then stand together with them against the coming Islamic global state of mind and state of affairs. When the combined ideological and theological chasm is this wide, there can be no alliance with these types of “Christians” and “Jews.”

They Were So Bad That Their Own Prophets Cursed Them

This lesson ends with a face-off between the prophets of Banū Isrā'īl on one side and the *kāfirs* of Banū Isrā'īl on the other. This should be mandatory reading for all peoples as it is a permanent fixture of the history of the world. Two of the towering figures in the history of Banū Isrā'īl — David and Jesus (ﷺ) — are quoted invoking damnation and doom on the Israeli deniers of God (*kāfirs*). And God responded in the manner He was requested because of the Israeli habit of disobedience, pugnacity, and contentiousness with the Divine. This Israeli recalcitrance against their commitment to Allah's (ﷻ) covenant turned into their social disintegration. When immorality began to spread among them, they had no public stamina and intensity to arrest it. They could never muster enough social solidarity to retard the creeping growth of immorality. At the same time, these Israeli deniers of God were more disposed to taking the non-scriptural deniers of God as their allies and superiors. It is their failure of scriptural duties that incurred the displeasure of Almighty God, who ultimately sentenced them to eternal denunciation and punishment,

Cursed are the deniers [of Allah's power] from among the Children of Israel by the articulation of David and Jesus, the son of Mary: this, because they, in solidarity, forcefully resisted [Allah as a power in society] and persisted in transgressing the bounds of what is right. They would not in unison prevent one another from doing whatever abominable things they did: vile indeed was what they were wont to do!

[And now] you can see many of them allying themselves with those who are deniers [of Allah's power]! [So] vile indeed is what their passions make them do that Allah has condemned them; and in suffering shall they abide. For, if they [in fact and practice] were committed to Allah and the Prophet and all that was bestowed upon him from on high, they would not take those [deniers of Allah's power and

truthful presence] for their allies: but most of them are iniquitous (5:78–81).

Allah's (ﷻ) curse and condemnation are the ultimate expression of His anger and wrath. Those who are thus cursed are deprived of His courtesy and care; expelled are they from His grace and favor. David (ﷺ) decried and excoriated the Children of Israel for their violation of the Sabbath in particular, and for their general social attitude of breaking away from God. Then Jesus (ﷺ), the last of a long line of prophets sent to Banū Isrā'īl, also damned and cursed them. This long-drawn-out disapproval and denunciation from the mouths of prophets came as a result of Banū Isrā'īl's flare-ups and display of bad temper with Allah (ﷻ). The phrase *kānū ya'tadūn* (meaning, *they — the Israeli kāfirs — were bent on irreverence and infractions*) divulges their well-established historical character.

The psychological delinquency and social bankruptcy of the *kāfir* pacesetters of Banū Isrā'īl centered around their unwillingness to curb any public expression of immorality or wickedness. They showed no group solidarity in intercepting and discontinuing the *munkar* they had perpetrated. A society gives itself the chance to endure if it has the capacity to control its trends, proclivities, and social forces. But Israeli society has always been disinclined to restrain the tendencies and drifts toward moral deviation and social ruin. Scripture has its moral standards, its social equality, and its economic justice. And if the leaders and constituents of a society cannot protect it from an outbreak of immorality, a straying toward injustice, and a prominence of prejudice, then everyone in that social unit is doomed.

Immorality in its mainstream complexion does not just suddenly appear out of the blue. A gradual degradation process makes it a societal norm. At first, individuals or small groups of people begin to exhibit symptoms of dishonesty, and it may take years before the more honest people of the same society adopt an attitude of simply "living with it." After that, the next incremental step of indecency may turn into obscenity, and this may take a few generations to "mature." After more people are conditioned to this

relative moral backslide in society, they may be ready for the increment of lewdness and licentiousness. And this also may need a couple of generations to become a feature of society. The “interests” and “power-structures” around this moral and social failure now become weighty components of the social order. Their outside character is one of “status” but their inner disposition is one of trickery, deviance, and abuse. The first victims of this social decay are usually women, children, racial minorities, orphans, and widows.

When the original inclinations of immorality turn into social forces, institutions, and legal entities, it becomes too late and too difficult for sages, rabbis, and clergymen to arrest a social momentum that is leading such a society to its ruin. What follows, in a natural course of things, is the institutionalization of irregularity, the legalization of injustice, and the preponderance of unfairness. At this stage of corruption, the weak voices of chaplains and priests, rabbis and the spiritual leaders of Jewish congregations, which inveigh against sin, evil, and wickedness, fall on deaf ears. They should not have waited until the eleventh hour to start checking the growing and expanding immorality. They should have done something about it when there was still time to catch it and stop it. When there was only a lukewarm social cohesion around the central theme of Allah’s (ﷻ) authority, His scriptural instructions, and the clean society that is founded on those attributes, then the hard facts of history demonstrate that the renegades in the Israeli community seized the upper hand, and in consequence their entire social order took a nosedive into *kufir*. The narrative of the “rise and fall” of Israeli society is punctuated with the proliferation of *munkar*; the loss of its moral quality and public ethics is endemic. The consolidated effort of a critical mass of dedicated, scripture-driven people would be necessary to stifle the inceptive attempts at breaking away from God and His scriptural standards. This is precisely where the *kāfirs* from among the Children of Israel failed miserably, “**Vile indeed was what they were committing.**” These breakaway Children of Israel who tolerated immorality and went along with corruption were actually distancing themselves from Allah (ﷻ), and for that they deserve to be decried in the

strongest terms and declared unfit to shoulder the responsibilities of God's covenant.

This Israeli trait, which has followed them wherever they have gone, is repeatedly highlighted in the Qur'an, firstly because the people the Israelis mix with have a tendency to overlook it due to the reverence accorded to ancient people of scripture. Secondly, the committed Muslims are reminded of it in order to save them from replicating this nefarious behavior, thereby setting themselves up to fall into the same abyss of *kufri*, à la the Israelis. There may be limited repeat performances by some Muslims here and there of this irredeemable behavior; however, in the final analysis, even these Muslims will be judged by what they do and not by the consequence of their having a special relationship with God. The Prophet of Allah (ﷺ) is reported to have said,

“The first encroachment of inadequacy within the Children of Israel happened when a man [from Banū Isrā’īl] would encounter another man [committing a sin] and tell him, ‘Be conscious of Allah [and His power] and refrain from your [sinful] conduct because it is unbecoming of you.’ Then, the following day, he would meet him [again] doing the same sinful act but this time would not object; what is more, the sinful conduct of this man would not stop the former from eating, drinking, and socializing with the latter. When this became a social trait Allah caused their hearts to collide with each other.” And then the Prophet (ﷺ) said, **“Cursed from the Children of Israel are the deniers of Allah [and His social power] in the words of David and Jesus, son of Mary — that was due to their disobedience and transgression [of Allah’s set perimeters]; they [the deserter Children of Israel] did not socially cooperate in prohibiting the munkar...”** Then he said, *“But never, by Allah! You [the committed Muslims] will most certainly stand for and construct the ma’rūf [the self-evident good] as you will most certainly take a stand against and deconstruct the munkar [the self-evident social vice]. Then you*

will, of a certainty, adjust the course of an oppressor by holding him to the reference of the ḥaqq [truth and justice]; you may even, for sure, bind him within the frame of truth and justice, or else Allah will cause your hearts to clash and [then] curse and condemn you [the committed Muslims] as he did them [the kāfir Israelis].”⁵⁵⁹

A few other hadiths carry the same general meaning. The issue here concerns whether or not the Muslims of today will be able to draw the pertinent lessons from these *āyāt* and take the relevant action to avoid becoming a carbon copy of these recreant Israelis. Today’s Muslims have shown they are capable of following in the footsteps of Banū Isrā’īl, despite the fact that the Qur’anic record on Banū Isrā’īl shouts out to the Muslims to not let their societies slide into a state of God-denial. Even some Islamic parties and organizations have enlisted in the tumbling process of *kufur*; and when the social rules of Allah (ﷻ) take their course it may be too late for these breakaway Muslims to redeem themselves.

What begins with acquiescing to the moral decay in society by followers of scripture ends with a political capitulation to their secular and godless superiors. In today’s world, as in the Prophet’s (ﷺ) world, the disavowing Yahūd continue to be who they are, **“You see many of them [the traitorous Children of Israel] becoming adjuncts and allies of those who are in denial of Allah.”** This means that Muhammad (ﷺ), and the committed Muslims for all times to come, are supposed to be able to recognize how the Children of Israel find common cause with the Muslims’ avowed enemies: the Arabian *mushriks*. They even catapulted these *mushriks* to do warfare against the last prophet of God — this, while he was committed to Allah (ﷻ) and what He had revealed to “their” prophets, and while he, in principle, acknowledged what had been revealed as scripture to them in times past. These partisans and eccentrics sided with the pagan *mushriks* and heathen *kāfirs*, who did not believe in the God of Abraham (ﷻ), while they together assembled a “coalition of the willing” against Muhammad (ﷺ), who was sacrificing everything to revive the legacy of Abraham (ﷻ).

It is their strange and unconventional behavior that motivates them to close ranks with the enemies of God against the apostles of God, “[So] vile indeed is what their passions make them do that Allah has condemned them...” What they do in this life and world is precisely what will cause them to suffer harrowing and afflictive punishment in the life beyond the grave. Allah (ﷻ) is not humanly upset with them; He cannot be. However, He is divinely disturbed by them, and for that they await His sentencing and retribution, “**And in torment shall they abide.**” They were never on God’s side, so how can He be on their side? They never pleased Him, so how can He please them? They never stood up for Him, so how can He stand up for them? The recurrent theme in what they did was to provoke His displeasure with the end result that their eternal dwelling will be in the permanent abode of pain and turmoil.

For, if they [truly] were committed to Allah and the Prophet and all that was bestowed upon him from on high, they would not take those [rejecters of Allah’s power and truth] for their allies... (5:81).

If these deniers of Allah’s power, from the “Jewish clan” that was working in tandem with the Arabian idolaters and the Makkan *mushriks*, were committed to Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet — that is, either Moses, Muhammad, or both (ﷺ) — and all that had been revealed to them from God in heaven, then they would not have found themselves in political company with such pagans and atheists. Not only were they defectors from the faith of Israel (Ya‘qūb – ﷺ), even though they claim to be his offspring while repeatedly demonstrating their inability to keep their own community within the domain of scripture, they were also meddling in the affairs of other faith communities trying to goad them into overstepping the ambit of scripture. This is truly evil.

Looking at this *āyah* in an alternative way, had the Arabian *kāfirs* and *mushriks* been committed to Allah (ﷻ), the Prophet (ﷺ), and what had been revealed to him, these Yahūd of Madinah would not have entered into a political and strategic alliance with

them. The only reason why the dissembling Yahūd found common political purpose with *mushriks* and *kāfirs* is that the latter were opposed to and in confrontation with Allah (ﷻ), His Messenger (ﷺ), and the revelation that had come to all. The common denominator could not be more predictable: an opposition to Allah (ﷻ) and a hostility to Muhammad (ﷺ) that triggered them to close ranks and move against the Islamic power base in Madinah and its prophetic leadership.

In yet another take on this *āyah*, the allies of these eccentric Yahūd were the *munāfiqs*.⁵⁶⁰ The *āyah* uses the phrase *al-ladhīna kafarū* to describe those who deny Allah's (ﷻ) power. That is the "description in progress" of the *munāfiqs* who were verbal Muslims but heartfelt *kāfirs*. In line with commentary on previous *āyāt* about the *munāfiqs*, for all practical purposes the *munāfiqs* are *kāfirs*. Had these *munāfiqs* given their core commitment to Allah (ﷻ), His Prophet (ﷺ), and the community of Muslims in Madinah, then the Yahūd there would not have pursued a political accord with them, making both sides allies of one another. The fact that the Yahūd were on working political terms with the *munāfiqs* indicates that the latter were *kāfirs*, despite the fact that their tongues would have the Muslims believe the opposite. As in the previous *āyāt* in this *sūrah* and elsewhere, the deviant Yahūd were in comfortable political company with both the *munāfiqs* and the *mushriks*, while simultaneously maintaining a vigorous hostility to the Prophet (ﷺ) and the assertive Muslims with him.

The psychological inferiority complex suffered by today's Qur'anically empty Muslims with respect to Jews and Christians, who themselves are intoxicated with the secularism that came out of an irrational relationship with scripture, has given rise to loud voices from influential individuals that excoriate Muslims for being cruel and insulting toward the Jews in particular. They try to use this line of thought to shape the public appraisal of Muslims as fanatics who cannot make any room for a Jewish-Christian-Muslim dialogue. All of this is nonsense. The news and substance of the Qur'an is not being amplified here to burn bridges with anyone who extends a hand of understanding and a mind of reasoning toward

the Muslims. Allah (ﷻ) is simply sweeping the dust off facts that have been intentionally omitted from the history of scripture, and the resulting clarity will help the committed ones determine whether “Jews, Christians, and Muslims” are able to identify with the facts or stick to their eccentricities.

Thus, floating these *āyāt* in the ocean of public information simply calls attention to the Israeli *kāfirs'* well-established history of noncompliance and even insubordination when it comes to God and His Prophets (ﷺ). And it emerges that the very prophets who were sent to rescue and redeem them were the ones who at the end indicted and condemned them, stating that these Israeli malcontents do not deserve God's benevolence and blessings. It was these same Israelis who pledged to God their aid and support for His Prophets (ﷺ), but when the time came they proved to be the formidable obstacles that stonewalled these prophetic men of God, **“Because they [the defecting Israelis] interactively disobeyed [God] and persisted in breaching the bounds [of man's normal relationship with Him].”**

Disobedience and contentiousness characterize the prevailing attitude of the Israeli God-deniers through their tortured history. These two features come to the fore in both the Israeli mindset and behavior. Their historical failure, which continues to trail them up to this very day, is their unwillingness to socialize scripture. They could never institutionalize the laws of God in a normal and functioning social order. Even in their chance at doing precisely this in what many of them consider a “Jewish state” in Palestine, they still as a society eat pork, work on the Sabbath, fornicate, manage a worldwide network of usury, run organized crime rackets all over the world, traffic in drugs and sexual slavery, establish themselves as the international money-laundering capital, and otherwise act and behave as if they are Gentiles and not Jews.

The Qur'an registers that political Jewish deniers of God were more than willing to cooperate and coordinate their efforts with the *mushriks* against the Prophet (ﷺ) and the Islamic State in Arabia. Imagine how far they were able to bend their “convictions” to take sides with scriptureless people against people of scripture.

In previous *āyāt*, the Qur'an documents that the Yahūd of Madinah would say, "...these [*mushriks*] have more sense of direction than the committed Muslims" (4:51). And in today's political climate — as always — the Yahūd will sleep with any devil who is at war with the committed Muslims, even those "Muslims" who are only so by name. Their nation-state of Israel is at once busy building relations with India, shoring up its relations with Ethiopia, working the ropes with China, and pursuing common cause with Banū Sa'ūd and its mercenary *takfirī* forces of ISIS and al-Qā'idah. At one time, even as the rest of the world registered its unanimous revulsion, it was a political bosom buddy with apartheid South Africa.

Historical information is replete with evidence that the political will of Zionist Jews can only thrive on alliances and agreements with every adversarial current and potential enemy of Allah (ﷻ) and His Messenger (ﷺ), "You will see many of them [the political Jews] allied with the *kāfirs*. Vile indeed is what their passions make them do that Allah has condemned them; and in torment shall they abide" (5:80). These lessons and insights are available right here and now in this Qur'anic proclamation. All we need do is look around and see how King Salmān of Arabia (and his predecessors) is a Zionist political ally, how President 'Abd al-Fattāh al-Sīsī of Egypt (and his predecessors) is a Zionist confidant, and how king so-and-so and president so-and-so are Zionist clients and stooges. And it is very easy to know which side of the Qur'anic red line they are on.

The Israeli *kāfirs* complicate their own lives when they socialize sin and politicize evil. Here again, without going into the shadowy recesses of their history, is a live example of Banū Isrā'il's collective failure at raising the standards of the Torah to their social authentication. And, as if nobody is watching to separate claim from reality, they have the nerve to assert that they live in a Jewish state. The *āyah* is still an apt definition of who they are, "They would not in social unison prevent one another from doing whatever repugnant things they did: vile indeed was what they were doing [and not doing]." That is because what they were doing was

building a sinful society while at the same time acquiescing to the incremental disintegration of a scriptural society.

To be honest, each society has an element that tends toward corruption and crime; the world has its share of criminals and culprits. Every society spawns its crooks as every yard grows its weeds. What separates a moral society from an immoral one is that the former does not permit sin and evil to become the mainstream norm. The force of socializing people toward a morally responsible way of life fosters the growth of a civic conscience that makes it difficult, if not semi-impossible, for sin and evil to spread. Society has the capacity and wherewithal to prohibit sinful acts that, left unchecked, devolve into criminal routines; and it also has the power to punish aberrations from the moral norm with deterring penalties. When the people of a society coalesce around virtue and godly values, the emotions, tendencies, and expressions of immorality and criminality are at their minimum. This is what helps to solidify the vital aspects of society, protecting it from decay and disintegration. At this working level of a social moral standard, the representatives of iniquitous and offensive behavior are reduced to individuals and desperate gangs, if that. At the minimum, this is what holds the society that honors God, His word, and His Messengers (ﷺ) together.

One of the reasons the Muslims are given an exhaustive review of Israeli history in this final and enduring Qur'an is to enable them to overcome the "Israeli" inside. The character and comportment of Israeli societies in scriptural history does not look good; as a matter of scriptural fact, it looks ugly and disgusting. Hence, never should the Muslims contemplate any expression of psycho-social disobedience to Allah (ﷻ) or any objectionable action of political and military transgression. The committed Muslims have to grow up sensitive to this issue, which is what makes them stubborn over the defense of truth and justice. This cannot be overemphasized. If crooks, criminals, and culprits were nurtured in Israeli society to become its pacesetters, executives, and decision-makers due to the passiveness, inactivity, and eventual participation of Israeli rabbis and temple attendees, then this should never happen with committed Muslims. The Muslims' initial and enduring responsibility given to

them by scripture, their fervent relationship with Allah (ﷻ), and their warm attachment to His Prophet (ﷺ) is what equips them to stand in the face of iniquity, take issue with corruption, oppose abusive power, and repel all forms of aggression and transgression. In doing this, Allah (ﷻ) is on the side of those who have committed to Him, and they are in the company of prophets; as history has already vindicated their position, their future will be more auspicious than the present. In standing their firm ground for justice and truth, the committed Muslims are oblivious to those blaming or lambasting them. In the process, they may have to endure for a while the whole weight of oppressive establishments, swimming against the tide as it were, but when they know they are with Allah (ﷻ) and He is with them, then these small details are passing trivia that will be addressed by Allah (ﷻ) in His own way.

This issue of building an Islamic scriptural society and then protecting it from decomposition and complacency stands at the nerve center of man's earthly duties. Societies that are scripturally rooted do not manifest or endure by words alone. The combined lectures, books, and articles of rabbis, priests, imams, intellectuals, and experts will fall short of bringing about a scriptural society and will not be enough to maintain one should it come into existence. What is necessary is a binding leadership, a legitimate authority, and a moral-cum-legal social setup that can leverage corrective power, deploy security personnel, and even dispatch a military force to preserve such a scriptural society from corruption, the disobedience of God, and aggression (which could either be self-generated or imposed from the outside). Three corroborating hadiths present the issue as follows,

Whoever of you [the committed Muslims] sees a munkar should change it with his hand [the use of force], and if he is not able to do so [in that manner] then he should change it verbally [through public communication], and if he cannot do so [in that manner] then he should change it in his heart [by privately objecting to it] and this [manner] is an expression of commitment to Allah in its lowest degree.⁵⁶¹

Allah does not punish the general public because of the [crimes of the] elites; until they [the public] are exposed to these crimes (munkar) in their midst and they have the ability to take issue and eliminate such crimes but do not do so. If it comes to that and the public acquiesces to this munkar [becoming a part of social life] then Allah will punish both the public and the elites.⁵⁶²

The best form of struggle is the expression of truth [and justice] to a tyrannical leader.⁵⁶³

Therefore the point is well-established, leaving no room for the kind of equivocation that places all this talk about social change, or what goes on outside a man's personal life, beyond the concern of the individual. It also delegitimizes the position of those who seek to evade social action by arguing that any kind of involvement will be accompanied by harm. These petty excuses may have been exactly the justifications that were used by the Israeli deniers of God — a people who were never short of self-justification and rationalization. In all likelihood, they may have had tons of it; but no amount of that was apropos as it went against the grain of standing up for God and defending His scripture in society and His society in scripture.

In the majority of cases, sin and crime take their infant steps in secret, private, and cloistered venues, where they cannot be detected by the public eye; hence nothing much can be done to mitigate these activities so long as they remain out of sight. If there are — and there always will be — individuals who want to get intoxicated or who want to fornicate in ways and places that are hidden, the maintainers of the faith can have no legal ground to inhibit such deviant conduct. However this does not mean that the committed Muslims have to honor the sinners' privacy to a degree that condones their destructive behavior. The vigilance of an Islamic society is such that any visible appearance of this unbecoming behavior will be dealt with directly, seriously, and proportionally to the extent outlined by Allah (ﷻ), His Prophet (ﷺ), and His Book.

No serious Muslim can consider immorality, the subversion of the human conscience, and the violation of heavenly guidance to be a matter of “personal freedom,” or “freedom of choice.” With all the hype about scientific advances and technological breakthroughs no one can say in a convincing way that, just because some materialistic societies have gone a long way in engineering, mechanics, and electronics, they can now get away with fraying their moral character. Breaking down this moral component in human individuals and societies is a crime against God and the first step toward bringing down whatever is left of the human conscience. If, God forbid, society sinks to the point of arriving at its own moral meltdown, then all types of justification for tyranny, aggression, and injustice will undoubtedly ensue. A society that once was ruled by the force of conscience in favor of justice will turn into a society that is ruled by a police state in favor of scandalization, offensive activities, and injustice.

Once society slips into the chokehold of unscrupulous powers — and this happens when men of God abdicate their duties — then any hope of it returning to a moral reference, by the placing of Islamic individuals back in key positions, is lost; after all, these individuals, despite their Islamic and scriptural credentials, cannot be considered in isolation from the corrupt society they belong to. When this happens, society itself has to be reconstructed, and in the reconstruction of society comes the remaking of the individuals therein. When God’s authority no longer informs the decisions and policies of institutions, organizations, and governments, clearing the way for anti-god forces to take charge, then such societies are once again in need of prophets and apostles, who came to change not individuals alone but societies at large. Therefore, these high-powered elites who are running the crooked show have to be challenged not in the convictions that are part of their private lives but in those of their convictions that have replaced the authority of Allah (ﷻ) in society.

Human history has been written by the conquerors or with their patronage; it has not been written by the conquered. Thus it is liable to be tainted with the vainglory of those who want to figure

prominently in their own history. The preponderant version of history in schools, universities, and learning centers has to do with a number of civilizations — Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Persian, Indian, Chinese, etc. Unnecessarily few of these historical records account, in a categorical fashion, for what really causes social disintegration or the rise and fall of civilizations. Material analyses concerning the reasons for the failure of a particular civilization remain confined to the domain of speculation. This Qur'an, however, sets the record straight as it conveys the unequivocal reasons for the rise and fall of societies and civilizations. The first and foremost cause for societal decay and the collapse of its infrastructure is the loss of its moral, conscientious, and ethical matter, as explained and understood through the Creator's words. Either compliance with or violation of Allah's (ﷻ) social laws (*sunan*) determines whether a society will grow or atrophy. Hence, societies may choose to honor these *sunan* and gain an extension of time or they may choose to disregard and defy these *sunan*, and in the process expedite their demise.

One of the more prominent social laws in this discourse concerns the necessity of discouraging and deconstructing the *munkar*. More than just individuals and scholars, this needs the combined effort of leaders and constituencies, families and communities, institutions and civic organizations — a social solidarity so to speak — that batter the *munkar* every time it rears its head. But, then, how is man to define the *ma'rūf* and the *munkar*, and other terms pertaining to the vital laws embedded in human behavior and social science? After reading all these *āyāt*, what should be evident is that man himself cannot be the source of the answer to such questions; he has to refer to his Creator and Maker, who provides the answers. Who is man to impugn one of his kind or a particular human behavior, who is he to initiate action against such deviant conduct, who is he to suggest remedial action or corrective measures, and who is he to pass judgement or apply penalties of his own design? Man simply does not qualify to do any of that, absent the information and the guidelines that belong to humanity because they come from the Creator and Fashioner of all mankind — Allah (ﷻ), the All-Hearing, All-Seeing, and All-Knowing. If

issues like these were left to human knowledge, human trial and error, and human speculation, then no one and no combination of people will be able to authoritatively and definitely decide what constitutes a *munkar*, for example, and what does not.

Humanity, with its rise and fall of empires, with its clash of civilization theories, with its apocalypse predictions, needs this Book to show it a way out of its periodic and devastating eruptions of war and international tension. But what happens when there are people who do not want to recognize this divine authority? Moreover, what happens when there are societies that want to wage educational programs and media campaigns against the notion (according to them) that God is man's only and ultimate authority? Ideologies and philosophies are cobbled together by men to try to substitute for this divine Criterion. Capitalism, imperialism, fascism, Zionism, racism, and globalization are just a few of the humanly contrived, humanly imposed, and humanly implemented mega-programs that are supposed to lead to a better life. The fact is that life has been deteriorating under the auspices of such man-made ideas and ideologies. This is the issue that committed Muslims should keep their eyes focused on. Man-made ideologies, civilizations, and world orders are not going to die out if the Muslims insist on an "Islamic program" that is centered on convincing people to wear the *thawb*, *jilbāb*, or *'abā'ah*; or an "Islamic agenda" of not tinkering with the *kāfir* system of *tāghūt* and, further, joining it with the hope of changing it in a democratic and "politically correct" way.

A point of reference is needed here. The Muslims should agree on how governments in this *jāhiliyah* work. But they cannot do that until they put their minds to understanding how the first transformation of the Arabian society of 1,400 years ago into an Islamic one happened. With that reference point, they will know how far a non-Islamic system and society will tolerate Islamic dissent in theory, how long it will tolerate Islamic popular momentum, and how much it will put up with Islamic political opposition.

Muslims, contrary to the Israeli deniers of Allah's (ﷻ) power presence in human affairs and in social reality, should express themselves beyond any shadow of a doubt on this matter. They

should have the scriptural courage to assert in front of atheistic societies and governments that all moral and legal systems concocted by philosophers or improvised by political theoreticians are null and void. The only reference in this area for all societies and populations on earth is Allah Almighty (ﷻ). Therefore, all non-scriptural or anti-scriptural governments are leading their citizens to an eventual social catastrophe. Many “sincere Muslims” are wasting their time as they have been distracted from this task of tasks, this legacy of the prophets, and this responsibility of scriptures.

It appears silly in the extreme for a person of faith to try to correct a solitary prostitute when she sets out on her immoral course in life because she was pressed into making a living. It is complicated folly for these types of Muslims to work away their lively efforts, not cognizant of a capitalist or materialistic system that forces innocent ladies into prostitution and harlotry, and then gives them the license to practice their “profession.” It is likewise asinine to tell a poor man who wants to secure a roof over his family’s head, and can only do so by borrowing money from usury lenders, that what he is doing is unacceptable. Why? Because there is a deliberately structured and well-thought-out financial system that forces innocent breadwinners to do these types of things. *Zinā* and *ribā* (adultery and usury) are both wrong and immoral social vices, indeed. And committed Muslims do not tolerate such acts. But the time has to come to identify the ideology and the institutions that facilitate or force people into these atrocious and pitiful positions. Usury and prostitution have a legal standing, legal protection, and even legal promotion by authorities, governments, and certain vested interests. Why, then, cannot the committed Muslims focus all their attention on eradicating the support system that fosters and sustains both *zinā* and *ribā*, not to mention the multitude of other institutionalized *munkars* that have overwhelmed human societies. These moral outrages and exploitative practices have become the norm because God has become the exception. And this was not a natural evolution. It took prolonged periods of time, the transition of generations, and the supervision of governmental institutions that deny God’s authority to bring us to where we are

today — constrained to live in a world exhausted by its sins, injured by its crimes, and debilitated by its wars. This world made an effort to get rid of man's natural inclination toward God and God's informed scripture to humanity. This was not an act of nature; this was social engineering of the worst kind.

What should a Qur'an-abiding Muslim do when he encounters a woman for hire who indiscriminately consorts with men, a woman who has given herself up to casual lewdness, or a woman who submits to haphazard sexual intercourse, which she solicits? What is expected of a Qur'an-abiding Muslim when he knows that the law of his land authorizes and protects the "right" of a woman to be a licensed private contractor who provides "escort services" and sex for a fee — the income from which can be taxed? Should a law-abiding, Qur'an-centered Muslim look at the effect (prostitution), or should he look at the cause and structure of the problem (social acceptance, legal protection, and her need for survival)?

This is only one example out of a long list of *munkars* that have to be abolished through the process of re-instituting Allah's authority as the only authority, Allah's criterion as the only criterion, and Allah's (ﷻ) frame of reference as the only frame of reference for a standard of living that behooves human beings as His subjects and servants.

How self-defeating it becomes when a group of individual Muslims go out here and there in society trying to convince straying flocks that usury is *ḥarām* when the court laws, financial institutions, economic conditions, and family necessities all drive a person into the usury channels of public life? Muslims sitting in the back seat of an errant car and trying to reverse direction are in a losing race; to do what they need to do, they have to be behind the wheel in the driver's seat.

This issue has gone beyond the simplistic and inchoate plans of feeble-minded and lackluster Muslims whose "vision" is to impose Shari'ah on society without giving society itself the opportunity to demand the Shari'ah. An Islamic social order with its Islamic governing body was not meant to be force fed a conviction in Allah (ﷻ); rather it was meant to have that conviction prosper through

man's free will and unobstructed freedom to debate and distinguish between a godless conscience and a godly one, between a society that affirms Allah (ﷻ) and one that contradicts Him, and between a society that has scriptural reference and one that has a secular one.

Even today, despite all the setbacks of the last 200 years, the Islamic psychology is still, more or less, in opposition to the *munkar*. The Muslims en masse have been subjected to cultural colonialism, its most violent form being the French occupation of Algeria; they are aware of the torment that imperialism inflicted on their economies and inter-societal relations. They are keenly conscious of occupations that still litter their geography and history from the Philippines to Kashmir, and from Palestine to the Balkans. Still, however, they have not lost the will to resist, the resolve to oppose injustice, and the will to fight when the circumstances are demanding. This psychology that has survived attacks from all directions will one day in the near future come back and reclaim its Qur'anic roots, its prophetic bearing, and its futuristic ambition — inspired, as it should be, by Allah (ﷻ) and His Messenger (ﷺ). Some “Muslims” have abandoned this wagon train and joined their Jewish and Christian counterparts in their secular journey to nowhere. But these are only an insignificant number who are better off being among their ideological kindred than with Allah (ﷻ) and His Apostle (ﷺ).

And we promise the Israeli deniers of God that we will not be like them. We will reconstitute a godly society on earth. We will build an Islamic life in our countries. We will do whatever it takes to honor our word with God. We do, indeed, read this *āyah* and we will not incur its penalty,

Cursed are the deniers [of Allah's power] from among the Children of Israel, [cursed they were] by the choice of words of David and Jesus, son of Mary; that is because they [the renegade Israelis] disobeyed [Allah] and were contentiously aggressive. They would not cooperate with each other to deter their own acts of *munkar*. Repulsive is what they were doing (5:78–79).

To encapsulate this extended lesson, all the political elites in the Jewish and Christian orbit are not committed to God and are not scripture-centered. Ninety-nine percent of the political elites in the Muslim domain are also of the same material, having no Islamic qualities whatsoever. Had they been committed to Allah (ﷻ), the Prophet (ﷺ), and what was revealed to him, they would not have sought the sponsorship of imperialists and the patronage of Zionists. Of course they try to get away with presenting themselves as religious individuals by separating the sacred from the secular, the divine from the authoritative, and the religious from the political. They have played this game for serial generations and it is time that they be exposed for the grand lie they have institutionalized and universalized. Enough is enough. In the end, there can be no political alliance between people who are in Allah's (ﷻ) *dīn* and others who have their own godless agendas and irreverent schemes.

All people of scripture have an open invitation to consider this Qur'an, to study the Prophet (ﷺ) from unpolluted sources, and to reach the conclusion that this is God's substantial and surviving Scripture. Allah (ﷻ), the Prophet (ﷺ), and this consummate Qur'an do not belong to a nationality, a culture, or a race. This final Testament is everyone's inheritance, and the people of previous scripture should understand this clearly.

After these issues become an influential frame of reference in the public mind, then the committed Muslims are duty-bound to be friendly and courteous toward devout Christians and reverent Jews. The Muslims' inter-social relations are to be conducted with cordiality and tenderness. When we the committed Muslims are in charge of our own domain, we are ordered by our Sustainer and His Prophet (ﷺ) to protect and defend the sanctity of the lives of our brothers and sisters in scripture, the well-being of their livelihoods, and the honor of their families. They are free to practice their creeds and beliefs to the full extent possible. And should a discussion or debate take place among us, we are counseled to nurture the level of mutual understanding that dispels the human tendency to be aggressive and disagreeable. We will remain true to them, as this is a measure of our being true to Allah (ﷻ), so long

as they remain true to us. And they are guaranteed their freedom of conscience and religious preference.

This cannot be said about the most advanced democracies and the most modern societies in the world today. Muslims are second-class citizens, if that, in occupied Palestine and in the Euro-American sphere. This is the difference between an Islamic society that is held to a higher Authority and His standard, and secular societies in which hypocritical authorities and their whims hold sway.

Endnotes


248 **Kemal Atatürk** (1881–1938) – name (*Ataturk* means *Father of the Turks*) assumed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in 1934; Turkish politician and general, first president of Turkey from 1923. After WWI, he established a provisional rebel government, and from 1921–1922, the Turkish armies under his leadership expelled the Greeks who were occupying Turkey. He was the founder of the post-sultanate westernized republic, which he ruled as virtual dictator, with a policy of consistent and extremist westernization.



Mustafa Kemal, born in Thessaloniki (now part of Greece and also known as Salonika), was banished for joining an insurrectionist society (1904). Later he was pardoned and promoted in the army, and was largely responsible for the successful defense of the Dardanelles against the British (1915). In 1918, after the Ottomans had been defeated in WWI, he was sent to Anatolia to implement the demobilization of the Turkish forces in accordance with the armistice terms, but instead established a provisional government opposed to that of Constantinople (under European control at the time), and in 1921 led the Turkish armies against the Greeks, who had occupied a large part of Anatolia. He checked them at the Battle of Sakaria (1921), for which he was granted the title of *ghazi* (the victorious), and within a year had expelled them from Turkish soil. When war with the British was averted by his diplomacy, what was left of Ottoman Turkey in Europe passed under Kemal's control. On Oct 29, 1923, Turkey was proclaimed a republic with all the secular anti-Islamic fury possible; Kemal was its first president.

249 **Karl Marx** (1818–1883) – German (Jewish) revolutionary thinker, social philosopher, economist, and theorist of socialism. His ideas, formulated with Friedrich Engels, laid the foundation for 19th-century socialism and 20th-century communism. The official doctrine of the defunct Soviet Union was based on his ideas. Marx's theory, much influenced in its formative stages by

Hegelian philosophy, turns the latter upside down and rejects Hegel's idealism in favor of materialism. His revolutionary pamphlet, *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), which he wrote with Engels shortly before the revolts of 1848, and *Das Kapital* (1867) are among the most important writings of the last 200 years. His social and political influence on the 20th century has been immense.



250 David Crystal (editor), *The Cambridge Encyclopedia, Second Edition*. (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 277–78.

251 **Third International** (1919–1943) – also known as the **Communist International**, or **Comintern**, it was an international association of communist organizations in various countries that advocated world revolution with the intent of creating a global communist state; in practice, however, it functioned chiefly as an organ of Soviet control over the international communist movement.



The Third International emerged because of a disagreement in the socialist Second International over the issue of WWI. A large number of socialist parties, comprising the International's "right" wing, endorsed the war efforts of their respective national governments against enemies they considered far more hostile to socialist aims. The "center" faction condemned the right's nationalism, seeking instead to reunify the Second International under the banner of world peace. The "left" faction, led by Vladimir Lenin, rejected both the nationalism of the right and the pacifism of the center, urging instead a socialist drive to transform the war of nations into a transnational class war. In 1915, Lenin proposed the creation of a new International to promote "civil war, not civil peace" through propaganda directed at soldiers and workers. Two years later Lenin led the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and in 1919 he called the first congress of the Third International, in Moscow, specifically to undermine ongoing centrist efforts to revive the Second International. Though the first congress was lightly attended, the second congress, also in Moscow (1920), received delegates from 37 countries; and it was there that Lenin promulgated the *Twenty-One Conditions* of admission to the Third International. The first four congresses developed the genuine ideas of Bolshevism, but from the fifth congress (1924) onward until its dissolution in 1943, Stalin's party structure was in control. Refer also to Endnote 545 in Volume 8.

252 David Crystal, *The Cambridge Encyclopedia*, p. 278.

253 **Tiananmen Square Massacre** (1989) – Refer to **Endnote 318** in Volume 5.

254 David Crystal, *The Cambridge Encyclopedia*, p. 278.

255 Ibid.

256 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-Ḥakīm (better known as Tafsīr al-Manār)*, Volume 6. (Beirut, Lebanon: Dār al-Ma'rifaḥ, 1414AH), p. 385 (the wording here is al-Bukhārī's, though it was also recorded by Muslim; it was originally transmitted by Anas ibn Mālik who heard it from Nāfi' via 'Abdullāh ibn 'Umar).

'Abdullāh ibn Salām – a senior rabbi who became a Muslim; refer also to **Endnote 82** in Volume 1, p. 308 in Volume 4, p. 349 in Volume 5, and **Endnote 610** in Volume 8.

257 Dr. Wahbah al-Zuhaylī, *Al-Tafsīr al-Munīr fī al-'Aqīdah wa-al-Shari'ah wa-al-Manhaj*, Volume 6. (Beirut, Lebanon: Dār al-Fikr al-Mu'āṣir, 1411AH), p. 193.

258 See also the Book of Exodus, 18:20.

259 William H. Gertz (editor), *The Dictionary of Bible and Religion*. (Nashville, Tennessee: The Abingdon Press, 1986), p. 422.

260 **Max Weber** (1864–1920) – German sociologist and political economist; one of the founders of modern sociology. He emphasized cultural and political factors as key influences on economic development and individual behavior. Weber argued for a scientific and value-free approach to research, yet highlighted the importance of meaning and consciousness in understanding social action. His ideas continue to stimulate thought on social stratification, power, organizations, law, and religion.



In *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904–1905), he challenged Marx's theory that economic factors are decisive in determining the course of history. He sought to identify some of the origins of capitalism and traced the significance of religious and ethical ideas. In his *Methodology of the Social Sciences* (published posthumously, 1949), he argued that scientific methods can be used in the study of sociology, but emphasized that the sociologist cannot be purely objective; he must attempt to put himself in the place of the people he is studying in order to understand their values and motives. Weber contributed almost more than any other scholar to compar-

ative sociology, and, in an effort to find a basis from which comparisons can be made with other civilizations, he evolved the concept of the “ideal type” or ideal mode of a set of social relationships. His ideas continue to stimulate thought on social stratification, power, organizations, law, and religion. Other key works include *The Sociology of Religion* (1920) and *Economy and Society* (published posthumously, 1922).

Rationalism – a type of epistemology; a branch of Western philosophy. It is a belief that opinions and actions should be based on human reason and knowledge rather than on religious belief or emotional response; it is a reliance on human reason as the only reliable source of human knowledge. Some of the major rationalist philosophers include Descartes (1596–1650), Leibniz (1646–1716), and Spinoza (1632–1677).

261 Joel Krieger (editor), *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*. (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 819–20.

262 Ibid.

263 Ibid.

264 Ibid.

265 **‘Alī ‘Abd al-Rāziq** (1888–1966) – an Egyptian *qāḍi*, learned person, and writer; born to an upper class and feudal family in al-Minyā, Egypt. He attended both religious and secular schools, at al-Azhar University in Cairo and Oxford University in Britain respectively. In 1925, he wrote his questionable and disputable book, *al-Islām wa-Uṣūl al-Ḥukm* (*Islam and the Substructure of Governance*), which in its entirety argues against an Islamic government or authority. He based his argument on the presentation of Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) as a spiritual and religious leader void of any statesman’s responsibilities and governor’s tasks; in other words, Muhammad (ﷺ) was strictly spiritual and at no time political. His abstract thought and interpretation remain a mainstay of those who continue to contest these categorical *āyāt* in the Qur’an today.



266 **penal law** – one that prohibits an act — some offense of a public nature or wrong committed against the state — and imposes a penalty (a pecuniary fine or mulct, that is, money extracted from someone by fine or taxation) or punishment for committing it. Strictly speaking, statutes allowing for private action against a wrongdoer are not penal in nature, neither the lia-

bility imposed nor the allowable remedy. If the wrong done is to the individual, the law giving him a right of action is remedial, rather than penal, though the sum to be recovered may be called a “penalty” or may consist in double or treble damages.

267 **gaon** (plural, **geonim**) – the intellectual leaders, ten of which had considerable temporal power, of the Babylonian Jewish community in the post-Talmudic period (6th–11th centuries). They headed the two leading academies, Sura and Pumbedita, and their influence extended for the greater part of this period over all Jewry. Their title, *gaon* (meaning *eminence*, *pride*), derives from their position as *resh metivta geon Yaakov* (head of the academy which is the pride of Jacob). The basic source of information on this period is the historical “letter” of Sherira Gaon. The *genizahs* (literally, *archives*; storage area in a Jewish synagogue or cemetery designated for the temporary storage of worn-out Hebrew-language books and papers on religious topics), however, has more recently also served as a prime source of agonic history, both before and after his day. Sherira lists Mar (Master) Hanan as the first *gaon* of Pumbedita, taking office in 589CE, and Mar bar Huna as the first Sura, appointed in 591CE. The academies were ancient institutions, dating from the early amoraic days of Rav and Samuel. Their geographical location, however, did not always remain in the cities after which they were named. Thus at the end of the 9th century, both academies moved to Baghdad, while retaining their distinctive names. Although Sura was given formal primacy through the influence of Rashi (acronym for the medieval French rabbi, Shlomo Yitzchaki, the main formulator of the Talmud) and also because of its special connection with the *exilarch* (leaders of the diaspora Jewish community in Babylon), there were several periods in which the rival institution exerted the dominant influence.

Important *geonim* in the early history of Sura were Mar Samuel (730–748CE) and Yehudai ben R Nahman (760–763CE), both originally from Pumbedita but appointed by the *exilarch* to the *gaonate* of the rival college. The succeeding *geonim* in the course of the 130-year ascendancy of the Sura academy were Hanina (pupil of Yehudai), Jacob ha-Cohen, Zadok ben Jesse, Moses ben Jacob, Cohen Tzedek, Sar Shalom, Tatronai, Amram, and Nahshon. The most famous *gaon* of this academy was Saadyah, appointed in 928CE. On his death in 942CE, the academy remained closed for 45 years, but was reopened with the appointment of Tzemah of Pumbedita, to be followed by Samuel ben Hophni (1003–1013). The last four *geonim* of this academy were Dosa, son of Saadyah (1013–1017); Israel, son of Samuel ben Hophni (1017–1034); Azariah ha-Cohen (1034–1038); and Isaac.

The ascendancy of the Pumbedita academy began with Paltoi (842–858CE), the first of the *geonim* from this academy to make contact with North African Jewry, hitherto connected only with Sura. His prominent

successors were his son Tzemah (858–876CE), Cohen Tzedek, and Nehemiah. The most important period of the academy was the 70 years when it was headed by Sherira (968–998CE) and his son Hai (998–1038). According to the medieval chronicler Abraham ibn Daud, the *gaonate* came to an end after a two-year period when it was administered by the *exilarch*, Hezekiah. Newly discovered documents show that this was not the case. The academies, having removed to Baghdad, were now united and continued their existence for another 150 years. Among the heads of the Baghdad academy were Hezekiah ben David (1058), Isaac ben Moses (1070), Eli, and Samuel ben Ali (1207). The Baghdad academy also took over the prerogatives of the *exilarch*.

The influence of the later *geonim* was primarily local, for the new Jewish centers in the Diaspora had by this time developed their own spiritual leadership. In addition, competing influence from a rival academy set up in Palestine, also under a nominal *gaon*, toward the end of the 9th century, drew away much Diaspora support. The Palestinian *gaonate*, of which little was known until the discovery of the *genizahs*, was founded in the early-10th century in rivalry to the Babylonian, but never enjoyed great authority outside Palestine. The attempt of Aaron ben Meir (920CE) to establish its supremacy was defeated by Saadyah. The names of about 18 incumbents of the office during the next two centuries are known. On the capture of Jerusalem by the Seljuks in 1071, the *gaon* Elijah ben Solomon (1062–1083) transferred his seat to Tyre. He was succeeded by his son Ebiathar, on whose death in 1109 the Palestinian *gaonate* disintegrated. Although agonic literature was primarily in the field of Halakhah, many *geonim* made contributions to the understanding of the language of the Talmud, the development of the liturgy, biblical exegesis, and religious philosophy. Important religious decisions, occasionally even the amendment of a talmudic law, were often taken by the *geonim* at the Talmud discussions during the Kallah months (refer to Elul and Adar, the 6th and 12th months of the Hebrew ecclesiastical calendar, respectively).

Talmud – refer to Endnote 57 in Volume 1, Endnotes 128–129 in Volume 4, Endnotes 374–375 in Volume 5, Endnote 17 in Volume 6, **Endnote 312** in Volume 7, and **Endnote 569** in Volume 8.

- 268 **Isaac ben Jacob Alfasi** (1013–1103) – author of the most important code prior to the *Mishneh Torah* of Maimonides. Alfasi, according to some historians, brought the *gaonic* period to a close. The last of the Babylonian *geonim*, Hai Gaon, died when Alfasi was 25 years old. Alfasi himself was called *gaon* by several early halakhic authorities. Alfasi was a native of Qal'ah Banī Ḥammād in Algeria. After a period of study in al-Qayrawān, Alfasi settled in Fās (Fez), Morocco (hence his surname *Alfasi*). He remained there

until 1088, when, in his 75th year, he was denounced to the government by (apparently Jewish) enemies and was forced to flee to Spain. It appears that he issued a judgement that favored a humble community member in a case against a community leader who abused his power as advisor to the king. After a few months in Cordoba he moved to Lucena, where he remained until his death. Shortly after his arrival in Lucena, he became head of the yeshivah (1089), following the death of Isaac ben Judah ibn Ghayyat.

269 **Maimonides** (1135–1204) – refer to **Endnote 101** in Volume 6.

270 **Asher ben Jehiel** (1250–1327) – talmudic scholar. After spending some time in France, apparently in Troyes, he moved on to Cologne and Coblenz in Germany. From there he moved to Worms, where his teacher Meir ben Baruch of Rothenburg had been appointed rabbi in 1281. Upon Meir's imprisonment, Asher became the acknowledged leader of German Jewry and headed unsuccessful efforts to obtain Meir's release. He distinguished himself for his activities during the period of the Rindfleisch massacres (1298) and for his decisions on matters arising from the resulting disruption of family and communal life. Asher ultimately left Germany in 1303, fearing that he too would be incarcerated, like his mentor and teacher. He settled in Barcelona, Spain, where he was welcomed with great honor. In 1305 he accepted the position of rabbi in Toledo.

Jacob ben Asher (circa 1270–1340) – Jacob ben Asher or Ba'al ha-Turim, son of Asher ben Jehiel; Jewish halakhic authority. Working as a man of modest means in Toledo, he compiled his halakhic masterpiece the *Arba'ah Turim* (Four Rows, 1475). The *Turim* is divided into four parts: (i) "*Orah Hayyim* (The Path of Life)" on the laws concerning religious life through the whole day, including conduct in synagogue, and on fast and festival days; (ii) "*Yoreh De'ah* (The Teaching of Knowledge)" on *issur ve-hetter* (halakhic rulings with regard to forbidden foods), family, mourning, usury, and oaths; (iii) "*Even ha-Ezer* (The Stone of Help)" on women, marriage, and divorce; and (iv) *Hoshen Mishpat* (The Breastplate of Judgement)" on civil law. The work went through many editions, evoking subsequent commentaries.

271 **Joseph ben Ephraim Caro** (1488–1575) – made Jewish law (Halakhah) available to the masses. His major works, the *Beit Yosef* and the *Shulkhan Arukh*, are considered by many to be the ultimate authorities in Halakhah.

Born in 1488 (in either Spain or Portugal), his family probably left for Portugal after the Spanish expulsion in 1492. After the expulsion from Portugal in 1497, Caro traveled with his family to Turkey. Throughout the 30 years he lived there, Caro settled in many areas of Turkey, and first studied under his father, Ephraim, a renowned Talmudist. Caro was also influ-

enced in Turkey by Kabbalists Joseph Taitazak and Solomon Alkabez.

In 1536, Caro left Turkey and spent time in Egypt before continuing on to Safed, Palestine. There, he met Jacob Berab who, as part of his plan to reinstitute ordination of judges, rabbis, and elders — a practice that had been abandoned for generations — ordained Caro in 1538. After Berab left Safed in 1538, Caro was seen as the leader of the Safed scholars. He served as head of the communal council of Safed, and led a yeshiva of approximately 200 students. He wrote hundreds of responses to halakhic questions from all over the Diaspora. He also got involved in non-halakhic issues, such as for example, when French Jews were treated unjustly with regard to taxes, they wrote to Caro, who's subsequent letter restored them their rights.



Caro's main focus, however, was his writing. He began the *Beit Yosef*, a commentary on Jacob ben Asher's *Arba'ah Turim* in 1522 when he was 34 years old, and finished it 20 years later. He consulted 32 Talmudic and rabbinical sources and discussed every law, starting with its source in the Talmud, tracing its development, discussing every divergent view and finally ruling on the law. His rulings were generally based on the majority view of Isaac Alfasi, Maimonides, and Asher ben Jehiel, though he did retain some discretion to insert his own views, particularly when there was no clear decision. The *Beit Yosef* was published in 1555.

The *Shulkhan Arukh*, a concise version of the *Beit Yosef* that cites only the final ruling on laws, has become known as Caro's most important work, an authoritative halakhic opus for all Jews. Written mostly according to Sephardic tradition, the *Shulkhan Arukh* was supplemented by Moses Isserles with a commentary dictating Ashkenazi traditions where applicable.

Caro was also a Kabbalist (Jewish mystic). He believed that a heavenly mentor, called a *maggid* visited him regularly. Caro recorded messages the *maggid* told him and parts of his notebook are printed in the book *Maggid Mesharim*. Caro married three times (two of his wives died) and had five sons and a daughter. He died in 1575 and is buried in Safed (source: <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Caro.html>).

- 272 **Moses ben Israel Isserles** (1525–1572) – considered the “Maimonides of Polish Jewry,” he was one of the greatest Jewish scholars of Poland. Born in Kraków, he was the great grandson of Jehiel Luria, the first Rabbi of Brisk. He studied in Lublin at the Shalom Shachna Yeshiva where he met his first wife, Schachna's daughter. She died young, at the age of 20, and he built the Isserles (later known as the Remu) Synagogue, in her memory. Isserles was later to remarry.

Isserles founded a Yeshiva in Kraków. He became a world-renowned Jewish scholar and was approached by many other well-known rabbis for halakhic decisions, including Joseph Caro, Solom Luria, and Joseph Katz. One of his most well-known commentaries was the *Mappa* (the *Tablecloth*), a commentary on the *Shulkhan Arukh*. The *Mappa* emphasizes Ashkenazi customs, where the *Shulkhan Arukh* focused mainly on Sephardic rites and customs, and so Isserles expanded the influence of the work to Eastern European Jewry.



Not only was Isserles well versed in Talmud, he also studied Kabbalah and Jewish mystical writings, as well as history, astronomy and Greek philosophy. Isserles is considered one of the forerunners of the Jewish enlightenment. Isserles died in Kraków and was buried next to his synagogue (source: <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Isserles.html>).

273 Just because there is a nation-state configuration of societies throughout the world does not mean that it is the natural order of things; it also does not make it legal. The Islamic rearrangement of the world political terrain will do away with these nation-states and “firm up” human societies on the basis of affirming or denying Allah’s (ﷻ) authority on earth.

274 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 778–82.

275 Ibid.

276 Ibid.

277 Ibid.

278 Ibid.

Shinto – Japan’s oldest indigenous religion; centering on the worship of deities called *kami* Shinto was the sacral basis of ancient Japanese society. It interacted for centuries with the immigrant “cult” of Buddhism but successfully retained its identity until they were separated by law at the Meiji Restoration (1868) when purist State Shinto ideology was enforced to unify the nation. State Shinto was formally abolished in 1946 during the Allied (Western) occupation of Japan as part of constitutional separation of state and religion.



Controversy still surrounds the status of the emperor and the Yasukuni shrine for the war dead. The Liberal Democratic Party has tried five times to

have this Shinto shrine nationalized in blatant violation of the constitution. Various Buddhist, Christian, and some Shinto groups oppose what is conceived as a move to revive State Shinto. Further controversy ensued over the funeral of Emperor Hirohito in 1989 and the accession rites of Emperor Akihito in 1990. The government divided the ceremonies into the secular state portion and the private Shinto rituals of the imperial household but followed the prewar Ordinance of Ceremonies. Widespread criticism resulted.

The crucial issue is whether Shinto should be classified as a religion. The prewar nationalist argument of it being folklore that could be mandatory for citizens without violating their freedom of religion has been revived to justify nationalizing certain shrines. Serious repercussions could follow such a program of state support including a shift in political orientation. The outcome is uncertain and is complicated by the active lobbying of associations of war-bereaved, right-wing groups, and revisionists within the Ministry of Education.

279 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 778–82.

280 Ibid.

281 Ibid.

282 Ibid.

283 Ibid.

Hinduism – the word *hindu* derives from *sindhu* (*indus* in the Greek transliteration), the name of the great river in the northwest of the South Asian subcontinent, a region still known as Sindh. The word is found in ancient Greek writings and refers to the natives of northern India. The terms *India* and its Persian counterpart *Hindustan* designate the territory around the Indus River. In the usage of Muslims who settled in the region, *hindu* came to refer to the non-Muslim population (the official Indian term for India today, *Bharat*, does not bear reference to this history).



Hinduism, the modern Western term for the majority religion of India, is not a religion in the Semitic sense, that is, based on prophetic revelation, sacred scripture, monotheism, and ecclesiastic organization. The Indian term that comes closest to “religion” is *dharma*, which might be glossed as “socio-religious order.” Hinduism can best be defined as a set of ideas and practices of the upper, so-called twice-born castes that are based on the interpretation of the ancient Vedas and auxiliary textual traditions by

Brahman priests. In addition, a multiplicity of religious movements and centers have arisen over time that are only partly integrated with Brahmanical discourse and practice.

Since the 18th century, a number of movements have tried to reformulate the disparate religious traditions of India in terms of a unified Hinduism. They have propagated a mixture of religious and social reforms to revitalize an Indian civilization that is considered to be in disarray. This enterprise has depended heavily on orientalist understandings of Indian traditions that share features with Western development rhetoric concerning "Hinduism as a hindrance to modernization."

A useful way of understanding the significance of these movements to contemporary Indian politics is to relate them to nationalism. The notion of the "Hindu nation" must be regarded in terms of the comparable notion of the "Muslim nation" that led to the founding of Pakistan, or the "Sikh nation," currently one of the major threats to the unity of the Indian state. Nationalists on the Indian subcontinent tend to construe shared religion as the basis of the nation-state, and powerful political movements have endeavored to find common ground for the establishment of a Hinduism that will serve as national religion. These commonalities can be found in a limited set of issues, such as conversion, protection of the sacred cow, or the rebuilding of sacred sites converted to Islam when their congregations became Muslims. Such issues create a fragile unity among the majority that depends on strong antagonism toward minorities such as Muslims and Christians. Christian missionaries are portrayed as the "dark forces" behind separatist movements in tribal areas. Muslims are portrayed as "secret agents" for Pakistan. The influence of Hindu nationalism on Hindu-Muslim relations has important implications for the development of international relations between India and Pakistan.

284 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 778–82.

apartheid – Afrikaans for *apartness*; the former policy of separate racial development in the Republic of South Africa, supported traditionally by the Nationalist Party, and later by other right-wing parties. The ideology had several roots: Boer concepts of racial, cultural, and religious separation arising out of their sense of national uniqueness; British liberal notions of indirect rule; the need to preserve African traditional life while promoting gradualism in its Christianization and westernization; and the concern for job protection, promoted by white workers to maintain their status in the face of a large and cheaper black proletariat. Under the policy, different races were given different rights.

In practice the system was one of white supremacy, with native Africans having no representation in the central state parliament. Many of the provisions of apartheid regarding labor, land reservation (reserves, Homelands,

bantustans), municipal segregation, social and educational separation, and a virtually exclusive white franchise, were in place before the Nationalist victory of 1948, but after that date they were institutionalized into a complete political, social, and economic system, down to the provisions of “petty apartheid” relating to transport, beaches, lavatories, park benches, etc. The whole system was founded upon extensive repression. Its principal architect, Hendrik Verwoerd, was assassinated in 1966.

The process of dismantling its provisions began in the late-1980s, following the political initiatives of President de Klerk, but its social effects are likely to prove more lasting. Its death knell was sounded when the country’s white community voted in favor of a multiracial society, followed by the signing of a new constitutional agreement by de Klerk and Nelson Mandela in November 1993 and the implementation of free elections in April 1994.

Union of South Africa (1910–1961) – historic predecessor to the present-day Republic of South Africa, it came into being in 1910 with the unification of four previously separate British colonies: Cape Colony, Natal Colony, Transvaal Colony, and Orange River Colony. It was founded as a dominion of the British Empire and governed under a form of constitutional monarchy, with the British monarch represented by a governor-general. With the 1961 constitution, making South Africa a sovereign republic, the Union was dissolved. Unlike Canada and Australia, the Union of South Africa was a unitary state rather than a federation, with each colony’s parliaments being abolished and replaced with provincial councils. A bicameral parliament was created, consisting of a House of Assembly and Senate, and its members were “elected” mostly by the country’s white minority.

285 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 778–82.

286 *Ibid.*

Gush Emunim – Hebrew for *group of those who keep the faith*; an Israeli pressure group set up after the 1973 elections, dedicated to an intrusive colonization policy in territories such as the West Bank, which was occupied by the Israelis after the 1967 Six-Day War.

287 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 778–82.

288 **Margaret Hilda Thatcher (1925–2013)** – British politician and Conservative prime minister. Formerly a research chemist and then a barrister specializing in tax law, she entered parliament as MP for Finchley, North London, in 1959. She held a succession of senior government and opposition posts and was Secretary of State for Education and Science (1970–1974). After two

successive Conservative election defeats, she succeeded Edward Heath as leader of the party in 1975. In 1979 she led the Conservative Party to an election victory. As Britain's first woman prime minister, she used her secure majority in the House of Commons to redirect economic policy along stringent conservative lines in an effort to solve the nation's economic and social woes. In 1982 she supported Britain's decision to fight Argentina to retain the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Mrs. Thatcher secured a second term in office in the 1983 election and a third in 1987.

Malvinas/Falklands War (1982) – Guerra de las Malvinas in Spanish; for 10 weeks in 1982, Argentina and Britain fought over a group of small islands in the South Atlantic, which the Argentines called las Malvinas and the British called the Falklands. After Argentina tried militarily to reclaim the islands, which the British had occupied since 1841, Britain mobilized a naval task force to engage the Argentine navy and air force. Seventy-four days into the conflict, Britain retained control of the islands after an amphibious assault forced the Argentine garrison to capitulate in June 1982. The hostilities between the two countries claimed the lives of 649 Argentine military personnel, 255 British military personnel, and three Malvinas islanders.

289 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 778–82.

290 **Augusto José Ramón Pinochet Ugarte (1915–2006)** – Chilean dictator, born in Valparaiso, Chile. A career army officer, he led the CIA-sponsored military coup overthrowing the elected Salvador Allende government (1973), establishing himself at the head of the ensuing military regime. In 1980 he enacted a constitution giving himself an eight-year presidential term (1981–1989). He stood down as president in 1990 following the democratic election of Patricio Aylwin.



Ṣaddām Ḥusayn (1937–2006) – In 1937, a few weeks after his father's death, Ṣaddām was born to a peasant family near Takrīt, a small country town on the Tigris River about 100 miles from Baghdad. His stepfather seems to have treated him brutally, and the boy found more affection in the house of his uncle, Khayrullāh Ṭalfāh, whose daughter Sājidaḥ he was to marry.

After his primary schooling, he was sent to Baghdad in the early-1950s to continue his education. In those years, although Iraq was nominally independent of Britain, it was ruled by a small pro-Western oligarchy; all opposition parties had been proscribed, and political life, dominated by the communists, was effectively driven underground. In 1955, Ḥusayn joined the Ba'ṯh, a pan-Arabian party that had only 300 members at the time.

In the aftermath of the revolt that swept away the ancient regime in 1958, the communists enjoyed a brief period of ascendancy, but they were bitterly opposed by the pan-Arabists (Nasserists and Ba'thists), who, in league with conservative and religious forces, felt threatened by the communists' potential radicalism. In the struggles of the late-1950s and early-1960s, the Ba'th made its presence felt by means of gangs who roamed the streets of Baghdad, attacking suspected communists and communist sympathizers.



On October 7, 1959, Ḥusayn and a group of Ba'thist conspirators tried to assassinate the Iraqi president, 'Abd al-Karīm Qāsim. The assassins managed to escape and Ḥusayn, just 23 years old, fled to Egypt. He stayed there until the Ba'thist-Nasserist coup overthrew Qāsim in February 1963. Back in Baghdad, Ḥusayn attracted the attention of the Ba'th Party's Syrian founder, Michel 'Aflaq, who put him in charge of organizing the civilian wing of the party in 1964. He was also linked, by family connections, to army officers in the party's military wing, most notably General Ahmad Ḥasan al-Bakr, who had served briefly as vice president of the republic in 1963.

In 1968, a military coup brought the Ba'th back to power and al-Bakr into the presidency. Ḥusayn worked to consolidate the party's grip on the state machinery and the armed forces. He appointed men whom he trusted to top posts in the army and put himself in charge of the country's internal security services. By 1969, a year after the coup d'état, at the age of 32, he had risen to the post of assistant secretary-general of the Ba'th Party and vice president of Iraq.

During the 1970s, he won increasing power by forging a close alliance with al-Bakr and by tightening his control over the vast security apparatus and the praetorian Republic Guard. He trusted few beyond his inner circle, which increasingly consisted of relatives and friends from his hometown of Takrīt. Among the public, he never achieved a charismatic following, but he did become known for his facile, if pretentious and self-adulatory, speeches.

Iraq's apparently progressive orientation convinced a willing Soviet Union to conclude a 20-year treaty of friendship and to encourage the Iraqi Communist Party to join with the Ba'th in a National Patriotic Front. Soviet oil expertise enabled Iraq to develop its unexploited southern oil fields, and the Iraq Petroleum Company was nationalized, a step that gave the government — now increasingly "Ṣaddām Ḥusayn and his entourage" — full control over the country's substantial oil revenues. The alliance with the communists gave him vital breathing space in his attempt to muzzle his most persistent opponents, the Kurds; the Kurdish movement was defeated as a result of an agreement negotiated between Ṣaddām Ḥusayn and the Shah of Iran at Algiers in March 1975, under which the Shah undertook to

close Iranian borders to the Kurdish guerrillas. By this time, the alliance with the communists had outlived its purpose, and Ṣaddām Ḥusayn began to inaugurate a merciless campaign against them.

In July 1979, Ḥusayn took over the presidency from al-Bakr. He demonstrated his power a few days later by turning against some of his closest former allies within the Ba'th Party; a "plot" was discovered in which a number of members of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) were implicated. Those found guilty were executed, with great publicity, by Ṣaddām Ḥusayn and the surviving members of the RCC in person, thus forging a gruesome blood brotherhood between them.

Barely a year after consolidating his power, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn launched a bid for primacy in the region by invading Islamic Iran in September 1980. After initial successes, Iraqi forces were driven back by the Islamic forces in Iran, but the war continued for nearly eight years, with high casualties and destruction on both sides. In the course of the war, Ḥusayn received considerable assistance in arms, intelligence, and military training from the United States and other Western countries as well as the Soviet Union. He used chemical weapons against Iranians fighting under the banners of Islam — as he was to do against the Kurds in March 1988 — and ordered several hundred thousand Iraqi Shī'īs deported to Iran on grounds that they were "really" Iranians and thus enemies of the Iraqi state.

In the 1980s, Ḥusayn's cult of personality reached new heights. Pictures of the "Great Leader" were visible everywhere, and buildings, monuments, and suburbs were renamed after him. Although it was difficult to represent the stalemate at the end of the war with Iran as a victory, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn managed to do so. He commissioned many enormous commemorative monuments, the most well-known being a metal sculpture forming an arch out of swords held in two hands, the latter cast from molds taken from the president's own wrists.

During the 1980s, when Iraq's relations with the West were extremely cordial, it was fashionable in the mainstream media and cabinet circles of various governments to assert that Ṣaddām Ḥusayn's programs of modernization and development were creating a new kind of national consensus in Iraq, and that even though his regime might be repressive, things were working and the population was becoming more literate, more educated, and more united.

Also in the middle- and late-1980s, the Kurdish population took advantage of the regime's other preoccupations to create virtually independent enclaves in northern Iraq. After the end of the First Gulf War, Ḥusayn undertook a vast pacification operation against them. During this campaign, government forces murdered some 100,000 Kurdish Iraqis and buried them in mass graves near the Iraqi-Saudi border. Although the regime's major human rights violations occasioned verbal condemnations from the West

from time to time, few more positive actions were taken; many Western countries had advanced huge sums to Iraq during the war and were hoping for rich pickings from postwar reconstruction.

In August 1990 Ḥusayn invaded the small, oil-rich state of Kuwait in yet another bid for regional supremacy. His attempt to annex Kuwait and appropriate its oil resources met strong international opposition, expressed through the UN. The United States organized a military coalition to oppose the invasion and demanded that Ḥusayn withdraw his forces unconditionally, but he refused. In January and February of 1991, coalition forces dealt a crushing military defeat to the Iraqis, while coalition bombing destroyed much of Iraq's modern infrastructure. Uprisings within Iraq followed the war, but Ḥusayn put them down with much bloodshed, giving rise to over two million refugees, many of them Kurds. In spite of these events and clandestine efforts to oust him, Ḥusayn clung tenaciously to power.

In the Spring of 2003, the United States put together a coalition of forces and invaded Iraq in a war of choice, ostensibly to neutralize Ḥusayn's stockpile of weapons of mass destruction and to punish him for sheltering al-Qā'idāh operatives, which as it turned out, were bogus reasons manufactured for public consumption to justify an invasion that had been in the works ten years earlier. Ṣaddām Ḥusayn went into hiding, but was ultimately captured in December 2003 and then quickly charged with the murder of 148 people in the Iraqi city of Dujail. Following his capture, he was tried under the auspices of the Iraqi Interim Government, a puppet regime created by the United States and headed up by Prime Minister Ayyād 'Allāwī. On November 5, 2006, Ḥusayn was convicted and sentenced to death by hanging. His execution was carried out on December 30, 2006, which happened to coincide with Yawm 'Arafāh in the *hijrī* year 1427, the day before 'Īd al-Aḍḥā. It is now difficult to characterize Ṣaddām Ḥusayn's "achievements" in anything but negative terms.

291 **James Earl (Jimmy) Carter** (1924–present) – thirtieth president of the United States (1977–1981), a Democrat. Born in Plains, Georgia, he served in the navy, studied nuclear physics, and after a spell as a peanut farmer, entered politics (1953). In 1976 he narrowly wrested the presidency from Gerald Ford. Features of his presidency were the return of the Panama Canal Zone to Panama, the Camp David synthesis between the regimes in Tel Aviv and Cairo, and the Iranian students' detention of American officials at the US embassy in Tehran. He was defeated by incoming President Ronald Reagan in 1980.



292 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 778–82.

293 liberation theology – refer to **Endnote 80** in Volume 1.

The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn) – a pan-Islamic organization founded in Egypt by Imam Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906–1049) around 1928. It emerged in the wake of the termination of the symbolic “*khilāfah*” by the Turkish secularists who had occupied Istanbul after WWI. The emphasis of the Muslim Brotherhood in its first two decades was on a mass return of the people in Egypt and elsewhere to an Islamic culture and an Islamic society. In a short time, the Brotherhood had gained hundreds of thousands of adherents in Egypt and beyond until it became the most recognized Islamic movement in the Muslim East.



Other Muslim peoples adopted their own version of the Brotherhood in such countries as Pakistan, Turkey, and many other Arab countries. The Brotherhood could not produce (and that is still the case today) an Islamic sociopolitical ideology that challenges the other secular ideologies of the current century. Subsequently, younger and incarcerated members broke away, forming their own organizations: Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr al-Islāmī, Jamā'ah al-Muslimīn, Jamaat-e-Islami, al-Jihād, and others.

Al-Qā'idah (al-Qaeda) – homologous with **Dā'ish** (al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī al-'Irāq wa-al-Shām); **ISIS** (the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) or **ISIL** (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant); and many other local and splinter “Islamic” groups, all of whom are simply the militant and insurrectionist offshoots of Wahhābī and *neo-salafī* indoctrination. They say their priority is to cleanse Islam from *shirk*, which they define in terms that render other Muslims who do not agree with their definitions as “*kāfirs*” or “*mushriks*.” The militarization of these insurgents can be traced to the regime(s) in the Arabian Peninsula, notably the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.



In the larger political context these radicals, who are either ignorant, immature, or mercenaries, are being misled — not only by the Wahhābī royals and court clerics of Arabia, but also by Wahhābism’s imperialist and Zionist handlers who are bleeding it for their own ends — into sparking an internal “Islamic civil war.” They display an obvious irrationality in their plans, a foolishness in their aims, and a superficiality in their statements. These fanatics have been brainwashed by the Wahhābī, *neo-salafī* contagion to wage war against other Muslims (Sufis, Shī'īs, Ash'arīs, Ḍāhirīs, Ibāḍīs)

and practically everyone who disagrees with them. Their atrocious acts speak volumes. So does their silence: they never speak about, much less analyze, the mega-criminals who control Islamic populations and steal Islamic resources on a scale that trivializes their narrow scope of thought.

Komeito – starting as a Nichiren Buddhist lay movement, then called the Soka Gakkai, it spread rapidly through Japan during the 1950s and 1960s. Soka Gakkai established a political wing in 1960 and in 1964 converted that unit into a nominally independent political party, the Komeito, or Clean Government Party. In 1967, the Komeito won 25 House of Representatives seats in its very first general election.


Calling itself “the party of welfare and peace,” the Komeito took its place alongside the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Democratic Socialist Party, and others in the left-leaning anti-LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) opposition. Like the JSP, it opposed the Japan-US Security Treaty and maintained that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) violated Japan’s pacifist constitution. However, the Komeito was not a party of rigid ideologues. As it established a firm foothold in national politics, it gradually moved toward a more pragmatic, centrist stance, and by the early-1980s, it had formally recognized the constitutionality of the SDF and acknowledged the necessity of the Japan-US Security Treaty.

A testimony to the strength of the Soka Gakkai organization is the Komeito’s proven ability to mobilize 7–8 million Soka Gakkai voters. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the Komeito worked to pass legislation allowing the deployment of SDF units to Iraq and the Indian Ocean to support the US “war on terror.” In 2013, it helped the government push through a tough and extremely unpopular state secrets law (Act on Protection of Specified Secrets). Reflecting its ideological malleability over the years, especially insofar as it is open to suggestion from US political and economic pressure, the Komeito of the 1960s and 1970s — with its emphasis on democracy, peace, and human rights — would never have dreamed of supporting policies so clearly geared to augmenting the power of the state (source: <http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2014/komeito-curious-journey>).

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – in English, Indian People’s Party; one of the two major political parties in India, along with the Indian National Congress (INC). As of 2015, it is India’s largest political party in terms of representation in the national parliament and state assemblies. The BJP is a right-wing, nationalist party, with close ideological links to the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.

The BJP traces its beginnings to the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, formed in 1951 by Syama Prasad Mookerjee. The Jana Sangh was later to merge with

several other parties to form the Janata Party, which defeated the incumbent Congress Party in the 1977 general election. After three years in power, the Janata Party dissolved (1980) with its members reconvening to form the BJP. After several years of successful constituency building (and bullying), the BJP became the largest party in parliament in 1996; however, it lacked a majority in the lower house of parliament, and its government lasted only 13 days.



After the 1998 general election, the BJP-led coalition known as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) formed a government under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee for a year. In the 2004 general election, the NDA suffered an unexpected defeat, and for the next ten years the BJP was the principal opposition party. Long time Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi led it to a landslide victory in the 2014 general election. Since that election, Modi has led the NDA government as prime minister.


BJP's official ideology is "integral humanism," first formulated by Deendayal Upadhyaya in 1965. The party expresses a commitment to Hindutva, that is, Hindu nationalism. It advocates social conservatism and a foreign policy centered on nationalist principles. Though some of its key rhetorical issues have included the abrogation of the special status to Jammu and Kashmir, the building of a Ram temple in Ayodhya and the demonization of Muslims as potential agents of subversion and terror, it has largely focused on neoliberal economic policy prioritizing globalization, economic growth, and defense spending over social welfare.

The BJP has been driving an expanded relationship with Israel, particularly insofar as defense and security issues are concerned. In the BJP's view, the countries have quite a bit in common, in that they are both democratic and secular; they both depend heavily on the United States, economically as well as ideologically; they both possess nuclear weapons; and they both have substantial Muslim minorities (which are routinely stereotyped as the existential enemy, and scapegoated for all terror attacks, regardless of who did or fomented them). Further, the BJP feels it can offer its huge market to Israeli goods, services, and technologies in return for intelligence and greater access in Washington executive and legislative circles. As this volume goes to press, close cooperation between the two governments has led to Israel's largest-ever sale of military hardware, \$3 billion (source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bharatiya_Janata_Party).

294 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 778–82.

295 Ibid.

- 296 **Dalai Lama** – Mongolian for *ocean-like guru*; the traditional religious and temporal head of Tibet, regarded as a manifestation of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara (one who embodies the compassion of all Buddhas). **Tenzin Gyatso** (1935–present), held to be the 14th incarnation, ruled in Tibet from 1940–1959. After temporarily fleeing Tibet (1950–1951) during the Chinese invasion of the country, he escaped to India during a local uprising in 1959, where he established an alternative government. Tibetans still regard him as their spiritual leader. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989.



- 297 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 778–82.

Confucius (551–479BCE) – refer to **Endnote 214** in Volume 2.

- 298 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 778–82.

- 299 **American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)** – a lobbying group that advocates pro-Israel policies to the US Congress and executive branch of the United States, though it has, by sleight of



hand, been able to get away without registering as an agent of a foreign government (Foreign Agents Registration Act, FARA). Perhaps the most powerful and influential lobbying organization in the US, AIPAC has more than 100,000 members, 17 regional offices, and “a vast pool of donors.” Since directly raising funds for political candidates would violate its tax-exempt status, AIPAC “helps organize” billionaire and millionaire American Zionists, industrialists, and corporate capitalists to channel money to candidates that would shelve their conscience for Israel in return for victory and ongoing incumbency.

A kissing cousin of the Likud Party in Israel, the Republican Party in the US, and the neoconservatives in the US ideological realm, AIPAC has a stranglehold on the US Congress and White House; in fact, no candidate for president can expect to successfully get to the White House without having the endorsement of AIPAC, paying homage to Israel, and denying that it has a poised arsenal of nuclear weapons.

In the 1950s, US President Eisenhower’s administration repeatedly demanded that the leaders of the American Zionist Council (precursor of AIPAC) register as “agents of a foreign government,” but the latter were able to exert enough lobbying influence to skirt the pressure. In 1962, Attorney

General Robert F. Kennedy's Department of Justice ordered the American Zionist Council to register as a foreign agent because of FARA violations, alleging it was being funded by the Jewish Agency for Israel and acting on behalf of Israel, but he, too, failed because of pressure from the Israel lobby. In 1988, former US Senator William Fulbright unsuccessfully petitioned the Department of Justice to register the lobby under FARA.

In 1987, as part of a plea agreement, Jonathan Jay Pollard pleaded guilty to spying for and providing top-secret classified information to Israel, and was later sentenced to life in prison for violations of the Espionage Act. In defense of his criminal activity, Pollard argued he committed espionage only because "the American intelligence establishment collectively endangered Israel's security by withholding crucial information." Since his conviction and imprisonment, Israeli officials, AIPAC and other American-Israeli activist groups, and American politicians have lobbied incessantly for his unconditional release. The Israeli government issued a formal apology to the US in 1987 but did not admit to paying him until 1998. Pollard was granted Israeli citizenship in 1995, and quietly released by the US government on November 20, 2015. A bill introduced in the Israeli Knesset in November 2015 would, if passed, authorize the Israeli government to fund Pollard's housing and medical expenses, and pay him a monthly stipend, for the remainder of his life.

In 2005, Lawrence Franklin, a Pentagon analyst pleaded guilty to espionage charges of passing US government secrets to AIPAC policy director Steven Rosen and AIPAC senior Iran analyst Keith Weissman, in what is known as the AIPAC Espionage Scandal. While this raised the possibility that AIPAC would come under greater scrutiny by the US Department of Justice, Rosen and Weissman were later fired by AIPAC, and in 2009, the Justice Department of the newly elected Obama administration dropped charges against the former AIPAC employees (source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Agents_Registration_Act).

Human rights activist and co-founder of CODEPINK: Women for Peace, Medea Benjamin, gives 10 reasons why AIPAC helps fuel a never-ending cycle of violence in the Muslim East, and thereby, the world,

1. AIPAC is lobbying [the US] Congress to promote a military confrontation with Iran. AIPAC — like the Israeli government — is demanding that the US attack Iran militarily to prevent Iran from having the technological capacity to produce nuclear weapons, even though US officials say Iran isn't trying to build a weapon (and even though Israel has hundreds of undeclared nuclear weapons). AIPAC has successfully lobbied the US government to adopt crippling economic sanctions on Iran, including trying to cut off Iran's oil exports, despite the fact that these sanctions raise the price of gas and threaten the US economy.


2. AIPAC promotes Israeli policies that are in direct opposition to international law. These include the establishment of colonies (settlements) in the Occupied West Bank and the confiscation of Palestinian land in its construction of the 26-foot high concrete “separation barrier” running through the West Bank. The support of these illegal practices makes it impossible to achieve a solution to the Israel/Palestine conflict.
3. AIPAC’s call for unconditional support for the Israeli government threatens our national security. The United States’ one-sided support of Israel, demanded by AIPAC, has significantly increased anti-American sentiment throughout the Middle East, thus endangering our troops and sowing the seeds of more possible terrorist attacks against us. General David Petraeus on March 16, 2010 admitted that the US/Palestine conflict “fosters anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of US favoritism for Israel.” He also said that “Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of US partnerships with governments and peoples in the [region] and weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab world. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and other militant groups exploit that anger to mobilize support.”
4. AIPAC undermines American support for democracy movements in the Arab world. AIPAC looks at the entire Arab world through the lens of Israeli government interests, not the democratic aspirations of the Arab people. It has therefore supported corrupt, repressive regimes that are friendly to the Israeli government, such as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak. Events now unfolding in the Middle East should convince US policy-makers of the need to break from AIPAC’s grip and instead support democratic forces in the Arab world.
5. AIPAC makes the US a pariah at the UN. AIPAC describes the UN as a body hostile to the State of Israel and has pressured the US government to oppose resolutions calling Israel to account. Since 1972, the US has vetoed 44 UN Security Council resolutions condemning Israel’s actions against the Palestinians. President Obama continues that policy. Under Obama, the US vetoed UN censure of the savage Israeli assault on Gaza in January 2009 in which about 1,400 Palestinians were killed; a 2011 resolution calling for a halt to the illegal Israeli West Bank settlements even though this was stated US policy; a 2011 resolution calling for Israel to cease obstructing the work of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees; and another resolution calling for an end to illegal Israeli settlement building in East Jerusalem and the occupied Golan Heights.

6. AIPAC attacks politicians who question unconditional support of Israel. AIPAC demands that Congress rubber stamp legislation drafted by AIPAC staff. It keeps a record of how members of Congress vote and this record is used by donors to make contributions to the politicians who score well. Members of Congress who fail to support AIPAC legislation have been targeted for defeat in re-election bids. These include Senators Adlai Stevenson III and Charles H. Percy, and Representatives Paul Findley, Pete McCloskey, Cynthia McKinney, and Earl F. Hilliard. AIPAC's overwhelmingly disproportionate influence on Congress subverts our democratic system.
7. AIPAC attempts to silence all criticism of Israel by labeling critics as "anti-Semitic," "de-legitimizers," or "self-hating Jews." Journalists, think tanks, students, and professors have been accused of anti-Semitism for merely taking stands critical of Israeli government policies. These attacks stifle the critical discussions and debates that are at the heart of democratic policy-making. The recent attacks on staffers at the Center for American Progress is but one example of AIPAC efforts to crush all dissent.
8. AIPAC feeds US government officials a distorted view of the Israel/Palestine conflict. AIPAC takes US representatives on sugar-coated trips to Israel. In 2011, AIPAC took one out of every five members of Congress — and many of their spouses — on a free junket to Israel to see precisely what the Israeli government wanted them to see. It is illegal for lobby groups to take Congresspeople on trips, but AIPAC gets around the law by creating a bogus educational group, AIEF [American Israel Education Foundation], to "organize" the trips for them. AIEF has the same office address as AIPAC and the same staff. These trips help cement the ties between AIPAC and Congress, furthering their undue influence.
9. AIPAC lobbies for billions of US tax dollars to go to Israel instead of rebuilding America. While our country is reeling from a prolonged financial crisis, AIPAC is pushing for no cuts in military funds for Israel, a wealthy nation. With communities across the nation slashing budgets for teachers, firefighters, and police, AIPAC pushes for over \$3 billion a year to Israel.
10. Money to Israel takes funds from [the] world's poor. Israel has the 24th largest economy in the world, but thanks to AIPAC, it gets more US tax dollars than any other country, at a time when the foreign aid budget is being slashed, keeping the lion's share of foreign assistance for Israel, meaning taking funds from critical programs to feed, provide shelter, and offer emergency assistance

to the world's poorest people (source: <http://mondoweiss.net/2012/02/ten-reasons-why-the-israel-lobby-aipac-is-so-dangerous/>).

See also pp. 252–54 and Endnote 169 in Volume 2.

300 **Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi** (1869–1948) – Indian nationalist leader who was given the laudatory title *Mahatma* (meaning *great soul*). Known as a pacifist, he led the struggle for Indian independence from the UK by advocating *satyagraha* (literally, *defense of and by truth*, but in practice, a form of civil resistance through nonviolent non-cooperation) from 1915. He was imprisoned several times by the British authorities and was influential in the nationalist Congress Party and in the independence negotiations (1947). He was assassinated by a Hindu nationalist in the violence that followed the partition of British India into India and Pakistan.



Gandhi was born in Porbandar, Gujarat and studied law in London, later practicing as a lawyer. He settled in South Africa where until 1914 he led the Indian community in opposition to racial discrimination. Returning to India, he emerged as leader of the Indian National Congress. He organized hunger strikes and events of civil disobedience, campaigned for social reform including religious tolerance, and sought an end to discrimination against the so-called untouchable caste. In 1947, after WWII, he played a significant role in negotiations for an autonomous Indian state.

Martin Luther King, Jr. (1929–1968) – African American minister and civil rights campaigner, born in Atlanta, Georgia. After studying at Morehouse College and Boston University (where he received a PhD in theology), he set up his first ministry in Montgomery, Alabama, and then quickly became a leader of the civil rights movement, known for his approach of passive resistance and his acclaimed oratorical skills. In 1964, he received the Kennedy Peace Prize and the Nobel Peace Prize. His greatest successes came in challenging the segregation laws of the American South. After 1965, he turned his attention to social conditions in the North, which he found less tractable. He was assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee in 1968; his assassin, James Earl Ray, was apprehended in London, and in 1969 was sentenced in Memphis to 99 years.



Alcide de Gasperi (1881–1965) – Italian statesman and prime minister (1945–1953), born in Trentino, Italy. He studied at Innsbruck and Vienna, entered parliament in 1911, and was imprisoned by Mussolini as an anti-fas-

cist (1927). From 1929, he worked in the Vatican library until he became prime minister of the new republic, heading a succession of coalition cabinets. A founding member of the Christian Democrat Party, he was also a strong believer in a United Europe.

Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike (1899–1959) – Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) statesman and prime minister (1956–1959), born in Colombo. He studied at Oxford, and was called to the bar in 1925. He became president of the Ceylon National Congress, and helped found the United National Party, becoming leader of the House in Ceylon's first parliament, and minister of health. In 1951 he resigned from the government and organized the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, which returned him to parliament as opposition leader and as prime minister on a policy of nationalization and neutralism (1956). He was assassinated by a Buddhist monk, and succeeded by his wife Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike, who became the world's first woman prime minister (1960–1965, 1970–1977).



Dag Hjalmar Agne Carl Hammarskjöld (1905–1961) – Swedish statesman who became secretary-general of the United Nations (1953–1961); born in Jonköping, Sweden. After teaching at Stockholm, he became the Swedish foreign minister (1951–1953). At the UN, he helped to set up the Emergency Force in Sinai and Ghazzaḥ (1956), and worked for conciliation in the Muslim East (1957–1958). He was posthumously awarded the 1961 Nobel Peace Prize as he did not survive an air crash near Ndola, Zambia, while engaged in negotiations over the Congo crisis.



Desmond (Mpilo) Tutu (1931–present) – African Anglican churchman, born in Klerksdorp, South Africa. Tutu became Bishop of Lesotho (1977), Bishop of Johannesburg (1984), and finally Archbishop of Cape Town (1986). He was a fierce critic of the apartheid system, advocating international sanctions against South Africa, but condemning the use of violence by its opponents. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984.




Lech Walesa (1943–present) – Polish trade unionist and president, born in Popowo, Poland. A former Gdansk shipyard worker, he became the leader of the independent trade union, Solidarity, which openly challenged the Polish (communist) government's economic and social policies. He held

negotiations with leading figures in the Church and state, but was detained by the authorities when martial law was declared in 1981. He was released in 1982, and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983. He continued to be a prominent figure in Polish politics, was much involved in the negotiations that led to Solidarity being involved in government in 1989, and in 1990 became president.



Imran Khan (1952–present) – Pakistani politician (chairman of the Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaaf), former cricketer, philanthropist, and founder of the Shaukat Khanum Memorial Cancer Hospital and the Namal College, Mianwali. Khan played international cricket for two decades, leading Pakistan to its only World Cup title in 1992; and, after retiring, entered politics. Born in Lahore, Punjab Province, he studied at Aitchison College and later went to Keble College, Oxford where he studied philosophy, politics, and economics. In 1996, Khan founded the Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaaf (Movement for Justice) political party. He was an elected MP of his native constituency Mianwali in the National Assembly from 2002–2007, and was again elected during the 2013 general elections, when his party gained 35 seats in the National Assembly. He has been critical of enduring corruption in Pakistan’s executive offices and legislative houses as well as America’s war on terror and the use of military drones for targeted assassinations in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.



Recep Tayyip Erdogan (1954–present) – twelfth president of the Turkish Republic (2014–present), prime minister (2003–2014), and mayor of Istanbul (1994–1998); founder of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001, which he led to three general election victories in 2002, 2007, and 2011. He became Istanbul’s mayor while still a member of Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party, but he was banned from office and sentenced to 10 months in prison for religious intolerance in 1998. He broke away from Erbakan in establishing the more secular AKP, whose well-crafted Islamic veneer pulled at the heartstrings of the average Turkish workingman, especially at election time, while its inner democratic neo-liberalism was agreeable to NATO. Through his three terms as prime minister, he tried unsuccessfully to become a member of the European Union.



With the help of Fethullah Gulen’s Cemaat Movement, Erdogan was able to curb the political power of the military through the Sledgehammer

and Ergenekon court cases. However, before he was elected president, in the wake of a corruption scandal investigation instigated by Gulen, he sacked the vast majority of Gulenists who were in high political, judicial, and civil constabulary (police) offices. In the June 2015 elections, he tried, but failed, to get the needed majority in parliament so that he could amend the constitution to endorse an executive presidency system of government, which would have allowed him expanded powers and to remain in office almost indefinitely. In the November 2015 elections, he secured a majority in parliament by whipping up anti-Kurdish nationalist sentiment among Turks.

From 2011–2015, he has been one of the key components of NATO's campaign to overthrow Bashar al-Asad's government in Syria. Under his direct involvement, Turkey has been providing training, weapons, supplies, medical aid, safe havens, and crossing corridors to terrorist groups (ISIS, Jabhah al-Nuṣrah, Aḥrār al-Shām, and others) operating in Syria. Much evidence from the war theater points to Erdogan facilitating the sale of oil produced from ISIS' territorial acquisitions in Syria and Iraq; reports also suggest that Erdogan's sons have made billions of dollars through this project. Lastly, using the accusation of terrorism as a justification, Erdogan has been accused of bombing strategic Kurdish positions in hot Syrian war zones that have been instrumental in reversing some of ISIS' territorial gains.

- 301 **Mao Zedong or Tse-Tung** (1893–1976) – Chinese communist leader and head of state; chairman of the People's Republic of China (1949–1959) and chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) until his death. By some accounts, he was the most influential person in modern Chinese history. After fighting against the Manchu dynasty (1911), he became a Marxist in 1919, devoting himself after 1923 to full-time revolutionary activity. Following the split between Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang and the CCP, Mao established his dominance over the CCP during the Long March (1934–1936). Between 1936 and 1949 he acquired a reputation as a theorist, adapting Marxism to the particular needs of the Chinese. Becoming chairman in 1949, Mao developed heavy industry and emphasized the need for rapid collectivization. In 1956 he attempted to draw on China's intellectual strength by encouraging ideological debate and in the late-1950s stressed the need for decentralization and people's communes stemming from the development of labor-intensive industries. His feeling that Chinese society was becoming more elitist led to the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969), but he gradually retired from administrative politics in the early-1970s.



Joseph Stalin (1879–1953) – adopted name (*stalin* is Russian for *steel*) of Joseph Vissarionovich Djugashvili; Soviet politician. A member of the Oc-


tober Revolution Committee (1917), Stalin became general secretary of the Communist Party in 1922. After Lenin's death in 1924, Stalin sought to create "socialism in one country" and clashed with Trotsky, who denied the possibility of socialism inside Russia until revolution had occurred in Western Europe. Stalin won this ideological struggle by 1927, and starting in 1928, a series of five-year plans was launched to collectivize industry and agriculture. All opposition was eliminated in the Great Purge (1936–1938). During WWII, Stalin intervened in the military direction of the campaigns against Nazi Germany. His role was denounced after his death by Khrushchev and other members of the Soviet regime.



Born in Georgia, the son of a shoemaker, Stalin was educated for the priesthood but was expelled from his seminary for Marxist propaganda. He became a member of the Social Democratic Party (1898), and joined Lenin and the Bolsheviks in 1903. Following repeated exile to Siberia (1903–1913), he became a member of the Communist Party's Politburo, and sat on the October Revolution Committee. Stalin rapidly consolidated a powerful following (including Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov); in 1921 he became commissar for nationalities in the Soviet government, responsible for the decree granting equal rights to all peoples of the Russian Empire, and was appointed general secretary of the Communist Party in 1922. As dictator in the 1930s, he disposed of all real and imagined enemies. In recent years increasing evidence has been uncovered revealing Stalin's "anti-Semitism," for example the execution of 19 Jewish activists in 1952 for "Zionist conspiracy."

302 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 778–82.

John Paul II (1920–2005) – papal name of Karol Jozef Wojtyła; pope (1978–2005). Born in Wadowice, Poland, he was the first non-Italian pope in 450 years. Ordained in 1946, he became professor of moral theology at the Catholic University in Lublin and at Kraków. During his tenure as Archbishop and Metropolitan of Kraków (1964–1978), he was made a cardinal in 1967. Noted for his energy and analytical ability, his pontificate saw many foreign visits, in which he preached to huge audiences. In 1981 he survived an assassination attempt when he was shot in St. Peter's Square by a Turkish national, Mehmet Ali Agca, whose motives have remained unclear. A champion of economic justice and an outspoken defender of the Church in communist countries, he was uncompromising on moral issues.



303 **World Council of Churches (WCC)** – the historical roots of the World Council of Churches are found in student and lay movements of the 19th

century, the 1910 Edinburgh world missionary conference, and a 1920 encyclical from the (Orthodox) Synod of Constantinople suggesting a “fellowship of churches” similar to the League of Nations. When the WCC came into being at the First Assembly in 1948, there were 147 member churches. At the end of 2013, the membership stood at 345 churches. Predominately Protestant and Western in its earliest years, the WCC’s profile and identity evolved during the 1960s with the influx of many Orthodox churches from the East and newly autonomous churches from formerly colonial regions in the South. The Second Vatican Council greatly improved relations between the WCC and Roman Catholics.



The WCC is the broadest and most inclusive among the many organized expressions of the modern ecumenical movement, a movement whose goal is Christian unity. The WCC brings together churches, denominations, and church fellowships in more than 110 countries and territories throughout the world, representing over 500 million Christians and including most of the world’s Orthodox churches, scores of Anglican, Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, and Reformed churches, as well as many United and Independent churches. While the bulk of the WCC’s founding churches were European and North American, today most member churches are in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America, the Muslim East and the Pacific (source: <https://www.oikoumene.org/en/about-us>).


World Fellowship of Buddhists (WFB) – a transnational Buddhist organization initiated by Gunapala Piyasena Malalasekera, and founded in 1950 in Colombo, Sri Lanka by representatives from 27 nations. Although Theravada Buddhists are most influential in the organization, members of all Buddhist schools are active in the WFB. It now has regional centers in 35 countries, including India, the United States, Australia, and several nations of Africa and Europe, in addition to traditional Buddhist countries. WFB’s objectives include (1) promotion among members of the strict observance and practice of the teachings of the Buddha; (2) securing unity, solidarity, and brotherhood amongst Buddhists; (3) propagating the sublime doctrine of the Buddha; (4) organizing and carrying out activities in the field of social, educational, cultural, and other humanitarian services; and (5) working for happiness, harmony and peace on earth and collaborating with other organizations working for the same ends (source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Fellowship_of_Buddhists).

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) – refer to Endnote 87 in Volume 2 and Endnote 45 in Volume 4.

304 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 778–82.

305 *Ibid.*, pp. 704–07.

William James (1842–1910) – psychologist and philosopher, born in New York City, brother of the novelist Henry James. He received a medical degree from Harvard (1869), where he began teaching anatomy and physiology (1873) and philosophy (1879). His books include *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy* (1897), and *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). He was a leader of philosophical pragmatism, and also helped found the American Society for Psychical Research, publishing numerous papers on the subject.



306 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 704–07.

307 *Ibid.*

308 **Harold Joseph Laski** (1893–1950) – political scientist and socialist, born in Manchester, UK. He studied at Oxford, and lectured at several US universities before joining the London School of Economics (1920), where he became professor of political science in 1926. The development of his political philosophy, a modified Marxism, can be seen in his many books, such as *Authority in the Modern State* (1919) and *A Grammar of Politics* (1925).



Leon Duguit (1859–1928) – French jurist, a revolutionary legal thinker who elaborated an influential natural-law philosophy. Duguit studied law at the University of Bordeaux and was appointed professor in the faculty of law at Caen in 1883. In 1886, he returned as professor to Bordeaux where he became dean of the faculty of law and remained until his death.



Duguit had a significant influence on French public law. Discarding traditional theories that looked upon law as deriving from the authority of the monarch or the state, Duguit instead found the basis of law in the fact that humans are social animals endowed with a universal sense or instinct of solidarity and social interdependence. Out of this sense came the recognition of certain rules of conduct as essential for living together in a society. In Duguit's view, the state is not a sovereign power but an institution that has arisen out of the social needs of humans; governments, like individ-

uals, are bound by the rules of law derived from social necessity.

309 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 704–07.

310 **Jean Bodin** (1530–1596) – French political philosopher whose six-volume *Les six livres de la République* (*Six Books of the Commonwealth*, 1576) is considered the first work on political economy.

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) – English materialist and empiricist, and the first Western thinker since Aristotle who attempted to develop a comprehensive theory of nature, including human behavior; one of the founders of modern political philosophy. In *Leviathan* (1651), he argues that because men are selfish by nature, an absolutist government is the only means of ensuring order and security. In a “social contract,” men agree to give up many personal liberties and accept such rule.



John Austin (1790–1859) – jurist, born in Creting Mill, Suffolk, UK. In 1818 he was called to the bar, and was appointed professor of jurisprudence at London (1826–1832). His *Province of Jurisprudence Determined* revolutionized English views on the subject and introduced a definiteness of terminology hitherto unknown.

311 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 704–07.

312 **Great Depression** – the worldwide slump in output and prices, and the greatly increased levels of unemployment, which developed between 1929 and 1934. It was precipitated by the collapse of the US stock market (the Wall Street crash) in October 1929. This ended American loans to Europe, which was just coming out of WWI, and greatly reduced business confidence worldwide. A major Austrian bank also collapsed, producing destabilization in much of Central and Eastern Europe.

313 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 704–07.

314 Ibid.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) – Swiss-French writer and philosopher born in Geneva, whose works have profoundly influenced European literary and political thought, as well as educational theory. In his first major essay *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (*Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, 1750), Rousseau advanced his theory of the “noble savage” whose innate goodness

is corrupted by civilization. His *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (*Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality among Men*, 1755) is another eloquent attack on structured society. It was with the publication of his novel, *La Nouvelle Heloise* (1761), that Rousseau emerged as the oracle of the French Romantic movement. In his next work, *Emile* (1762), Rousseau expounded his views on education, some of which have left their mark on today's schools. In *Du contrat social* (*The Social Contract*, 1762), his greatest work of polemical philosophy, he argued that power is vested not in princes, but in the common people, and that government must be by general consent. Rousseau's bold investigation of the paradox of human society — man is born free, but everywhere is in chains — put his own freedom in jeopardy.



Alexis Charles Henry Maurice Clerel de Tocqueville (1805–1859) – historian and political scientist, born in Verneuil, France. He became a lawyer (1825), and in 1831 went to the United States to report on the prison system. On his return, he published a penetrating political study, *De la démocratie en Amérique* (*Democracy in America*, 1835), which gave him a European reputation. He became a member of the Chamber of Deputies in 1839, and in 1849 was vice president of the Assembly and briefly minister of foreign affairs. After Louis Napoleon's coup, he retired to his estate, where he wrote the first volume of *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution* (*The Old Regime and the Revolution*, 1856). He died before it could be completed.



315 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 704–07.

316 Ibid.

317 Ibid.

318 Ibid.

319 Ibid.

320 Ibid.

321 Ibid.

322 Ibid.

- 323 **Ḥabīb ibn 'Alī Būrġibāḥ** (1903–2000) – Tunisian politician, first leader of the Tunisian nation-state (1957–87). Educated at the University of Paris, he became a journalist and was often imprisoned by the French for his nationalist aims as leader of the Neo-Destour Party. He became prime minister (1956) and then president for life (1974); later, he was overthrown in a coup in 1987.



- 324 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 592–96.

- 325 **Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns** – in the context of Western civilization, disputes among scholars concerning the superiority of classical Greek and Roman authors over contemporary writers have occurred at least since the time of the Renaissance. In the late-17th and early-18th centuries, however, such debates turned into heated conflicts, particularly in France and England. In these two countries the *Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes* and the Battle of the Books pitted the Ancients — who upheld the authority of the writers of antiquity in intellectual matters — against the Moderns — who maintained that writers of the present day possessed greater knowledge and more refined tastes than their predecessors. Underlying these positions were fundamental assumptions regarding the state of art, culture, and human knowledge. The Ancients viewed Greco-Roman civilization as the apex of human achievement and all subsequent culture as a decline from this high point. Thus, they contended, writers of the present were in no position to judge the ancients, who were their superiors. The Moderns, on their side, saw human knowledge and understanding as progressing since antiquity. They considered classical works as admirable in certain respects, but also crude and in need of correction and improvement. In the course of these debates human knowledge, which previously had been regarded as an undifferentiated whole, began to be divided into broad categories. Areas of inquiry such as science and mathematics, which depend upon the intellect, were for the first time distinguished from the pursuits of art and literature, which rely upon the imagination.

Broadly speaking, the quarrel originated in the Renaissance, with the humanist revival of interest in works of antiquity and the desire to imitate them. In order to better understand their models, scholars began to uncover and analyze more and more ancient works, with the unexpected consequence that the more they learned, the more alien and distant classical culture seemed. This gave rise to historical consciousness — the sense that language, customs, and manners constitute a changing set of conventions, responsive to varying conditions. Change, then, was seen as inevitable; the dispute arose over whether change was to be regarded as desirable. The Ancients maintained the precedence of classical works, the enduring wisdom

and beauty of which were to be sought after and imitated. The Moderns, to the contrary, valued innovation and invention and strove to use the past creatively, adapting it to present conditions (source: <http://www.enotes.com/topics/quarrel-between-ancients-and-moderns>).

- 326 **Isaac Newton** (1642–1727) – iconic physicist and mathematician; born in Woolsthorpe, Lincolnshire, UK. While he was studying at Cambridge, during the years 1665–1666, the fall of an apple is said to have suggested the train of thought that led to the discovery of the law of gravitation. He studied the nature of light, concluding that white light is a mixture of colors that can be separated by refraction, and devised the first reflecting telescope. He became professor of mathematics at Cambridge in 1669, where he resumed his work on gravitation, expounded finally in his famous *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (*Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, 1687). In 1696 he was appointed warden of the Mint, and was master of the Mint from 1699 until his death. He also sat in parliament on two occasions, was elected president of the Royal Society in 1703, and was knighted in 1705. During his life he was involved in many controversies, notably with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz over the question of priority in the discovery of calculus.



- Rene Descartes** (1596–1650) – Rationalist philosopher and mathematician, considered to be “the father of modern philosophy”; born in La Haye, France. Trained at the Jesuit College at La Fleche, he remained a Catholic throughout his life, but soon became dissatisfied with scholasticism. In his most famous work, *Meditationes de prima philosophic* (*Meditations on First Philosophy*, 1641), he began by claiming that one can doubt all one’s sense experiences, even the deliverance of reason, but that one cannot doubt one’s own existence as a thinking being: *cogito ergo sum* (*I think, therefore, I exist*). From this basis he argued that God must exist, and (as a perfect Being) would not systematically deceive us, so that our beliefs based on ordinary sense experience can be assumed to be correct. He also argued that mind and body are distinct substances, and that this dualism made possible human freedom and immortality. Other major works are the *Discourse de la methode* (*Discourse on Method*, 1637), *Principia philosophize* (*Principles of Philosophy*, 1644), and *Les Passions de l’ame* (*Passions of the Soul*, 1649).



He also made major contributions to astronomy and mathematics, and virtually founded coordinate geometry. He lived quietly in Holland after 1628, but in 1649 was persuaded to move to Stockholm to teach Queen

Christina of Sweden. He could not, however, cope with the rigors of the regime and climate, and died of pneumonia the next year.

327 **Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux** (1636–1711) – critic, born in Paris. He studied law and theology at Beauvais, then devoted himself to literature, and in 1677 was appointed royal historiographer. His first publications (1660–1666) were satires, and he also wrote epistles, critical dissertations, epigrams, and translations. *L'Art poétique* (*The Art of Poetry*, 1674), expressing the classical principles for writing verse, was very influential in France and England.



Jean de La Fontaine (1621–1695) – poet, born in Chateau-Thierry, France. Early on, he devoted himself to the study of ancient writers and to verse writing. His *Contes et nouvelles en vers* (*Tales and Novels in Verse*, 1655) was followed by his major work, a collection of over 200 verse stories, *Fables choisies mises en vers* (*Selected Fables in Verse*, 1688).



William Temple (1628–1699) – English diplomat and essayist, born in London. He studied at Cambridge, became a diplomat in 1655, was made ambassador at the Hague, and negotiated the Triple Alliance (1668) against France. After becoming a baronet in 1666, in 1677 he helped to bring about the marriage of the Prince of Orange to the Princess Mary, daughter of James, Duke of York (later James II). After the 1688 revolution he declined a political post and lived in retirement at Moor Park, Surrey, where he devoted himself to literature. His essay style was a major influence on 18th-century writers, including Jonathan Swift, who was his secretary.



Jonathan Swift (1667–1745) – clergyman and satirist, born in Dublin. Educated at Dublin, he moved to England, where he became secretary to the diplomat, William Temple. During a visit to Ireland, he was ordained in the Anglican Church (1695). He wrote several poems, then turned to prose satire, exposing religious and intellectual complacency in *A Tale of a Tub* (1704); he also produced a wide range of political and religious essays and pamphlets. Swift was made dean of St. Patrick's in Dublin at the fall of the Tory minister (1714), and afterwards visited London only twice. His world-famous satire, *Gulliver's Travels*, appeared (like all his works,



anonymously) in 1726, and in later years he wrote a great deal of light verse, and several essays on such topics as language and manners. He also progressively identified himself with Irish causes in such works as *The Drapier's Letters* (1724) and the savagely ironic *A Modest Proposal* (1729).

- 328 **Bernard de Fontenelle** (1657–1757) – French scientist and man of letters, described by Voltaire as the most universal mind produced by the era of Louis XIV. Many of the characteristic ideas of the Enlightenment are found in embryonic form in his works. Educated at the Jesuit college in Rouen, he did not settle in Paris until he passed the age of 30 and became famous as the writer of operatic librettos. His literary activity during the years 1683–1688 won him a great reputation. *Nouveaux Dialogues des morts* (*New Dialogues of the Dead*, 1683–1684), conversations modelled on the dialogues of Lucian, between such figures as Socrates and Montaigne, Seneca and Scarron, served to disseminate new philosophical ideas. The popularization of philosophy was carried further by the *Histoire des oracles* (*History of the Oracles*, 1687), based on a Latin treatise by the Dutch writer Anton van Dale (1683). Here Fontenelle subjected pagan religions to criticisms that the reader would inevitably see as applicable to Christianity as well. Fontenelle's most famous work was the *Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes* (*A Plurality of Worlds*, 1688). These charming and sophisticated dialogues were more influential than any other work in securing acceptance of the Copernican system, still far from commanding universal support in 1686 (source: <http://www.britannica.com/biography/Bernard-Le-Bovier-sieur-de-Fontenelle>).



Charles Perrault (1628–1703) – writer, born in Paris. He became a lawyer, and in 1663 was a secretary to Colbert. He wrote several poems, and engaged in debate over the relative merits of the Ancients and the Moderns, but is best known for his eight fairy tales, *Contes de ma mere l'oye* (*Tales of Mother Goose*, 1697), which included *The Sleeping Beauty* and *Red Riding Hood*.



329 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 592–96.

330 Ibid.

331 Ibid.


332 Ibid.

333 Ibid.

334 Ibid.

335 Ibid.

336 **Talcott Parsons** (1902–1979) – sociologist, born in Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA. He studied at Amherst College, the London School of Economics, and Heidelberg University, and became one of the most prominent US sociologists, based throughout his career at Harvard. He developed a functionalist analysis of social systems through his principal publications, *The Structure of Social Action* (1939) and *The Social System* (1951).



Ferdinand Tonnies (1855–1936) – German social theorist and philosopher, one of the founders of the sociological tradition of community studies and urban sociology through his key work, *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* (*Community and Society*, 1887).

337 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 592–96.


338 **Immanuel Kant** (1724–1804) – German philosopher, possibly the most influential of modern times. A life-long teacher at Königsberg and a prolific writer, originally on the physical sciences, his later philosophical works were so influential that he became an oracle on important questions of his day. He synthesized Leibniz's rationalism and Hume's skepticism into his "critical philosophy," the foundation of the subsequent history of the subject. In *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), he wrote that ideas do not conform to the external world, but rather the world can be known only insofar as it conforms to the mind's own structure. In *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), Kant claimed that morality requires a belief in God, freedom, and immortality, although these can be proved neither scientifically nor by metaphysics. Finally, in *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), he presented the concept of the categorical imperative.



339 **Jürgen Habermas** (1929–present) – philosopher and social theorist, born in Düsseldorf, Germany. He studied at Göttingen and Bonn Universities, taught at Heidelberg (1962) and Frankfurt (1964), and became director of the Max Planck Institute (1971). He continues the tradition of Marxist social philosophy associated with the Frankfurt School, and a central theme

of his work is the possibility of a rational political commitment to socialism in societies where science and technology are dominant. His books include *Erkenntnis und Interesse* (*Knowledge and Human Interest*, 1968) and *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (*Theory of Communicative Action*, 1982).

Ernest Gellner (1925–1995) – a British-Czech philosopher and social anthropologist, born in Paris, France. His first book, *Words and Things* (1959), became popular because of his attack on linguistic philosophy. As Professor of Philosophy, Logic, and the Scientific Method at the London School of Economics for 22 years, the William Wyse Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Cambridge for eight years, and head of the New Centre for the Study of Nationalism in Prague, Gellner argued, through his writing, teaching, and political activism, against “...closed systems of thought, particularly communism, psychoanalysis, relativism, and the dictatorship of the free market.” Among other issues in social thought, modernization theory, and nationalism was his multicultural perspective allowing him to work within the subject-matter of three separate civilizations: Western, Islamic, and Russian. He is considered one of the leading theoreticians on the issue of nationalism.



340 **Adam Smith** (1723–1790) – Scottish economist, often regarded as the founder of political economy. He was born in Kirkcaldy, Scotland, and was professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow (1752–1763). His major work, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), defined national wealth in terms of labor. The cause of wealth is explained by the division of labor, that is, by dividing a production process into several repetitive operations, each carried out by different workers. Smith advocated the free working of individual enterprise, and the necessity of “free trade.” He also published the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759).



341 **Emile Durkheim** (1858–1917) – one of the founders of modern sociological theory. He was born in Epinal, France, and educated at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, where he took an interest in political and social philosophy. He then became the first professor of sociology and education at Bordeaux, a post he held until 1902, when he was honored by an appointment to the Sorbonne. Durkheim was interested in the application of sociology to education. He studied how societies were structured in order




to satisfy the wants of people and the interrelationships between individual striving and social cohesiveness. He also investigated the extent to which individualism and social order could coexist. In *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1912), based on a study of “primitive” societies, he posited the theory that religion is the matrix out of which culture develops. Deeply affected by the violence and upheaval of WWI, he died in 1917.

342 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 592–96.

343 Ibid.

344 **Sigmund Freud** (1856–1939) – founder of psychoanalysis, born in Freiburg, Austrian Empire; of Jewish parentage. He studied medicine at Vienna, then specialized in neurology, and later in psychopathology. Finding hypnosis inadequate, he substituted the method of “free association,” allowing the patient to express thoughts in a state of relaxed consciousness, and then interpreting the data of childhood and dream recollections. He became convinced, despite his own puritan sensibilities, of the fact of infantile sexuality, a theory that ostracized him from the medical profession.



In 1900 he published his major work, *Die Traumdeutung* (*The Interpretation of Dreams*), arguing that dreams are disguised manifestations of repressed sexual wishes (in contrast with the widely-held modern view that dreams are simply a biological manifestation of the random firing of brain neurons during a particular state of consciousness). In 1902, he was appointed to a professorship in Vienna, despite previous academic “anti-Semitism,” and began to gather disciples, among them Alfred Adler and Carl Jung. Out of this grew the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society (1908) and the International Psychoanalytic Association (1910). It was not until 1930, when he was awarded the Goethe Prize, that his work ceased to arouse active opposition from public bodies. In 1933, Hitler banned psychoanalysis, and after Austria had been overrun, Freud and his family were extricated from the hands of the German troops and allowed to emigrate. He settled in Hampstead, London, where he died.

345 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 592–96.

346 Ibid.


347 **Friedrich Nietzsche** (1844–1900) – German philosopher and poet, author of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (1880), the first comprehensive statement of his mature thought, whose central doctrine saw the will for power as the driving force of all human endeavor. His writings also include *The Will to Power*

(1888) and *The Genealogy of Morals* (1886). His influence on existentialism, theology, psychiatry, and literature has been significant. Refer also to **Endnote 44** in Volume 2 and **Endnote 284** in Volume 7.

- 348 **Vilfredo Pareto** (1848–1923) – economist and sociologist, born in Paris. He studied at Turin, and became professor of political economy at Lausanne, writing textbooks on the subject, in which he demonstrated a mathematical approach. His work on criteria for improvements in efficiency without making interpersonal comparisons laid the foundations of modern welfare economics. In sociology, his *Trattato di sociologica generale* (*The Mind and Society*, 1916), with its theory of governing elites, anticipated some of the principles of fascism.



- José Ortega y Gasset** (1883–1955) – writer, social critic, and existentialist philosopher, born in Madrid, Spain. He studied in Madrid and Germany, and became professor of metaphysics at Madrid (1910). His critical writings on modern authors made him an influential figure, and his *La rebellion de las masas* (*The Revolt of the Masses*, 1930) foreshadowed the Spanish Civil War. He lived in exile in South America and Portugal (1936–1946). His *perspectivist* (the doctrine that reality is known only in terms of the perspectives of it seen by individuals or groups at particular moments) asserted the uniqueness and equal validity of the infinity of different possible interpretations of the world, and he grounded ultimate reality in the life of the individual: “I am I and my circumstances.”



- Robert Michels** (1876–1936) – German social and political theorist. Originally a radical, he became a critic of socialism and Marxism, and in his last years supported Hitler and Mussolini. In his *Political Parties* (1911), he propounded the Iron Law of Oligarchy, arguing that in any organization or society, even a democracy, there is a tendency toward rule by the few in the interests of the few, and that ideologies such as socialism and communism were merely propaganda to control the masses. He believed that the rise of totalitarian governments — both fascist and communist — in the 1930s confirmed his analysis and proved that the masses were incapable of asserting their own interests.



Max Horkheimer (1895–1973) – philosopher and social theorist, born in Stuttgart, Germany. He studied at Frankfurt, and became a leading figure in the Frankfurt School together with Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. His *Kritische Theorie* (*Critical Theory*, 1968) expounds the basic principles of the school in their critique of industrial civilization. His other major works include *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (*Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 1947), with Adorno, and *Eclipse of Reason* (1947).



Theodor Adorno (1903–1969) – refer to **Endnote 511** in Volume 8.

350 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 592–96.

351 **Charles Baudelaire** (1821–1867) – French poet, born in Paris. As a young man, Baudelaire studied law at the Lycée Louis-le-Grand. Dissatisfied with his choice of profession, he began to drink daily, hire prostitutes, and run up considerable debts. Upon obtaining his degree in 1839, Baudelaire chose not to pursue law, turning instead to a career in literature. In 1845, he published his first work, an art review. Baudelaire gained notoriety for his 1857 volume of poems, *Les Fleurs du mal* (*The Flowers of Evil*). His themes of sex, death, lesbianism, metamorphosis, depression, urban corruption, lost innocence and alcohol not only gained him loyal followers, but also garnered controversy. The courts punished Baudelaire, his publisher, and the book's printer for offending public morality, and as such, suppressed six of the poems (source: <http://www.biography.com/people/charles-baudelaire-39436>).



352 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 592–96.

353 **Georg Simmel** (1858–1918) – German sociologist, philosopher, and critic, born in Berlin. Simmel's neo-Kantian approach laid the foundations for sociological antipositivism, asking "What is society?" and presenting pioneering analyses of social individuality and fragmentation. An acquaintance of Max Weber, Simmel wrote on the topic of personal character in a manner reminiscent of the sociological "ideal type." Both Simmel and Weber's nonpositivist theory would inform the eclectic critical theory of the Frankfurt School. Simmel's most famous works include *The Problems of the Philosophy of History* (1892), *The Philosophy of Money* (1907), *The Metropolis and Mental Life* (1903), *Soziologie* (1908, including *The Stranger*, *The Social*



Boundary, The Sociology of the Senses, The Sociology of Space, and On The Spatial Projections of Social Forms), and *Fundamental Questions of Sociology* (1917). He also wrote extensively on the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, as well as on art, most notably his book *Rembrandt, An Essay in the Philosophy of Art* (1916).

354 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 592–96.

355 *Ibid.*

356 **fascism** – a term applied to a variety of vehemently nationalistic and authoritarian movements that reached the peak of their influence from 1930–1945. The original fascist movement was founded by Mussolini in Italy (1921), and during the 1930s several such movements emerged in Europe, the most important being the German Nazi Party. The central ideas of fascism are a belief in the supremacy of the chosen national group over other races, and the need to subordinate society to the leadership of a dictator who can pursue national aggrandizement without taking account of different interests. Fascism advocates the abolition of all institutions of democracy, the suppression of sources of opposition such as trade unions, and to varying degrees, the mobilization of society under fascist leadership. Fascism is also strongly associated with militaristic and belligerent foreign policy stances. Since WWII its appeal has declined, although in some Latin American countries, fascist-type governments have held office.

Nazism – an ideology based on racism, nationalism, and the supremacy of the state over the individual. The German Nazi Party, or Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers' Party), was founded in 1919 and led by Adolf Hitler (1921–1945). During the 1930s, many similar parties were created throughout Europe and the USA, although only those of Austria, Hungary, and the Sudetenland (the border districts of Bohemia, Moravia, and those parts of Silesia located within Czechoslovakia that were inhabited primarily by German speakers) were of major importance. These parties collaborated with the German occupation of Europe from 1939–1945. After the Nazi debacle in WWII, the party was banned in Germany, but today parties with Nazi or neo-Nazi ideologies exist in many countries.

357 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 220–24.

358 *Ibid.*

359 *Ibid.*

360 Ibid.

361 Ibid.

362 Ibid.

363 Ibid.

364 **Reformation** – the religious and political movement in 16th-century Europe to reform the Roman Catholic Church, which led to the establishment of Protestant churches. Anticipated from the 12th century by the Waldenses, Lollards, and Hussites, it was set off by German priest Martin Luther (1517), and became effective when the absolute monarchies in some parts of Europe gave it support by challenging the political power of the papacy and confiscating church wealth. Below is a brief chronology of its important milestones,

- 1517 – Martin Luther’s protest against the sale of indulgences began the Reformation in Europe.
- 1519 – Ulrich Zwingli led the Reformation in Switzerland.
- 1529 – The term “Protestant” was first used.
- 1533 – Henry VIII renounced papal supremacy and proclaimed himself head of the Church of England.
- 1541 – The French theologian John Calvin established Presbyterianism in Geneva, Switzerland.
- 1559 – The Protestant John Knox returned from exile to found the Church of Scotland.
- 1545–1563 – The Counter-Reformation was initiated by the Roman Catholic Church at the Council of Trent. It aimed at reforming abuses and regaining lost ground by using moral persuasion and extending the Spanish Inquisition to other countries.
- 1648 – By the end of the Thirty Years War, the present European alignment had been reached, with the separation of Catholic and Protestant churches.

Refer also to **Endnote 120** in Volume 6.

365 **Thirty Years War** (1618–1648) – refer to **Endnote 173** in Volume 4.

366 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 220–24.

367 Ibid.

English Revolution (1640–1688) – the term has been used to describe two different events in English history. According to Whig historians, it refers to

the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which concerned the overthrow of King James II of England by a union of English Parliamentarians with the Dutch stadtholder (chief magistrate of the United Provinces of the Netherlands) William III of Orange-Nassau (William of Orange). William's successful invasion of England with a Dutch fleet and army led to his ascending of the English throne as William III of England jointly with his wife Mary II of England, in conjunction with the documentation of the Bill of Rights (1689). However, Marxist historians use the term to describe the period of the English Civil Wars and Commonwealth period (1640–1660), in which the parliament challenged King Charles I's authority, engaged in civil conflict against his forces, and executed him in 1649. This was followed by a ten-year period of bourgeois republican government, the so-called Commonwealth, before monarchy was restored in the shape of Charles' son, Charles II in 1660.

- 368 **Niccolo di Bernardo dei Machiavelli** (1469–1527) – Italian politician and author whose name is synonymous with cunning and cynical statecraft. In his most celebrated political writings, *Il principe* (*The Prince*, 1513) and *Discorsi* (*Discourses*, 1531), he discussed ways in which rulers can advance the interests of their states (and themselves) through an often amoral and opportunistic manipulation of other people.



Machiavelli was born in Florence and was second chancellor to the republic (1498–1512). On the accession to power of the Medicis (1512), he was arrested and imprisoned on a charge of conspiracy, but in 1513 was released to exile in the country. *The Prince*, which was based on his observations of Cesare Borgia, is a guide for the future prince of a unified Italian state (this did not occur until the Risorgimento in the 19th century). In *L'Arte della guerra* (*The Art of War*, 1520), Machiavelli outlined the provision of an army for the prince, and in *Historie fiorentine* (*History of Florence*, 1532) he analyzed the historical development of Florence until 1492. Among his later works are the comedies, *Clizia* (1515), and *La Mandragola* (*The Mandrake*, 1524). Refer also to **Endnote 85** in Volume 3.

- 369 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 220–24.

370 Ibid.

- 371 **James Madison** (1751–1836) – US statesman and 4th president of the United States (1809–1817); born in Port Conway, Virginia. He entered politics in 1776, played a major role in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, which framed the federal constitution, and collaborated in the writing of *The Federalist Papers* (1788). He was elected to the First National Congress,

and became a leader of the Jeffersonian Republican Party. He was secretary of state under Jefferson, and when he himself became president, his tenure was witness to the European wars, which were destructive of American commerce, and to conflict with Britain (1812).

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) – English philosopher, legal and economic theorist and reformer, and one of the chief proponents of *utilitarianism*, whose central doctrine states that all human action must be aimed at producing the greatest happiness for the greatest number. It is by this criterion, Bentham said, that a man must judge the law and all other social institutions and practices that he might wish to reform.



James Mill (1773–1836) – English philosopher, historian, and economist, born in Logiepert, Tayside; the father of John Stuart Mill. He became a disciple and friend of Jeremy Bentham, an enthusiastic proponent of utilitarianism, and a prominent member of the circle of Philosophical Radicals. He took a leading part in the founding of University College in London (1825), held a senior position in the East India Company, and published many important essays and treatises, including *Elements of Political Economy* (1821), which was considered an important influence on Marx.



372 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 220–24.

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) – British philosopher and economist, author of *Principles of Political Economy* (1848), one of the most important 19th-century economic texts. A liberal and a disciple of Bentham, he pursued the utilitarian doctrine of “greatest happiness” as an end to be achieved through legislation. See also **Endnote 322** in Volume 5 and **Endnote 323** in Volume 7.

373 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 220–24.

374 Ibid.

375 **Friedrich Engels** (1820–1895) – socialist philosopher, collaborator with Marx, and founder of “scientific socialism.” Born in Barmen, Germany, but from 1842 he lived mostly in England. He first met Marx at Brussels in 1844 and collaborated with him on the *Communist Manifesto* (1848). He spent his later years editing and translating Marx’s writings. Refer also to **Endnote 166** in Volume 6.

376 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 220–24.

377 Ibid.

378 Ibid.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev (1931–present) – first president of the Soviet Union (1990–1991), general secretary of the Communist Party (1985); born in Privolnoye, Russia. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his leadership role in ending the Cold War and promoting peaceful international relations. Born to a peasant Ukrainian family, Gorbachev graduated from Moscow University with a law degree (1955). In the ensuing years he advanced through the ranks of the Communist Party, becoming a member of the Soviet Politburo in 1980. Upon the successive deaths of the two previous general secretaries of the Communist Party, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, Gorbachev was elected general secretary. Though his first policy initiatives were *glasnost* and *perestroika* (openness and restructure), directed at improving the failing Soviet economy, he will be remembered most for the difficult negotiations with then US President Ronald Reagan in a bid to end the Cold War. His final acts as general secretary were to revoke the Communist Party's special status as set forth in the USSR's constitution. State power was handed over to the Congress of People's Duties of the USSR, the Soviet Union's first parliament, based on democratic elections. The Congress of People's Duties elected Gorbachev the first president of the Soviet Union (1990).



As president of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev ordered Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, as this was economically and politically unsustainable. Through his negotiations with President Reagan, Gorbachev was also instrumental in ending the Cold War. He is likewise credited for his crucial role in the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent reunification of Germany. For his leadership and contributions, Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (1990). When the Soviet Union finally crumbled in 1991, Gorbachev stepped down from his position as president, handing over power to Boris Yeltsin (source: <http://www.biography.com/people/mikhail-sergeyevich-gorbachev-9315721>).

379 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 220–24.

380 Ibid.

381 Ibid.

382 Ibid.

383 Ibid.

384 Ibid.

385 Ibid.

386 Ibid.

387 “We have an established order dating back to our ancestors and in honoring their legacy we shall be guided” (43:22).

388 **Enlightenment** – the Germans, who first gave the Enlightenment its name (*aufklärung*, the same word for explaining the facts of life), have a branch of spiritual or intellectual history that has no equivalent in English. An offshoot of German idealist philosophy, German intellectual history (*Geistesgeschichte*) focuses on ideas rather than on political, economic, or social forces as the motive power of history. Thus, while a cultural historian might describe the 18th century as baroque, rococo, or neo-classic, and someone with a political or economic specialty would talk about the *ancien regime* and mercantilism, the Germans characterized the Enlightenment by a common style of thinking.

Historian Arnold Hauser, for one, believes that the Enlightenment, and not the Renaissance, is the decisive turning point to modern (European) history. The period is generally held to begin with the scientific discoveries of Newton, Galileo, and Descartes in the 17th century. The scientific revolution they launched encouraged European scholars in all fields to seek more rigorous rules or methods — their own laws of gravity, as it were. Replacing faith with reason, these scholars (called philosophers) were cosmopolitan, humanist, and above all, secular (in this regard, Newton was an exception since he described God as “the Great Mathematician,” and fussed with “biblical arithmetic” to date the millennium).

From unraveling the mysteries of nature, the philosophers turned to the science of man, giving birth to the first classics of the social sciences. In sociology, Montesquieu wrote his groundbreaking *The Spirit of Laws* (1748); in psychology, Diderot (better known for the first encyclopedia, a typical Enlightenment enterprise to spread knowledge) anticipated some of the concepts of Freud; John Locke applied the scientific method to the study of government; and perhaps most important of all, in political economy, Adam Smith opened new worlds of analysis with his *Wealth of Nations* (1776). The field of history, neither new nor claiming to be a science, also produced new classics, such as Edward Gibbon’s *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (1776–1788).

Just as the scientific revolution launched the Industrial Revolution and the Enlightenment, these forces combined in turn to launch a political revolution. First came a new variation on an old theme — “enlightened despotism” — as in Frederick the Great’s Prussia, Catherine the Great’s Russia, or Joseph II’s Habsburg Empire. According to Jacob Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish in *The Western Intellectual Tradition*, Frederick “...collected great philosophers in the way his father before him collected outsized soldiers.” It was in the least enlightened of contemporary despotisms, Bourbon France, that the great revolution burst forth in 1789, sweeping away the *ancien regime* entirely.

The first country to put the Enlightenment into practice was the United States of America, under the leadership of its own great philosophers, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine, and Thomas Jefferson. “The American nation,” writes religious historian Sydney Ahlstrom in *A Religious History of the American People*, “was born in the full illumination of the Enlightenment. And this fact would permanently distinguish it from every other major power in the world.” With the American Revolution in 1776, as Peter Gay points out in *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, “the United States first became an exporter rather than an importer of ideas, helping prepare the way in turn for the French Revolution.”

The leading contemporary work on the period exists fortunately in both short and long forms. Peter Gay’s two-volume study, *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, also comes in an abbreviated volume, *Age of Enlightenment*. On the American Enlightenment, a good source is *Cincinnatus: George Washington and the Enlightenment* by Gary Wills. See also Endnote 33 in Volume 4.

Regarding a historical and analytical account of how the idea of a secular justification of political power spread, see,

Jean Bodin, M.J. Tooley (translator), *Six Books of the Commonwealth*. (London, United Kingdom: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1962).

With respect to the quote, “Sovereignty resides with the people, the only legitimate source of power,” see,

Jean Charles Léonard Simonde de Sismondi, *Observations générales sur le gouvernement actuel, et sur la proclamation de Napoléon au peuple français* (*General comments on the current government, and the proclamation of Napoleon to the French people*). (Paris, France: 1815).

Charles Maurice de Talleyrand (1754–1838) – French statesman and constitutional monarchist, born in Paris. Educated for the Church, he was ordained (1779), appointed Bishop of Autun (1788), elected to the Estates General, and made president of the Assembly (1790). He lived in exile in England and the US until after the fall of Robespierre. As foreign minister under the Directory (1797–1807), he helped to consolidate Napoleon's position as consul (1802) and emperor (1804); but alarmed by Napoleon's ambitions, he resigned in 1807, becoming leader of the anti-Napoleonic faction. He became foreign minister under Louis XVIII, representing France with great skill at the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815). He then lived largely in retirement, but was Louis Philippe's chief adviser at the July Revolution, and was appointed French ambassador to England (1833–1835).



390 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, p. 533.

391 Ibid.

392 Ibid.

393 Ibid.

Henri-Benjamin Constant de Rebeque (1767–1830) – novelist and politician, born in Lausanne, Switzerland. He studied at Oxford, Erlangen, and Edinburgh, then settled in Paris (1795) as a publicist. He supported the French Revolution, but was banished in 1802 for his opposition to Napoleon. He returned in 1814, and became leader of the liberal opposition. His best-known work is the novel *Adolphe* (1816), based on his relationship with Madame de Stael.



394 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, p. 533.

395 Ibid.

396 Zafar Bangash, *Power Manifestations of the Sīrah: Examining the Letters and Treaties of the Messenger of Allah* (ﷺ). (Toronto, Canada: Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought, 2011), pp. 13–20.

397 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, pp. 423–24 (originally cited in *al-Hadyu al-Nabawī* by Ibn al-Qayyim).

- 398 The incident is cited in many books of *tafsīr*, among them by al-Bayhaqī in *al-Dalā'il* as well as by Ibn 'Asākir who got it from al-Walīd ibn 'Ubādaḥ on the authority of (his father) 'Ubādaḥ ibn al-Ṣāmit.
- 399 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, p. 425 (originally transmitted by 'Aṭīyah ibn Sa'd and recorded by Ibn Abī Shībah and Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī).
- 400 Ibid.

Abū Sufyān (64BH–31AH) – a prominent Makkan merchant and military figure. Having fought against the Prophet (ﷺ) for over two decades, he finally accepted Islam in 9AH. His daughter, Umm Ḥabībah, was married to the Prophet (ﷺ). The first king of the Umayyad dynasty was one of his sons, Mu'āwiyāḥ. Refer also to **Endnote 345** in Volume 5 and **Endnote 382** in Volume 7.

- 401 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, p. 20.

- 402 **Louis XIV** (1638–1715) – known as Louis the Great or Le Roi Soleil (the Sun King), king of France (1643–1715); born in St. Germain-en-Laye, the son of Louis XIII, whom he succeeded at the age of five. Through Louis' adolescence (1643–1651), France was ruled by his mother, Anne of Austria, and her chief minister, Cardinal Mazarin. In 1660 Louis married the Infanta Maria Theresa, elder daughter of Philip IV of Spain, through whom he was later to claim the Spanish succession for his second grandson. In 1661 he assumed sole responsibility for government, advised by various royal councils. His obsession with France's greatness led him into aggressive foreign and commercial policies, particularly against the Dutch. Though his patronage of the Catholic Stuarts led to the hostility of England after 1689, his major political rivals were the Austrian Habsburgs, particularly Leopold I. From 1665 Louis tried to take possession of the Spanish Netherlands, but later became obsessed with the acquisition of the whole Spanish inheritance. His attempt to create a Franco-Spanish Bourbon bloc led to the formation of the Grand Alliance of England, the United Provinces, and the Habsburg Empire, and resulted in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1713).



In his later years, Louis was beset by other problems. His determination to preserve the unity of the French state and the independence of the French Church led him into conflict with the Jansenists, the Huguenots, and the papacy, with damaging repercussions. His old age was overshadowed by military disaster and the financial ravages of prolonged warfare. Yet Louis

was the “greatest” monarch of his age, establishing the parameters of successful absolutism. In addition, his long reign marked the cultural ascendancy of France within Europe, symbolized by the Palace of Versailles, where he died. He was succeeded by his great-grandson, Louis XV.

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) – Emperor of the French (1804–1814; and again in 1815); also known as Napoleon I. A general from 1796 in the Revolutionary Wars, in 1799 he overthrew the ruling Directory and made himself dictator. From 1803 he conquered most of Europe (the Napoleonic Wars) and installed his brothers as puppet kings. After the Peninsular War and retreat from Moscow in 1812, he assumed power once more but was defeated by British forces at the Battle of Waterloo and exiled to the island of St. Helena. His internal administrative reforms are still evident in France.



Napoleon, born in Ajaccio, Corsica, received a commission in the artillery (1785) and first distinguished himself at the Siege of Toulon (1793). After suppressing a royalist uprising in Paris (1795), he was given command against the Austrians in Italy and defeated them at Lodi, Arcole, and Rivoli (1796–1797). Egypt, seen as a halfway house to India, was overrun and Syria invaded, but his fleet was destroyed by British Admiral Nelson at the Battle of the Nile. Napoleon returned to France and carried out a coup against the government of the Directory to establish his own dictatorship, nominally as First Consul. The Austrians were again defeated at Marengo (1800) and the coalition against France shattered, a truce being declared in 1802. A plebiscite the same year made him consul for life. In 1804 a plebiscite made him emperor. While retaining and extending the legal and educational reforms of the Jacobins, Napoleon replaced the democratic constitution established by the French Revolution with a centralized despotism, and by his concordat with Pope Pius VII, conciliated the Catholic Church. The Code Napoleon remains the basis of French law.

War was renewed by Britain in 1803, aided by Austria and Russia from 1805 and Prussia from 1806. Prevented by the British navy from invading Britain, Napoleon drove Austria out of the war by victories at Ulm and Austerlitz (1805), and Prussia by the victory at Jena (1806). Then, after the Battles of Eylau and Friedland, he formed an alliance with Russia at Tilsit (1807). Napoleon now forbade entry of British goods to Europe, attempting an economic blockade known as the Continental System; he occupied Portugal, and in 1808 placed his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. Both countries revolted with British aid, and Austria attempted to reenter the war but was defeated at Wagram. In 1796 Napoleon had married Josephine de Beauharnais, but in 1809, to assert his equality with the Hapsburgs, he divorced her to marry the Austrian emperor's daughter Marie Louise.

When Russia failed to enforce the Continental System, Napoleon occupied Moscow, but his army's retreat in the bitter winter of 1812 encouraged Prussia and Austria to declare war again in 1813. He was defeated at Leipzig and driven from Germany. Despite this aberrational campaign on French soil (Napoleon's wars were usually conducted on enemy territory), the Allies (Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria) invaded Paris and compelled him to abdicate (April 1814); he was banished to the island of Elba, off the west coast of Italy. In March 1815 he escaped and took power for 100 days, with the aid of Marshal Ney, but Britain and Prussia led an alliance against him at Waterloo, Belgium, in June. Surrendering to the British, he again abdicated, and was exiled to the island of St. Helena, 1,200 miles (1,900km) west of Africa, where he died. His body was brought back in 1840 to be interred in the Hotel des Invalides, Paris. See also **Endnote 241** in Volume 7.

Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) – Austrian-born firebrand and Fuhrer of the German Third Reich, whose policies plunged Europe into WWII. According to some sources, he died by his own hand in the flames of Berlin as the conflict drew to its close. At the end of WWI, in which he served in the German army, he joined the unimportant National Socialist Workers Party, which he transformed and enlarged by his talent as an orator, and in 1923 he tried, unsuccessfully, to overthrow the Bavarian government in a *putsch* at Munich. For this he was imprisoned, and while in jail, he wrote *Mein Kampf*, in which he expounded his political and social theories.



The great depression of the late-1920s brought him millions of recruits from people who were disillusioned with other parties, frightened by inflation, unemployed, and hungry. It also won him the support of business interests, fearful of communism. By 1930 the Nazi Party was the second largest political organization in Germany, having achieved much of its success by offering the Germans a way out of national humiliation and economic strangulation.

The German Jews were identified as an enemy and treated as such. In 1933 President Hindenburg made Hitler chancellor, and by “contriving” the burning down of the Reichstag and blaming it on the communists, Hitler was able to establish a strong central authority. He also eliminated a key political rival, Ernst Rohm, who was a close friend and early ally, by having him executed in the Night of the Long Knives. Hitler then set about rearming Germany. In a series of increasingly aggressive acts, phased to coincide with the progressive re-militarization of Germany, he embarked on the gradual conquest of Europe by sending troops into the demilitarized Rhineland (1936), forming an alliance with Mussolini (formally concluded in 1939), and sending his troops into Austria and Czechoslovakia (1938). By

invading Poland (September 1939) he precipitated the WWII. See also **Endnote 241** in Volume 7 and **Endnote 126** in Volume 9.

403 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, p. 20.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) –

association set up in 1949 to provide for the collective defense of the major Western European and North American states against the perceived threat from the USSR. Its chief body is the Council of Foreign Ministers, who have representatives in permanent session; in addition there is an international secretariat in Brussels, Belgium, and the Military Committee consisting of the Chiefs of Staff from member countries. The military headquarters, called SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe), are in Chievres, near Mons, Belgium. After the East European Warsaw Pact was disbanded in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union, an adjunct to NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, was established, including all the former Soviet republics, with the aim of building greater security in Europe.



Both the Supreme Allied Commanders (Europe and Atlantic) are from the US. In 1960 a permanent multinational Allied Mobile Force (AMF) was established to move immediately to any NATO country under threat of attack; the AMF is headquartered in Heidelberg, Germany.

France withdrew from the military integration, not the alliance, in 1966; Greece withdrew politically but not militarily in 1974. In 1980 Turkey was opposed to Greek reentry because of differences over rights in the Aegean Sea. NATO has encountered numerous problems since its inception over such issues as the hegemonic position of the US, the presence in Europe of US nuclear weapons, burden sharing, and standardization of weapons. In 1990, after a meeting in London, NATO declared that “nuclear weapons [are] of last resort” rather than a “flexible response,” and offered to withdraw all nuclear artillery shells from Europe if the USSR did the same. NATO’s counterpart was the Warsaw Pact, until the abandonment of its military role in 1990. In October 1991, it was agreed that NATO’s ground-launched and air-delivered nuclear arsenal in Europe would be reduced by 80%. There were also plans for NATO forces to be reduced by up to 30% by the mid-1990s. In July 1992, it was agreed that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would in the future authorize all of NATO’s military responses within Europe. See also **Endnote 163** in Volume 4.


404 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, p. 20.

405 Ibid.

406 **Cold War** (1947–1991) – see **Endnotes 278, 289,** and 317 in Volume 5; pp. 210 and 347, and Endnotes 379 and 390 in Volume 7; and pp. 165–66, 206–07, and 335 in Volume 9.

Warsaw Treaty Organization (1955–1991) – see **Endnote 288** in Volume 5.

League of Nations – international organization formed after WWI to solve international disputes by arbitration. Established in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1920, the league included representatives from nation-states throughout the world, but was severely weakened by the US decision not to become a member; it had no power to enforce its decisions. It was dissolved in 1946. Its subsidiaries included the International Labor Organization and the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague, Netherlands, both now under the auspices of the United Nations.



The formation of the league was first suggested by US President Woodrow Wilson in his *Fourteen Points* as part of the peace settlement for WWI. The US did not become a member since it did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles. Although the League organized conferences, settled minor disputes, and did humanitarian work, it failed to handle the aggression of the 1930s — of Japan against China, of Italy in Ethiopia, and of Germany against neighboring countries. See also **Endnote 347** in Volume 7.

407 **Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)** – regional body consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The idea of a regional body in the Gulf grew out of Saudi Arabia's proposal for an internal security pact with fellow monarchies in the Arabian Peninsula following an armed uprising in Makkah in late-1979. The matter became urgent when the Western-imposed war on Islamic Iran erupted in September



1980 (the First Gulf War). Meeting in Abu Dhabi, rulers of the six Gulf monarchies founded the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on May 26, 1981. Its objectives were to coordinate the internal security, procurement of arms, and national economies of member states, and settle border disputes.

'Abdullāh Bishārah, a Kuwaiti diplomat, was appointed secretary-general of the GCC, whose secretariat was in Riyadh. In June 1982 the GCC foreign ministers' attempt to end the First Gulf War failed. A GCC communique in November condemned Islamic Iran for occupying Iraqi territory. However continuation of the war helped the GCC to become a cohesive body, particularly in defense, where collectively the GCC states had 190,000 troops and 300 warplanes. In October 1984 the GCC conducted a three-week joint military exercise in the desert of the United Arab Emirates.

At the GCC summit in November it was decided to set up a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) of two brigades under a Saudi officer based in Riyadh. A year later the GCC summit pledged to continue its efforts to end the war in a manner that safeguarded the legitimate rights and interests of "the two sides." The next summit in late-1987 urged the UN Security Council to implement its ceasefire Resolution 598, passed in July.

Following Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait in August 1990, the GCC condemned the Iraq action. It despatched its RDF to the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. The GCC summit in December 1990 demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait, and when that did not happen, the troops and air forces of GCC members participated in the Second Gulf War against Iraq. In March 1991 GCC ministers agreed to give grants to Egypt and Syria for the deployment of the 35,000 Egyptian and 20,000 Syrian troops as part of the backbone of an expanded Gulf defense force. But these plans were later abandoned.

The GCC states decided to suspend their subsidies to the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as Yāsir 'Arafāt, who had sided with Iraq during the Second Gulf War (1990–1991), was its chairman. Following the PLO-Israeli accord in Washington in September 1993, GCC members ended their ostracization of the PLO and the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia promised to contribute up to US \$100 million over a five-year period to a development fund for the West Bank and Ghazzaḥ. In 1994 the GCC challenged the status of Islamic Iran in the Tunb Islands. See also Endnote 49 in Volume 4.

408 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, p. 20.

409 Benjamin Netanyahu (editor), *Terrorism: How the West Can Win* (New York, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Girous, 1986), pp. 61–63.

410 **Tupamaros** – an Uruguayan urban guerilla movement founded by Raul Sendic in 1963, named after the 18th century Peruvian Indian rebel, Tupac Amaru. The movement was suppressed by the military controlled government of 1972–1985.

Montaneros – the Argentinian parallel to the Tupamaros.

411 Bernard Lewis, Benjamin Netanyahu (editor), *Terrorism: How the West Can Win* (New York, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Girous, 1986), pp. 65–67.

412 **Nicephorus II Phocas** (circa 912–969CE) – Byzantine Emperor (963–969). Born to a military family, he joined the army at an early age and became supreme commander of the eastern frontier by the age of 41. He is known for the military victories that contributed to the resurgence of the Byzantine Empire during the 10th century. He was assassinated in a plot that included his second wife, Theophano, and his nephew, John Tzimiskes (the next emperor), both of whom had become lovers. He was decapitated and his head paraded about on a spike; his body was thrown out of a palace window. An inscription carved on the side of his tomb reads, “You conquered all but a woman.”

Pope John VIII (died 882CE) – pope (872–882CE). Born in Rome, he devoted much of his papacy to attempting to halt and reverse the Muslim gains in southern Italy and their march northward. He was the first pope to be assassinated, due in part, it is said, to his failure to resolve the “Muslim problem,” and his exhaustion of the papal treasury.

413 In 1071 a force from the east struck Constantinople a lethal blow. The Seljuk Turks, Muslims since the 8th century and recruited as “mercenaries” by the ‘Abbasids, had crossed the Oxus into Khorasan in 1034, attacked the outlying Byzantine province of Armenia in 1049, and captured Baghdad in 1055. Their ascendancy in Syria was crowned by the capture of al-Quds from the Fatimid dynasty in 1070.


Thus began the gradual “Turkish” infiltration and transformation of the Islamic political domain that, even though Seljuk power itself waned in less than a century, was to reach its apogee under the Ottomans. In 1071 the Byzantine emperor, Romanus Diogenes, marched against the Seljuk sultan, Alp Arslan, and in the Armenian town of Manzikert, Byzantium suffered one of the worst defeats in its history. The Seljuks then overran Asia Minor, which was to lead to profound historical consequences.

By reducing Byzantium to a small area around Constantinople, Seljuk military control signaled the fact that real power within Christendom now lay in the West. In this regard, the Normans had already seized Apulia in 1042 and by 1071 expelled the Greeks from Bari, their last foothold in Italy. It was the empowerment of Islam in the old Roman empire — the sultanate established in Asia Minor was known as the Sultanate of Rūm, or Rome — that contributed to the initiation of the Crusades in the West.

Pope Alexander II (died 1073CE) – Bishop of Lucca, pope (1061–1073); born in Milan, Italy. In 1065, Alexander II called for a crusade against the Moors (Muslims) in Spain. In this crusade, he ordered the holy warriors to protect the Jews, but to fight and expel the Muslims.

- 414 André Crovisier, John Childs (editors), *A Dictionary of Military History*. (Oxford, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 360.

Pope Urban II (1042–1099) – pope (1088–1099); born in Chatillon-sur-Marne, France. He became a monk at Cluny, and was made Cardinal Bishop of Ostia (1078). As pope, he introduced ecclesiastical reforms, drove foreign armies from Italy, and launched the First Crusade at the Council of Clermont (1095). He was beatified in 1881.



Alexius I Comnenus (1056–1118) – Byzantine emperor (1081–1118). Inheriting a collapsing empire and faced with constant warfare during his reign against both the Seljuk Turks in Asia Minor and the Normans in the western Balkans, Alexius I was able to halt the Byzantine decline and begin the military, financial, and territorial recovery known as the Comnenian restoration. His appeals to Western Europe for help against the Turks was likely what catalyzed the Crusades.

- 415 **St. Bernard of Clairvaux** (1090–1153) – theologian and reformer, born of a noble family in Fontaines, France. In 1113 he entered the Cistercian monastery of Citeaux, and in 1115 became the first abbot of Clairvaux. His studious, ascetic life and stirring eloquence made him the oracle of Christendom. He founded more than 70 monasteries and his preaching kindled the enthusiasm of France for the Second Crusade (1146). His writings include hundreds of epistles and sermons, and several theological treatises. He was canonized in 1174. The monks of his reformed branch of the Cistercians are often called Bernardines.



- 416 **Templars** – the Poor Knights of Christ and the Temple of Solomon; an international religious-military order, whose members were subject to monastic vows. The order was founded (1120) chiefly to protect pilgrims to the Holy Land; its name derives from the location of its headquarters — near the site of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem. It developed



into a great army, acquiring wealth and property, and was suppressed by Pope Clement V in 1312.

Hospitallers – members (priests or brother knights subject to monastic vows) of the Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem, originally a purely charitable organization to care for sick pilgrims to the Holy Land. The warrior element developed and became predominant, and from the 12th century, played a prominent role in the Crusades as an international religious-military order. After the loss of Acre in 1291, they transferred their headquarters to Limassol, Cyprus (1292), and later to Rhodes (1309), but were expelled by the Ottoman Turks in 1523. They moved to Malta (1530), which they held until dislodged by Napoleon I in 1798. The Sovereign Order is now based in Rome.



417 **Teutonic Knights** – members of the Order of St. Mary of the Germans, a religious-military order founded in 1190 and inspired by crusading ideals. By the 14th century they controlled the East Baltic lands of the Livonian Knights, Prussia, and East Pomerania. The Order was dissolved in Germany in 1809, but re-established in Austria in 1834.



418 **Barbary Coast** – the coast of North Africa from Morocco to Tripolitania (Libya), famous for buccaneering between the 16th and 18th centuries. This coast and the Barbary states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Tripolitania take their name from the Berbers who inhabited this region.



419 **Albigenses** or **Albigensians** – followers of a form of Christianity that, in the 11th and 12th centuries especially, had its main strength in the town of Albi, Southwest France. It was derived from 3rd-century followers of the Persian religious teacher, Mani, whose ideas gradually spread along trade routes to Europe, predominantly to Italy and France. Also known as Cathari or Bogomiles, they believed life on earth to be a struggle between good (spirit) and evil (matter). In extreme cases, they were rigidly ascetic, with marriage, food, and procreation all condemned. They believed in the transmigration of souls. Condemned by Rome and the Inquisition, they were devastated in the early-13th century crusade against them, which also broke down the distinctive civilization of Provence, France.

Papal States – territories in the Italian Peninsula under the sovereign direct rule of the pope, from the 8th century until 1870. They were among the major states of Italy from roughly the 8th century until the Italian Peninsula was unified in 1861 by the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia. At the pinnacle of their power, they covered most of the modern Italian regions of Lazio (which includes Rome), Marche, Umbria and Romagna, and portions of Emilia. After 1861, the Papal States, reduced to Lazio, continued to exist until 1870. Between 1870 and 1929, the pope had no physical territory at all. Eventually the Italian fascist leader, Benito Mussolini, solved the crisis between modern Italy and the Vatican, and, in 1929, the Vatican City State was granted sovereignty.



420 André Crovisier (editor), *A Dictionary of Military History*, p. 360.

421 **Ferdinand of Castile** (1452–1516) – also known as Ferdinand the Catholic; King of Castile as Ferdinand V (from 1474), of Aragon and Sicily as Ferdinand II (from 1479), and of Naples as Ferdinand III (from 1503); born in Sos, Aragon (Spain). In 1469 he married Isabella, sister of Henry IV of Castile, and ruled jointly with her until her death. He introduced the Inquisition (1478–1480), and in 1492, after the defeat of the Muslims, expelled the Jews. Under him, Spain gained supremacy following the “discovery” of America, and in 1503 he took Naples from the French, with the help of the Holy League. After Isabella’s death (1504) he was Regent of Castile for his insane daughter Juana, and in 1512 gained Navarre, thus becoming monarch of all Spain. The unity of Spain, its grandness as a nation, and the foundation of its imperial influence are credited to Ferdinand and Isabella. See also **Endnote 136** in Volume 3.



422 Dr. Robert Stewart, *The Illustrated Almanac of Historical Facts from the Dawn of the Christian Era to the New World Order*. (New York, New York: Prentice Hall, 1992), p. 106.

423 Ibid.

424 **Counter-Reformation** – also known as the Catholic Revival or Catholic Reformation; the period of Catholic resurgence beginning with the Council

of Trent (1545–1563) and ending at the close of the Thirty Years War (1648), and was initiated in response to the Protestant Reformation. See also Endnotes 115 and 120 in Volume 6; and Endnote 360 in Volume 7.

425 Dr. Robert Stewart, *The Illustrated Almanac of Historical Facts*, p. 107.

426 **Ḥāṭib ibn Abī Balta‘ah** (35BH–30AH) – an adjunct to Banū Asad ibn ‘Abd al-‘Uzzá. It is said that at one time he was close to al-Zubayr ibn al-‘Awwām. All Islamic historians seem to agree that Ḥāṭib attended the Battle of Badr. Ḥāṭib also corresponded with the Makkan *mushriks* advising them that the Prophet (ﷺ) was on his way to Makkah at the head of a military contingent. The *āyah*, “**O you who are securely committed! Do not take the side of My enemy — who is also your enemy...**” (60:1), was disclosed to bring this act to light. As a result ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb asked the Prophet (ﷺ) to execute him for treason; however, Allah’s Messenger (ﷺ) replied, “*But he [Ḥāṭib] participated in the Battle of Badr.*” Ḥāṭib tried to excuse himself by saying that he had no supportive allies in Makkah who would be able to protect his immediate family there. His alibi was accepted. Ḥāṭib had also expressed his belief that whatever he wrote to the *mushriks* in Makkah would have done no strategic harm to Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ).

427 Refer to Article 25 of the Document (or Covenant) of Madinah, p. 125.

428 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, p. 427.

429 Ibid., (originally cited in *Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī*).

430 Ibid., p. 429.

431 Ibid., p. 430.

432 Ibid.

433 Sayyid Quṭb, *Fī Ṣilāl al-Qur‘ān*, Volume 2. (Beirut, Lebanon: Dār al-Shurūq, 1405AH), 11th ed., p. 913 (originally narrated by Hanād, Yūnus ibn Bakīr, and ‘Uthman ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, and recorded by al-Zuhri and Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī).

434 Ibid., (originally narrated by ‘Ubādaḥ ibn al-Ṣāmit who told (his son) al-Walīd ibn ‘Ubādaḥ, who told Ishāq ibn Yasār, who related it to Muḥammad ibn Ishāq).

435 William H. Gentz, *The Dictionary of Bible and Religion*, p. 474.

436 **Synoptic Gospels** – the first three canonical Gospels, traditionally ascribed to Sts. Matthew, Mark, and Luke. They are known as the Synoptic Gospels, since they share a generally common presentation of the events of Jesus' (ﷺ) life and "death." In spite of important differences, these three Gospels share a basic structural core, running from Jesus' baptism at the hands of John the Baptist (ﷺ) to the report of the women who found the tomb of Jesus empty. The term *synoptic* comes from the Greek words *syn* (meaning *with* or *together*) and *optos* (meaning *seeing*), indicating that the three Gospels "see events together or alike." In contrast, the fourth Gospel, that by St. John, diverges from the other three Gospels in sequence and in content. In St. John's Gospel, for example, Jesus drives out the money changers from the Temple early in his ministry; in the Synoptics, the cleansing of the temple takes place in the last week of Jesus' (ﷺ) life and is the last straw that forces the chief priest to act against him.

437 **Battle of Badr (Ghazwah Badr al-Kubrā)** – also referred to as **Yawm al-Furqān (The Day of Criterion), Yawma Iltaqā al-Jam'ān (the Day the Two Assemblies Met, or Went to War)**. Taking place on Ramaḍān 17, 2AH, this is the confrontation between Islam and *kufr* that is described by the Qur'anic words,

Certainly, Allah loves those who fight on His course as [one solid] rank, as if they were a sturdy structure (61:4);

And Allah gave you [the committed Muslims] victory at Badr while you were infirm, so be on your guard [against the power of Allah] so that you may be able to offer [Him] thanks (3:123).

See also Endnote 432 in Volume 7.

Battle of the Confederates (Ghazwah al-Aḥzāb) – also referred to as **Battle of the Trench (Ghazwah al-Khandaq)**, which took place during the month of Shawwāl 5AH. It is described by the eternal Qur'anic words, "At a time when visual sensation faded and hearts reached the throats" (33:10).

438 Dilip Hiro, *A Comprehensive Dictionary of the Middle East*. (Northampton, Massachusetts, US: Olive Branch Press, 2013), pp. 128–29.

439 Some *mufasssirs* consider the word *fath* here to refer to the liberation of Makkah; what argues against limiting this word to the liberation of Makkah, which takes away from its more general and inclusive meaning, is that there are Muslim historians and scholars who consider the *fath* to have commenced with the Treaty of Ḥudaybiyah, a few years prior.

440 ‘Ubādaḥ ibn al-Šāmit al-Khazrajī al-Anṣārī (died 45AH) – also known as Abū al-Walīd. A veteran of Badr, he may have been one of the original members who met the Prophet (ﷺ) at ‘Aqabaḥ before the Hijrah. He also participated in most, if not all, the military campaigns against the *mushriks* and *kāfirs*, living to witness the liberation of Egypt. He narrated many hadiths of the Prophet (ﷺ). He may have been the first governor of an Islamic Palestine, and at one time was the administrator of Ḥuṣṣ (Homs) in Syria. He is reported to have passed away in Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem).

441 Referring to al-Ṭabarī, Ibn Kathīr, al-Zamakhsharī, and the like.

442 The validity of aspects of this narrative are problematic as there are general guidelines for Islamic combat duty — and death by incineration is not one of them. This gives the impression that portions of the narrative in question are not accurate.

443 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, p. 435 (originally cited by Qatādaḥ in the words of Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī).

444 Abū Bakr and those who stood their ground with him may have the honor of fulfilling the meanings of this *āyah*, as was narrated by some *mufasssirs* on the authority of ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī, Qatādaḥ, and al-Ḍaḥḥāk. Al-Suddī places the meanings of this *āyah* with the Anṣār who gave support to the Prophet (ﷺ) when no one else had offered it. There are other indications that this refers to “the Persians” as it pertains to a hadith about Salmān al-Fārsī, and that the *āyah* here is in reference to his people. The hadith seems to be *ḍa’if* (uncorroborated).

In a broader overview of this area, it should be noted that some extremists among the Muslims accuse Abū Bakr of abandoning Islam after the Prophet (ﷺ) passed on; however the facts on the ground and the meanings of this *āyah* place him in an honorable position given the dynamics of the circumstances at the time. There may be legitimate criticism of how designated authority and a consensus developed concerning the appointment and voting into office of Abū Bakr, but that cannot be exaggerated into the horrible and schismatic accusation of him abandoning Islam. To tip the balance of this historical dispute on the side of sanity Imam ‘Alī was with Abū Bakr — on his military side and never against him. The nationalism that erupted with the Umayyads and the counter-nationalism that followed (*al-shu’ūbiyah*) by the Persians may be responsible to a certain extent for the vindictive accusations against Abū Bakr and ‘Umar, on whose watch the Islamic armies liberated Persia from its *jāhiliyah*. This, though, should not be confused — as it almost always is — with the monarchical rule of the Umayyads followed by the ‘Abbasids — dynasties that plagued the

Muslim peoples with their autocracies and tyrannies, which we have inherited in the form of non-representative governments. At last count in our world today, these nation-state tyrannies were approaching 60.

445 **Yemen** – from an Arabic root meaning *felicity*. The region in the south of the Arabian peninsula, which was called Arabia Felix by the Romans. The total population is over 20 million. Yemen, which receives the monsoon rains from the Indian Ocean, is fertile and agriculturally rich. It was the seat of numerous civilizations in pre-Islamic times, notably the Sabaean, Minaean, and Himyaritic.



Until the time of Constantine the Great, when cremation in the Roman Empire was replaced by the practice of burial, Yemen's economy was based on the export of frankincense (used as incense), and myrrh (used for cosmetics), both from indigenous trees. Many religions in turn played an important role in Yemen: Judaism was the religion of one of the kings in Yemen, named Dhū Nuwās, who was overthrown by the Christian Negus of Ethiopia acting on behalf of the Byzantine emperor. The latter called for the punishment of Dhū Nuwās because of the destruction of the Christian community of Najrān (523CE) in southern Arabia. Christianity spread widely in Yemen as a result of Abyssinian suzerainty; however, when Yemen became a Persian satrap (around 575CE), Zoroastrianism was introduced.

In the first century of the Hijrah, Yemen was converted to Islam. Today, roughly half of the population of the Republic of Yemen, mostly tribesmen in the mountains, are Zaydī Shī'īs. The rest are Sunnīs of the Shafī'ī school of law. There are also small minorities of different branches of Ismā'ilism, remnants of once larger communities.

Yemenis from the Ḥaḍramawt area were noted seafarers in the age of the dhows (a lateen-rigged ship with one or two masts), and in the age of the steamship, they became stokers famed for their ability to withstand great heat. They have migrated near and far, to India and particularly to Indonesia where there is a large community of Indonesians of Yemeni descent.

446 **Saba'** – one of the kingdoms of ancient southern Arabia, the capital of which was Ma'rib, near a famous dam that collapsed around 580CE, an event that sent a wave of lamentation through the desert tribes. For the Arabians this was one of the few markers in an otherwise timeless world; an age had passed. In the Bible this kingdom is called Sheba, and it reached the



heights of its development in the 6th century BCE, having colonized Abyssinia four centuries earlier. The Queen of Saba' (Sheba), known in Islam as Bilqīs, is accorded a prominent place in Islamic lore as the consort of Solomon (ﷺ).

447 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, pp. 437–38.

448 Ibid., (narrated among others by Na'im ibn Mas'ūd al-Ashja'i and recorded by Ibn Kathīr in his book, *al-Bidāyah wa-al-Nihāyah*).

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ. من محمد رسول الله إلى مسليمة الكذاب. السلام على من اتبع الهدى. أما بعد فإن الأرض لله يورثها من يشاء من عباده والعاقبة للمتقين.

449 Ibid.

450 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, pp. 437–38.

Khālīd ibn al-Walīd – one of the nobles of pre-Islamic Quraysh; known also as Sayfullāh (Allah's Sword). His mother was al-'Abbās' sister-in-law. He was on the side of Quraysh in its wars against the Prophet (ﷺ) until 'Umrah al-Ḥudaybiyah. It is said that he became a Muslim in the 7th year of the Hijrah after the Khaybar campaign. He was a participant in the military campaign of Mu'tah along with Zayd ibn Ḥārithah, and was also present with Allah's Prophet (ﷺ) during the liberation of Makkah. He also took part in the military encounters of Ḥunayn and al-Ṭā'if. As the first *khalīfah*, Abū Bakr dispatched him to fight against those who were defecting from Islam during Ḥurūb al-Riddah (Wars of Renunciation); he then was placed as a commander in the wars against the Byzantines and the Persians and his performance was remarkable. It was Khālīd who liberated Damascus. 'Umar relieved him of his high ranking military position. It is reported that Khālīd said, "Jihad has preoccupied me from learning [memorizing] much of the Qur'an."

The disagreement between Abū Bakr and 'Umar concerning Khālīd had to do with some of Khālīd's partisan decisions and unbecoming conduct. For example, Khālīd distributed war spoils among the warriors without sending an accountability register to Abū Bakr. Furthermore, he inappropriately killed Mālik ibn Nuwayrah and married his widow. All of this Abū Bakr found deplorable. And so he presented Mutammim ibn Nuwayrah with financial compensation for the loss of his father, and ordered Khālīd to divorce Mālik's widow; however, Abū Bakr did not relieve Khālīd of his military command. 'Umar, on the other hand, could not countenance Khālīd's impetuous behavior.

'Umar advised Abū Bakr to write to Khālīd, telling him not to disperse anything of value except under executive supervision. Abū Bakr followed

through along these lines. Khālid replied, "You should leave me and my tasks alone, and make sure you are doing what you have to do." 'Umar then urged Abū Bakr to relieve Khālid of his duties. This led Abū Bakr to inquire, "But who is able to substitute for Khālid?" To which 'Umar said that he could. Abū Bakr agreed and ordered 'Umar to replace Khālid in the field. But on the day 'Umar was set to depart from Madinah, high-ranking Muslims approached Abū Bakr and expressed their disapproval of his decisions to send out 'Umar when his services were needed in Madinah, and to decommission Khālid when his military prowess was needed in the field. Abū Bakr replied, "But what shall I do?" They counseled Abū Bakr to insist that 'Umar stay in Madinah, and to implore Khālid to remain in his position and duties.

When 'Umar succeeded Abū Bakr upon the latter's death, he wrote to Khālid, ordering him not to dispense even a sheep until he consulted with Madinah first. Khālid responded to 'Umar in the same way he had to Abū Bakr. At this point, 'Umar decided it would be dishonest to Allah (ﷻ) for him to have advised Abū Bakr to do something that he himself was not willing to do. So he sacked Khālid.^a

Khālid died in the city of Ḥumṣ (Syria) in 21AH. Some historical narratives record that he died in Madinah. He willed that his weapons and horse be donated to the Muslim military.

a Al-Ḥāfiẓ Aḥmad ibn 'Alī ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, *al-Iṣābah fi Tamyiz al-Ṣaḥābah*, Juz' 2 (*Getting it Right: Who are the Ṣaḥābah*, Volume 2). (Beirut, Lebanon: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, 1415AH), pp. 215–21.

451 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, pp. 437–38.

452 Ibid., p. 438.

453 **Mu'tazilah** – from the Arabic word *i'tazala*, meaning *to remove oneself from, to bow out*; a school of thought that was born out of, or inserted itself into, the controversies of the civil strife between Imam 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib on the one hand and the Prophet's (ﷺ) companions, al-Zubayr ibn al-'Awwām and Ṭalḥah ibn 'Ubaydillāh, and the absolutist, binary, and condemnatory views of the Khawārij (Kharijites) on the other hand. Faced with a conflict between opposing parties, none of whom could reasonably be considered absolutely reprehensible, the need arose for dogmatic nuances. One response was formulated as *manzilah bayna al-manzilatayn* (a status between the two statuses). This was the answer to a question treated in the *halaqah* (scholarly study circle) of al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (21–110AH) as to whether or not a Muslim who had committed a grave sin was a *mu'min*. The Khawārij position was that he was no longer a *mu'min*, and therefore could be put to death. Al-

Ḥasan al-Baṣrī's answer was that such a one was a *mu'min* but a hypocrite; that of Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā' (81–130AH/700–748CE) was that he was neither a *mu'min* nor a *kāfir*, but somewhere between the two, and this marked the beginning of the Mu'tazilī school — those who “had distanced themselves” from al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, as the great teacher reportedly had said.

This “status between the two statuses” or “position between the two positions” is what is known in Christianity as the Arian heresy; philosophically it is a violation of Aristotle's law of non-contradiction. That is to say it is a violation of objective reality, and opens the door to total subjectivism and solipsism (the philosophical theory that the self is all that is known to exist). This is also why the Chalcedonian answer is theologically another version of Aristotle's law and a fundamental statement about the nature of reality. Formulations like the “position between two positions” appear constantly in different disguises and are infinitely tempting for they represent the illusion of having it both ways.

The other prominent figures of the Mu'tazilī school were 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd (died 145AH/762CE), and later Abū al-Hudhayl al-'Alāf (died 235AH/849CE) and Ibrāhīm al-Nazzām (died 221AH/836CE), who was the most important formulator of Mu'tazilī teachings. The school, it appears, took stock of the philosophic tools of Hellenistic antiquity, and applied reason to the solution of philosophical problems, leading thereby to the birth of *'ilm al-kalām*, a form of Islamic theology. The Mu'tazilī school catered to certain ideologies in Persia, and through its historical position between the point of view of the Umayyads and the Shī'īs, it lent itself easily for a time to being the dominant philosophy of the 'Abbasids. Its doctrine of free will, moreover, could be used as an arm against the Umayyads, who rationalized their regimes with arguments of divine predestination propounded by Ahl al-Ḥadīth (*muḥaddithūn*). Although the theology may have been conceived in order to move Islam onto dualist tracks, the Mu'tazilīs themselves, like antibodies created after vaccination, became opponents of dualism.

The Mu'tazilīs held, as rationalists (and materialists), that the Qur'an is created (the orthodox dogma is that the Qur'an is uncreated in its essence). This was proclaimed official doctrine by 'Abbasid King al-Ma'mūn in 212AH/827CE and enforced by a *miḥnah*, a scrutiny of the beliefs held by the various religious authorities, which was virtually an intellectual broiling. Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, founder of one of the schools of fiqh, was scourged for publicly maintaining that the Qur'an was not created. In a particularly categorical fashion, he said the Qur'an was “uncreated from cover to cover,” which could also have been taken as an anti-materialist stance. But shortly thereafter, when, under the reign of al-Mutawakkil, this doctrine was suppressed, the Mu'tazilī school went into a sharp decline and fell out of favor, until it reappeared as an integral part of Twelve-Imam Shī'ism. Today, aspects of Mu'tazilī thought are also evident in modern movements among Sunnīs.

Nevertheless, the influence exerted by the school was considerable: it established the widespread use of rational arguments in the subsequent development of theology, and many of its original conclusions were adopted by the mainstream, even though the school as a whole was attacked as heretical. The Mu'tazilis called themselves *ahl al-'adl wa-al-tawhīd* (the people of justice and divine unity), and their school was based upon the following five principles: (1) *tawhīd* (unity), (2) *'adl* (justice), (3) *al-wa'd wa-al-wa'id* (the promise and the threat), (4) *al-manzilah bayna al-manzilatayn* (the position between two positions), and (5) *al-amr bi-al-ma'rūf wa-al-nahī 'an al-munkar* (authorizing the public good and dis-establishing the public umbrage).

With regard to *tawhīd* they formulated a paradoxical doctrine. Sunnis say that some of the divine attributes — *asmā'*, meaning *the names of Allah* (ﷻ) — are of the Essence and some are of the Being. By the Mu'tazili *tawhīd*, the Essence is unknowable, and hence, none of the attributes can be of the Essence; these attributes, or *names*, are reduced to a kind of demiurgic level, to being something on the order of created energies.

This un-knowability of God led the Mu'tazilis to deny the generally accepted idea that those whom salvation brings into Paradise have a vision of God, arguing that such seeing of God would place Him within space. The Ash'arī and Sunnī position is that Allah (ﷻ) is knowable, that some divine names (attributes) are names of the Essence, and not some created energy. This became symbolized by the vision of Allah (ﷻ) in Paradise. The Prophet (ﷺ) is credited with saying that the inhabitants of Paradise would be able to see Allah (ﷻ). When asked how, he said as people would see the full moon; that is, by reflection, as the Moon reflects the light of the Sun.

It is these problems that al-Ash'arī, who himself was previously a Mu'tazili, addressed with his theory of atoms of time and space, which are "mirrors" of the One Reality, and his theory of will as the "acquiring of divine action on the part of the creature" (*iktisāb*).

In the orthodox conception, according to which Allah (ﷻ) is both Absolute and Being, there is a continuity of identity between the Attributes and the Absolute. The Attributes are not the Essence in and of themselves, neither are they anything other than the Essence; an inescapable and necessary antinomy. It is this vertical identity, "with God and one with God," that is true non-duality, by virtue of which the divine attributes are not other divinities. The Mu'tazili understanding of *tawhīd*, like that of some modern philosophers such as Martin Buber, is a unity in name only; the question of how the supposed unity can contain differentiated contraries is simply ignored.

By *'adl* (justice) they affirmed that man has free will, which is necessary because of divine justice, in contrast to early Shī'īs who believed that Allah (ﷻ) created and determined the acts of man (present-day Shī'īs are more disposed to accepting the notion of free will). The Mu'tazilis also asserted that

Allah (ﷻ) does what is best (*ṣalāḥ* or *aṣḥāḥ*) for the world He has created, that He compensates the saved for the sufferings they endured in life. What makes this conception of divine justice scandalous, however, is that it obliges God to what man does; it puts God on an equal plane with man, and hence if a man does a good act, God must react accordingly. What the Mu'tazilī notion of divine justice means, therefore, is reciprocity between man and God. The absurdity of this perspective was not lost on its detractors, but because of the psychology that grew out of "a position between two positions," neither did it faze its supporters as contradictions were not a problem. It was one thing to make God observe the necessity of His own nature, as did Aristotle; it was another to make Him dependent upon something created.

The Ash'arīs claimed, not without reason, that the Mu'tazilah made God into a servant of man because it made Him respond to human acts and made God, as they put it, into the impregnator of women. The idea of *ṣalāḥ* became the point on which al-Ash'arī revolted against the Mu'tazilah, neatly showing its weakness, but not, however, disproving the idea that necessity is an aspect of perfection.

By the third principle, *al-wa'd wa-al-wa'id*, they meant Heaven and Hell. They believed that if someone went to Hell, he could not leave by reason of divine mercy or intercession. According to them, reciprocity would limit God's ability to act; by contrast, the Ash'arīs feel that sins may be pardoned, even in Hell, or that one who has acquiesced to Allah's (ﷻ) command and counsel may be withdrawn from Hell once his sins are expiated. Present-day Shi'īs generally accept that a sinner can be saved from Hell, ironically, because of the power of the Imams.

The fourth principle, *al-manzilāḥ bayna al-manzilatayn*, was, on the one hand, their philosophical method, but on the other, their political outlook in the historic controversies. This was the middle position between 3rd-century (AH) Sunnīs and Shi'īs, the latter of whom were more *ghulāḥ* (prone to hyperbole and esotericism) than the Twelve-Imam Shi'īs have been until recently, although this is again changing. This middle position is what made the creed of the Mu'tazilīs the chosen theology of the early 'Abbasids, and the decisive theological influence upon the Shi'īs. There would be some validity to claims that Mu'tazilī theology was the doctrine of those who brought the 'Abbasids to power, and therefore they were obliged to accept it until power shifted.

In present-day Shi'ism this concept of "the position between two positions," insofar as it relates to the sinner being between *islām* and *kufr*, has been abandoned. The Shi'īs, apart from the doctrine of the Imams, developed their theology much later, under the Buyids. By that time Mu'tazilī thinking had already formed the basis of Twelve-Imam theology, through the Nawbakhti family of Baghdad, and, being established, was not further modified. The doctrine of the Imāmah continued to undergo development.

The fifth principle, the establishment of the common good and the dis-establishment of the common aversion in society, was not different from the view of the rest of the Muslims.^a See also Endnote 469 in Volume 8.

- a Cyril Glassé, *The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam*. (San Francisco, California: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1989), pp. 291–93.

Abū al-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Ismā‘īl al-Ash‘arī (260–324AH/ 873–935CE) – considered to be the founder of what is known in history as Sunnī *kalām*, or theology. Born and raised in al-Baṣrah, until the age of 40, al-Ash‘arī was a Mu‘tazilī and the student of Abū ‘Alī Muḥammad al-Jubbā‘ī (died 303AH/915CE). At that point, he put this famous question (here paraphrased from the many versions recorded of al-Ash‘arī’s thought-experiment) to his teacher, “Take the case of three brothers, one a *mu‘min* who did good works, one a sinner, and one who died in infancy. What would happen to them?” His (Mu‘tazilī) teacher answered that the *mu‘min* went to Paradise, the sinner to Hell, and the infant was in limbo. “Well,” asked al-Ash‘arī, “since according to the Mu‘tazilī doctrine of *aṣlah*, Allah (ﷻ) always chooses the best for His creatures, why did the infant die?” “Because,” the teacher answered, “Allah (ﷻ) knew the infant would go on to be a sinner, and so ended his life at the stage that avoided Hell, the most advantageous solution.” “Then,” asked al-Ash‘arī, “why did Allah (ﷻ) let the sinner grow to the age of responsibility and be punished for his sin?”



To this, Mu‘tazilī rationalism had no answer, and with this episode al-Ash‘arī abandoned their school, became a Ḥanbalī “Sunni,” and made public repentance and repudiation in the *masjid* of al-Baṣrah for his errors. Although al-Ash‘arī considered himself a Ḥanbalī, the Ḥanbalīs themselves accord little place to theology. Like the Ḥanbalīs, al-Ash‘arī asserted that the Qur’an was completely uncreated, even in its letters and sounds; in the school of theology that bears his name, however, the Qur’an is uncreated in its essence, but created when it takes on a form in letters and sounds — when, that is, it is written or recited.

Despite his repudiation, al-Ash‘arī went on to apply the Mu‘tazilī use of dialectic and rational methods to the dogmas of orthodox Islam, except that whereas the Mu‘tazilāh had used logic to bring everything down to a horizontal plane, he accepted the transcendent aspects of divinity. However, he set these aspects of divinity “off limits” to speculation by the use of the formula “*bilā kayfa*: without asking how.” He assumed the acts of Allah (ﷻ) to be inscrutable and beyond accountability. In particular, he exalted Allah’s (ﷻ) will to be so far beyond human comprehension that it became absolute in and of itself, beyond coherence, and even purely arbitrary. According to al-

Ash'arī, Allah (ﷻ) could punish good if He so willed, and send the pious to Hell. This is clearly a reaction to the Mu'tazilīs' desire to reduce the vertical dimension of divine transcendence and mystery to that of horizontal — and human — logic. It was al-Ash'arī who actually legitimized the use of some of the Mu'tazilī methods in many domains because he became one of the most accepted authorities in theology. Thus, in the end, he achieved precisely a reformed rationalism, or even, one could say, a reformed Mu'tazilī theology.

Al-Ash'arī, denying the existence of secondary causes, is also known for the doctrine of *kasb* (literally *acquisition*) regarding human action. According to him, any act such as the mere raising of the hand, is created by Allah (ﷻ), but acquired by the creature who thus takes responsibility for it. This is a device to ascribe free will to man and therefore responsibility, but to reserve all power of action to Allah (ﷻ) alone. In other words, it is an attempt to resolve the inconsistency between freedom and determinism without resorting to antinomy or to formulations that are contradictory on one plane and resolved on a higher plane. In a sense, it could be said that what al-Ash'arī actually produced was a reverse antinomy.

Within the Ash'arī scheme of things it is technically impossible to make a statement about the present without saying "if Allah wills" whereas normally this proviso, *inshā'allāh*, is only applied to the future. The great achievement of Ash'arī thinking was to establish an orthodox dogmatic guideline. A mystic such as al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī could resolve metaphysical problems intuitively, but it required the integration of philosophy into Islamic thought in order to provide the tools and concepts to deal with metaphysical thought precisely and flexibly. In theology, Ash'arī conceptualizations laid down a line of defense against reductive reasoning; inevitably it could also be used against philosophy itself — and was, by al-Ghazzālī.

Through his followers, al-Ash'arī's influence became considerable. Although Ash'arī theology was at first opposed by the Seljuk Turks, and Ash'arīs were even persecuted, as the ideological struggle with the Fatimids became more important, Ash'arī theology revealed itself as a useful weapon, and the Seljuk Wazīr Niẓām al-Mulk named Ash'arīs to teaching posts, namely al-Juwaynī, al-Ghazzālī, and others. Ash'arī theology also became a cornerstone of the Almohad (al-Muwaḥḥidūn) movement, a Moroccan Berber Muslim movement founded in the 12th century CE. The Ash'arī school of theology is widespread in the Islamic West while that of al-Māturīdī, which is in practice very similar, is the preferred theology in the East.

Among al-Ash'arī's many works, the most famous are *al-Ibānah 'an Uṣūl al-Diyānah* (*The Elucidation of the Foundations of Religion*), *Maqālāt al-Islamīyīn* (*The Discourses of the Islamicists*), *Risālah fī Istiḥṣān al-Khawḍ fī 'Ilm al-Kalām* (*Treatise on Theology*), and *Kitāb al-Sharḥ wa-al-Taḥṣīl* (*The Book of Commentary and Explanation*). By correcting major doctrinal errors, al-Ash'arī played in Islam the role the great councils played in early

Christianity, and for this reason, he was credited with “singlehandedly saving Islam.”^a

a Cyril Glassé, *The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam*, pp. 291–93.

454 Narrated by Anas ibn Mālik and recorded by al-Bukhārī and Muslim.


ثَلَاثٌ مِّنْ كُنِّ فِيهِ وَجِدَ حَلَاوَةَ الْإِيمَانِ: مَن كَانَ اللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُ أَحَبَّ إِلَيْهِ مَا سَوَاهُمَا. وَمَنْ أَحَبَّ عَبْدًا لَا يَجِبُهُ إِلَّا لِلَّهِ. وَمَنْ يَكْرَهُ أَنْ يَعُودَ فِي الْكُفْرِ بَعْدَ إِذْ أَنْقَذَهُ اللَّهُ. كَمَا يَكْرَهُ أَنْ يُلْقَى فِي النَّارِ.

455 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, p. 439 (originally cited by al-Bukhārī and Muslim on the authority of Anas ibn Mālik).

جاءَ أعرابي إلى النبي صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فَقَالَ "يا رسولَ اللهِ متى السَّاعَةُ؟" قَالَ "ما أعددتُ لَهَا؟" قَالَ "يا رسولَ اللهِ ما أعددتُ لَهَا كَبِيرَ صَلَاةٍ وَلَا صِيَامٍ إِلَّا أَنِّي أَحَبُّ إِلَيْهِ وَرَسُولِهِ." فَقَالَ لَهُ رَسُولُ اللهِ صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ "المرءُ معَ من أحبَّ." قَالَ أنسُ (بن مالك) "فما رأيتُ المسلمِينَ فرحوا بشيءٍ بعدَ الإسلامِ فرحهم بذلكَ."

456 Ibid.

Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī (450–505AH) – philosopher, theologian, jurist, and Sufi; born and died in Tūş, Persia. An extraordinary figure, al-Ghazzālī was the architect of the latter development of Islam.



In his youth, al-Ghazzālī attracted the attention of his teachers because of his capacity and desire for learning. He studied at Nayshābūr with al-Juwaynī, the “Imam of the Ḥaramayn,” and was appointed a professor of law at the Niẓāmīyah in Baghdad by Wazīr Niẓām al-Mulk, the great statesman, patron of learning, and prolific founder of schools. At Baghdad, al-Ghazzālī became renowned and achieved great success as a lawyer, but after four years experienced a crisis of faith and conscience.

After periods of great solitude, he visited the spiritual fountainheads of al-Quds (Jerusalem) and al-Khalīl (Hebron, the site of the tomb of Ibrāhīm – ﷺ), as well as Makkah and Madinah. During this period of searching, it has been said that for a short time he became a *kāfir*. He turned his attention to the ways of knowledge one by one: philosophy, theology, and the various schools of the age. In the end he found his satisfaction in Sufism; or he returned to it, because it was, in fact, the intellectual climate of his family upbringing. In light of this continuity and the certainty that he exhibits even as he describes his searching, it would seem that the crisis of his life was not one of doubt as such, but a turning inward away from the world; for as al-Ghazzālī said, “I arrived at Truth, not by systematic reasoning and accumulation of proofs, but by a flash of light that Allah (ﷻ) sent into my soul.”

He wrote his great works, the *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* (*Reinvigorating the Knowledge of the Dīn*) and *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl* (*The Rescuer from Error*), about his search for knowledge. In the *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* (*The Incoherence of the Philosophers*), he refutes the ability of philosophy — on the basis of its own assumptions — to reach truth and certainty, and reduces it to an ancilla of theology. His ethical works are *Kīmīyā' al-Sa'ādah* (*The Alchemy of Felicity*) and *Yā Ayyuhā al-Walad* (*O Young Man*). On mysticism, his most famous work is the *Mishkāṭ al-Anwār* (*The Niche of Lights*). In all he wrote about 70 books.

Al-Ghazzālī concluded that the Sufis were the heirs of the Prophet (ﷺ). They alone walked the path of direct knowledge and they were the decisive authorities on doctrine. At the same time, he affirmed the indispensable need for the exoteric framework, that is, law and theology, to make that knowledge possible. Toward the end of his life, he returned briefly to teach at Nayshābūr and then to Ṭūs, where he lived out his days among Sufi disciples. It should be noted that alternative definitions of *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* include not only the first two or three generation of Muslims after the Prophet (ﷺ), but all those generations up to the time of al-Ghazzālī. Al-Ghazzālī is a man for all seasons: for the Sufis, he is a Sufi; for the theologians, he is a theologian; and for the legalists, he is a jurist.^a

a Cyril Glassé, *The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam*, pp. 137–38.

457 'Abd al-'Azīz ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān Āl Sa'ūd (1879–1953) – founder and king of Saudi Arabia (1932–1953). Born in Dir'iyāḥ, central Arabia, 'Abd al-'Azīz grew up in Kuwait, where his ruling Banū Sa'ūd family was exiled following its defeat in 1891. In 1902 he regained Dir'iyāḥ and neighboring Riyāḍ (Riyadh) from the rival Rashīd clan, which was allied with the Ottoman Sultanate. After consolidating his domain, he captured al-Aḥsā' (al-Hasa), a coastal region of the Gulf, in 1913. Two years later, in the midst of WWI, Britain, the most important European power in the region, recognized him as ruler of an independent Najd and al-Aḥsā'. In 1920 he conquered the 'Asīr region on the Red Sea. The next year he defeated his rival, Muḥammad ibn Rashīd, who was based in Shammar. After he had added more territories to his domain in 1922, he called himself the Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies.



He couched his campaigns in Bedouin terms as a struggle to punish either religious dissenters or those who had strayed from “true Islam” as encapsulated by Wahhābism. He also made it a point to marry into the family of the defeated tribal chief, thus consolidating his control of the captured territory. In the process, it is said that he “married” 135 virgins and retained some 100 concubines, siring 43 sons (not including the “lesser ones”) and innumerable

daughters. Among his wives the most important were Ḥuṣṣāh bint Aḥmad al-Sudayrī, mother of seven sons, known as the Sudayrī Seven, including Fahd, Sulṭān, Nāyif, and Salmān; al-Jawharāh bint al-Musā'id ibn Jiluwī, mother of Khālid; Fahdah bint al-Āṣī ibn Kulayb ibn Shuraym Āl Rashīd, mother of 'Abdullāh; and Ṭarfah bint 'Abdillāh Āl al-Shaykh, mother of Fayṣal.

In 1924 'Abd al-'Azīz defeated Sharīf Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī al-Hāshim in al-Ḥijāz, and deposed him. Having declared himself King of al-Ḥijāz and Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies in January 1926 (later King of al-Ḥijāz and Najd and its Dependencies), 'Abd al-'Azīz sought Yahūdī and Naṣrānī recognition. The following year Britain recognized him as King of al-Ḥijāz and Najd and its Dependencies. In 1929 he came into conflict with the militant section of the Ikhwān, the armed wing of the Wahhābīs, which had so far been his fighting force. Assisted by the British, then controlling Kuwait and Iraq, 'Abd al-'Azīz crushed the Ikhwān rebellion. In September 1932 he combined his two domains, comprising 77% of 1.12 million square miles (3.1 million km²) of the Arabian Peninsula, into one — the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He made his eldest son, Sa'ūd, crown prince, and Fayṣal the next in line.

'Abd al-'Azīz faced an economic crisis caused by a severe drop in the tax revenue from the *ḥujjāj* going to Makkah following a decline in their numbers as a result of a global depression. It was against this backdrop, it is said, that he granted an oil concession to the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) in 1933 for £50,000 as an advance against future royalties on oil production. Modest commercial extraction, which started in 1938, was interrupted by WWII, in which 'Abd al-'Azīz remained neutral, on the surface. In reality he could not throw his support behind the Axis powers because this would have gone against the wishes of his Yahūdī and Naṣrānī superiors, who had paved the way for his kingdom to begin with. Besides, growing links with US petroleum corporations would bind and tie. And so in 1945, 'Abd al-'Azīz met with US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt aboard a US warship in the Great Bitter Lake of the Suez Canal. 'Abd al-'Azīz was instrumental in getting the Arab League established in Cairo in March 1945. His Arab policy was "conservative," meaning that no one should rock the boat as the corporate oil conglomerates were descending on the resources of the Muslim world. His Yahūdī-Naṣrānī job was cut out for him: he was to maintain the status quo and shun any dramatic moves toward the closing of ranks in the Arab countries. Scuttling the merger and confederation of Arab countries with the plotting of an Israel in the Holy Land was something the Saudi monarch would play a critical role in.

As a Zionist and imperialist proxy 'Abd al-'Azīz was a domineering and militarily successful tribal chief. He behaved as an autocrat in his domestic policies. When the title of King of al-Ḥijāz came to him through the sponsorship of the Yahūd and Naṣrāá, he announced with their behind-the-scenes approval a 24-member Consultative Council, consisting of clergy, lay

notables, and merchants — in line with Zionist-imperialist policies of propping up their proxies; of course *āyāt* from the Qur'an were used for public consumption. The Council played an insignificant role as it was meant to, and then became extinct. It was not until October 1953, a month before his death, that 'Abd al-'Azīz issued a decree appointing a council of ministers as an advisory body. Ultimately, 'Abd al-'Azīz spent all of his life in the service of the Yahūd and Naṣārā, while constraining the committed Muslims to a self-obsessed and self-centered dogma (Wahhābism) that has more to do with dividing the Muslims than exposing the Zionist and imperialist control of the Prophet's birthplace, the Prophet's homeland, and the Prophet's peninsula, all of which were ordered by the Prophet (ﷺ) to be free from the influence of Zionist Jews and imperialist Christians. See also Endnote 47 in Volume 4.

458 **Ikhwān** – see **Endnote 297** in Volume 7.

459 **Eisenhower Doctrine** (1957) – following the strengthening of ties between Egypt and the Soviet Union in late-1956, US President Dwight Eisenhower sent a message on January 5, 1957 to the US congress outlining a counter-vailing strategy for the Muslim East, later to be called the Eisenhower Doctrine. It proposed joint measures by the US Congress and the president to accelerate economic development of the region to help it maintain political independence; to provide military aid and cooperation on request; and, most importantly, to safeguard the territorial integrity and political independence of individual countries requesting such aid against aggression from any nation “controlled by international communism” (a phrase that included Egypt under President Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir, who was seen by Washington as being under Soviet control). In March 1957 the US Congress adopted the Eisenhower Doctrine.

460 **Edward Richard George Heath** (1916–2005) – also known as Ted Heath; British conservative statesman and prime minister (1970–1974), born in Broadstairs, Kent, UK. He studied at Oxford, served in WWII, and became an MP in 1950. Following a career in the Whip's office (1951–1959), he was minister of labor (1959–1960), then Lord Privy Seal (1960–1963), and chief negotiator for Britain's entry into the European Common Market. Elected leader of the Conservative Party in 1965, he was leader of the opposition until his 1970 victory. After a confrontation with the miners' union in 1973, he narrowly lost the two elections of 1974, and in 1975, was replaced as leader by Margaret Thatcher. After his loss, he continued to play an active role in British politics, and was also known for his interests in yachting and music. Following the 1992 election, he became Father of the House.



461 **Aḥmad Zakī Yamānī** (1930–present) – Saudi oil expert and politician. Born into the family of a religious judge in Makkah, Yamānī studied law, first at Cairo University and then at New York and Harvard Universities in the US. In 1958 Crown Prince Fayṣal ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz appointed Yamānī as adviser to the cabinet. Two years later he was promoted to minister of state, and in 1962 to minister of petroleum and mineral resources. In the mid-1960s he became chairman of the state-owned General Petroleum and Mineral Organization, and a director of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco).



As a “pragmatist,” Yamānī tried to persuade King Fayṣal, who was critical of America’s staunchly pro-Israel stance, to cooperate with it in formulating Saudi policies on oil output and pricing. His efforts were successful, and Yamānī became a close adviser of the monarch. Yamānī served as secretary-general of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) from 1968–1969. He backed Fayṣal’s strategy to use the “oil weapon” during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, thus endorsing his newly-formed perception that petroleum could no longer be divorced from Middle Eastern politics. Equally, Yamānī supported Fayṣal’s decision to lift the Arab oil embargo against the US in March 1974, even though the conditions requiring Israel’s evacuation of the occupied Arab territories and the granting of Palestinian rights had not been met.

In December 1975, 11 OPEC oil ministers, meeting in Vienna, were taken hostage by commandos led by Ilich Ramirez Sanches (alias “Carlos the Jackal” Martinez); Yamānī was one of their chief targets. He was freed two days later in Algiers after a clandestine deal involving between \$5–50 million had been made between Saudi Arabia and Martinez.

Yamānī lobbied hard, and successfully, to maintain OPEC’s share of global output, even if that resulted in lower oil prices. He thus became leader of the pro-Western (Yahūdī-Naṣrānī) camp within OPEC. He implemented the policy of Saudi Arabia, acting in tandem with Kuwait, to produce above its OPEC quota and thus depress the price of oil in order to impair Iran’s ability to continue the First Gulf War (1980–1988). This cut the price by nearly two-thirds between December 1985 and July 1986, to \$10/barrel. In August, yielding to pressure from other OPEC members, Yamānī agreed to fresh OPEC output figures, which raised the price to \$14–16/barrel. In early-October 1986, after meeting the Iranian oil minister in Riyāḍ, King Fahd ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz backed the idea of a fixed price of \$18/barrel. When Yamānī refused to endorse this, Fahd, it is said, dismissed him on October 29, 1986.

Yamānī retired from public life and devoted himself to private business, including the Center for Global Energy Studies, London. In the mid-1990s, with political and financial crises brewing in Saudi Arabia, Yamānī, based in

Jiddāh, became a center of attraction for disaffected businessmen and religious figures. See also Endnote 157 in Volume 3.

Muḥammad Anwar al-Sādāt (1918–1981) – see **Endnote 45** in Volume 4.

Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 – see also p. 180 in Volume 2; p. 316 and Endnotes 148, 149, and 157 in Volume 3.

462 Well known from historical information about the rise and fall of empires is the fact that a disproportionate distribution of power in an elite leads to the oppression of the many by the few who wield power. What ought to be equally evident, but generally remains unacknowledged, is that a disproportionality of morals, for instance the Christian practice of “loving your enemy” or “turning the other cheek,” acts as a potent impediment to restoring the balance of power.

463 **Danish Cartoons** – see **Endnote 97** in Volume 1, and pp. 263–4 in Volume 4.

464 **colonialism** and **imperialism** – the policy of extending the rule or authority of a nation or an empire over foreign nations or of taking and holding foreign colonies. Since the breakup of empires and the granting of independence to most colonies, some refer to the continuing economic domination of these former holdings as neocolonialism.

465 Neocolonialism as a system was analyzed in the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah’s book, *Neo-colonialism: the Last Stage of Imperialism* (1965).

466 The Muslims had their own central political authority until the collapse of the Ottoman Sultanate. And now they have regained a portion of it with the emergence of the Islamic state in Iran.

467 Some dictionaries, such as the *Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language*, list one of the definitions of swine as *a coarse, gross, or brutishly sensual person*.

468 Volumes 1–3 on *Sūrah al-Baqarah* and Volumes 6–8 on *Sūrah al-Nisā’* contain a long discourse on the social deviation and misbehavior of Banū Isrā’īl in these two *sūrah*s.

469 **Sabbath** or **Shabbat** – Hebrew for *cessation, rest*; in Arabic, it is al-Sabt. The Sabbath is the seventh day of the week, which in Jewish belief is designated a day of rest and cessation from labor, beginning just before sunset on Friday and ending at sunset on Saturday. The laws of Sabbath observance derive

from a “short” ban found in the Pentateuch (Exodus, 20:8–11; 31:12–17) and from God’s own “rest” in the creation account from the Book of Genesis. Rabbinic regulations specify 39 forbidden activities, which are then further elaborated, but in more liberal Reform Judaism, the Sabbath is mainly a day of worship. In Christianity, the Sabbath is Sunday, but some denominations — for example, the Seventh-day Adventists — still keep it on Saturday.

470 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, p. 448 (originally cited in the book, *al-Durr al-Manthūr fī al-Tafsīr bi-al-Ma’thūr*, by Jalāl al-Ḍīn al-Suyūṭī, who got it from Ibn al-Mundhir and Ibn Abī Ḥātim).

471 The statement is given in Arabic below:

ربى فلان الملك قومه أو جيشه على الشجاعة والغزو فجعل منهم الأسود الضواري وكان له منهم الذئاب المفترسة.

472 A statement attributed to ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abbās.

473 **Gerson von Bleichroeder** (1822–1893) – German banker and philanthropist. Succeeding in 1855 to the banking business of his father, Samuel Bleichroeder, he became the friend and confidant of Otto von Bismarck and was ennobled in 1872 in recognition of his economic advice during and immediately after the Franco-Prussian War. At the Congress of Berlin (1878), he advocated on behalf of the persecuted Balkan Jews. His sons, who inherited his banking house, converted to Christianity.



Joseph ben Issachar Susskind Oppenheimer (1698–1738) – also referred to as Joseph Suss or Jud Suss; financier. Appointed by Carl Alexander of Württemberg as his finance minister in 1732, he endeavored to consolidate the duchy’s finances and free its ruler from dependence on grants from the estates. His “modern” financial methods aroused much opposition and after the death of the duke (1737), he was accused of embezzling state finances and hanged at Stuttgart, nominally for having sexual relations with Christian women. He refused to save his life by accepting baptism. His career is the subject of many books, including the novel *Jew Suss* by Lion Feuchtwanger.



Samuel Oppenheimer or **Oppenheim** (1630–1703) – philanthropist and court Jew. The first Jew to settle in Vienna after the 1670 expulsion, he was

Leopold I's agent and financier, helping to finance his wars with the Ottomans and the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1697, he was accused of conspiring to murder his rival Samson Wertheimer and was imprisoned until vindicated. Oppenheimer was a liberal contributor to the Jewish poor and the scholarly, and Judah Hasid's movement to settle in Palestine.

Rothschild – European Jewish family active in the financial world for two centuries. Mayer Amschel Rothschild (1744–1812) set up as a moneylender in Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany, and business houses were established throughout Europe by his ten children.



Nathan Mayer Rothschild (1777–1836) settled in England, and his grandson Nathaniel (1840–1915) was created a baron in 1885. Lionel Walter Rothschild (1868–1937) succeeded his father as 2nd Baron Rothschild and was an eminent naturalist. His daughter Miriam Louisa (1908–2005) was an entomologist, renowned for her studies of fleas. The 2nd Barons' nephew, Nathaniel (1910–1990), 3rd Baron Rothschild, was a scientist. During WWII he worked in British military intelligence, and later (1970–1974) he was head of the central policy review staff in the Cabinet Office, the “think tank” set up by Edward Heath. Of the French branch, Baron Eric de Rothschild (1940–present) owns Chateau Lafite and Baron Philippe de Rothschild (1902–1988) owned Chateau Mouton-Rothschild, both leading red Bordeaux-producing properties in Pauillac, southwest France.

474 joint-stock bank – a bank that is a public company with shares owned by investors rather than a government. It is a bank that issues stock and requires shareholders to be held liable for the company's debt. In other words, a joint stock bank combines features of a general partnership, in which owners of a company split profits and liabilities, and a publicly-traded company, which issues stock that shareholders are able to buy and sell on an exchange. A non-joint-stock bank has no shareholders other than the sole proprietor.

475 Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century*. (Princeton, New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press), pp. 47–49.

Weimar Republic – the name by which the German federal republic of 1919–1933 is known. In 1919 a National Constituent Assembly met at Weimar, on the Elbe River, and drew up a constitution for the new republic. The government moved from Weimar to Berlin in 1920. In 1933, two months after becoming chancellor, Hitler passed an Enabling Act suspending the Weimar constitution.

476 **Paradegoyim** – the name given to non-Jewish figurehead CEOs of banks and insurers in antebellum (pre-WWI) Austria and Germany; in other words, the non-Jew who was put in the front of the bank to show people that it was a good bank, even though the bank was run by Jews.

477 **Rathenau** – German family. One of the more prominent among them was Emil Rathenau (1838–1915), a German engineer who organized the German telephone system and directed the Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG or “General Electric Company”). To Emil are due many improvements in the fields of radio-telegraphy and aluminum manufacture. Emil’s son, **Walther Rathenau** (1867–1922), also an engineer, went on to become an economist and statesman. He discovered a new method for extracting chlorine and alkalis and built power stations in several countries. In 1915, he succeeded his father as director of the General Electric Company, which became one of the largest enterprises in Germany. In 1921, Rathenau was appointed minister of reconstruction in the German republican government and in the following year, foreign minister; in both positions he strove for a Franco-German rapprochement. He was assassinated by what is said to be in the mainstream media an “anti-Semite.” He was the author of works on politics and philosophy.



Mond – English family founded by Ludwig Mond (1839–1909), who was a chemist, industrialist, and art collector. Born in Germany, he settled in England in 1862 and established its alkali industry. His art collection was subsequently presented to the National Gallery in London. His son, **Alfred Mond** (1868–1930), created Lord Melchett in 1928, was an industrialist and statesman. He joined his father’s firm, and by a series of amalgamations, developed it into the Imperial Chemical Industries of which he was chairman. He entered parliament in 1906 and was later first commissioner of works and minister of health. Both as minister and as industrialist he devoted himself to fostering cooperation between employers and their employees. Although not brought up as a Jew, Mond became profoundly interested in Zionism, generously supported Zionist work, and was joint-chairman of the Jewish Agency. Alfred’s son, Henry Mond, the 2nd Lord Melchett (1898–1949), was an industrialist and economist. Although brought up as a Christian, he formally embraced Judaism at the outset of the Nazi persecutions. He was a director of Imperial Chemical Industries and chairman of the council of the Jewish Agency. Henry’s son, Julian Edward Alfred Mond, the 3rd Lord Melchett (1925–1973), was appointed chairman of the British Steel Corporation in 1967.



Albert Ballin (1857–1918) – German industrialist. He rose from small beginnings to be managing director of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, the largest shipping company in Germany, with a fleet of 400 vessels. Ballin was responsible for the American-German shipping agreement of 1912 and for other agreements designed to eliminate unnecessary competition. He committed suicide after Germany's military collapse in WWI.




478 Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century*, pp. 47–49.

For W.D. Rubinstein's data on Jewish participation in various economic elites, see,

Niall Ferguson, *The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700–2000*. (London, UK: Allen Lane, 2001), p. 378.

479 **Otto Eduard Leopold, Prince of Bismarck, Duke of Lauenburg**, also known as **Otto von Bismarck** (1815–1898) – the first chancellor of the German Empire (1871–1890), born in Schonhausen, Germany. He studied law and agriculture at Gottingen, Berlin, and Greifswald. In the new Prussian parliament (1847) he became known as an ultra-royalist, resenting Austria's predominance and demanding equal rights for Prussia.



He was ambassador to Russia (1859–1862), and was appointed prime minister in 1862. During the Schleswig-Holstein question and the “seven weeks’ war” between Prussia and Austria, he was the guiding figure, becoming a national hero. Uniting the German sense of self-eminence, he deliberately provoked the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) and acted as Germany's spokesman. He was made a count in 1866, and created a prince and chancellor of the new German Empire. After the Peace of Frankfurt (1871), his policies aimed at consolidating and protecting the young empire. His domestic policy included universal suffrage, reformed coinage, and the codification of the law. He engaged in a lengthy conflict with the Vatican (known as the Kulturkampf), which proved to be a failure. In 1879, to counteract Russia and France, he formed the Austro-German Treaty of Alliance, which was later joined by Italy. Called the “Iron Chancellor,” he clashed with Emperor William II over social policy, and tendered his resignation from the chancellorship, which was accepted with relief (1890). In the same year he was made Duke of Lauenburg, and was finally reconciled to his sovereign in 1894.

480 Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century*, pp. 47–49.

Nicholas I (1796–1855) – emperor of Russia (1825–1855), born near St. Petersburg, Russia, the third son of Paul I. An absolute despot, he engaged in wars with Persia and Turkey, suppressed an uprising in Poland, and attempted to “Russianize” all the inhabitants of the empire. He helped to quell the 1848 Hungarian insurrection, and drew closer to the alliance with Prussia. The re-establishment of the French empire confirmed these alliances, and led him to think of absorbing Turkey; but the opposition of Britain and France brought on the Crimean War, during which he died.



481 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, p. 457 (originally recorded by Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī who got it from Mujāhid; also narrated by al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī, and Rabī’ who told it to Abū al-Shaykh).

482 **Ashkenazim** is the Jewish ethnic identity most readily recognized by North Americans — the culture of black-hatted Hasidism, and Yiddish — originated in medieval Germany. Although strictly speaking, *Ashkenazim* refers to Jews of Germany, the term has come to refer more broadly to Jews from Central and Eastern Europe. Jews first reached the interior of Europe by following trade routes along waterways during the 8th and 9th centuries.

Eventually, the vast majority of Ashkenazim relocated to the Polish Commonwealth (today’s Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine, and Belarus). The small preexistent Polish Jewish community’s customs were displaced by the Ashkenazi prayer order, customs, and Yiddish language. Jewish life and learning thrived in northeastern Europe. The yeshiva culture of Poland, Russia, and Lithuania produced a constant stream of new talmudic scholarship. In 18th-century Germany, the Haskalah movement advocated for modernization, introducing the modern denominations and institutions of secular Jewish culture. Although the first American Jews were Sephardic, today Ashkenazim are the most populous ethnic Jewish group in North America. The modern religious denominations developed in Ashkenazi countries, and therefore most North American synagogues use the Ashkenazi liturgy.

Many historical documents recount a large population of Jews in Spain, known as **Sephardim**, during the early years of the Common Era. Their cultural distinctiveness is characterized in Roman writings as a “corrupting” influence. Later, with the arrival of Christianity, Jewish legal authorities became worried about assimilation and maintaining Jewish identity. However, with the arrival of an inclusivist and liberating Islam to the Iberian peninsula, by the 7th century Sephardim had flourished, beginning a time known as the “Golden Age of (Islamic) Spain.”

During this period, Sephardic Jews reached the highest echelons of government and the military. Many Jews were renowned in non-Jewish circles as poets, scholars, and physicians. New forms of Hebrew poetry arose, and talmudic and halakhic study took on great sophistication.

Ladino, the Judeo-Spanish language, unified Jews throughout the peninsula in daily life, ritual, and song. Ladino, a blend of medieval Spanish with significant loan words from Hebrew, Arabic, and Portuguese, had both a formal, literary dialect, and numerous daily, spoken dialects that evolved during the immigrations of Sephardic Jews to new lands.

The Sephardic Golden Age ended when Christian princes consolidated their kingdoms and reestablished Christian rule throughout Spain and Portugal. In 1492, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella expelled all Jews and Muslims from Spain; soon after, a similar law exiled Jews from Portugal. The Sephardim immigrated to Amsterdam, North Africa, and the Muslim East.

Others established new communities in the Americas or converted publicly to Christianity, sometimes secretly maintaining a Jewish life. These forced converts (known in Ladino as *conversos* and in Hebrew as *anusim*) often maintained their Judaism in secret. In the 21st century, there are still people in both Europe and the Americas who are discovering and reclaiming their Jewish ancestry.

Wherever Sephardim traveled, they brought with them their unique ritual customs (*minhagim*), language, arts, and architecture. Sephardic synagogues often retain the influence of Islam in their architecture by favoring geometric, calligraphic, and floral decorative motifs. Although they may align with the Ashkenazi religious denominations (usually Orthodoxy), the denominational identity of Sephardic synagogues is, in most cases, less strong than their ethnic identity.

Although often confused with Sephardim (because they share many religious customs), **Mizrahim** have a separate heritage. Mizrahi (in Hebrew, *eastern* or *oriental*) Jews come from Middle Eastern ancestry. Their earliest communities date from Late Antiquity, and the oldest and largest of these communities were in modern Iraq (Babylon), Iran (Persia), and Yemen.

Today, most Mizrahi Jews live either in Israel, Iran, or the US. Mizrahim are more likely than other Jews to maintain particularly strong ties with others from their family's nation of origin. Thus, it is not uncommon to find a specifically Persian or Bukharan synagogue. Likewise, Mizrahim are not united by a single Jewish language; each subgroup spoke its own tongue.

Even though unique Mizrahi culture has penetrated Israeli mainstream society in recent years, Jewish ethnic barriers remain strong. In Israel, Ashkenazi Jews still dominate leadership roles in public institutions. For much of Israel's history, Sephardim and Mizrahim have been disproportionately underrepresented in the government, despite the fact that, today, they make up more than half of the population. It should be obvious to any onlooker that

the Sephardim and Mizrahim have been disenfranchised in the “homeland” of Jews because they happen to come from an inclusivist Islamic background, which clashes with the exclusivist mindset of the European Ashkenazim.

Ethnicity has always been highly relevant in Israeli society. For example, the public school curriculum overrepresents Ashkenazi culture and history. Studies have reported that Mizrahim are still half as likely to attend universities as Ashkenazim, obviously demonstrating the desire to resist the homogenizing and assimilating Ashkenazi indoctrination that aims to erase the formidable Islamic influence on contemporary Jewish identity, especially insofar as Sephardic Jewish scholars (either growing up in or finding safe haven from persecution in multiethnic Islamic Spain) were the ones who saved Judaism and Hebrew from being lost to antiquity. Massive economic disparities continue to exist among Jewish ethnicities, and this may be the reason why Israeli political parties are often formed along ethnic lines, such as Shas (Sephardic), Agudas Israel (Ashkenazi), and Atid Ehad (Ethiopian Jews) (source: <http://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/sephardic-ashkenazic-mizrahi-jews-jewish-ethnic-diversity/>).

483 **Abū Ghurayb (Abu Ghraib)** in Iraq, **Guantanamo** in Cuba, and **Bagram** in Afghanistan are three notorious prison sites where American military forces are involved in the most outrageous and vicious acts of torture against Muslims.

484 **Anti-Defamation League (ADL)** – an organization that seeks “to stop the defamation of the Jewish people,” and “to secure justice and fair treatment for all citizens alike.” An arm of the service organization, B'nai B'rith, the ADL was founded in 1913 as a reaction to the trial by prejudice of Leo Frank, accused of rape and murder in Atlanta, Georgia (US), and subsequently lynched.

485 **Simon Wiesenthal** (1908–2005) – the media-made promoter of Zionism through the agency of European guilt, born in Buczacz, Austria. During the Jewish persecution in Germany that preceded WWII, he started his professional life as an architect, receiving a degree in architectural engineering from the Technical University of Prague in 1932; he later settled in Lvov, Poland. Lvov came under Russian rule following the non-aggression pact between Stalin and Hitler just prior to WWII. Until Germany invaded Russia in June 1941, the Jews of the city were either sent to Siberia, where by and large they survived, or allowed to remain. The arrival of the Germans meant the round-up of all Jews, and Wiesenthal was no exception. Wiesenthal and his wife survived the concentration camps. In Simon's case it was



little short of a miracle; on two occasions he was listed to be killed but escaped, and on recapture was put to work. Even two attempts at suicide failed. However, 89 family members were not so lucky.

Regaining his health after WWII ended, Wiesenthal began helping the American army gather evidence with which to prosecute German war criminals. In Linz, Austria in 1947, Wiesenthal and 30 others opened the Documentation Center on the fate of the Jews and their persecutors. In 1954 the Center was closed and the files transferred to Israel, and Wiesenthal started freelancing in his hunt for those who had committed “genocide.” With the help of Israeli agents he was responsible, in 1959, for discovering that Adolf Eichman was alive and well, and living in Argentina. In 1961 he opened the Jewish Documentation Center in Vienna, in a building that was formerly the Gestapo headquarters. For over four decades he sought out German war criminals constantly on the run from being discovered. In 1967 he discovered Fritz Stangl, the commandant of Treblinka and Sobibór concentration camps — a particular victory for Wiesenthal and great loss to fugitive Nazis. He holds the rank of Chevalier de la Legion k’Honneur.

Wiesenthal also wrote a number of books, including *Concentration Camp Mauthausen* (1946), *I Hunted Eichman* (1961), *The Murderers Amongst Us: The Simon Wiesenthal Memoirs* (1967), *The Case of Jaworska* (1975), and *Every Day Remembrance Day: A Chronicle of Jewish Martyrdom* (1986). After writing his last book, he continued to take an active part in the hunt for German war criminals and was most vocal when, in August 1996, an Italian court rejected the case against SS Captain Priebkes, claiming “he was only obeying orders.” Wiesenthal responded, “No Nazi murderer, however old, should be allowed to die in peace.” His institute in Los Angeles, California continues his pursuit of real and imagined former Nazis or their equivalents.

486 Michael Collins Piper, *The New Jerusalem — Zionist Power in America*, (American Free Press: Washington, DC, 2004), pp. 11–16.

487 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 32–34.

488 Ibid.

489 Ibid.

What has been recounted in the pertinent pages herein are the intra-Yahūdī-Naşrānī analyses about anti-Semitism. This does not apply to the reason why Muslims take issue with the Yahūd. The Muslims are not against them for the many similarities shared by both communities, but rather because of the political aggression and the religious racism that comes out of their Zionist ideology.

490 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 32–34.

491 Ibid.

492 Ibid.

493 Ibid.

494 Ibid.

495 Ibid.

496 Ibid.

497 Ibid.

498 Ibid.

499 Ibid.

500 Ibid.

501 Ibid.

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) – see **Endnote 45** in Volume 2 and **Endnote 65** in Volume 3.

502 Joel Krieger, *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, pp. 32–34.

503 Ibid.

504 Ibid.

505 Ibid.

506 Ibid.

507 Ibid.

508 Ibid.

509 The term *Arabs* refers more to the mentality and attitude gained from the Arabic language of the Qur'an that turns into a communicative and social reality, and less to ethnic or racial Arabs.

510 **United Nations (UN)** – an organization

formed to maintain world peace and foster international cooperation, formally established on October 24, 1945 with 51 founder countries. The UN Charter, drafted by the US, UK, and USSR during WWII, remains virtually unaltered despite the growth in membership and activities. There are six “principal organs.” The General Assembly is the plenary (all-inclusive) body that controls much of the UN’s work, supervises the subsidiary organs, sets priorities, and debates major issues of international affairs. The 15-member Security Council is dominated by five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the USA) who each have the power of veto over any resolutions; the remaining 10 are elected for 2-year periods. The primary role of the Security Council is to maintain international peace and security; its decisions, unlike those of the General Assembly, are binding on all other members. It is empowered to order mandatory sanctions, call for ceasefires, and establish peacekeeping forces (these forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988). The use of the veto has prevented it from intervening in a number of disputes, such as Vietnam. The Secretariat, under the Secretary-General, employs some 16,000 people at the UN’s headquarters in New York City and 50,000 worldwide. The staff are answerable only to the UN, not national governments, and are engaged in considerable diplomatic work. The Secretary-General is often a significant person in international diplomacy and is able to take independent initiatives. The International Court of Justice consists of 15 judges appointed by the Security Council and the General Assembly. As only states can bring issues before it, its jurisdiction depends on the consent of the states who are a party to a dispute. It also offers advisory opinions to various organs of the UN. The Economic and Social Council is elected by the General Assembly; it supervises the work of various committees, commissions, and expert bodies in the economic and social area, and coordinates the work of UN specialized agencies. The Trusteeship Council oversees the transition of Trust Territories to self-government.



In addition to the organs established under the UN Charter, there is a range of subsidiary agencies, many with their own constitutions and membership, and some pre-dating the UN. The main agencies are the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, the International Atomic Energy Authority, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”), the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the

Universal Postal Union, the International Telecommunication Union, the World Meteorological Organization, and the World Health Organization. The UN has around 200 members. It is generally seen as a forum where states pursue their national interests, rather than as an institution of world government, but it is not without considerable impact.

511 Michael Collins Piper, *The High Priests of War*. (Washington, DC: American Free Press, 2004), pp. 99–103.

512 Ibid.

513 Ibid.

514 Ibid.

515 Ibid.

516 Ibid.

517 Ibid.

518 Ibid.

519 **Thera** or **Santorini** – **Santorini** in Greek, **Thera** or **Thira** in classical languages; a Greek island in the Aegean Sea 140km (87 miles) north of Crete. The last great eruption of its volcano (circa 1470BCE), in an explosion four times more powerful than Krakatoa, has been held responsible for the rapid decline of the Minoan civilization. The excavated site displays notable wall paintings and 3-storied houses.

520 **Vesuvius** – active volcano in Campania, southern Italy, nine miles southeast of Naples. Its first recorded eruption (79CE) overwhelmed Pompeii, Herculaneum, and Stabiae; eruptions at long intervals occurred until 1631, but more regular activity has been taking place since. The last eruption was in 1944.



521 **Krakatoa** – volcanic island in the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra, Indonesia. Active for the last million years, it erupted catastrophically in

1883. Activity began on May 20, 1883 culminating in an explosion on August 27th, which ejected ash to a height of 80km (50 miles) and which was heard 3,200km (2,000 miles) away in Australia. Several tsunamis were generated and responsible for the deaths of 36,000 people in the coastal areas of Java and Sumatra. The eruption left a small island 816m (2,677 feet) high and a sea basin 275m (900 feet) deep. Smaller eruptions have continued, including that of January 26, 1928, when an ash cone rose above the sea to form Anak Krakatoa (Child of Krakatoa).



522 **Mont Pelee** – active volcano on Martinique Island, East Caribbean; erupted in 1902 killing over 30,000 people, including 26,000 in the town of St. Pierre.

523 **Great Potato Famine (Irish Famine)** – the widespread starvation of Irish peasantry that followed the effects of potato blight in 1845–1847, and the consequent destruction of the crop. Because of starvation and emigration (to Britain and the US), the population of Ireland fell by almost 25% between 1845 and 1851. The British government was widely blamed by the emigrants for the disaster.


524 **Bihar or Behar** – a state in eastern India, south of Nepal, crossed by the River Ganges, with capital, Patna. Having a population in 1991 of around 87 million, it is governed by a 325-member legislative assembly. Its major mineral deposits include coal and copper, mica; commercial agriculture consists of rice, jute, sugarcane, oilseed, wheat, and maize; and industry comprises iron and steel, machine tools, fertilizers, electrical engineering, paper mills, and cement.



525 **Dutch Famine (1944–1945)** – also known as the *Hongerwinter* (“Hunger Winter”) in Dutch; a famine that took place in the German-occupied part of the Netherlands, especially in the densely populated western provinces north of the great rivers, during the winter of 1944–1945, near the end of WWII. A German blockade cut off food and fuel shipments from farm areas. Some 4.5 million were affected and survived because of soup kitchens. As many as 22,000 may have died because of the famine; most of the victims were

reported to be elderly men. The famine was alleviated by the liberation of the area by the Allies (US, UK, France, and USSR in addition to others) in 1945.

African Sahel Drought (1968–1974) – Burkina Faso, northern Nigeria, southern Niger, northern Cameroon (near Lake Chad), and central Chad all struggled with dwindling rainfall from the early-1960s, leading to famine and dislocation



on a massive scale. From the late-1960s to early-1980s famine killed 100,000 people, left 750,000 dependent on food aid, and affected most of the Sahel's 50 million people. The economies, agriculture, livestock and human populations of much of Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso (known as Upper Volta during the time of the drought) were severely impacted.


526 **Great Fire of London (1666)** – a devastating fire that started in a baker's shop on Pudding Lane and lasted several days. It engulfed approximately 160 hectares (400 acres) — four-fifths of the city — destroying 13,000 houses, 89 parish churches, and most public buildings; but casualties were low (no more than 20 reported dead). The capital was rebuilt with “safer” materials.

527 **yellow fever** – an infection caused by a virus that infests monkeys, which is transmitted to humans by mosquitoes. It is often a mild short-lived feverish illness, but may become severe, with jaundice, liver failure, and kidney failure, sometimes leading to death. It occurs in Africa and South America.

528 **cholera** – any of several intestinal diseases, especially Asiatic cholera; an infection caused by the bacterium *Vibrio cholerae*, transmitted in contaminated water, and characterized by violent diarrhea and vomiting. It is prevalent in many tropical areas. The formerly high death rate during epidemics has been much reduced by treatments to prevent dehydration and loss of body salts. There is an effective vaccine that must be repeated at frequent intervals for people exposed to continuous risk of infection. The worst epidemic in the Western hemisphere for 70 years occurred in Peru (1991), with 55,000 confirmed cases and 258 deaths. It was believed to have been spread by the consumption of seafood contaminated by untreated sewage.




529 **heroin** or **diamorphine** – powerful endogenous opiate analgesic, an acetyl derivative of morphine. It is more addictive than morphine but causes less nausea and is one of the most abused drugs in the United States. Because of its powerful habit-forming characteristics, its manufacture and import are forbidden in the US, even for medical use.



opium poppy – a bluish or grayish-green annual (*Papaver somniferum*) growing to one meter (3.25 feet), native to Europe and Asia. It has oblong, shallowly-lobed leaves, a clasping stem, 4-petaled flowers, and a capsule pepper-pot shape with a ring of pores around the rim. In the garden form (subspecies *hortense*), the flowers are mauve with a dark center; in the drug-producing form (subspecies *somniferum*), the flowers are white. Opium is obtained by making incisions in the young fruit capsules, which weep latex (a milky liquid in certain plants that coagulates upon exposure to air) containing the drug. The refinement of raw opium yields other drugs, such as morphine.



crack (cocaine) – the free base of cocaine, produced by mixing with baking powder and water. The cocaine hardens to white cinder chunks that can be smoked in a small pipe. The effect is immediate. This form of cocaine is held to be extremely addictive.



530 **alcoholic drinks** – any drink containing ethanol (C_2H_5OH), often used for its intoxicating effects. Ethyl alcohol, a colorless liquid, is the basis of all common intoxicants. Foods rich in sugars, such as grapes, produce this alcohol as a natural product of decay, called fermentation.

Malt liquors are beers, ales, and stouts, in which the starch of the grain is converted to sugar by malting, and the sugar then fermented into alcohol by yeasts. Fermented drinks contain less than 20% alcohol. Liquors are distilled from malt liquors or wines and can contain up to 55% alcohol. Examples are whiskey, rum, and brandy. A concentration of 0.15% alcohol in the blood causes mild intoxication; 0.3% leads to definite drunkenness and partial loss of consciousness; and 0.6% endangers life. Alcohol is more

rapidly absorbed at higher altitudes, as in, for example, the slightly reduced pressure of an aircraft cabin.

tobacco – an annual or shrubby perennial, native to warm parts of the Americas, Asia, and Australia; it has large leaves and tubular flowers that are either greenish, yellow, pink, or reddish. The dried, slightly fermented leaves of various species, principally *Nicotiana tabacum*, are used for smoking, chewing, and snuff, and contain the powerful alkaloid nicotine that is both poisonous and addictive.



531 **Nasdaq** – a US stock exchange founded in 1971 by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD); it grew to be the second-largest exchange in the world by market capitalization, behind only the



New York Stock Exchange. At its inception, NASDAQ was an acronym standing for National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations. NASD divested itself of NASDAQ in a series of sales from 2000–2001. Today, the exchange platform is owned by the NASDAQ OMX Group.

532 Refers to Humanist Manifesto II, which, along with all its signatories, can be found at: http://americanhumanist.org/humanism/humanist_manifesto_ii.

533 **Alexander Pope** (1688–1744) – poet, born in London. In 1700, his family settled at Binfield, Berkshire. He suffered from poor health, and had a curvature of the spine, his diminutive stature providing a target for critics, since he was frequently engaged in literary vendettas. He became well known as a satirical poet, and a master of the heroic couplet, notably in *The Rape of the Lock* (1712–1714). He turned to translation with the *Iliad* (1715–1720), whose success enabled him to set up a home in Twickenham. There he wrote his major poem, *The Dunciad* (1728, continued 1742), the *Epistle to Doctor Arbuthnot* (1734), the philosophical *An Essay on Man* (1733–1734), and a series of satires imitating the *Epistles of Horace* (1733–1738).



Patrick Buchanan's quotation from Alexander Pope may be found in the latter's Epistle II from *An Essay on Man* (source: <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2428/2428-h/2428-h.htm>).

534 Will Durant, *Caesar and Christ* (New York, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944), p. 666.

535 Ibid.

536 Patrick Buchanan, *The Death of the West*. (New York, New York: St. Martins Press, 2002), pp. 25, 46–48.

537 Ibid., pp. 231–32.

538 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, p. 463 (transmitted by ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abbās and recorded by Ibn Mardawayh and al-Ḍiyā’; transmitted by al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī and recorded by Abū al-Shaykh; and also transmitted by Mujāhid and recorded by ‘Abd ibn Ḥamīd, Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī and Ibn Abī Ḥātim).

539 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, p. 463 (transmitted by Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī and recorded by Ibn Abī Ḥātim, Ibn Mardawayh, Ibn ‘Asākir).

Ghadīr Khumm – an area between Madinah and Makkah where the Prophet (ﷺ) is reported to have nominated ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib the *mawlá* (*primus inter pares*, superordinate) of those whom Muhammad (ﷺ) was their *mawlá*. Shi‘īs interpret this statement as an affirmation of ‘Alī’s legitimate position to lead Muslim society after the Prophet (ﷺ), and annually celebrate the occasion on the 18th of Dhū al-Hijjah. Many Sunnīs, however, view this statement as one of many statements the Prophet (ﷺ) expressed to show respect and appreciation for his companions’ worthiness. Furthermore, they see this statement in the context of a public opinion that was uneasy with the way ‘Alī administered the spoils of war from Yemen in the weeks before the statement was made (the graphic also shows the path the Prophet (ﷺ) took in the Hijrah).



540 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, p. 464.

541 Ibid.

542 Ibid., (originally transmitted by many companions, among them 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, 'Ammār ibn Yāsir, Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī, and 'Abdullāh ibn 'Abbās, and recorded in all the major compendiums of the Hadith).

من كنت مولاه فعلي مولاه. اللهم وال من والاه وعاد من عاداه.

543 Transmitted by al-Barā' and Buraydah and recorded by Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal in his *Musnad*, al-Tirmidhī, al-Nisā'ī, and Ibn Mājah; also transmitted by Zayd ibn Arqam and recorded in *al-Mukhtarah* by al-Ḍiyā'. To some, the hadith is *ḥasan*, while to others it is *ṣaḥīḥ*.

544 Versions of this hadith are narrated by many, among them 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Abū Sa'īd al-Khudrī, and Zayd ibn Arqam, and it has been recorded in some of the major books of the Hadith.

إني تركت فيكم الثقلين كتاب الله وعترتي أهل بيتي. فانظروا كيف تخلفوني فيهما. فإنهما لم يفترقا حتى يردا علي الحوض. الله مولاي. وأنا ولي كل مؤمن.

545 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, p. 465.

546 Recorded in all the books of *Siraḥ*, among them,

Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī, *Fiqh al-Siraḥ (The Understanding of the Siraḥ)*. (Damascus, Syria: Dār al-Qalam, 1418AH), p. 456.

Dr. Muḥammad Ḥamīdullāh, *Al-Wathā'iq al-Siyāsiyah fi al-'Ahd al-Nabawī wa-al-Khilāfah al-Rāshidah*, 7th edition. (Beirut, Lebanon: Dār an-Nafā'is, 2001), p. 228.

اللهم هل بلغت... اللهم اشهد.

547 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār*, Volume 6, p. 467 (originally transmitted by 'Abdullāh ibn 'Abbās and recorded by Ibn Mardawayh and al-Ḍiyā').

سئل رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم أي آية من السماء أنزلت أشد عليك؟ فقال "كنت بمنى أيام موسم واجتمع مشركو العرب وافناء الناس في الموسم. فنزل علي جبريل فقال (يا أيها الرسول بلغ ما أنزل إليك من ربك وإن لم تفعل فما بلغت رسالته) الآية. قال فقمت عند العقبة فقلت 'يا أيها الناس من ينصرنني على أن أبلغ رسالات ربي ولكم الجنة؟ أيها الناس وقلوا: لا إله إلا الله. وأنا رسول الله إليكم. تفلحوا وتنجحوا ولكم الجنة.' قال (الرسول) 'فما بقي رجل ولا امرأة ولا أمة ولا صبي إلا يرمون علي بالتراب والحجارة ويقولون: كذاب صابئ! فعرض علي العارض فقال 'يا محمد إن كنت رسول الله فقد أن لك أن تدعو عليهم كما دعا نوح على قومه بالهلاك.' فقال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم 'اللهم اهد قومي فإنهم لا يعلمون. وانصرنني عليهم أن يجيبوني إلى الطاعة.' العباس عمه فأنقذه منهم وطردهم عنه.

548 Ibid., p. 469.

549 This account is found in the books of *tafsīr* and grounded Islamic literature including al-Tirmidhī, Abū al-Shaykh, al-Ḥākim, Abū Nu‘aym, al-Bayhaqī, al-Ṭabarānī; also recorded in the writings of some of the Ṣaḥābah.

550 Transmitted by Jābir ibn ‘Abdillāh and ‘Abdullāh ibn ‘Abbās.

551 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār, Volume 6*, p. 473 (transmitted by Jābir ibn ‘Abdillāh and recorded by al-Tirmidhī, Abū al-Shaykh, al-Ḥākim, Abū Nu‘aym, al-Bayhaqī, and al-Ṭabarānī).

كَانَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ إِذَا خَرَجَ بَعَثَ مَعَهُ أَبُو طَالِبٍ مِنْ يَكَلُوهُ حَتَّى نَزَلَتْ (وَاللَّهُ بِعَصْمِكَ مِنَ النَّاسِ) فَذَهَبَ لِيُبْعَثَ مَعَهُ فَقَالَ " يَا عَمَّ إِنَّ اللَّهَ قَدْ عَصَمَنِي لَا حَاجَةَ لِي إِلَى مَنْ تَبَعْتُ."

552 **Holy Trinity** – in Christianity, the union of three persons — father, son, and holy ghost/spirit — in one godhead. The precise meaning of the doctrine has been the cause of unending dispute, and was the chief cause of the split between the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches.

553 Nigel Scotland, *A Pocket Guide to Sects and New Religions*. (Oxford, UK: Lion Hudson plc, 2005).

554 Ibid.

555 Ibid., pp. 41, 117.

556 **Dispensationalism** – a form of biblical interpretation derived from the teachings of **John Nelson Darby** (1800–1882) of Dublin, Ireland, a leader of the Plymouth Brethren, and popularized by C.I. Scofield (1843–1921) in his Scofield Reference Bible (1902–1909; revised in 1917). This system is based on the belief that God deals with the human race in different ways at different times. Scofield said that there are seven dispensations, or epochs of time, and interpreted a dispensation (from the Greek word *oikonomia*) as “a period of time during which man is tested in respect of obedience to some specific revelation of the will of God.” The Darbyite term *dispensation* is taken from the King James Version translation of *oikonomia*. Darby, Scofield, and other Dispensationalists use this system to interpret the Old and New Testaments.




While various Dispensationalists offer differing details, they generally accept C.I. Scofield’s sevenfold series of dispensations. These are: (1) Inno-

cence (Genesis, 1:28) to the loss of Eden; (2) Conscience or moral responsibility (Genesis, 3:7) up to the Great Flood; (3) Human government (Genesis, 8:15) up to the call of Abraham; (4) Promise, the test of Israel's response to God (Genesis, 12:1) down to the covenant at Sinai; (5) Law, to the death of Christ (Exodus, 19:1); (6) the Church, the dispensation of the Holy Spirit (Acts, 2:1) to Christ's return (Second Coming); and (7) the Millennial Kingdom to eternity (Revelation, 20:4).

Scofield held that while there is but one dispensation or overall plan of God in both the Old and New Testaments — that is, redemption in Christ — nevertheless God progressively deals with humanity through the sevenfold series of dispensations. Specifically, Scofield thought that each of these epochs was a time of testing, in which God sets the human race to a particular test. He said, "No particular portion of scripture is to be intelligently comprehended apart from some concept of its place in the whole world." Many scholars believe that this is an imposition or eisegesis since, according to them, there is no evidence of any dispensational thinking in the scriptures, although the Greek term *oikonomia* (which literally means *economy* or *administration*) does occur in 1 Corinthians, 9:17; Ephesians, 1:20 and 3:2; and Colossians, 1:25.

Dispensationalism is above all a system of biblical interpretation for the religious education of lay people. For the Bible reader, the Sunday school class, and for students in Bible schools who lacked knowledge of the ancient languages and ancient history, some simple, overall plan seemed to be needed so as to interpret the Bible as a whole. This need is both the reason for Darby's and Scofield's system and the cause of its early and continuing popularity. Although there are schools devoted to Dispensationalism among Christian fundamentalists in the US and Britain, most of the system's influence flows from the steady popularity of Scofield's Reference Bible, which was revised again as recently as 1966.

Pentecostalism – a contemporary Christian renewal movement inspired by the descent of the Holy Spirit as experienced by the Apostles at the first Christian Pentecost, the seventh Sunday after Easter (Acts, 2:1–31). It is marked by the reappearance of speaking in tongues, prophecy, and healing. Beginning in Topeka, Kansas (USA) in 1901, the movement became organized in Los Angeles in 1905. Rejected by their own churches, new churches were established, commonly called "Pentecostal," and since then their missionary zeal has reached every part of the world. Pentecostal churches are characterized by a literal interpretation of the Bible, informal worship during which there is enthusiastic singing and spontaneous exclamations of praise



and thanksgiving, and the exercise of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. There are over 22 million Pentecostals worldwide. Since the 1960s, Pentecostalism (usually referred to as “charismatic renewal”) has appeared within the established Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Greek Orthodox Churches.

557 **Pentecost** – Greek for the “Feast of Weeks,” a prominent feast in the calendar of ancient Israel celebrating the giving of the Law to Moses at Sinai. In Christianity, Pentecost is celebrated 50 days after Easter Sunday, inclusively, hence its name. Pentecost falls on the tenth day after Ascension Thursday, which itself is 40 days after Easter. In the Christian liturgical year, Pentecost became a feast commemorating the occasion of the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the Apostles and other followers of Jesus Christ (ﷺ). Pentecost is described by some Christians as the “Birthday of the Church.”

558 This position is argued by Victor Paul Wierwille (1916–1985) in his book *Jesus Christ is Not God* (1975).

559 Transmitted by ‘Abdullāh ibn Mas‘ūd and recorded by Abū Dāwūd, al-Tirmidhī, Ibn Mājah and others.

إِنَّ أَوَّلَ مَا دَخَلَ النَّقْصُ عَلَى بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ أَنَّهُ كَانَ الرَّجُلُ يَلْقَى الرَّجُلَ فَيَقُولُ "يَا هَذَا اتَّقِ اللَّهَ وَتَعَّ مَا تَصْنَعُ فَإِنَّهُ لَا يَجِلُّ لَكَ." ثُمَّ يَلْقَاهُ مِنَ الْعَدُوِّ وَهُوَ عَلَى حَالِهِ فَلَا يَمْتَعُهُ ذَلِكَ أَنْ يَكُونَ أَكْبَلَهُ وَسَّرِيْبَهُ وَقَعِيدَهُ فَلَمَّا فَعَلُوا ذَلِكَ ضَرَبَ اللَّهُ قُلُوبَ بَعْضِهِمْ بِبَعْضٍ ثُمَّ قَالَ (لِإِنِّ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا مِنْ بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ عَلَى لِسَانِ دَاوُدَ وَعِيسَى ابْنِ مَرْيَمَ ذَلِكَ بِمَا عَصَوْا وَكَانُوا يَعْتَدُونَ كَانُوا لَا يَتَنَاهَوْنَ عَنِّ مَنْكَرٍ فَعَلُوهُ لَبِئْسَ مَا كَانُوا يَفْعَلُونَ تَرَى كَثِيرًا مِنْهُمْ يَتَوَلَّوْنَ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا لَبِئْسَ مَا قَدَّمَتْ لَهُمْ أَنفُسِهِمْ إِلَى قَوْلِهِ فَأَسِيقُونَ) ثُمَّ قَالَ "كَلَّا وَاللَّهِ لَتَأْتِمُرَنَّ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَلَتَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَلَتَأْخُذَنَّ عَلَى يَدِ الظَّالِمِ وَلَتَأْطِرْنَ عَلَى الْحَقِّ أَطْرًا وَلَتَقْضِرْنَ عَلَى الْحَقِّ قَضْرًا أَوْ تَبْضِرْنَ اللَّهَ بِقُلُوبِ بَعْضِكُمْ عَلَى بَعْضٍ ثُمَّ آيَلَعْتَكُمْ كَمَا لَعْنَهُمْ."

560 Transmitted by Mujāhid.

561 Transmitted by Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī and recorded by Muslim, Abū Dāwūd, Ibn al-‘Arabī, Ibn Taymiyah, and others.

من رأى منكم منكرا فليغيره بيده. فإن لم يستطع فبلسانه. فإن لم يستطع فبقلبه وذلك أضعف الإيمان.

562 Transmitted by ‘Uday ibn ‘Umayrah and recorded by Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal.

إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَعْذِبُ الْعَامَّةَ بِعَمَلِ الْخَاصَّةِ حَتَّى يَرَوْا الْمُنْكَرَ بَيْنَ ظَهْرَانِهِمْ وَهُمْ قَادِرُونَ عَلَى أَنْ يَنْكَرُوهُ فَلَا يَنْكَرُونَهُ. فَإِذَا فَعَلُوا عَذَبَ اللَّهُ الْعَامَّةَ وَالْخَاصَّةَ.

563 Transmitted by Abū Sa‘īd al-Khudrī and recorded in the Sunans of Abū Dāwūd and al-Tirmidhī.

أَفْضَلُ الْجِهَادِ كَلِمَةٌ حَقٌّ عِنْدَ سُلْطَانٍ جَائِرٍ.

Glossary

‘abā’ah (or ‘abāyah) – *cloak, frock, gown.*

‘abada – *to comply with and conform to Allah (ﷻ).*

‘Abbasids – second major dynasty in Muslim history, which came directly after the Umayyads. ‘Abbasid kings ruled from 132–656AH (750–1258CE) until their capital city of Baghdad was sacked by the Mongols. The dynasty regrouped in the Mamluk capital of Cairo in 659AH (1261CE) and continued to rule over a limited area of the original empire until 923AH (1517CE), when the Ottoman Sultanate gained ascendancy. At its peak, the empire extended from Persia to what is now Algeria in North Africa and northward into Asia Minor and Anatolia. Wrongly described as a *khilāfah*, the dynasty was named after the Prophet’s (ﷺ) uncle, al-‘Abbās ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib.

‘adl – *generic fairness, justice, and impartiality in human relations.*

Ahl al-Kitāb – *Folks of the Book (also People of the Book); this expression refers to people who belong or belonged to any of a*

number of holy books or scriptures that were revealed by Allah (ﷻ) to His Prophets (ﷺ) throughout the course of history. Most notably among them are “Jews” and “Christians” who still have an affinity with or a “working relationship” with the Bible — Old or New Testaments.

ahzāb – *confederates, regional confederation of military forces*; usually refers to the alliance of *mushrik* armies that surrounded Madinah during the Battle of the Trench (al-Khandaq), otherwise known as the Campaign of al-Ahzāb.

ākhirah – *the end-life or afterlife*; this expression refers to the here-after, or afterlife, or life after death. In a more refined sense, this word alludes to the time-period that will follow the Day of Resurrection and Judgment.

‘alim – *learned person, intellectual, expert*; this expression usually refers to scholars, particularly scholars who are well versed on Islamic matters. Plural for ‘alim is ‘ulamā’.

‘amal ṣāliḥ – *an effort of merit*; this is an honorific phrase that usually refers to the actions and conduct of *al-ladhīna āmanū* in the Qur’anic discourse. The implication is that there is a synergy between a secure commitment to Allah (ﷻ) and the exertion of efforts of merit and rectitude.

āmīn – *we consent to, approve of, and are committed to what was said.*

al-amr bi-al-ma‘rūf wa-nahī ‘an al-munkar – *to demand and authorize what is self-evidently right and to deconstruct and decommission what is self-evidently obnoxious.*

Anṣār – *supporters*; in Islamic literature this word has to be understood in context. It could occur in reference to the Almighty — as in the Qur’an, *anṣār allāh* — or it could be in reference to the Prophet (ﷺ) — as in the Sirah, *anṣār rasūl allāh*. The word *anṣārī* is the singular of Anṣār.

‘aqīdah – *a set of key convictions; indoctrination*. In Islamic history, responding to challenges from Christianity and Zoroastrianism, it was a largely unfinished attempt by the Mu‘tazilaḥ and other notable Islamic scholars (working individually, that is, not within the deliberative mechanism of a *shūrā* that such a task demands) to define the core elements of the Islamic theology.

aṣḥāb al-sabt – *people/companions of the Sabbath*; Qur’anic expression referring to certain members of Banū Isrā’īl who were feigning devotional service to God while, in reality, they were surreptitiously engaged in market activities on a day they were forbidden to do so.

‘āsim – *protector*.

aṣlah – *better, best*; in context, this refers to the Mu‘tazilī doctrine that Allah (ﷻ) does what is best for the world He has created.

asmā’ al-ḥusná – *Allah’s (ﷻ) beautiful and excelling names or attributes*.

awliyā’ – *plural of walī*.

Aws – in Yathrib, one of the two main Arabian power factions, perpetually at war with each other, before the arrival of the Prophet (ﷺ), the other one being the Khazraj.

āyah – *illustration, miracle*; this could refer to Allah’s (ﷻ) illustration through revelation, that is, the verse(s) of the generous Qur’an; it can also refer to Allah’s (ﷻ) illustration of power and authority in the course of prophetic and social history (that is, an alteration of physical laws: miracles); and lastly, it could refer to Allah’s (ﷻ) illustration of power as an act of creation. Plural for *āyah* is *āyāt*.

balāgh – *communication, announcement, proclamation*; often used to describe the mode of communication between the Prophets (ﷺ) and their peoples and societies.

ballaghtu – *I communicated or I announced.*

balligh – *Proclaim!* (in the imperative).

Banū Isrā'il – *the Children of Israel.*

bay'aḥ – *pledge of allegiance.*

Bayt al-Maqdis – *literally, the sacred house; in practice, however, it could refer to the entire city of Jerusalem or to the holy sanctuary there, inclusive of al-Masjid al-Aqṣá, the Dome of the Rock, and the Wailing Wall; it is also referred to as al-Ḥaram al-Sharīf or the Temple Mount.*

ḍa'if – *weak, feeble; in hadith literature, this refers to substandard or unacceptable hadiths.*

ḍa'wah – *call; contemporarily used, though not necessarily right, to mean missionary activity designed to convince non-Muslims of Allah's (ﷻ) message.*

Dhū al-Ḥijjah – *the twelfth month of the Islamic hijrī calendar; it is also one of the four months in which al-ladhīna āmanū are not to initiate any fighting or hostilities.*

dīn – *ideological pattern and social prototype; this word is probably one of the most mistranslated words. The usual translation of the word is religion. But in a better understanding of Islamic terms the word dīn should carry within its meaning a lively prototype and a social system. As such a dīn could be man-made and in denial of Allah (ﷻ) or it may be in conformity with Allah (ﷻ) and in affirmation of Him.*

dīnār – *a gold coin used as currency at the time of the Prophet (ﷺ) and for many hundreds of years thereafter in the Islamic domain; a modern*

equivalent of an original Makkan *dīnār* would be approximately 4.25 grams of gold.

diyyaḥ – blood money, indemnity, financial compensation for the bereaved relatives of a person who was killed or murdered.

du‘ā’ – prayer or a reverent petition to Allah (ﷻ).

dunyā – world.

fāsiq – degenerate, decomposed; this term usually is used in reference to human beings who initially commit themselves to Allah (ﷻ) and His Prophet (ﷺ) but then later during the details of social struggle show an elemental or visceral tendency to quit from the tasks and demands of such a struggle as it peaks. This failure of theirs is a failure of nerve and resolve at an *instinctual* level. The plural is *fāsiqūn*. The word *fusūq* is the noun, meaning *decomposition* or *decay*.

fath – literally, a breakthrough; liberation from oppression and injustice. Many Muslims, subjected as they are to the dominance of the orientalist lexicon and the history of seizure and subjugation behind it, confuse the word to mean *conquest* or *conquer*.

fi sabīlillāh – on a course to Allah (ﷻ); for the cause of Allah (ﷻ).

fiqh – practical knowledge, legal knowledge, jurisprudence; the moral and legal understanding and interpretation of Islamic norms and laws within a particular generation or set of circumstances.

Grotto of Ḥirā’ – a secluded cave on a small mountain outside of Makkah, where the Prophet (ﷺ) used to meditate before receiving the first revelation of the Qur’an there.

ghulāḥ – people who are prone to exaggeration, fanaticism, extremism, and zealotry.

hadith – a verbal or practical precedent of the Prophet (ﷺ); the simple linguistic meaning of the word is *speech*.

al-Hadith – the full body of hadith literature of the Prophet (ﷺ).

ḥājj – a *pilgrim*; those Muslims who have gone to Makkah and performed the mandatory Hajj assignment. It is an honorific title in some cultures. The plural is *ḥujjāj*.

Hajj – *the Pilgrimage*; this is the annual meeting of the Muslims in Makkah during the last three months of the lunar year: Shawwāl, Dhū al-Qa‘daḥ, and Dhū al-Ḥijjah. The mass assembly of people during this annual congregation is Yawm ‘Arafah, which is the 9th day of Dhū al-Ḥijjah — the day before ‘Īd al-Aḍḥá.

Ḥajjah al-Wadā‘ – *the last and only Hajj pilgrimage the Prophet (ﷺ) participated in (10AH)*.

ḥalaqaḥ – *scholarly study circle*.

Ḥanbalī – one of the four institutional Sunni Islamic schools of law (*madhhabs*), based on the teachings and rulings of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (164–241AH). Known for its uncritical acceptance of a wide range of hadith literature, it thrives for the most part in the Arabian Peninsula.

ḥaqīqaḥ – *factuality*.

ḥaqq – *truth, veracity, validity; right (as in civil, human, natural, and inalienable rights)*.

ḥarām – *taboo, unauthorized or unlawful*; this word is the opposite of *ḥalāl*.

Ḥaramayn – *the two holy sanctuaries, referring to al-Masjid al-Ḥarām in Makkah and al-Masjid al-Nabawī in Madinah*.

ḥasan – good, agreeable; in the categorization of hadiths, this refers to those that are acceptable.

hawzaḥ – a (Shī‘ī) religious seminary.

ḥijāb – cover, wrap, drape; screen, partition. In general usage, it refers to the dress code according to Islamic standards.

al-Ḥijāz – historical province of the Arabian Peninsula on the western shore of the Red Sea, the territory in which the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah are located.

ḥijrah – the resolute act of forsaking a domain of oppression for a social order in which justice and fairness prevail as a byproduct of its people yielding to Allah’s (ﷻ) command and counsel.

Hijrah, the – the forced departure of Muhammad (ﷺ) from Makkah to Madinah; in a sense it was the Prophet (ﷺ) securing asylum from the Makkan mushriks and also his assumption of the role of leader, statesman, and ultimate decision maker, or imam, of the newly established Islamic State in Madinah.

ḥijrī – referring to the Hijrah, or more generally to the Islamic calendar and the dates organized according to its lunar pattern of timekeeping.

ḥizbullāh – the party or group (throughout history) that strives and struggles for Allah’s (ﷻ) cause.

ḥudá – guidance; in the Qur’anic paradigm it is the specific guidance that emerges from the Scripture and the Prophet (ﷺ).

ḥujjaḥ al-islām – authority on Islam. On the Sunnī side, this is an honorific title used almost exclusively for al-Ghazzālī; on the Shī‘ī side, however, it is a scholarly rank just below *āyatullāh*.

Ḥurūb al-Riddah – *Wars of Regression*; not to be confused with the typical orientalist translation, “Wars of Apostasy.”

‘ibādāt – *acts of compliance*; many times reduced or confused with the word *rituals*.

Ibādī – what survives of the Khārijī direction of thought; it is named after ‘Abdullāh ibn Ibād al-Tamīmī (died 89AH), a *tābi‘ī*, but more generally based on the teachings and rulings of Jābir ibn Zayd al-Zahrānī al-Azdī, also a *tābi‘ī*. Like the Khawārij, the Ibādīs oppose the rule of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, the third successor to the Prophet (ﷺ); however, they do not adopt the reductionist Khārijī position on *takfir*. The Ibādīs are to be found in Oman, and North and East Africa.

Iblīs – *Lucifer*; this word is generally used as a name of Satan before he broke with God and became the evil being that would bedevil Adam, Eve (ﷺ), and their descendants.

‘Īd al-Aḍḥá – the high, holy Day(s) of Sacrifice.

iktisāb – (*abnormal*) *acquisition*; in context, it refers to the Mu‘tazilī doctrine of a creature taking responsibility for, or “acquiring,” an act created by Allah (ﷻ). Note that *iktisāb* refers to abnormal acquisition whereas *kasb* refers to normal acquisition.

imam – *leader*; the word has both positive and negative usages in the Qur’anic text.

imāmah – *the position of leadership, ultimate decision making, and executive power; the Islamic leadership of the Islamic State*. It is often used interchangeably, though not precisely, with *khilāfah* and *imārah*.

imān – *secure commitment, covenant*; the word is virtually a distillation of *amānah* (trust) and *amn* (security).

imārah – executive bureau or the office of command.

inshā'allāh – if Allah (ﷻ) wills, decrees, or wants.

iqāmat al-ṣalāh – standardizing (and socializing) the ṣalāh. Refer also to ṣalāh below.

irtidād – treason; renunciation.

Islam – resignation/yielding; this is a relationship with Allah (ﷻ) more than it is a religion. And it defines individuals and people who acquiesce and adhere to the will of Allah (ﷻ). Like other Qur'anic words, its specific meaning is refined within the context it is in. Generally speaking, it may be understood to refer to the “civic character” or “civilian status” of people once there is a full and meaningful *taqwā*-type orderliness with associated rules.

itā' al-zakāh – systematic and social allocation of zakāh. Refer also to zakāh below.

i'tazala – to remove oneself from, to bow out; in context it refers to the origin of the designation, Mu'tazilah.

'itrah – the Prophet's (ﷺ) posterity.

jāhili – pertaining to jāhiliyah (ignocracy); ignocratic.

jāhiliyah – an era of governance without God, the age of systemic lack of scriptural guidance; it may be characterized as an “ignocracy” or “idiocracy.” It not only refers to the time preceding Muhammad (ﷺ), but also any time period in which Allah's (ﷻ) *dīn* is overrun by other systems and establishments.

jamā'ah – aggregation/congregation; in a more exacting sense, it is the quorum of Muslims needed for a particular task or obligation.

jihad – *the ultimate effort and sacrifice; it is not holy war.* The word has a spectrum of meanings and applications that range from a struggle against the forces of evil within the self to a struggle against the forces of evil within the cosmos.

jihādī – *of or pertaining to jihad.*

jilbāb – *long, flowing outer garment.*

Jumadā al-Ākhirah – *the sixth month of the Islamic hijrī calendar.*

Ka‘bah – *a cubic structure, an object of veneration; the black enshrouded cube at the center of al-Masjid al-Ḥarām, originally built by Ibrāhīm and Ismā‘īl (ﷺ) and around which Muslim pilgrims perform their ṭawāf (circumambulation).*

kāfir – *one who actively resists and refuses to comply with Allah (ﷻ); every person who enlists in kufr becomes a kāfir. Plurals are kāfirūn, kāfirīn, and kuffār; refer to the general definition of kufr below.*

kalām – *theology.*

kasb – *(normal) acquisition; in context, it refers to the Mu‘tazilī doctrine of a creature taking responsibility for, or “acquiring,” an act created by Allah (ﷻ). Note that kasb refers to normal acquisition whereas iktisāb refers to abnormal acquisition.*

khalīfah – *successor; this word has its Qur’anic context. In this context man/humans are designated as Allah’s (ﷻ) successors on earth. In post-prophetic Islamic literature it refers to those who succeeded the Prophet (ﷺ) as the leader of the Muslims.*

khanāzīr – *pigs, hogs, swine; when the word is used for human beings, it may refer metaphorically to them acquiring the characteristics of pigs, such as filthiness and gluttony. The singular is khinzīr.*

Khazraj – the other of the two main Arabian power factions in Yathrib, at war with the Aws, before the arrival of the Prophet (ﷺ).

khilāfah – *successorship; Caliphate.*

al-Khilāfah al-Rāshidah – *Rightly-Guided Caliphate*; this is typically identified by Sunnī historians as the short period of legitimate representative Islamic rule following the death of the Prophet (ﷺ) and preceding the first age of repressive, autocratic, and hereditary kings, started by the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, Mu‘āwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān. Lasting 30 years, it comprised the administrations, in order, of Abū Bakr (10–12AH), ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (12–22AH), ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān (22–34AH), ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (34–39AH), and al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī, the Prophet’s (ﷺ) grandson (40AH) who ruled for six months.

kitābī – *a follower of scripture.*

kufr – *denial of Allah’s (ﷻ) authority and power*; this becomes a “philosophy” or an “ideology.” There is a mental construct of ideas that argue against Allah (ﷻ) as Sovereign, Lawgiver, and Authority. There may be many expressions of this antithetical hypothesis and political orientation; but one thing in common among all of them — bar none — is their exclusion of Allah (ﷻ) as the Almighty and the ultimate Authority.

al-ladhīna āmanū – *those who are securely committed to Allah (ﷻ); the first among equals in an Islamic society.*

al-ladhīna kafarū – *those who deny Allah’s (ﷻ) authority and power; the first among equals in a jāhili society.* The term usually refers to the leaders and their enablers who run the homogenizing institutions of *kufr* in society. See also *kāfir* above.

maḥārim – *immediate family blood-relatives with whom marriage is proscribed; singular of maḥārim is maḥram.*

al-manẓilah bayna al-manẓilatayn – in context, it refers to the Mu'tazilī doctrine of a position midway between *īmān* and *kufr*.

marḥūmūn – those who receive Allah's (ﷻ) mercy; plural of *marḥūm*.

ma'rūf – that which is self-evidently right and proper.

masjid – the place or area of *sujūd* (prostration); a mosque.

al-Masjid al-Nabawī – The Prophet's (ﷺ) Masjid; located in Madinah, it is the second of the three holy sanctuaries.

Māturīdī – Islamic theological school based on the systematic theology of Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī (238–333AH), which is very similar to Ash'arī theology. One of the differences between the two theologies is that whereas the Māturīdīs say *taqwā*, not *īmān*, increases or decreases with actions the Ash'arīs maintain that *īmān* is what does in fact increase or decrease with actions.

mā'ūn – financial assistance.

mawaddah – affection.

mawlá – master, patron, client; plural is *mawāli*.

mihnah – ordeal, tribulation; affliction.

miswāk – a twig from the *Salvadora persica* tree, usually employed to clean and disinfect the teeth. *Siwāk* and *miswāk* refer to the same object.

mufassir – exegetist; one who explains the meanings of the Qur'an.

mufti – one who dispenses an Islamic legal opinion (*fatwa*).

muḥaddith – a scholar and/or compiler of hadiths of the Prophet (ﷺ); plural is *muḥaddithūn*.

Muhājirūn – *people forced out of their homelands*; in particular, these are people who are forced out because of their scriptural convictions, strenuous efforts, and energetic attempts at socializing scripture. Generally in Islamic literature, this term refers to the Prophet's (ﷺ) companions who made the Hijrah from Makkah to Madinah. The word *muhājir* is singular for Muhājirūn.

muḥṣanāt – *women fortified by their morality from illicit sexual behavior*; singular is *muḥṣanaḥ*.

mujāhid – *an individual active in jihad*; see *jihad* above. Its plural is *mujāhidūn* or *mujāhidīn*.

mulk ‘aḏūd – *autocratic monarchy*.

mulk jabrī – *despotic monarchy*.

mu’min – *every person who is firmly and securely committed to Allah (ﷻ)*; a bearer of *īmān*. See *īmān* above.

munāfiq – *a dual loyalist*; those “Muslims” who are outwardly performing their part in a ritual Islam, but when it comes time to honor this Islam in its struggle and sacrifices, they show inclination toward the anti-Islamic camps, states or powers around. They feign Islam, while in reality they owe their allegiance to the representatives of *kufr*. See *nifāq* below.

munkar – *that which is self-evidently objectionable and offensive*.

mushrik – *an individual(s) and people(s) who actively and institutionally diminish the authority of Allah (ﷻ) and promote the authority of others*. They equate worldly powers with Allah (ﷻ) and they denigrate Allah (ﷻ) as “one among many” deities and authorities. The feminine singular is *mushrikaḥ*; feminine plural is *mushrikāt*.

muslimah – a woman who has acquiesced to the command and counsel of Allah (ﷻ), and the leadership of the final prophet, Muhammad (ﷺ); plural is *muslimāt*.

muttaqī – one who is actively conscious of Allah's (ﷻ) power presence and hence is always on the alert and on the defensive pertaining to Allah (ﷻ); this word should never be translated as *pious* or *fearful*, as it is known nowadays.

nafs – the bio-self.

nahy – to forbiddance, prohibition, interdiction.

Naṣārā – theological Christians or political Christians (defined by context).

Naṣrānī – a theological or ideological Christian (defined by context).

nastaghfir-allāh – we ask Allah (ﷻ) for forgiveness.

nifāq – disloyalty, hypocrisy, feigning allegiance.

nūr – light, luminance.

qāḍi – judge, magistrate.

qiblah – the accommodating and unifying center that attracts the Muslims in their time of ṣalāh and devotional services. The Muslims' qiblah is Makkah.

qiradah – apes, monkeys; when the word is used for human beings, it may refer metaphorically to them acquiring the characteristics of monkeys, such as imitation and mockery. The singular is *qird*.

qitāl – fighting, warring, combat.

qiyām – *rising, standing*; the portion of a Muslim's *ṣalāh* that is performed while he is standing.

al-Quds – *the Consecrated City*; this, obviously, is the name of Jerusalem in the Arabic language.

Quraysh – refer to **Endnote 257** in Volume 7 for a brief history of the dominant power constituent of Makkah.

Qurayshī – *having to do with the Quraysh*.

raḥmah – *mercy, grace*.

Ramaḍān – *the ninth month of the Islamic hijrī calendar*; the month of fasting for committed Muslims, and the auspicious month in which the Qur'anic revelation to Muhammad (ﷺ) began.

Rasūl-Allah (ﷺ) – *the Messenger of Allah* (ﷺ); also called Allah's Apostle (ﷺ), Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) or simply the Prophet (ﷺ). When this is used in Islamic literature, the majority of times it is in reference to the final messenger, Muhammad (ﷺ).

ribā – *usury*; a particular type of nefarious and vicious financial transaction that generates money from lending money.

ṣabr – *patient perseverance in adversity*.

al-Sabt – *the Sabbath*; in the Islamic week, this is the day after Yaum al-Jumu'ah (corresponds to Saturday).

Ṣaḥābah – *the companions of the Prophet* (ﷺ).

ṣaḥīḥ – *sound, authentic, credible*; in hadith literature, this refers to (unquestionably) valid hadiths.

al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ – the sincere predecessors, ancestors, forebears; according to one definition, these are the early predecessors after the Prophet (ﷺ) comprising the generation of the Companions (the Ṣaḥābah) and the first two generations of the Tābi‘ūn. Another definition suggests that they comprise all the Muslim generations up to and including al-Ghazzālī.

salafī – a person who attributes himself to the first generations of Islam; today, this word is used to describe a certain segment of Muslims who are, in general, fast and loose with accusing other Muslims of *kufr*. Some would say the *salafīs* are the “next generation” of Wahhābīs.

ṣalāḥ – expressing a concentrated and devotional relationship with Allah (ﷻ); Muslims do this five times a day: *Fajr*, *Zuḥr*, *‘Aṣr*, *Maghrib*, and *‘Ishā’*.

ṣalāḥ – good, proper; in context, this refers to the Mu‘tazilī doctrine that Allah (ﷻ) does what is best for the world He has created.

ṣāliḥūn – those who sincerely do good works for the cause of Allah (ﷻ), expecting no earthly gratification or reward; plural of *ṣāliḥ*.

ṣawm – abstaining from appetite tendencies (such as food, conversation, etc.); fasting. Plural: *ṣiyām*.

Shafī‘ī – one of the four institutional Sunnī Islamic schools of thought (*madhhabs*), based on the teachings and rulings of Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāf‘ī (150–204AH). Shāfī‘ī scholars are considerably more circumspect about hadith literature than their Ḥanbalī counterparts. The *madhhab* is prevalent in the Arab Muslim East, and in Indonesia and Malaysia.

shahīd – martyr; plural: *shuhadā’*.

sharī‘ah – legal course; more technically, the codes, procedures, and laws that take society in the direction of prosperity and survival. The

word originally meant — before the Qur'an was revealed — to take a path to a body of fresh water; now it generally refers to the body of Islamic law.

Shari'ah, the – *the Islamic legal system.*

Shawwāl – *the tenth month of the Islamic hijrī calendar; the month in which the Battle of Uḥud took place.*

shaykh – *venerable gentleman, chieftain, elder; an honorific title accorded to an Islamic scholar.*

Shī'ī – *literally, a follower; the intimate group around the Prophet (ﷺ) inclusive of his family and his bloodline descendants. This was a term coined by Mu'āwiyah to single out and sideline the supporters of Imam 'Alī as a cult of personality that had separated and deviated from the rest of the Ummah.*

shirk – *the act and implementation of equating or associating others with Allah (ﷻ) as divine and as authority; in other words the displacement of allegiance in man's heart and the dislocation of authority in man's life. See also mushrik above.*

shūrā – *a consultative assembly convened for the purpose of participatory decision-making.*

shu'ūbiyah – *tribalism, nationalism, "other-ism."*

ṣiddiqūn – *those who remain true to their commitment to Allah (ﷻ) despite obvious challenges to the contrary; plural of ṣiddiq.*

Sīrah – *biography of the Prophet (ﷺ); this is an account of his lifetime, particularly its struggle aspect, during his years in Makkah and Madinah.*

al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm – *the straight span*; this is in reference to man’s meaningful and directional journey to Allah (ﷻ) during his lifelong efforts and movements. It is a phrase used in every *ṣalāḥ* to focus a Muslim’s attention on the fact that he/she is pursuing a path that “leads to God.”

ṣiyām – *plural of ṣawm*.

Sufi – *mystic*.

sunan – *social laws*. This is the word’s Qur’anic meaning in so far as such laws are the pattern of history, human activities, and nature. *Sunan* also refers to a compilation of hadith collected and organized by a *muḥaddith*, one who searches hadith literature with a view to organizing and verifying hadiths of the Prophet (ﷺ). It is the plural of *sunnah*.

Sunnah, the – *the lifestyle pattern of the Prophet (ﷺ)*; or the final set of social laws imparted by Allah (ﷻ) to humanity through the agency of Muhammad (ﷺ).

Sunnī – *literally, one who adheres to the Sunnah*; the core group around the Prophet (ﷺ) inclusive of his companions and their non-errant descendants. This is an abbreviated form of a term invented by Mu‘āwiyah — *ahl al-sunnah wa-al-jamā‘ah* — to give legitimacy to his usurpation and takeover by force of the highest office in the Islamic State.

sūrah – *ensemble of a body of themes in the Qur’an*; there are 114 *sūrah*s in the glorious Qur’an.

tabligh – *communication*; most of the time, this word is specifically used to describe the mode of communication between the Prophets (ﷺ) and their peoples and societies. The Prophets (ﷺ) communicated scripture to the masses of people around them.

tafsīr – *exegesis*; simple interpretation or critical interpretation of the meanings of the Qur'an.

tāghūt – *concentration and abuse of excessive power*; this word is usually used to describe governments and regimes that, having accumulated wealth and resources, find themselves in a “superpower” or “hyper-power” position in the world. The exercise of this kind of centralized power makes these governments rivals (in their own consciousness) to the power and authority of Allah (ﷻ). This aggregation and engrossment of power becomes satanic.

takfīr – *the declaration that someone is a kāfir*; usually refers today to the methodology employed by Muslims with a post-modern *salafi* (Anglo-Wahhābī) orientation who easily and uncritically declare other Muslims, usually the oppressed ones, to be *kāfirs*.

takfīrī – *having to do with takfīr, or one who does this.*

tanzīl – *expressed or denotative meaning*; refers to the specific revelation received by the Prophets (ﷺ), but not the inferred meaning of some of the *āyāt*.

taqīyah – *dissimulation.*

taqwá – *the feeling and thinking of Allah's (ﷻ) immediate power presence in the affairs of man that makes a person avoid Allah's (ﷻ) corrective interference in man's individual and social life.*

taskhīr – *utilization/employment*; the word is used basically to inform people that Allah (ﷻ) has made everything in existence of service to, and under the supervision of a divinely enlightened man.

tawalli – *adopting an alliance.*

tawhīd – *monotheism, singular divine authority*; this combines in its connotational and denotational meanings all the consolidated and

indivisible traits and understandings of Allah (ﷻ). In *His* self *He* is one; in *His* attributes *He* is one; therefore, in any way the human mind tries to understand *Him*, *He* remains exalted — as *He* distinguishes *Himself* in *His* own words.

thawb – garment, dress.

ṭughyān – tyranny, oppression.

tuṣībunā dā'irah – lest we suffer a setback.

'ulamā' – learned persons, intellectuals, experts; plural of 'alim.

Umayyads – first dynasty in Muslim history, which usurped power after 30 years of al-Khilāfah al-Rāshidah. Inaugurated by Mu'āwiyah ibn Abī Sufyān who initiated the pattern of hereditary rule over the Muslim Ummah, the dynasty's despots ruled from 41–132AH (661–750CE) until they were overthrown by resistance movements consisting of the Khawārij and Imam 'Alī's descendents. Unfortunately, the progenitors of what would become the 'Abbasid dynasty were waiting in the wings to fill the political vacuum created by the fall of the Umayyads. The 'Abbasids moved the capital from Damascus to al-Kūfah and then to Baghdad.

ummah – the consolidation of a collective will.

Ummah, the Islamic – (uppercase reference is always to) the Islamic ummah of Muhammad (ﷺ).

al-wa'd wa-al-wa'id – literally, the promise and the threat; reward and punishment.

walā' – fidelity, fealty, allegiance; devotion, loyalty.

walāyah – the meaning of the word depends on the context. The Qur'anic usage of the word means *obeisance, reverence, and deference*

to Allah (ﷻ). Historically, however, the word is interpreted to mean devotion to Imam ‘Alī’s family and hatred by some of their adversaries (this definition specifically pertains to the context of the ‘Alawīs).

walāyatihim – *their alliance.*

walī – *helper, ally, supporter, benefactor, sponsor; guardian, patron; plural is awliyā’.*

yā ayyuhā al-nabī – *O Prophet!*

yā ayyuhā al-rasūl – *O Messenger/Apostle!*

yanhāhum – *to forbid, interdict them.*

yaqīn – *certitude.*

yatawalla – *they ally themselves with...; refer above to the definition of walāyah.*

yatawallahum – *whoever allies himself with those (others).*

Yathrib – the (pre-Islamic) name of the city of Madinah before the Prophet (ﷻ) arrived there.

Yawm ‘Arafah – *the day in which the Hajj pilgrims stand on the plateau of ‘Arafāt and make du‘ā’.* It is the most important ritual of Hajj, and a pilgrim’s Hajj is not complete without him observing this day.

Zāhiri – Islamic school of law (*madhhab*) based on the teachings/rulings of its founder, Dāwūd ibn ‘Alī ibn Khalaf al-Zāhirī (199–270AH). It is characterized by its reliance on literalist (*ẓāhir*) interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunnah, and by its rejection of *qiyās* as a source of Islamic legislation. One of its more influential proponents was

Ibn Ḥazm. Though it is still recognized by contemporary Islamic scholars, the *madhhab* is largely considered to be non-existent.

zakāh – *freely paying money as an act of financial maturity*; usually the word is translated as *almsgiving* or *charity*, which not at all renders correctly its original meaning. Many times in the divine Writ the word *zakāh* is preceded by *aqāma, itā, yuqīmūna...*, which means that this giving of money has to be institutionalized or regulated.

zālim – *one who does zulm; a tyrant, oppressor.*

zawiyah – *literally, a corner*; in Islamic religious literature, it is a *retreat*. The plural is *zawāyā*.

Zaydī – *one of the two mainstream Shī'ī Islamic schools of law (madhhabs), founded on the rulings of Imam Zayd ibn 'Alī (76–122AH), great-grandson of Imam 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. Zaydī theology is close to the Mu'tazilah, and most of its adherents today reside in Yemen.*

zinā – *adultery, fornication.*

zulm – *injustice/oppression*; this is the practical result, in human societies, of deleting Allah (ﷻ) as the only Authority and only Power in life. Many times in the divine Writ Allah (ﷻ) refers to *shirk* as being a massive expression of *zulm*. For those who are confused about who the *mushriks* are, they only need to look at parts of the world where there is colossal injustice and identify the operators of that injustice.

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